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ABSTRACT
T h i s  t h e s i s  examines t he  l e g a l  p r ob l ems  a f f e c t i n g  t h e  
m a r k e t i n g  o f  Zambian c o p p e r .  In t h i s  r e s p e c t ,  t h e  t h e s i s  
seeks t o  d i s c o v e r  t he  r e a l  causes o f  c opper  p r i c e  i n s t a b i l i t y  
and t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l e g a l  p r i n c i p l e s  and 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  measures employed i n  an a t t e m p t  t o  reduce 
such i n s t a b i l i t i e s .  A s t u d y  o f  t h i s  n a t u r e ,  demands a 
c a r e f u l  s c r u t i n y  o f  t h e  v a r i o u s  l e g a l  and i n s t i t u t i o n a l  
mechanisms g o v e r n i n g  t h e  m a r k e t i n g  o f  copper  and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
measures d e s i g n e d  t o  r e g u l a t e  such a r r a n g e m e n t s .
To t h i s  e f f e c t ,  c h a p t e r  one o f  t he  t h e s i s  p r o v i d e s  an 
i n t r o d u c t i o n  wh i ch  seeks t o  s e t  ou t  i n  g e n e r a l  t e r m s ,  t he  
n a t u r e  o f  t h e  p r ob l ems  f a c e d  i n  t h e  m a r k e t i n g  o f  c o p p e r .
These p rob l ems  are then  examined i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e i r  e f f e c t  
on t h e  Zambian economy i n  g e n e r a l .
C h ap te r  t w o ,  examines t he  backgr ound  and d eve l opmen t  
o f  t h e  Zambian m i n i n g  i n d u s t r y  w i t h  a v i ew t o  h i g h l i g h t i n g  
t h e  g e n e s i s  o f  t h e  co ppe r  m a r k e t i n g  sys tem employed by 
Zambia.  D i s c u s s e d  i n  t h i s  c h a p t e r  are i s s u e s  r e l a t i n g  t o  
m i n e r a l  r i g h t s ,  m i n e r a l  t a x a t i o n ,  and measures aimed at  t h e  
c o n t r o l  o f  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  p r o c e s s .
In  c h a p t e r  t h r e e  an a t t e m p t  i s  made t o  examine t he  
r u l e s  and i n s t i t u t i o n a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n  o f  t h e  most  i m p o r t a n t  
co ppe r  m a r k e t i n g  and p r i c e  s e t t i n g  i n s t i t u t i o n  - t h e  London 
Meta l  Exchange.
C ha p t e r  f o u r ,  examines one o f  t h e  i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l  
m a c h i n e r y  employed t o  t a c k l e  t he  p rob l ems  o f  commodi t y  p r i c e
i i i
i n s t a b i l i t y  and t h e  p o s s i b l e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  i t s  p r i n c i p l e s  
t o  c o p p e r .
C ha p te r  f i v e ,  e v a l u a t e s  t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  Common 
Fund wh i ch  i s  d e s ig n e d  t o  s u p p o r t  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  commodi ty  
agreement  mechanism.  Of p r ime  concer n  i n  t h e  a n a l y s i s  i s  t o  
d i s c o v e r  how f a r  i t s  p r i n c i p l e s  may go i n  s u p p o r t i n g  a 
p o s s i b l e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  co ppe r  agreement .
Cha p t e r  s i x  i s  d e vo t ed  t o  a d i s c u s s i o n  o f  one o f  t h e  
e x i s t i n g  i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l  mechanism f o r  t h e  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  
o f  copper  p r i c e s .  The d i s c u s s i o n  c e n t r e s  on t h e  r o l e  and 
e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  t h e  I n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l  C o u n c i l  f o r  Copper 
E x p o r t i n g  C o u n t r i e s  (CIPEC) .
The second e x i s t i n g  i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l  approach  t o  p r i c e  
s t a b i l i z a t i o n  i s  d i s c u s s e d  i n  c h a p t e r s  seven and e i g h t .
T h i s  approach  i n v o l v e s  some f o r m o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f i n a n c i a l  
s u p p o r t  m a c h i n e r y  wh i ch  may a l l o w  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  
p roduce co ppe r  t o  m a i n t a i n  t h e i r  e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s  even when 
demand or  p r i c e s  d e c l i n e .  There are two such schemes 
o p e r a t i n g  a t  t h e  moment and c h a p t e r  seven i s  d e vo te d  t o  one 
scheme wh i ch  i s  o p e r a t e d  by t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Mo ne t a ry  Fund.  
Chap te r  e i g h t  examines t h e  second scheme o p e r a t i n g  under  a 
t r e a t y  o f  c o - o p e r a t i o n  between t h e  EEC c o u n t r i e s  on t he  one 
hand and ACP c o u n t r i e s  on t h e  o t h e r .
C hap te r  n i n e  s u gg es t s  an a l t e r n a t i v e  approach t o  t he  
p rob l em o f  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  o f  copper  p r i c e s .  T h i s  approach 
i n v o l v e s  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  a Sou th er n  A f r i c a n  m i n e r a l  m a r k e t ­
i ng  c o r p o r a t i o n  t h a t  c o u l d  a c t  as a s o l e  m i n e r a l  m a r k e t i n g  
agency f o r  c o u n t r i e s  i n  t h e  sub r e g i o n  a s s o c i a t e d  under
iv
Sou th er n  A f r i c a n  Development  C o - o r d i n a t i n g  C o n f e r e nc e  (SADCC). 
The f i n a l  c h a p t e r  p r o v i d e s  a summary o f  c o n c l u s i o n s .
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1CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION
I . So v e r e i g n  E q u a l i t y  and Economic R e l a t i o n s  
between S t a t e s
C l a s s i c a l  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law has s i n c e  t he  e a r l y  days
been c oncerned  w i t h  th o se  r u l e s  and i n s t i t u t i o n s  t h a t  sought
t o  promote t h e  common i n t e r e s t  o f  a l l  s t a t e s .  In t h i s
r e s p e c t ,  P r o f e s s o r  H ig g i n s  p o i n t e d  ou t  some y e a r s  ago t h a t
t h e  c o n t i n u i n g  f u n c t i o n  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law i s  t o  seek
“ t o  e s t a b l i s h  what  i s  t h e  common i n t e r e s t  and t o  base i t s e l f  
1
upon i t . "
The p r e o c c u p a t i o n  o f  t he  f a m i l y  o f  n a t i o n s  i n  the
e a r l y  p a r t  o f  t h i s  c e n t u r y  has been peace and j u s t i c e .
The aims o f  t he  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  t h e r e f o r e ,  r e f l e c t  t he  d e s i r e
o f  w a r -w e ar y  n a t i o n s  t o  a vo id  f u t u r e  m i l i t a r y  c o n f r o n t a t i o n s
t he  main aim o f  t h e  UN i s  t o  m a i n t a i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  peace 
9
and s e c u r i t y .  The ma jo r  p o r t i o n  o f  t he  c h a r t e r  t h e r e f o r e ,  
d e a l s  w i t h  t h e  i n s t r u m e n t s  and methods f o r  i m p l e m e n t i n g  
t h i s  o b j e c t i v e .  For  example ,  Chap te r  VI i s  dev ot ed  t o  
methods o f  p e a c e f u l  s e t t l e m e n t  o f  d i s p u t e s ,  and Chapte r  V I I  
o u t l i n e s  measures t o  be t ake n  i n  t he  more s e r i o u s  s i t u a t i o n s  
i n v o l v i n g  t h r e a t s  t o  t h e  peace,  b reaches o f  t h e  peace,  and 
a c t s  o f  a g g r e s s i o n .
1. R. H i g g i n s ,  C o n f l i c t  o f  i n t e r e s t s  ( 1 965 ) ,  p . 7.
2. See preamble  t o  t he  UN C h a r t e r .
2T h i s  d e s i r e  f o r  peace has he lped  p e r p e t u a t e  and r e i n ­
f o r c e  a w e l l  e s t a b l i s h e d  p r i n c i p l e  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law - 
t h a t  o f  s o v e r e i g n  e q u a l i t y  o f  s t a t e s .  T h i s  p r i n c i p l e  c a l l s  
f o r  e q u a l i t y  o f  t r e a t m e n t  o f  a l l  s t a t e s  r e g a r d l e s s  o f  t h e i r  
a c t u a l  s t r e n g t h  and n o n - d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  as between i n d i v i d u a l  
s t a t e s  o r  groups o f  s t a t e s .  C omp l i me nt i ng  t h i s  p r i n c i p l e ,  
i s  t he  p r i n c i p l e  o f  u n i v e r s a l i t y  - r e q u i r i n g  a l l  r u l e s  o f  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law t o  be r e c i p r o c a l l y  a p p l i c a b l e  t o  a l l  
s t a t e s . ^
S i nce  t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  C h a r t e r  came i n t o  be i ng  i n  
1945, m a t t e r s  o f  economic r e l a t i o n s  between s t a t e s  have 
assumed s i g n i f i c a n t  i m p o r t a n c e  as i s  e v i d e n t  f r om  t he  numer­
ous U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  r e s o l u t i o n s  on t h e  s u b j e c t .  The economic 
concerns,  and o b j e c t i v e s  e xp r ess ed  i n  t he s e  r e s o l u t i o n s  have 
made t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  s o v e r e i g n  e q u a l i t y  
a p p l i c a b l e  t o  economic r e l a t i o n s  between s t a t e s .
The a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  s o v e r e i g n  e q u a l i t y  
t o  m a t t e r s  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  economic r e l a t i o n s  has m a i n l y  
t ak en  p l a c e  t h r o u g h  t r a d i t i o n a l  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l e g a l  p r o c e s s e s .  
These p r o ces se s  have i n c l u d e d  the  c o n c l u s i o n  o f  m u l t i l a t e r a l  
t r e a t i e s ,  b i l a t e r a l  t r e a t i e s ,  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o n v e n t i o n s ,  
and t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  an i n t e r r e l a t e d  n e t wor k  o f  r e g i o n a l  and 
g l o b a l  economic i n s t i t u t i o n s .
TJie e x p e r i e n c e  o f  t h e  p a s t  t h r e e  decades however ,  has 
r e v e a l e d  s e r i o u s  s h o r t c o m i n g s  i n  t he  a b i l i t y  o f  t he s e
3. For  d i s c u s s i o n  on s o v e r e i g n  e q u a l i t y ,  see J . L .  B r i e r l y ,  
The Law o f  N a t i o n s  - an i n t r o d u c t i o n  t o  t h e  i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  law o f  p e a c e . /  igk'TTO xfa p
3p r oc ess es  i n  a s s u r i n g  an e q u i t a b l e  system f o r  t h e  m a r k e t i n g  
o f  p r i m a r y  c o m m o d i t i e s .  A l o t  o f  c r i t i c i s m  has been v o i c e d  
i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  i n s t i t u t i o n s  and norms employed i n  t he  m a r k e t ­
i ng  o f  such c o m m o d i t i e s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  by d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  
who t en d  t o  be p a r t i c u l a r  v i c t i m s  o f  t h e i r  o p e r a t i o n s .  The 
reasons f o r  t h e s e  c r i t i c i s m s  are numerous and w e l l  documented 
by i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l a w y e r s ,  p o l i t i c a l  s c i e n t i s t s ,  and e co no mi s t s  
a l i  ke . ^
I * * The p r ob l em o f  commodi ty  m a r k e t i n g
One o f  t h e  ma jo r  c r i t i c i s m  made by d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  
about  t h e  e x i s t i n g  commodi ty  m a r k e t i n g  systems r e l a t e s  t o  
t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  c o n t r o l ,  and t he  r u l e s  employed on i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  . commodi ty  m a r k e t s .  In t h i s  r e s p e c t  t h e  c r i t i c i s m  
has two d i m e n s i o n s .  In t he  f i r s t  p l a c e ,  i t  i s  p o i n t e d  ou t  
t h a t  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t he s e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  and t he  r u l e s  t h e y  
employ have ten de d  t o  r e s u l t  i n  p r i c e s  o f  p r i m a r y  c ommod i t i es  
upon which  many d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  depend t o  show more 
s h o r t - t e r m  f l u c t u a t i o n s  when compared t o  t h e  p r i c e s  f e t c h e d  
by m a n u f a c t u r e d  goods p roduced i n  t he  d e ve l op ed  c o u n t r i e s .  
S e c o n d l y ,  t h a t  t h e  o p e r a t i o n  o f  t h i s  m a r k e t i n g  system r e s u l t s  
i n  t h e  l ong run t o  t h e  d e c l i n e  o f  p r i m a r y  commodi t y  p r i c e s  
r e l a t i v e  t o  t he  p r i c e s  o f  m a n u f a c t u r e d  goods.
4. See f o r  exampl e,  S c h a c h t e r ,  S h a r i n g  t he  w o r l d
r e s o u r c e s . Co lumbia  U n i v e r s i t y  P r es s ,  New Yo r k ,  1977, 
pp. 87-1 05 ; TT /V?. F r t t n j t .. , " S t a n d a r d s  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
commodi ty  n e g o t i a t i o n s " ,  ( l ^ S )  IbO d €  (tro tf J n te f
n a t i o n a l  R e c u e i l  Des Cours ,  I I  / 4-037 . '
I . B r o w n l i e ,  ' "Loaves and f i s h e s :  Access t o  n a t u r a l  
r e s o u r c e s  and i n t e r n a t i o n a  l aw.  An i n a u g u r a l  l e c t u r e  
d e l i v e r e d  a t  London School  o f  Economics ,  1978.
4T h i s  r e s u l t s  i n - a  c i r c u 1ar d e t e r i o r  C l t i o n  i n  t h e  te rms o f  
t r a d e  f o r  p r i m a r y  commodi ty  e x p o r t i n g  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  
when compared t o  e x p o r t e r s  o f  m a n u f a c t u r ed  goods i n  t he  
i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  c o u n t r i e s .
The s u g g e s t i o n  t h e r e f o r e ,  i s  t h a t  t h e  o p e r a t i o n  o f  
commodi ty  p r i c i n g  norms and i n s t i t u t i o n s  based on o l d  
n a t i o n s  o f  s o v e r e i g n  e q u a l i t y  have not  shown s i g n s  o f  
b e n e f i t i n g  c o u n t r i e s  dependent  on t he  e x p o r t  o f  p r i m a r y  
c o m m o d i t i e s .  In f a c t  t he se  norms and i n s t i t u t i o n s  have 
t ended  t o  p romote t h e  unequal  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  t h e  b e n e f i t s  
a c c r u i n g  f r om  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  economic r e l a t i o n s .
I t  i s  f o r  t h i s  reason  t h a t  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  have 
i n  t he  p a s t  decade advoca t ed  o*f t he  r e v i s i o n  o f  a l l  t ho se  
norms an.d i n s t i t u t i o n s  used i n  t he  m a r k e t i n g  o f  p r i m a r y  
c o mmod i t i es  which  are founded  on o u t d a t e d  n o t i o n s  o f  
s o v e r e i g n  e q u a l i t y  o f  s t a t e s .  Such norms and i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  
i t  i s  a r gue d ,  s ho u l d  n o t  be a p p l i e d  t o  a l l  t r a n s a c t i o n s  
between c o u n t r i e s  w i t h o u t  p ay ing  due r e g a r d  t o  t h e  e v i d e n t  
i n e q u a l i t i e s  e x i s t i n g  between f o r  example ,  t h e  d e v e l o p i n g  
c o u n t r i e s  and t h e  d ev e l oped  c o u n t r i e s .
Deve loped c o u n t r i e s  however ,  have g e n e r a l l y  defended
t he  s t a t u s  quo m a i n l y  i n  an a t t e m p t  t o  s a f e g u a r d  t h e i r  own
i n t e r e s t ,  t h a t  i s ,  t o  m a i n t a i n  t h e i r  sou r ces  o f  s u p p l y  o f
p r i m a r y - c o m m o d i t i e s  and t o  o b t a i n  them a t  t h e  l o w e s t  
5
p o s s i b l e  c o s t .
5. For  a f u l l e r  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e ' commodi ty  p r ob l em,
see S t u a r t  H a r r i s ,  "The c om mod i t i e s  p rob l em and t he  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  economic o r d e r :  what  r u l e s  o f  what  game?" 
In P. Oppep.heii'Vl-e/' : ( e d . ) .  I ssu es  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l
economi  cs , N 980] ? London , O r i e l ,  p . 199.
5T h i s  c o n f l i c t  o f  i n t e r e s t  between t h e  deve l oped  and 
t h e  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  has been the  co r e  o f  t h e  commodi ty  
m a r k e t i n g  and p r i c i n g  p r o b l e ms .  A t t e m p t s  a t  r e s o l v i n g  t h i s  
c o n f l i c t  i n  t h e  p as t  few decades have r e s u l t e d  i n  t he  
c o n c l u s i o n  o f  a number o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  agreements  s ee k i ng  
e i t h e r  t o  m i n i m i z e  commodi ty  p r i c e  f l u c t u a t i o n s  or  m i n i m i z e  
t he  e f f e c t  o f  such f l u c t u a t i o n s  on t ho se  c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  
depend on t h e  e x p o r t  o f  such c o mm o d i t i e s .
The t y p e s  o f  agreements  t h a t  have emerged i n c l u d e  
in te rn a tio n a l commodi ty  agreements c o nc l ud ed  between consumer 
c o u n t r i e s  and e x p o r t i n g  c o u n t r i e s  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  commod i t i es  
such as i s  t h e  case w i t h  t he  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  C o f f e e  Agr eemen t ;  
agreements  c r e a t i n g  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  f o r  e x p o r t i n g  c o u n t r i e s  
such as .is t h e  case w i t h  t h e  O r g a n i z a t i o n  o f  P e t r o l eu m  
E x p o r t i n g  C o u n t r i e s  (OPEC) and t he  I n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l  C ou nc i l  
o f  Copper  E x p o r t i n g  C o u n t r i e s  (CIPEC);  agreements  c onc l uded  
between a group o f  e x p o r t i n g  c o u n t r i e s  on t h e  one hand and 
a group o f  consuming n a t i o n s  on t he  o t h e r  as i s  t h e  case 
w i t h  t h e  Lome C o n ve n t i on s  between t h e  EEC and ACP c o u n t r i e s .  
More r e c e n t l y  a new t y p e  o f  agreement  i n  t h e  fo r m o f  the  
Common Fund wh i ch  seeks t o  t a c k l e  t h e  p rob l em f r om a g l o b a l  
p e r s p e c t i v e  has come i n t o  b e i n g .
The need f o r  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  o f  t h e s e  v a r i o u s  t yp es  
o f  agreements  has a r i s e n  as a r e s u l t  o f  t h e  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  
t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  c o n f l i c t  between p r o d u c e r s  and e x p o r t e r s  
o f  p r i m a r y  c o mm od i t i e s  c anno t  be r e s o l v e d  a t  t h e  n a t i o n a l  
l e v e l  bu t  needs some fo rm o f  j o i n t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  measures.
6I t  sh ou l d  be no ted  here t h a t  i n  t h e  p a s t  few decades 
many o f  t h e  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  e x p o r t e r s  o f  p r i m a r y  com­
m o d i t i e s  have a t  t h e  n a t i o n a l  l e v e l  t ak en  measures aimed 
a t  r e v e r s i n g  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  t h e  e x i s t i n g  norms and p r i c i n g  i n s t i  
t u t i o n s  on the  p r i c e s  and income t h e y  r e c e i v e  f r om t h e i r  e x p o r t s
I I I .  N a t i o n a l  measures i n  copper  e x p o r t i n g
d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s
A number o f  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s 1 e x p o r t e r s  o f  p r i m a r y  
c o m m o d i t i e s ,  have sought  i n  t h e  pas t  two decades t o  t a c k l e  
t he  prob l ems a r i s i n g  w i t h i n  t h e i r  economies as a r e s u l t  o f  
f l u c t u a t i o n s  i n  t h e  p r i c e s  o f  copper  by i n s t i t u t i n g  v a r i o u s  
n a t i o n a l  measures.  The most p o p u l a r  measure has been the  
i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  l e g i s l a t i o n  or  p o l i c y  aimed a t  r e g a i n i n g  
o wn er sh ip  and c o n t r o l  o f  t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  m i n i n g  i n d u s t r i e s .
In 1970 f o r  example ,  t he  government  o f  Peru p r o c l a i m e d  the  
b a s i c  m i n i n g  law f o r  t he  c o u n t r y ,  namely N or ma t i v e  Decree 
Law number 18225 wh i ch  enab l ed  the  P e r u v i a n  s t a t e  t o  assume 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  m a r k e t i n g  o f  a l l  m i n e r a l  p r o d u c t s .
By t h e  t e r ms  o f  t h a t  l aw ,  t h e  s t a t e  was t o  t a k e  o ve r  the  
r e s p o n s i b i 1 i t y  f o r  t he  m a r k e t i n g  o f  copper  w i t h i n  18 months 
w i t h  t h e  d e a d l i n e  b e i ng  14th Oc tober  1971.  In t h i s  r e s p e c t ,  
t he  s t a t e  was t o  o u t l i n e  a l l  areas i n  wh i ch  s a l e s  o f  m i n e r a l s  
and m i n e r a l  p r o d u c t s  were t o  t a ke  p la ce  and t o  s e t  up a l l  
c i r c u m s t a n c e s  i n  wh i ch  t he  s t a t e  would approve sa le s  
c o n t r a c t s  or  t a k e  them over  when n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t  d i c t a t e d  
so.  Th i s  d i r e c t  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  o f  t he  s t a t e  i n  t h e  m a r k e t i n g  
o f  copper  and o t h e r  m i n e r a l s  was t o  be e f f e c t e d  t h r o u g h  t he  
P e r u v i a n  M i n i n g  E n t e r p r i s e ,  M i n e r o - P e r u .
7In Zambia,  P r e s i d e n t  Kaunda announced measures a f f e c t ­
i ng  t h e  m i n i n g  i n d u s t r y  on 11th August  1969 wh i ch  i n c l u d e d  
t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  by t he  government  o f  51% shares  i n  t he  m i n i n g  
compan i es .  The y e a r  1970 t h e r e f o r e ,  was d evo t ed  t o  t he  
r e o r g a n i z a t i o n  o f  t h e  e n t i r e  m i n i n g  i n d u s t r y .  T h i s  r e ­
o r g a n i z a t i o n  r e s u l t e d  i n  t he  c r e a t i o n  o f  two w h o l l y  s t a t e  
owned compan i es ,  t he  Zambia I n d u s t r i a l  and M i n i n g  C o r p o r a t i o n  
(ZIMCO),  and t h e  M i n i n g  Development  C o r p o r a t i o n  L t d . '
(MINDECO) wh i ch  was t o  h o l d  t h e  51% shares  i n  t h e  m i n i n g  
companies on b e h a l f  o f  t h e  government .  In a d d i t i o n ,  a l l  
t he  m i n i n g  companies f o r m e r l y  b e l o n g i n g  t o  A n g l o - A m e r i c a n  
c o r p o r a t i o n  were grouped i n t o  a new company namely Nchanga 
C o n s o l i d a t e d  Copper Mines (NCCM) and t ho s e  f o r m e r l y  b e l o n g ­
i ng  t o  t.he Roan Sel e c t i  on T r u s t  L td  (RST),  were amal gamated 
i n t o  a s i n g l e  company,  namely Roan C o n s o l i d a t e d  Mines (RCM). 
Management c o n t r a c t s  were then  s i gned  w i t h  bo th  A n g l o -  
Amer ican c o r p o r a t i o n  and Roan Sel e c t i o n  T r u s t  t o  p r o v i d e  
m a n a g e r i a l ,  t e c h n i c a l ,  and m a r k e t i n g  s e r v i c e s .  For  t hese  
s e r v i c e s ,  RST and AAC were t o  r e c e i v e  11% o f  g ro ss  t u r n o v e r  
and 2% o f  p r o f i t s  b e f o r e  income t a x .  The c o s t  f o r  Zambia 
as a r e s u l t  o f  t he s e  management c o n t r a c t s  p roved enormous.
I t  i s  f o r  example e s t i m a t e d  t h a t  A n g l o - A m e r i c a n  C o r p o r a t i o n  
a lone  was p a i d  about  3 .3  m i l l i o n  Kwacha i n  1972 f o r  m a r k e t i n g  
f e e s  a l o n e .  B e a r i n g  t h i s  c o s t  i n  mind,  t h e  Zambian g o v e r n ­
ment announced t h r o u g h  i t s  then  M i n i s t e r  o f  F i n a n c e ,  Mr. John 
Mwanakatwe,  t h a t  a new m a r k e t i n g  company was t o  be e s t a b l i s h e d .
6. A f r i c a  r e s e a r c h  b u l l e t i n ,  1973,  a t  page 2883.
8Ten days l a t e r ,  on- 24th  September  1 973 a company c a l l e d  
Metal  M a r k e t i n g  C o r p o r a t i o n  (Zambia)  L t d .  was r e g i s t e r e d  
w i t h  an a u t h o r i z e d  c a p i t a l  o f  K500,000 and w i t h  p r o v i s i o n  
f o r  10 d i r e c t o r s .  The r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  t h e  company was
t o  c onduc t  t h e  m a r k e t i n g  o f  a l l  m i n e r a l s  and m i n e r a l
p r o d u c t s  produced i n  Zambia.
In a n o t h e r  ma j o r  copper  e x p o r t i n g  c o u n t r y ,  C h i l e ,  
t he  government  p o l i c y  i n  1970 was t o  r e c l a s s i f y  t he  
economy i n t o  p r i v a t e  and p u b l i c  o wner sh i p  w i t h  t he  l a t t e r  
a b s o r b i n g  a l l  t h o s e  i n d u s t r i e s  and s e r v i c e s  c o n s i d e r e d  
v i t a l  t o  t h e  economy o f  t h a t  c o u n t r y .  F o l l o w i n g  t h i s  p o l i c y ,  
a l l  copper  mines were t o  be n a t i o n a l i z e d  and a l l  m ar K e t i ng
a spec ts  o f  m i n e r a l s  were t o  be c o n t r o l l e d  by a s t a t e  a u t h o r i t y
A l l  t h e  n a t i o n a l  measures u n de r t a k e n  by copper  e x p o r t i n g  
d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  have addressed t h e m s e l v e s  t o  i s s u e s  o f  
o w n e r s h i p ,  c o n t r o l  o f  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  p rocess  and t o  some 
e x t e n t  m a r k e t i n g .  Foc us ing  our  a t t e n t i o n  on measures 
r e l a t i n g  t o  m a r k e t i n g  i t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  what  has been a t t e m p t e d  
i s  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  n a t i o n a l  m a r k e t i n g  i n s t i t u t i o n s  t o  u n d e r ­
t a k e  i n d i v i d u a l l y  t he  t a s k  o f  d i s p o s i n g  o f  t h e  m i n e r a l s  
p roduced i n  t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  c o u n t r i e s .
I t  i s  however ,  common knowledge t h a t  many o f  t h e  m u l t i ­
n a t i o n a l  c o r p o r a t i o n s  t h a t  had been i n v o l v e d  i n  t he  m i n i n g  
i n d u s t r i e s  o f  t h e s e  c o u n t r i e s ,  d i d  no t  o n l y  e x e r t  a f i r m  
g r i p  on t h e  o w n e r s h i p ,  p r o d u c t i o n  and d i s p o s a l  o f  t he  m i n e r a l s  
bu t  d i d  a l s o  c o n t r o l  t h r o u g h  a c o m p l i c a t e d  n e t w o r k ,  t he  p r i c e  
s e t t i n g  i n s t i t u t i o n s  such as t he  London Meta l  Exchange.  
A l t h o u g h  t h e r e f o r e ,  t he  power o f  t he se  f o r e i g n  i n v e s t o r s
9has been c u r t a i l e d  t h r o u g h  the  v a r i o u s  n a t i o n a l  measures 
d i s c u s s e d  above,  t h e y  s t i l l  w i e l d  enough i n f l u e n c e  and 
power on i n t e r n a t i o n a l  commodi ty  p r i c e  s e t t i n g  i n s t i t u t i o n s  
t o  be a b le  t o  m a n i p u l a t e  t h e  p r i c e s  t he se  c o u n t r i e s  may 
e xp ec t  f rom t h e i r  m i n e r a l  p r o d u c t s .  I n c r e a s i n g  t h e  power 
o f  p r o d u c e r  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  on t he s e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  
would seem t o  be one o f  t h e  main i s s u e s  t h a t  may he lp  
copper  p r o d u c e r  c o u n t r i e s  l i k e  Zambia t a c k l e  e f f e c t i v e l y  t he  
h ar mf u l  e f f e c t s  o f  p r i c e  i n s t a b i l i t y  on t h e  w o r l d  copper  
m a r k e t s .  I t  i s  now commonly agreed by t h e  UN t h a t  i n c r e a s i n g  
t he  b a r g a i n i n g  l e v e r a g e  o f  p r o d u c e r  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  
as f a r  as commodi ty  p r i c e s  are concerned can t a k e  p l ac e  
o n l y  t h r o u g h  c o n c e r t e d  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  measures aimed at  
g e n e r a l l y  r e s t r u c t u r i n g  t h e  p a t t e r n  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e  
r e l a t i o n s  between t h e  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  on t h e  one hand 
and the  deve l oped  c o u n t r i e s  on t he  o t h e r .
I V . The U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  and t h e  r e s t r u c t u r i n g
o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e l a t i o n s
The need f o r  t he  r e s t r u c t u r i n g  o f  l e g a l  norms and i n s t i -
of
t u t i o n s  g o v e r n i n g  t he  m a r k e t i n g Aco mmod i t i es  has l ong  been 
r e c o g n i z e d  by t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s .  The Genera l  Assembly o f  
the  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  passed a r e s o l u t i o n  way back i n  1974 
c a l l i n g . f o r  t he  a d o p t i o n  o f  a new i n t e r n a t i o n a l  economic 
o r d e r .  In t h i s  r e s o l u t i o n ,  t he  General  Assembly observed  
t h a t :
7. See UN General  Assembly r e s o l u t i o n  3 2 0 1 ( S - V I ) .
t le iiro c fu  eed in D j o n o v i c h ,  U n i t ed  N a t i o n s  r e s o l u t i o n s . 
S e r i e s  1, G . A . ,  volume XIV,  1972-1979 ,  page 527.
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"The d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s ,  which c o n s t i t u t e  se ve n t y  
p e r c e n t  o f  t h e  w o r l d ' s  popul  a t i o n  a ccoun t  f o r  o n l y  
t h i r t y  p e r c e n t  o f  t h e  w o r l d ' s  income.  I t  has proved 
i m p o s s i b l e  t o  a c h ie v e  an even and ba la nce d  d e v e l o p ­
ment o f  t he  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  communi ty under  t he  
e x i s t i n g  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  economic o r d e r .  The gap 
between t h e  deve l oped  and the  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  
c o n t i n u e s  t o  widen i n  a system which  was e s t a b l i s h e d  
a t  a t i m e  when most o f  t he  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  d i d  
not  even e x i s t  as i nd e p e n d e n t  s t a t e s  and p e r p e t u a t e s  
i n e q u a l i  t y . "
The new i n t e r n a t i o n a l  economic o r d e r  c a l l e d  f o r  by the  General  
Assembly was no t  o n l y  t o  be based on t he  p r i n c i p l e  o f  
s o v e r e i g n  e q u a l i t y  bu t  on t h e  f u l l  and e f f e c t i v e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  
o f  a l l  c o u n t r i e s  b e a r i n g  i n  mind t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  t he  d e v e l o p ­
i n g  c o u n t r i e s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  t he  l e a s t  d e v e l o p e d ,  l a n d - l o c k e d ,  
i s l a n d  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s ,  and t ho se  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  
most  s e r i o u s l y  a f f e c t e d  by economic c r i s e s  and n a t u r a l  
ca lami  t i  e s .
In an a t t e m p t  t o  i mpl ement  t h e se  d e c l a r a t i o n s  o f  
p r i n c i p l e ,  t h e  General  Assembly adopted t h e  programme o f  
a c t i o n  on t he  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  a new i n t e r n a t i o n a l  economic
o
o r d e r .  As f a r  as i t  r e l a t e s  t o  t he  p rob l em f a c i n g  
co mmod i t i es  e x p o r t e d  by d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s ,  t he  programme 
o f  a c t i o n  c a l l e d  on members o f  t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s ,
" t o  t a k e  measures t o  r e v e r s e  t h e  c o n t i n u e d  t r e n d  
o f  s t a g n a t i o n  o r  d e c l i n e  i n  t he  r e a l  p r i c e  o f  s e v e r a l  
co mm od i t i es  e x p o r t e d  by d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s ,  d e s p i t e  
a g e ne r a l  r i s e  i n  commodi ty  p r i c e s ,  r e s u l t i n g  i n  a 
d e c l i n e  i n  t h e  e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s  o f  t h e s e  d e v e l o p i n g  
c o u n t r i e s . "
Th i s  was f o l l o w e d  by a more comprehens ive  pronouncement  i n  
t h e  c h a r t e r  o f  economic r i g h t s  and d u t i e s  o f  s t a t e s  adopted
8.  R e s o l u t i o n  3202 ( S - V I ) ,  May 1974.
nby t h e  General  Assembly i n  December 1974.  The c h a r t e r  
i n t e n d e d  t o  deal  s ummar i l y  w i t h  a g r e a t  number o f  prob lems 
i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  economic r e l a t i o n s .  The prob l ems d e a l t  
i n  t he  c h a r t e r  i n c l u d e d  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  t r a n s n a t i o n a l  c o r p o r ­
a t i o n s ,  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  o f  p r i m a r y  commodi ty  p r o d u c e r s ,  
r e s t r i c t i v e  b u s i n e s s  p r a c t i c e s ,  t r a n s f e r  o f  t e c h n o l o g y ,
and p r e f e r e n t i a l  t r e a t m e n t  o f  e x p o r t s  o f  d e v e l o p i n g  
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c o u n t r i e s .  In s p e l l i n g  o u t  g u i d e l i n e s  i n  t h e s e  prob lem 
a r e as ,  i t  was hoped t h a t  a more d e t a i l e d  c o d i f i c a t i o n  would 
f o l l o w .  E f f o r t s  t owa rds  such a d e t a i l e d  c o d i f i c a t i o n  o f  
some o f  t he se  t o p i c s  have a l r e a d y  y i e l d e d  r e s u l t s .  For 
example ,  a code o f  c on du c t  f o r  l i n e r  c o n f e r e n c e s  was agreed 
as e a r l y  as 1974,  w h i l e  work on a code o f  c o n d u c t  f o r  
t r a n s n a t i o n a l  c o r p o r a t i o n s  and a code on t r a n s f e r  o f  
t e c h n o l o g y  has r e c e n t l y  been c o n c l u d e d .
W h i l e  work to wa r ds  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  o f  codes o f  conduc t  
i n  v a r i o u s  spheres  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  economic r e l a t i o n s  have 
been c o nc l u d e d  or  are i n  an advanced s t a g e ,  t h e  work o f  
UNCTAD c o n c e r n i n g  g e ne r a l  r u l e s  r e g a r d i n g  t r a d e  i n  co mmod i t i e s  
appears t o  be i n  s t a g n a t i o n  p a r t i c u l a r l y  a f t e r  t h e  no t  so 
s u c c e s s f u l  UNCTAD VI which  t o o k  p l a c e  i n  B e l g r a d e  i n  
June 1983.
D e s p i t e  s low p r o g r e s s  i n  f o r m u l a t i n g  a c omprehens i ve  
approach t o  t h e  commodi ty  p rob l em s i m i l a r  t o  say t h e  code 
o f  c on du c t  f o r  t r a n s n a t i o n a l s ,  i t  remai ns  c l e a r  t h a t  what  
t he  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  has c a l l e d  f o r  i n  i t s  r e s o l u t i o n s  on t he
9. C h a r t e r  o f  Economic l i g h t s  and i i u t i  es , of 2.
paras, 2, 5 , 7, 13, 14, 18, 19, and 28.
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new i n t e r n a t i o n a l  economi c o r d e r ,  has been t h e  r e o r d e r i n g  
o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r u l e s  g o v e r n i n g  commodi t y  t r a d e  and t he 
r e s t r u c t u r i n g  o f  i n s t i t u t i o n s  d e a l i n g  w i t h  c o m m o d i t i e s . ^ 0 
Such a r e s t r u c t u r i n g  o f  t h e  l e g a l  norms and i n s t i t u t i o n s  i s  
r q u i r e d  t o  be based on two o b j e c t i v e s .  F i r s t ,  i t  shou l d
aim at  t h e  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  o f  p r i c e s  f o r  p r i m a r y  c o mmo d i t i e s ,
and s e c o n d l y ,  t he  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  o f  t he  e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s  o f  
t he  c o u n t r i e s  dependent  on t he  e x p o r t  o f  such c o m m o d i t i e s . ^
Th i s  t h e s i s  i s  a s t u d y  o f  t he  l e g a l  norms and i n s t i ­
t u t i o n s  g o v e r n i n g  t he  m a r k e t i n g  o f  c oppe r .  The e f f e c t  t hese  
norms and i n s t i t u t i o n s  have on d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  who 
e x p o r t  copper  are not  un i que  because e x p o r t e r s  o f  o t h e r  
p r i m a r y  c ommod i t i es  i n  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  e x p e r i e n c e  
s i m i l a r  p r o b l e ms .  I t  woul d however ,  have been u n r e a l i s t i c  
t o  d i s c u s s  t h es e  norms and i n s t i t u t i o n s  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  a l l  
commod i t i es  e x p o r t e d  by d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  i n  one t h e s i s .
Copper  i s  e x p o r t e d  by a number o f  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  
but  i t  woul d be i m p o s s i b l e  t o  deal  s a t i s f a c t o r i l y  w i t h  t he  
e f f e c t  such l e g a l  norms and i n s t i t u t i o n s  may have on a l l  
such p r o d u c e r s .  I t  i s  f o r  t h i s  reason t h a t  i n  t h e  t h e s i s ,
p a r t i c u l a r  emphasi s  i s  p l a c e d  on one e x p o r t i n g  c o u n t r y  -
Z amb i a .
1 0 . A* Y* s D i f f e r e n t i a l  t r e a t m e n t  as a
d i mens i on  o f  t he  r i g h t  t o  d eve l opmen t .  0 ^ ^ )A c u d e w ie  de  
d r o i t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l ,  3 3 % ,
11.  See f o r  exampl e ,  t he  Ma n i l a  d e c l a r a t i o n  and programme 
o f  a c t i o n  - p o s i t i o n  paper  o f  t he  group o f  77,  t h i r d  
m i n i s t e r i a l  mee t i ng  o f  group o f j 77,  26t h  Januar y  -
2nd F e b r u a r y  1 976.  Document  7 7 / m m ( I I I ) / 4 9 ,  7 th  Fe b r u a r y  
1976;  R E s o l u t i o n  3202 ( S - V I )  o f  t he  UN General  Assembl y ,  
programme o f  a c t i o n  on t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  a new i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  economi c o r d e r ,  p a r t  I ,  para  3 ( a ) ( i i i ) .
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V. Copper  i n  t h e  Zambian economy
Zambia l i e s  on t he  g r e a t  i n l a n d  p l a t e a u  o f  C e n t r a l
A f r i c a ,  a p l a t e a u  t h a t  i s  r i c h  i n  m i n e r a l s .  G e o l o g i c a l
su r veys  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t he  c o u n t r y  has v a s t  d e p o s i t s  o f
co p p e r ,  c o b a l t ,  manganese,  s i l v e r ,  i r o n  o r e ,  and c o a l .
But  by f a r  t he  l a r g e s t  d e p o s i t s  are t h o s e  o f  c o p p e r .
Copper  was f i r s t  s e r i o u s l y  e x p l o i t e d  i n  t he  1930s
and has s i n c e  c o n t i n u e d  t o  be a domi nant  f a c t o r  i n  t he
economy o f  t h a t  c o u n t r y .  Commercial  e x p l o i t a t i o n  o f  copper
was up u n t i l  1969 i n  t h e  hands o f  two groups o f  compani es
namel y ,  t he  Rhodes i a  S e l e c t i o n  T r u s t  (RST) whi ch was l a r g e l y
Amer i can f i n a n c e d ,  and An g l o - Amer i c an  C o r p o r a t i o n  w i t h
B r i t i s h  and South A f r i c a n  f i n a n c i a l  b a c k i n g .
Si nce t h e  1930s,  t h e  Zambian economy has been dependent
on copper  f o r  i t s  v e r y  s u r v i v a l  and t od a y  i t  r e p r e s e n t s  over
90% o f  t h a t  c o u n t r y ' s  t o t a l  e x p o r t s .  In t h i s  r e s p e c t  Zambia
r e p r e s e n t s  an ex t r eme exampl e o f  a one s i de d  economy w i t h  a
r i c h  i m p o r t - e x p o r t  o r i e n t e d  mi n i n g  s e c t o r  and a poor  and
1 2m a i n l y  s u b s i s t e n c e  a g r i c u l t u r a l  s e c t o r .  The i mp o r t a n c e  o f  
copper  t o  t he  Zambian economy i s  made g l a r i n g l y  obv i ous  by 
t he  f o l l o w i n g  t a b l e s :
TABLE I - Va l ue o f  Zamb i a ' s  copper  e x p o r t s  and i t s  p e r c en t a ge  
c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  t he  gr oss  domes t i c  e x p o r t s  i n  
s e l e c t e d  yea r s  up t o  1980.
Year Ex p o r t  Val ue 
( K 1 mi 11i on )
% o f  g r oss  d o mes t i c  e x p o r t s
1 965 343. 2 93%
1 974 877 94%
1980 900 94%
Source o f  f i g u r e s ,  Re p u b l i c  o f  Zambia,  mo n t h l y  d i g e s t  o f  
s t a t i s t i c s ,  v a r i o u s  y e a r s .
12.  G  S- Lombard £\nd , A g r i c u l t u r e  i n  Zambia
s i n c e  i n d e p e n d e n c e , Tbe Kationot Ed u art i eh Oowitwng
o f  Z a m b ia  > p*3. • ' r
TABLE 2 - C o n t r i b u t i o n  
between 1964
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o f  copper  
and 1980
t o  government revenue
T o t a l  Govt . Copper  1 s c o n t r i b u t i o n % o f
Year Revenue t o  gov t . r evenue c o n t r i b u t i o n
( K ' mi 1 1 . ) approx ( K ' m i l l . )  a p p r o x .
1964 108 57 53
1970 432 218 52
1975 448 59 13
1976 443 1 12 n 31977 522 -1 .1
1978 560 ' - '
1980 758 41
Source:  E s t i ma t e s  o f  r evenue and e x p e n d i t u r e  f o r  1978-1980 
and mo n t h l y  s t a t i s t i c s  o f  e a r l i e r  y e a r s .
V I . Copper  and Zamb i a ' s  e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s
Tab l e  1 above i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  Zambia depends a l mos t  
e n t i r e l y  on copper  f o r  i t s  e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s .  Th i s  dependence 
on t he  e x p o r t  o f  one commodi t y ,  r e n de r s  t h e  c o u n t r y  v u l n e r ­
ab l e  t o  any s l i g h t  f l u c t u a t i o n s  i n  t he  p r i c e s  o f  t he  
commodi t y  on w o r l d  ma r k e t s .  Th i s  v u l n e r a b i l i t y  has become 
a p pa r e n t  i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s  due t o  t he  u n p r e d i c t a b l e  n a t u r e  
o f  copper  p r i c e s  on t he  w o r l d  ma r k e t s .  The u n p r e d i c t a b l e  
p r i c e s  have r e s u l t e d  i n  t h r e e  ma j o r  p r ob l ems f o r  t he  c o u n t r y .
{ a ) U n p r e d i c t a b l e  r evenue f o r  t he  government
Si nce  1970,  t h e  Zambian g o v e r n me n t ' s shar e  o f  t he  
e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s  f r om copper  has been c o n s t i t u t e d  by t he t a x  
i t  l e v i e s  on t he  p r o f i t s  a c c r u i n g  t o  t h e  m i n i n g  compani es 
and d i v i d e n d s  a c c r u i n g  t o  i t  by v i r t u e  o f  be i ng  a m a j o r i t y  
s h a r e h o l d e r  i n  t h e  Zambia C o n s o l i d a t e d  Copper  Mines (ZCCM).
Under  t he  1 970 Mi n e r a l  Tax Ac t  . {Act  number 2 7 ) ,  t he  
r a t e  o f  t a x a t i o n  f o r  copper  i s  51% of  t he  p r o f i t s  a c c r u i n g
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t o  t he  m i n i n g  company.  In a d d i t i o n  t he  government  r e c e i v e s  
i t s s h a r e  o f  t he  d e c l a r e d  d i v i d e n d s  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  i t s  
shares  i n  t he  m i n i n g  company.  U n p r e d i c t a b l e  w o r l d  copper  
p r i c e s  t h e r e f o r e ,  make i t  d i f f i c u l t  f o r  t h e  Zambian g o v e r n ­
ment  t o  e s t i m a t e  i t s  r evenue f r om t he  e x p o r t s  o f  c o ppe r .  
Shoul d t he  p r i c e s  o f  copper  f a l l  below t h e  e s t i m a t e d  l e v e l s ,  
i t  woul d mean l e s s  t a x a b l e  p r o f i t s  f o r  t h e  mi nes and t h e r e ­
f o r e  l es s  i ncome f o r  t he  gover nment .  S i m i l a r l y  a sudden 
d r a s t i c  f a l l  i n  t he  p r i c e s  o f  copper  woul d mean no p r o f i t s  
f o r  t he  mi nes and t h e r e f o r e  no d e c l a r e d  d i v i d e n d s .  In 
f a c t  between 1974 and 1980 t h i s  happened t o  be t h e  p o s i t i o n  
and t h e r e f o r e  no d i v i d e n d s  were pa i d  r e s u l t i n g  i n  t he  g o v e r n ­
me n t ' s  t a k e  d i m i n i s h i n g  d r a s t i c a l l y  f r om K341 m i l l i o n  i n  
1974 t o  n i l  i n  1980.
{ b ) I n c r e a s e  i n  f o r e i g n  debt
U n p r e d i c t a b l e  p r i c e s  o f  copper  have 1ed t o  a s i t u a t i o n  
i n  wh i ch  t h e  c o u n t r y  has f ound i t s e l f  b o r r o w i n g  i n c r e a s i n g l y  
t o  cove r  s h o r t f a l l s  i n  government  r evenue .  S i nce  1969,  
copper  p r i c e s  have shown a f l u c t u a t i n g  t e nd e nc y  and t h i s  
has been r e f l e c t e d  i n t he  p a t t e r n  o f  gover nment  debt  as 
t h e  t a b l e  bel ow i n d i c a t e s .
TABLE 3.
Debt  
o u t s t a n d i n g  
at  end 
o f  y e a r  
($ m i l l i o n )
S e r v i c e  
payments 
($ m i l l i o n )
S e r v i c e  
payments 
a t  % o f  
e x p o r t s
Ser v i  ce 
payments 
as % o f  
g o v t . 
r evenue
1969 246. 6 29.9 2 .2 4 . 8
1974 762. 2 105.6 7.3 10.5
1975 1098. 8 88. 5 10 .2 12.7
1976 1251 .5 112.7 10 .2 20 .2
1977 1391 .7 181.0 18.7 27.5
1978 1396. 3 191. 4 20 .8 27.4
1979 1558. 6 300. 6 Not  a v a i l a b l e 34.2
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Source:  IBRD, Wor l d Debt  T a b l e s ,  E x t e r n a l  P u b l i c  Debt  o f  
Dev e l o p i n g  C o u n t r i e s .
( c ) Government  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  new mi n i n g  v e n t u r e s
A f u r t h e r  pr ob l em r e s u l t i n g  f r om u n p r e d i c t a b l e  copper  
p r i c e s  f o r  t he  Zambian government  i s  l i k e l y  t o  be one 
a f f e c t i n g  t he  domes t i c  p a r t i c p a t i o n  i n  new mi n i n g  v e n t u r e s .
S e c t i o n  20 o f  t he  Mines and M i n e r a l s  Ac t  o f  1976 
makes domes t i c  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  a p r e - c o n d i t i o n  f o r  t he  e s t a b ­
l i s h m e n t  o f  any new mi n i ng  e n t e r p r i s e s  by a f o r e i g n  i n v e s t o r  
i n  Zambia.  The Ac t  g i v e s  t h e  government  t h e  o p t i o n  t o  
p a r t i c i p a t e  up t o  t h e  e x t e n t  o f  51% o f  t he  e q u i t y .
In v i ew o f  t h e  government s  d i m i n i s h e d  r ev e nu e ,  i t  
woul d seem u n l i k e l y  t h a t  t he  government  woul d op t  f o r  a 
51% p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  any new v e n t u r e s .
I ndeed i n  1980 t he  Zambian government  e n co u n t e r e d
d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  f i n d i n g  t he  f i n a n c e  t o  deve l op  t he  Mokambo
1 3d e p o s i t s  i n  c o n j u n c t i o n  w i t h  Romania.  The bes t  i t  can
do perhaps i s  t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  t o  t he  t une  o f  l e s s  t han 51%
r a i s i n g  q u e s t i o n s  o f  c o n t r o l  o f  such v e n t u r e s .  M i n o r i t y  
c o n t r o l  o f  such v e n t u r e s  woul d s u r e l y  r a i s e  doub t s  about  
i t s  programme o f  economi c i ndependence .
V I I .  The Rol e o f  t h e  M i n i n g  Se c t o r  i n  t he
deve l opment  p r ocess  o f  Zambia
The r o l e  o f  t h e  m i n i n g  s e c t o r  i n  t he  deve l opment  
p r ocess  i n  Zambia i s  bes t  unde r s t o od  i n  t e rms o f  p r i c e  
s t a b i l i z a t i o n .  Any c o n t r i b u t i o n  by t h i s  s e c t o r  t o  t he
13. See Mi n i ng  Ma g a z i n e , Feb r ua r y  1980,  p . 169.
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deve l opment  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y  i s  t h e r e f o r e  not  o n l y  d e t e r mi n e d  
by i t s  o wn e r s h i p ,  but  a l s o  on how f a r  Zambia i s  ab l e  t o  
c o n t r o l  t he  mar ke t s  f o r  t he  m i n e r a l s  i t  p r o du c e s .  Thus 
a l t h o u g h  Zambia has i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s ,  i n t r o d u c e d  measures 
t h a t  have i n c r e a s e d  t he  d i r e c t  r o l e  p l ayed  by t he  s t a t e  i n  
m i n e r a l  p r o d u c t i o n ,  t h e  s a l i e n c e  o f  t he  g l o b a l  ma r k e t i n g  
and d i s t r i b u t i o n  systems t h r o u g h  whi ch Zambia must  d i spose  
o f  i t s  m i n e r a l s  s t i l l  r emai n v e r y  much as t h e y  were b e f o r e  
i t  sought  t o  ga i n  c o n t r o l  o f  t he  p r o d u c t i o n  p r o c e s s .
S t a t e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  i n  t he  mi n i ng  s e c t o r  o f  Zambia i s  
not  an e n t i r e l y  new phenomenon^on 1y . i t s  f o r m and e x t e n t  
has changed r a d i c a l l y  i n  t h e  l a s t  f i f t e e n  y e a r s .  Dur i ng  t he  
c o l o n i a l  e r a ,  s t a t e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  was m a i n l y  l i m i t e d  t o  t he  
d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  t he  c o n d i t i o n s  i n  whi ch f o r e i g n  i n v e s t o r s  
woul d be a l l o w e d  t o  u n d e r t a k e  mi n i n g  a c t i v i t i e s .  I t  was 
assumed t hen t h a t  t he  o p e r a t i o n s  o f  t he  f o r e i g n  i n v e s t o r  
woul d s t i m u l a t e  deve l opment  o f  t he  mi n i n g  s e c t o r  and t he  
economy g e n e r a l l y .  The c o l o n i a l  g o v e r n me n t ' s  power  was 
t h e r e f o r e  devo t ed  mer e l y  t o  t he  s e c u r i n g  o f  g r e a t e r  f i n a n c i a l  
r e t u r n s  f o r  t he  government  t h r o u g h  t he  t a x a t i o n  o f  t he  
mi n i n g  compani es and t h r o u g h  t he  exchange c o n t r o l  r e g u l a t i o n s .
A f t e r  Zambia ga i ned  i ndependence i n 1964,  t h e  new 
i nd e p e n d e n t  gover nmen t ,  devot ed  much o f  i t s  e f f o r t s  t o  
secur i ng ,  more f i n a n c i a l  r e t u r n s  f r om t he  m i n i n g  s e c t o r .
Th i s  was done t h r o u g h  t h e  r e n e g o t i a t i o n s  o f  t h e  c oncess i ons  
agreements  w i t h  a v i ew t o  e n a b l i n g  t he  government  t o  l e v y  
r o y a l t i e s  and o t h e r  t a x e s .
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Si nce  1969 s t a t e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  i n  t he  Zambian mi n i ng  
i n d u s t r y  has assumed an even more d i r e c t  f o r m.  The g o v e r n ­
ment  s e t  up a s t a t e  mi n i n g  and i n d u s t r i a l  c o r p o r a t i o n ,  namel y 
ZIMCO, t o  t a k e  over  t he  e x i s t i n g  mi n i ng  compan i es .  The 
most  i m p o r t a n t  i s s u e  beh i nd  t h i s  change was t h e  chang i ng  
p e r c e p t i o n  t h e  government  l e a d e r s  now he l d  r e g a r d i n g  t he 
a p p r o p r i a t e  r o l e  t he  mi n i n g  i n d u s t r y  shou l d  p l a y  i n  t he  
deve l opment  p r o c e s s .
D e s p i t e  t he  i n c r e a s e d  r o l e  t he  Zambian government  has 
now assumed i n  t he  mi n i ng  i n d u s t r y ,  t he  pr ob l ems  o f  t he 
l i n k a g e s  o f  t h e  Zambian mi n i n g  s e c t o r  w i t h  economi c f o r c e s  
beyond i t s  b o r de r s  s t i l l  r ema i n .  As men t i oned  e a r l i e r  on,  
t he  mi n i n g  i n d u s t r y  i n  Zambia remai ns h i g h l y  dependent  on 
t h e  o p e r a t i o n  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  norms and m a r k e t i n g  i n s t i ­
t u t i o n s  t o  whi ch  Zambia as a c o u n t r y  has l i t t l e  o r  no c o n t r o l .
V I I I .  The p o l i c y  o f  t he  Zambian government
r e g a r d i n g  t h e  m i n i n g  i n d u s t r y
Si nce i ndependence ,  one f a c t o r  has he l ped  t o  shape 
t he  p o l i c y  o f  t he  government  r e g a r d i n g  t h e  m i n i n g  i n d u s t r y .  
Th i s  f a c t o r  has been t he  need t o  u t i l i z e  t he  m i n e r a l  r e s o u r c e s  
i n  t he  c o u n t r y  t o  s t i m u l a t e  t he  deve l opment  o f  t he  c o u n t r y .
I t  i s  t h i s  f a c t o r  whi ch has d i c t a t e d  t he  v a r i o u s  government  
p o l i c y  changes t h a t  have t aken  p l ace  ove r  t h e  y e a r s  r e g a r d i n g  
m i ne r a l  o wn e r s h i p ,  c o n t r o l  o f  t he  i n d u s t r y ,  t a x a t i o n ,  i n v e s t ­
ment ,  and t h e  d i s p o s a l  o f  t he  mi n e r a l  p r o d u c t s .
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As f a r  as o wner sh i p  i s  concer ned ,  s i n c e  1970,  t he 
government  owns t h e  m a j o r i t y  shares  i n  a l l  m i n i n g  v e n t u r e s .
The m a j o r i t y  owne r sh i p  i n  m i n i n g  v e n t u r e s  has he l ped  
p r o v i d e  an i m p o r t a n t  l i n k a g e  between t he  m i n i n g  i n d u s t r y  
and t h e  o v e r a l l  w e l f a r e  o f  t he  c o u n t r y .
T a x a t i o n  p o l i c i e s  o f  t he  government  have r e f l e c t e d  
t he  d e s i r e  o f  t h e  government  t o  max i mi ze government  r evenue  
f r om mi n i n g  and t h e r e b y  c h a n n e l i n g  t he  p r oceeds  f r om t h a t  
i n d u s t r y  i n t o  t he  c o u n t r y ' s  deve l opment  e f f o r t s .
Be f o r e  1969 when t he  government  announced t he  a c q u i s i t i o n  
o f  m a j o r i t y  shar es  i n  a l l  m i n i n g  compani es ,  t h e  government  
c o u l d  o n l y  i n f l u e n c e  i n v e s t m e n t  by l e g i s l a t i o n  p r o v i d i n g  
i n c e n t i v e s  t o  f o r e i g n  i n v e s t o r s .  Si nce t hen however ,  t he  
government -  p a r t i c i p a t e s  more d i r e c t l y  i n  a l l  i n v e s t m e n t  
d e c i s i o n s  i n  t h e  mi n i n g  i n d u s t r y .  These d e c i s i o n s  are now 
ve r y  much c onnec t ed  t o  t h e  l e v e l s  o f  copper  p r i c e s  and 
t h e r e b y  government  i ncome.
A l t h o u g h  t h e  Zambian g o v e r n me n t ' s  p o l i c i e s  r e g a r d i n g  
t he  m i n i n g  i n d u s t r y  may be s a i d  t o  have p r o v i d e d  a means 
t h r o u g h  whi ch  t h e  m i n i n g  i n d u s t r y  can shape t h e  p a t t e r n  o f  
t he  c o u n t r y ' s  economi c deve l op men t ,  one p r ob l em s t i l l  r ema i n s .  
Th i s  p r ob l em i s  one o f  i n s t a b i l i t y  o f  t he  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
copper  ma r k e t s .  I n s t a b i l i t y  i n  copper  mar ke t s  has t ended 
t o  underm. ine t h i s  l i n k a g e  between t he mi n i n g  i n d u s t r y  and 
deve l o p men t .  How t h i s  l i n k a g e  i s  undermi ned has a l r e a d y  been 
d i s c u s s e d  above.  S i nce  t he  i n s t a b i l i t y  i n  t he  copper  mar ke t s  
r e s u l t  m a i n l y  f r om f o r c e s  e x t e r n a l  t o  Zambia,  t h i s  i s  one area 
where Zambia i s  u n l i k e l y  t o  succeed by e mp l o y i ng  domes t i c
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measures .  I t  i s  due t o  t he  g l o b a l  n a t u r e  o f  t h i s  probl em 
t h a t  any e f f o r t s  aimed at  s t a b i l i z i n g  t he  p r i c e s  o f  copper  
must  assume an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  d i me n s i on .
IX . I n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o - o p e r a t i o n  i n  t he  s t a b i l i z a t i o n
o f  copper  p r i c e s
Sugge s t i n g  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o - o p e r a t i o n  i n  s t a b i l i z i n g  
o f  copper  p r i c e s  does r e f l e c t  and s u p p o r t  a d o c t r i n a l  v i ew 
t h a t  s t a t e s  are no l o n g e r  t o t a l l y  e f f e c t i v e  i n d i v i d u a l l y  
as u n i t s  o f  economi c o r g a n i z a t i o n  and economi c p o l i c y  mak i ng.  
The r e a l i t i e s  o f  p r e s e n t  day i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e  r e l a t i o n s  
d i c t a t e  t h a t  t h e r e  ought  t o  be some measure o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
c o - o p e r a t i o n  i n  t a c k l i n g  prob l ems t h a t  t r a n s c e n d  n a t i o n a l  
b o u n d a r i e s .  There are at  l e a s t  two v i ews r e g a r d i n g  t he 
n a t u r e  o f  such i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o - o p e r a t i o n  whi ch  d i f f e r  i n  
t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  c o n c e p t i o n  o f  s o v e r e i g n t y .
The f i r s t  v i ew r e g a r d s  s o v e r e i g n t y  as t h e  power t o  
c r e a t e  l aws t h a t  govern t h e  b e h a v i o u r  o f  i n d i v i d u a l s  i n  a 
g i ven  s o c i e t y .  Those who ho l d  t h i s  v i ew,  b e l i e v e  t h a t  any 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o - o p e r a t i o n  i n  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  o f  commodi t y  
t r a d e  wh i ch  r e s u l t s  i n  r u l e s  t o  be obser ved  by t h e  c o ­
o p e r a t i n g  s t a t e  must  o f  n e c e s s i t y  d e r i v e  f r om a h i g h e r  
a u t h o r i t y  s i m i l a r  t o  t he  s o v e r e i g n  i n  a n a t i o n  s t a t e .  Th i s  
woul d e n t a i l  t he  c r e a t i o n  o f  a h i g h e r  r u l e - m a k i n g  a u t h o r i t y  
whi ch woul d be r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  t h e  g o v e r n i n g  o f  t h e  conduc t  
o f  t he  c o - o p e r a t i n g  s t a t e s .  A good exampl e o f  where t h i s  
approch i s  employed i s  t he  EEC. The t r e a t y  o f  Rome c r e a t i n g  
t h e  EEC has been made p a r t  o f  t h e  mu n i c i p a l  l aws o f  t he 
member c o u n t r i e s  p r o v i d i n g  not  o n l y  r i g h t s  and o b l i g a t i o n s
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f o r  government s  but  a l s o  f o r  p r i v a t e  i n d i v i d u a l s  i n  t he  
commun i t y .  New l aws hav i ng  s i m i l a r  e f f e c t  are c o n t i n u o u s l y  
be i ng  c r e a t e d  by t he  organs o f  t he  Communi ty such as t he  
Commi ss i on,  t he  Counc i l  and t he  European c o u r t .
What t h i s  k i n d  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o - o p e r a t i o n  b r i n g s  
t o  t he  f o r e  i s  t h a t  s o v e r e i g n  s t a t e s  must  be w i l l i n g  t o  
f o r e g o  p a r t  o f  t h e i r  s o v e r e i g n t y  and s u b j e c t  t h e i r  s o c i e t i e s  
t o  l aws ,  t h e  c r e a t i o n  and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  wh i ch  t h e y  do 
not  f u l l y  c o n t r o l .  Th i s  approach t o  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o ­
o p e r a t i o n  however  does not  seem t o  ho l d  a l o t  o f  p romi se  
r e g a r d i n g  g l o b a l  p r ob l ems such as commodi t y  p r i c e  f l u c t u a t i o n s .
The a l t e r n a t i v e  approach whi ch seems more a c c e p t a b l e  
and whi ch  has over  t h e  y e a r s  been employed i n  t a c k l i n g  
v a r i o u s  p r ob l ems t r a n s c e n d i n g  n a t i o n a l  b o u n d a r i e s  i s  one 
t h a t  seeks t o  b r i n g  t o g e t h e r  a number o f  s t a t e s  w i t h  a 
v i ew f o r  them t o  j o i n t l y  c o n t r o l  t h o se  areas  o f  economi c 
l i f e  wh i ch  none c o u l d  c o n t r o l  i n d i v i d u a l l y .  The concep t  
o f  s o v e r e i g n t y  env i saged  i n  t h i s  v i ew i s  t h e  v e s t i n g  o f  t he  
power t o  shape and c o n t r o l  t he  d e s i r e d  economi c goa l s  i n  a 
j o i n t l y  c r e a t e d  and run i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e g u l a t o r y  agency.
Th i s  l a t t e r  approach has been beh i nd  a l l  measures 
t h a t  have been sugges t ed  by v a r i o u s  s c h o l a r s  f o r  t he  
s t a b i l i z a t i o n  o f  copper  p r i c e s .  The i m p o r t a n t  measures t h a t  
have been sugges t ed  as t he  b a s i s  o f  economi c c o - o p e r a t i o n  i n  
t h e  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  o f  copper  p r i c e s  i n c l u d e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
commodi t y  agreement s  embodyi ng both p r o d u c e r s  and e x p o r t e r s ,  
p r o d u c e r s '  a s s o c i a t i o n s ,  compensatory '  f i n a n c i n g  schemes,  
r e f o r m  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  m a r k e t i n g  a r r a n g e me n t s ,  and l ong 
t e r m g u a r a n t e e d  p r i c e  agr eement s .
22
CHAPTER TWO
BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF 
THE COPPER MARKETING SYSTEM FOR ZAMBIA
Th i s  c h a p t e r  exami nes t he  background and t he  h i s t o r i c a l  
deve l opment  o f  t h e  v a r i o u s  aspec t s  o f  t he  Zambian mi n i ng  
i n d u s t r y .  Such a background i s  necessa r y  i n  o r d e r  t o  grasp 
t he  prob l ems Zambia f ace s  i n  t he  ma r k e t i n g  o f  i t s  copper  
t o d a y .  I ssues  t h a t  w i l l  be d i s c u s s e d  here are t he  d e v e l o p ­
ment  o f  m i n e r a l  o wn e r s h i p ,  c o n t r o l  o f  p r o d u c t i o n ,  t he 
s t r u c t u r e  o f  t a x a t i o n  o f  t he  mi n i n g  compan i es ,  l e g i s l a t i o n  
aimed at  t he  r e g a i n i n g  o f  t he  p r o d u c t i o n  s t age  by t he 
s t a t e ,  l e g i s l a t i o n  aimed at  t h e  r e a s s e r t i o n  o f  t h e  r i g h t  
t o  o wner sh i p  o f  m i n e r a l s  by t h e  s t a t e ,  and l e g i s l a t i o n  aimed 
a t  t he  r e s t r u c t u r i n g  o f  t he  copper  m a r k e t i n g  a r r angement s .
I ( i ) Mi n e r a l  ownersh i  p
Under  t he  E n g l i s h  common l aw,  t he  p o s i t i o n  has a lways 
been t h a t  i n d i v i d u a l s  and compani es can a c q u i r e  m i n e r a l  
r i g h t s .  Th i s  p o s i t i o n  i s  a r e s u l t  o f  a l ong  s t a n d i n g  
p r i n c i p i e  o f  E n g l i s h  common l aw t h a t  r e c o g n i z e s  t h e  r i g h t  o f  
a l and  owner  over  e v e r y t h i n g  above,  upon and bel ow t he  s u r f a c e  
o f  h i s  1 and . ^
In Zambi a,  p r i o r  t o  t he  s t a r t  o f  c o l o n i a l  r u l e ,  l and  
and e v e r y t h i n g  above and under  i t  was owned by t he  t r i b a l  
g roups who o c c u p i e d  i t .  Th i s  j o i n t  owne r sh i p  was o n l y
1. H. W i l l i a m s ,  . . The Mi n i ng  Law o f  N o r t h e r n  Rhodes i a
London,  : : p . 29.
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s u b j e c t  t o  t he  a u t h o r i t y  o f  t he  t r i b a l  k i n g s  and c h i e f s
who were r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  see i ng  t h a t  l aw and custom were
2
obser ved  i n  i t s  use.  Under  t he  a u t h o r i t y  o f  t he se  r u l e r s ,  
one c o u l d  work t he  l and  f o r  a g r i c u l t u r e  or  m i n i n g  i n  
accor dance w i t h  t he  p r e v a i l i n g  l aws and cus t oms .
,The dawn o f  c o l o n i a l i s m  i n  Zambi  a . / her  al  ded a new
f
era i n  as f a r  as owner sh i p  o f  m i n e r a l s  was conc e r n e d .
European s e t t l e r s  and compani es embarked on a sear ch  f o r  
mi ne r a l  c o n c e s s i o n s  f r om t he  v a r i o u s  t r i b a l  a u t h o r i t i e s .
The p r ocess  o f  h u n t i n g  f o r  m i n e r a l s  i n  t h a t  p a r t  o f  A f r i c a  
had l i k e  i n  many o t h e r  p a r t s ,  been t r i g g e r e d  by t he  p rocess  
o f  i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n  i n  Europe.  The i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n  p r ocess  
i n  Europe had r e s u l t e d  i n t o  an i n c r e a s e d  demand f o r  raw 
m a t e r i a l s . t o  f eed  t he  i n c r e a s i n g  number o f  i n d u s t r i e s .  For  
i n d i v i d u a l  European c o u n t r i e s  t h i s  meant  a sea r ch  f o r  raw 
m a t e r i a l s  by way o f  c a r v i n g  spheres  o f  i n f l u e n c e  t h a t  
woul d e x c l u d e  o t h e r s .  In t hese  spheres  o f  i n f l u e n c e ,  a 
v i g o r o u s  sear ch  f o r  raw m a t e r i a l  was embarked on,  and i n  
t he  case o f  m i n e r a l s  t h i s  was t he  genes i s  o f  c o n c es s i o n  
h u n t e r s .
In t h e  area c o v e r i n g  t he  p r e s e n t  day . Zambi a  t h e  f i r s t  
s t ep  was f o r  t h e  co n c e s s i o n  h u n t e r s ,  bot h  compani es and 
i n d i v i d u a l s , t o  n e g o t i a t e  w i t h  t he  t r i b a l  r u l e r s  c o nc es s i o n  
agr eement s .  Many o f  t he  r e s u l t i n g  c o n c e s s i o n  agreements 
had g e n e r a l l y  t he  same e f f e c t  - t o  t r a n s f e r  m i n e r a l  owner sh i p  
f r om t he  t r i b a l  g roup t o  t he  compani es or  i n d i v i d u a l  s e t t l e r s .  
The most  i m p o r t a n t  c o n c es s i on  g r a n t e d  ‘was t h a t  g r a n t e d  by
2. A' Rober t s  , .,  A h i s t o r y  o f  Zambi  a , (  \
Hei  nemann, p . 1 44-1 45.
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Lewan i ka ,  t he  Ki ng o f  t h e  Lozi  . Linder t h i s  c o n c e s s i o n ,
t he  B r i t i s h  South A f r i c a n  company o b t a i n e d  t h e  owner sh i p
o f  m i n e r a l  r i g h t s  t o  an area t h a t  cover ed  v i r t u a l l y  t he
e n t i r e  wes t e r n  p o r t i o n  o f  Zambia.  In r e t u r n  f o r  t hese
r i g h t s ,  t he  company s i mp l y  made a p l edge t o  p r o t e c t  t he
Ki ng and h i s  s u b j e c t s  a g a i n s t  e x t e r n a l  a g g r e s s i o n  and an
3
annual  s u b s i d y  o f  £850 t o  t he  K i ng .  Th i s  p a t t e r n  of  
a c q u i r i n g  m i n e r a l  r i g h t s  was not  un i que  t o  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  
i n  t he  t e r r i t o r y  t h a t  now c o n s t i t u t e s  Zambi a.  Th i s  
p a t t e r n  had been f o l l o w e d  e l s e wh e r e .  For  exampl e ,  i n  
Zimbabwe i t  was t he  Rudd conces s i on  g r a n t e d  by C h i e f  
Lobengu l a  i n  1890 and l a t e r  passed t o  t h e  B r i t i s h  South 
A f r i c a n  company whi ch t r a n s f e r r e d  t he  m i n e r a l  o wne r sh i p  t o  
t h a t  company.  Under  t he  t erms o f  t h a t  c o n c e s s i o n ,  Lobengul a  
s i gned  away t h e  r i g h t s  o f  t he  Mat abe l e  peop l e  t o  m i n e r a l s  
i n  t h e i r  l and  i n  r e t u r n  f o r  a cons i gnment  o f  guns f r om t he
company.  A s i m i l a r  approach was f o l l o w e d  by t h e  East  I n d i a
company i n  I n d i a ,  i n  some p a r t s  o f  East  A f r i c a  and West 
A f r  i c a . ^
In t he  case o f  Zambi a,  t he  B r i t i s h  South A f r i c a n  
company (BSA) wh i ch  was a c h a r t e r e d  company whose c h a r t e r  
had t he  e f f e c t  o f  a u t h o r i s i n g  i t  t o  b r i n g  t he  c o n c es s i o n  
areas under  B r i t i s h  i n f l u e n c e  and t o  p roceed t o  a d m i n i s t e r  
them on b e h a l f  o f  t he  B r i t i s h  crown pr oceeded t o  e s t a b l i s h
5
an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  mach i ne r y  f o r  t he  t e r r i t o r y .
3. The Lewani ka c o n c e s s i o n s  o f  17th Oc t ober  1900 and 
11th August  1909 , R&pwdi<££dm iflA/illttin i$ The M i n i n g  Laws
o f  No r t h e r n  Rhode si  a , Append i x .
4.  f  * M • j6 ou r r  e t > Gold C o a s t , London
5. A> , A H i s t o r y  o f  Zamb i a , p.  157.
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The c on c e s s i o n  agreements t h a t  t r a n s f e r r e d  m i n e r a l  
r i g h t s  t o  t h e  BSA company have been c h a l l e n g e d  
f o r  a t  l e a s t  t h r e e  r easons .  F i r s t ,  t h a t  c o n c es s i o n s  
somet i mes cover ed  areas t o  whi ch t h e  i s s u i n g  t r i b a l  r u l e r  
had no a u t h o r i t y .  Th i s  c e r t a i n l y  appears t o  be t h e  case 
w i t h  t he  two Lewani ka c o nc es s i o ns  ment i oned  above.
Second l y ,  doubt s  have been exp r essed  as t o  whe t he r  t r i b a l  
r u l e r s  such as Lewani ka knew what  t h e y  were s i g n i n g  l e t  
a l one whe t he r  t h e y  knew t h a t  t h e y  were p a r t i n g  w i t h  m i n e r a l  
o wn e r s h i p .  T h i r d l y ,  doub t s  have been exp r essed  as t o  whe t he r  
Lewani ka f o r  exampl e ,  had t h e  mandate o f  h i s  s u b j e c t s  t o  
d i s p o s e  o f  m i n e r a l  r i g h t s  i n  t he  way he d i d .
These t h r e e  v i ews bear  a l o t  o f  r e l e v a n c e  t o  t he 
a t t i t u d e  o f  t h e  pos t  i n d ep e nd en t  Zambian gover nment  t owar ds  
mi n i n g  compani es whi ch  i t  c o n s i d e r e d  t o  have e x p l o i t e d  t he  
c o l o n i a l  s i t u a t i o n  t o  o b t a i n  mi n i ng  r i g h t s .
( i i ) B r i t i s h  C o l o n i a l  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  and 
m i n e r a l  r i g h t s  i n  t e r r i t o r i e s
The b e g i n n i n g  o f  t h e  1900s was c h a r a c t e r i s e d  by an 
i n c r e a s e d  i n t e r e s t  by t he  B r i t i s h  government  i n  a d m i n i s t e r ­
i ng  d i r e c t l y  t he  v a r i o u s  t e r r i t o r i e s  t h a t  had been b r o ug h t  
under  t h e i r  sphere  o f  i n f l u e n c e  by c o n c es s i o n  compan i es .  In 
Ghana f o r  exampl e ,  t he  B r i t i s h  government  d i s s a t i s f i e d  w i t h
t he  p o l i c y  o f  t h e  A f r i c a n  company b r o ug h t  t he  t e r r i t o r y
7under  d i r e c t  B r i t i s h  r u l e  i n  1874.  In Zambi a,  f o r  b a s i c a l l y  
s i m i l a r  r easons  as i n  Ghana,  t he  B r i t i s h  government  assumed
o
d i r e c t  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o f  t he  t e r r i t o r y  i n  1924.
6 . N o r t h e r n  Rhodes i a Hansard,  Number 60,  p . 336.
7. B r i t i s h  and F o r e i g n  pape r s ,  1894,  vol ume LXVI ,  p.  957 .
8 . A  * R o b e r ts  j A H i s t o r y  o f  Zamb i a , ( jT f k )  j> 182 r
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The manner  i n  whi ch t e r r i t o r i e s  were b r o u g h t  i n t o
d i r e c t  B r i t i s h  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  p l ayed  a d e c i s i v e  r o l e  i n  t he
n a t u r e  o f  t h e  m i n i n g  l aws r e g a r d i n g  mi n e r a l  r i g h t s .  ■ In
t he  case o f  t h o s e  t e r r i t o r i e s  d e s i g n a t e d  as c o l o n i e s ,
m i n e r a l  r i g h t s  were u s u a l l y  ves t ed  d i r e c t l y  i n  t h e  B r i t i s h
crown.  I n t h i s  case any g r a n t s  o f  l and  t o  c o l o n i a l  s e t t l e r s
and compani es r e s e r v e d  a l l  m i n e r a l  r i g h t s  i n  t h e  crown.
G e n e r a l l y  s p e a k i n g ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  owne r sh i p  o f  l and  i n  such
t e r r i t o r i e s  d i d  not  e n t a i l  owner sh i p  o f  m i n e r a l s .  Th i s  f a c t
was r e f l e c t e d  i n  a number o f  e a r l y  mi n i ng  l aws i n  a
number o f  B r i t i s h  t e r r i t o r i e s .  In Ghana f o r  exampl e ,  t he
Mi n e r a l  Or d i nance  o f  1936 ves t ed  a l l  t he  p r o p e r t y  i n  and
q
c o n t r o l  o f  a l l  m i n e r a l s  i n  t he  B r i t i s h  c rown.
The. second c a t e g o r y  o f  f o r me r  B r i t i s h  t e r r i t o r i e s  are
t h o s e  t h a t  f e l l  under  B r i t i s h  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  t h r o u g h  t he
League o f  Na t i o ns  mandate sys t em.  Under  t h i s  sys t em,
t e r r i t o r i e s  t h a t  had been a d m i n i s t e r e d  by Germany,  were
e n t r u s t e d  t o  c e r t a i n  government s  o f  t he  v i c t o r i o u s  a l l i e s  t o
a d m i n i s t e r  w i t h  a p l edge  t o  advance t he  t e r r i t o r i e s  t o
e v e n t u a l  s e l f  r u l e .  In t h e  B r i t i s h  mandat es ,  t h e  e a r l y
mi n i n g  laws v e s t e d  a l l  m i n e r a l  r i g h t s  i n  t h e  g o v e r n o r s  o f
t he  t e r r i t o r i e s  t o  be he l d  i n  t r u s t  f o r  t he  i n h a b i t a n t s  o f
t he  t e r r i t o r i e s .  An exampl e o f  a t e r r 1t o r y  t h a t  had been
a d m i n i s t e r e d  i n  t h i s  way was Tangan y i ka ,  now Ta n z a n i a .  The
f i r s t  m i n i n g  o r d i n a n c e  i n  t h a t  t e r r i t o r y  v e s t e d  a l l  m i n e r a l
1 0r i g h t s  i n  t h e  g o v e r n o r .
In t he  two c a t e g o r i e s  o f  t e r r i t o r i e s  above,  t h a t  i s  
t he  c o l o n i e s  and mandat es ,  t h e r e  was no q u e s t i o n  o f  an
9.  M i n e r a l  Or d i nance  o f  t h e  Gold Coas t ,  1936,  s e c t i o n  13.
10.  M i n e r a l  Or d i nance  o f  Ta n gan y i k a ,  1920,  s e c t i o n  22.
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i n d i v i d u a l  o r  company a c q u i r i n g  mi n e r a l  r i g h t s .  A l l  t h a t
co u l d  be a c q u i r e d  were m i n i n g  r i g h t s  i n  t h e  f o r m o f  a l ease
whi ch was a c q u i r e d  under  t he  t erms o f  t h e  l aws e x i s t i n g  at
t he  t i m e ,  and f o r  a d u r a t i o n  s p e c i f i e d  i n  t h e  l e a s e .  In
Ta n z a n i a ,  f o r  exampl e ,  one c o u l d  a c q u i r e  a m i n i n g  l ease
11t h a t  d i d  not  exceed t w e n t y  y ea r s  i n  d u r a t i o n .  In
Kenya,  t h e  l eases  were t o  run f o r  a p e r i o d  o f  between
f i v e  and t w e n t y - o n e  y e a r s ,  w h i l e  i n  Ghana t h e  l eases
1 2c o u l d  cove r  any p e r i o d  between one and 99 y e a r s .  Th i s  
p o s i t i o n  i n  t h e  two c a t e g o r i e s  o f  t e r r i t o r i e s  c o n t i n u e d  
unchanged u n t i l  t he  t i me  o f  i ndependence when t h e  new 
i n d e p e n d e n t  c o n s t i t u t i o n s  t r a n s f e r r e d  t he  m i n e r a l  r i g h t s  
t o  t he  newl y  c r e a t e d  s t a t e s .
11 . The Devel opment  o f  M i n e r a l  R i g h t s  
Legi  s i a t i  on
The deve l opmen t  o f  m i n e r a l  r i g h t s  l aws i n  Zambia
t ook  a s l i g h t l y  d i f f e r e n t  p a t t e r n  f r om t h o se  d i s c u s s e d
above.  U n t i l  1912 when t he  v e r y  f i r s t  m i n i n g  l e g i s l a t i o n
was p r omu l g a t e d  i n  t h e  f o r m o f  p r o c l a m a t i o n  number f i v e
o f  1912,  t h e  p o s i t i o n  was t h a t  a l l  m i n e r a l  r i g h t s  t o  a
v a s t  p o r t i o n  o f  t he  t e r r i t o r y  ves t ed  i n  t h e  B r i t i s h
South A f r i c a  company (BSA) .  The 1912 p r o c l a m a t i o n ,
e s s e n t i a l l y  v es t ed  t h e  r i g h t  t o  s ea r c h ,  mi ne,  and d i s p os e
1 3o f  a l l  m i n e r a l s  and mi n e r a l  o i l s  i n  t he  BSA.
The same l e g i s l a t i o n  gave t he  BSA t he  r i g h t  as
11. I b i d . , s e c t i o n  29.
12. Kenya Mi n i ng  Or d i nance  o f  1 940 s e c t i o n s  .39 and 43 and 
The Gold Coast  M i n e r a l  Or d i nance  o f  1936 s e c t i o n  37.
13.  Preambl e ,  The N o r t h e r n  Rhodesi a P r o c l a m a t i o n  number 5 
o f  1912.
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a d m i n i s t r a t o r  o f  t he  t e r r i t o r y ,  t o  g r a n t  p r o s p e c t i n g  and 
m i n e r a l  r i g h t s  t o  i n d i v i d u a l s  and compani es .
The agreement  by whi ch  t he  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o f  t he 
t e r r i t o r y  was t aken  over  by t h e  B r i t i s h  C o l o n i a l  O f f i c e  i n  
1924 s t r e n g t h e n e d  t he  BSA company ' s  l e g a l  p o s i t i o n  r e g a r d i n g  
mi n e r a l  r i g h t s .  In t h i s  agreement ,  t he  p a t t e r n  f o l l o w e d  
i n  o t h e r  B r i t i s h  a d m i n i s t e r e d  t e r r i t o r i e s  was not  f o l l o w e d ,  
and t he  company was a l l o we d  t o  r e t a i n  i t s  m i n e r a l  r i g h t s .
The t r a n s f e r  o f  t he  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t he  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o f  
No r t h e r n  Rhodes i a  f r om t he  hands o f  t he  company i n t o  t he  
hands o f  t he  B r i t i s h  C o l o n i a l  O f f i c e  d i d  not  t h e r e f o r e  
cause any s u b s t a n t i a l  change i n  t he  p o s i t i o n  o f  m i ne r a l  
r i g h t s  i n  t he  t e r r i t o r y .
The- f i r s t  change i n  t he  p o s i t i o n  o f  m i n e r a l  r i g h t s
i n  Zambia was made i n  1958 when l e g i s l a t i o n  was passed
v e s t i n g  own e r sh i p  o f  m i n e r a l s  i n  t he  B r i t i s h  c r own,  but
1 4s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  r i g h t s  o f  t he  BSA company.  As men t i oned  
above,  however ,  t h e  company owned p r a c t i c a l l y  a l l  m i n e r a l  
r i g h t s  i n  t he  t e r r i t o r y  e xcep t  perhaps t o  t he  e x t e n t  i t  
had d i s p o s e d  o f  such r i g h t s .  Th i s  be i ng  t he  case,  t he  1958
Or d i nance  woul d seem t o  have ves t ed  o n l y  r e s i d u a l  m i ne r a l
r i g h t s  t o  t he  c r own.  In o t h e r  words t he  company s t i l l  
owned t he  i m p o r t a n t  m i n e r a l  r i g h t s  and t h e  crown 
was o n l y - v e s t e d  w i t h  m i n e r a l  r i g h t s  i n  t h o s e  areas  where
t he  company had not  seen f i t  t o  s t ake  a c l a i m .
The most  i m p o r t a n t  m i n e r a l  r i g h t s  i n  N o r t h e r n  Rhodesi a 
c o n t i n u e d  t o  v e s t  i n  t h e  BSA company u n t i l  t h e  c o u n t r y
14. N o r t h e r n  Rhodes i a M i n i n g  (Amendment )  O r d i n a n c e ,  1958,  
s e c t i o n  6.
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ga i ned  i ndependence  i n  1964.  At  t he  t i me  o f  i ndependence ,  
t h e  new government  a c q u i r e d  t h e  company ' s  m i n e r a l  r i g h t s  and 
a £4 m i l l i o n  compensa t i on  was pa i d  t o  t h e  company by t he  
Zambian and B r i t i s h  government s  j o i n t l y .  I t  i s  o n l y  a t  t h i s  
p o i n t ,  i n  f a c t ,  t h a t  t h e  mi n e r a l  r i g h t s  became ves t ed  i n  
t he  s t a t e .  L e g i s l a t i o n  e f f e c t i n g  t h i s  change was enac t ed  
i n  1 965 . 1 5
One o f  t he  i m p o r t a n t  consequences o f  m i n e r a l  r i g h t s
be i ng  he l d  by t h e  BSA company and not  t he  B r i t i s h  crown as
i n  o t h e r  f o r m e r  B r i t i s h  c o l o n i e s ,  r e l a t e d  t o  t he  g r a n t  o f
mi n i n g  r i g h t s .  A l l  l e g i s l a t i o n  enac t ed  i n  Zambia d u r i n g  t he
c o l o n i a l  p e r i o d  d e a l t  w i t h  t he  system o f  a c q u i r i n g ,  h o l d i n g ,
and t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  m i n i ng  r i g h t s .  Si nce t h e  company owned
mi n e r a l  r i g h t s  i n  v i r t u a l l y  t he  whol e t e r r i t o r y ,  l e g i s l a t i o n
passed d u r i n g  t h a t  t i me  gave t he  r i g h t  t o  g r a n t  p r o s p e c t i n g
and mi n i n g  r i g h t s  t o  t h e  company.  A mi n i n g  r i g h t  cou l d
t h e r e f o r e  be a c q u i r e d  o n l y  by o b t a i n i n g  a p r o s p e c t i n g  r i g h t
1 6or  s p e c i a l  g r a n t  f r om t he  company.  The power  o f  t he  
company t o  i s s u e  mi n i n g  r i g h t s  was v e r y  i m p o r t a n t  i n  t h a t  
i t  a l l o we d  t he  company t o  c o n t r o l  t he  p r o d u c t i o n  p rocess  
and t he  p a t t e r n  o f  i n v e s t me n t  i n  t he  m i n i n g  i n d u s t r y  i n  
Zambi  a .
The owner sh i p  o f  m i n e r a l s  gave t h e  company a f u r t h e r  
aspec t  o-f c o n t r o l  over  t h e  mi n i ng  i n d u s t r y  i n  t h a t  c o u n t r y ,  
t h a t  i s ,  t h e  power  t o  c o l l e c t  a s u b s t a n t i a l  p o r t i o n  o f  t he  
r evenue a c c r u i n g  f r om t h e  mi n i n g  a c t i v i t i e s  i n  t h e  f o r m o f  
r o y a l t i e s  and o t h e r  r e n t s .  The company ' s  c o n t r o l  o f
15. Act  N o . 5 o f  1965.
16.  The N o r t h e r n  Rhodes i a Mi n i n g  P r o c l a m a t i o n  o f  1912,  
s e c t i o n s  6,  7,  9,  11,  13 and 14.
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p r o d u c t i o n  and i n v e s t m e n t  i s  d i s c u s s e d  l a t e r  on i n  t he  
c h a p t e r  under  t h e  head i n g ,  " c o n t r o l  o f  p r o d u c t i o n " ,  and 
t he  i s s u e  o f  r o y a l t i e s  i s  d i s c u s s e d  i m m e d i a t e l y  a f t e r  t h i s  
s e c t i o n  under  t h e  head i ng  o f  " m i n e r a l  t a x a t i o n  i n  Zambi a" .
I t  w i l l  s u f f i c e  here t o  ment i on  t h a t  t h e  p a t t e r n  o f  
m i n e r a l  own e r sh i p  t h a t  Zambia e x p e r i e n c e d  d u r i n g  t he  
c o l o n i a l  p e r i o d  had i m p o r t a n t  consequences i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  
t h e  c o n t r o l  Oiu L t in a t  i onal  c o r p o r a t i o n s  were i n  l a t e r  ye a r s  
t o  e x e r c i s e  on t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  p r o c e s s ,  i n v e s t m e n t  p a t t e r n ,  
and m a r k e t i n g  a r r angement s  i n  t he  mi n i n g  i n d u s t r y .  Indeed 
t h i s  d i c t a t e d  t o  a g r e a t  e x t e n t  t he  p a t t e r n  o f  t he  l e g a l  
measures t he  i nd e p e nde n t  s t a t e  t ook  t o  r e g a i n  c o n t r o l  o f  t he  
mi n i ng  p r o d u c t i o n ,  i n v e s t m e n t ,  t a x a t i o n ,  and t h e  ma r k e t i n g  
a r r angement s  f o r  i t s  m i n i n g  i n d u s t r y .  These measures are 
d i s c u s s e d  i n  d e t a i l  i n  t he  f o l l o w i n g  t h r e e  s e c t i o n s .
I I I .  The Devel opment  o f  M i n e r a l  T a x a t i o n  
Legi  s i a t i  on
( i ) M i n e r a l  T a x a t i o n  i n  gene r a l
Revenue d e r i v e d  by a government  f r om e x p l o i t a t i o n  o f  
m i n e r a l  r e s o u r c e s  i n  any one c o u n t r y  u s u a l l y  f a l l s  i n t o  one 
o f  t he  f o l l o w i n g  c l a s s e s :  l i c e n c e  f e e s ,  r e n t s ,  r o y a l t i e s ,  
t a x e s ,  and e x p o r t  d u t i e s .  The usual  p r a c t i c e  i s  t h a t  f ees  
are char ged f o r  a s e r v i c e  r ende r ed  or  f o r  an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  
a c t i o n  t a k e n  by t he  gover nmen t .  R o y a l t i e s ,  on t he  o t h e r  
hand,  are u s u a l l y  l e v i e d  as a pe r c en t a g e  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  w h i l e  
t a x e s  are u s u a l l y  l e v i e d  on t he  i ncome t h a t  acc r ues  t o  t he  
mi n i ng  e n t e r p r i s e  as a r e s u l t  o f  t he  e x p l o i t a t i o n  o f  t he  
m i n e r a l s .  E x p o r t  d u t i e s  are r e a l l y  s e l f  e x p l a n a t o r y  and
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1 7are l e v i e d  on t h e  m i n e r a l s  e x p o r t e d .
In f o r me r  B r i t i s h  c o l o n i e s ,  two p a t t e r n s  o f  m i n e r a l
t a x a t i o n  were f o l l o w e d .  The f i r s t  p a t t e r n  was f o l l o w e d  i n
t hose  c o l o n i e s  and t e r r i t o r i e s  where m i n e r a l  r i g h t s  were
v e s t ed  i n  t he  crown or  i n  t he  c o l o n i a l  Gover nor  on b e h a l f
o f  t he  peop l e  o f  t he  t e r r i t o r y .  The second p a t t e r n  was
f o l l o w e d  by t hose  t e r r i t o r i e s  where mi n e r a l  r i g h t s  were
ves t ed  i n  c o n c e s s i o n  compani es as was t h e  case i n  No r t h e r n
Rhodes i a ,  now Zambi a.  In both cases however ,  p r o v i s i o n s
g o v e r n i n g  t h e  payment  o f  r e n t s ,  r o y a l t i e s  and e x p o r t  d u t i e s ,
were u s u a l l y  embodi ed i n  l aws s p e c i f i c a l l y  d e a l i n g  w i t h  t he
e x p l o i t a t i o n  o f  m i n e r a l  r e s o u r c e s  w h i l e  t h os e  d e a l i n g  w i t h
1 8t a x e s  were embodi ed i n  t he  gene r a l  l aws on i ncome t a x .
The. n a t u r e  o f  t he  mi n i n g  t a x a t i o n  l aws f o r  any c o u n t r y  
are d i c t a t e d  by t he  s o c i o - e c o n o mi c  p o l i c i e s  t h a t  t he  
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  se t s  i t s e l f  t o  a c h i e v e .  Once t h e  p o l i c i e s  
have been i d e n t i f i e d ,  t h e  a c t u a l  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  t h e  l aws 
d e a l i n g  w i t h  t he  t a x a t i o n  o f  m i n e r a l  r e s o u r c e s  demon s t r a t es  
two i m p o r t a n t  f a c e t s .  F i r s t ,  t h e y  se t  ou t  r u l e s  as t o  who 
must  pay t he  t a x ,  and s e c on d l y  i n  what  r e s p e c t .
The manner  i n  wh i ch  t h e  s o c i o - e c o n o mi c  p o l i c i e s  d i c t a t e  
t he  p a t t e r n  o f  m i n e r a l  t a x a t i o n  l aws can be e x e m p l i f i e d  by 
an e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  t he  m i n e r a l  t a x a t i o n  l aws o f  Zambia d u r i n g  
t he  c o l o n i a l  days and a f t e r  i ndependence .  Th i s  i s  i m p o r t a n t  
i n  t he  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  t h e  t a x a t i o n  measures t h a t  have been 
t aken  by t h e  Zambian government  i n  an e f f o r t  t o  o b t a i n  a
17.  Un i t e d  N a t i o n s ,  Survey  o f  Mi n i n g  L e g i s l a t i o n  M inera l
Resources Devel opment  S e r i e s ,  Number 9,  New York ,
UN Sal es  No. 1 9 5 7 . I I . F . 5.
18. See f o r  exampl e ,  s e c t i o n s  59 and 60 o f  t h e  No r t h e r n
Rhodes i a M i n i n g  P r o c l a m a t i o n  o f  1912.
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g r e a t e r  p o r t i o n  o f  t he  p r o f i t s  t h a t  acc r ued  t o  t h e  mi n i n g  
compani es and how i t  has gone about  i mp l e me n t i n g  them.
( i i ) M i ne r a l  T a x a t i o n  L e g i s l a t i o n  i n  Zambia 
p r i o r  t o  1924
Up and u n t i l  1924,  m i n e r a l  r i g h t s  i n  t he  area now
known as Zambia were ves t ed  i n  t he  BSA company.  These
r i g h t s  were r e c o g n i z e d  by t he  f i r s t  m i n i n g  l e g i s l a t i o n ,
t h a t  i s  t h e  1912 Mi n i n g  P r o c l a m a t i o n .  P r i o r  t o  t h i s
l e g i s l a t i o n ,  t he  company c o u l d  g r a n t  p r o s p e c t i n g  l i c e n c e s
and m i n i n g  r i g h t s  t o  i n d i v i d u a l s  by means o f  an exchange o f  
1 9l e t t e r s .  The t e r ms  and c o n d i t i o n s  o f  such g r a n t s  i n c l u d e d
a number o f  aspec t s  r e g u l a t i n g  t he  p o s i t i o n s  o f  t h e  company
v i s - a - v i s  t h e  p r o s p e c t o r  o r  m i n e r .  Some o f  t h e  most  i m p o r t a n t
i s s ue s  i n  t he s e  exchange o f  l e t t e r s  i n c l u d e d  t h e  o b l i g a t i o n
o f  t he  g r a n t e e  t o  pay r o y a l t i e s  and c e r t a i n  f e e s  t o  t he
company and an o b l i g a t i o n  on t he  g r a n t e e  t o  o f f e r  t he  company
30 t o  50 p e r c e n t  o f  t he  e q u i t y  o f  any company e s t a b l i s h e d
20t o  work a d i s c o v e r y .
A l t h o u g h  t h e  p o s i t i o n  i n  Zambia up t o  1924 i s  s a i d  t o  
have been based on t h e  mi n i n g  l aws t hen i n  e x i s t e n c e  i n 
Sou t he r n  Rhodes i a (now Zi mbabwe) ,  t he  i s s ue  o f  m i n e r a l  
t a x a t i o n  seems t o  have f o l l o w e d  d i f f e r e n t  p a t t e r n s  i n  t he  
two t e r r i t o r i e s .  In Zambia t he  q u e s t i o n  o f  r o y a l t i e s  
was d e 1i b e r a t e l y  1e f t  t o  be de t e r mi n ed  as a m a t t e r  o f  
c o n t r a c t  between company as g r a n t o r  o f  m i n i n g  r i g h t s  and t he
19.  See f o r  exampl e,  c o n c es s i o n  t o  F.R.  Burnham e t c . ,  
Ge o l o g i c a l  Surveys  Depar t men t ,  Lusaka.
20.  L e t t e r  f r om t h e  BSA company t o  N o r t h e r n  Rhodes i a 
t e r r i t o r i e s  BSA E x p l o r a t i o n  Company L t d .  da t ed  17th 
A p r i l  1899.  BSA R e g i s t e r  o f  t i t l e s ,  G e o l o g i c a l  Survey 
Depa r t men t ,  Lusaka.
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g r a n t e e  o f  such r i g h t s .  Th i s  a l l o wed  t he  company t o
vK
d e t e r m i n e  t h e  r a t e  o f  r o y a l t y  and who shou l d  pay tl>em.
Th i s  g r e a t l y  enhanced t h e  power o f  t he  company i n  shap i ng
t he  p a t t e r n  o f  i n v e s t me n t  i n  t h a t  c o u n t r y ' s  m i n i n g  i n d u s t r y .
In Sou t her n  Rhodes i a (now Zi mbabwe) ,  where t h e  same
company owned m i n e r a l  r i g h t s  up t o  1933,  m i n i n g  l e g i s l a t i o n
had been passed s p e c i f i c a l l y  d e a l i n g  w i t h  t h e  i s s u e  o f
21mi n e r a l  r o y a l t i e s  and o t h e r  f e e s .  The 1907 M i n i n g  Or d i nance
i n  t h a t  c o u n t r y ,  f o r  exampl e ,  made p r o v i s i o n  f o r  t h e  wo r k i n g
22o f  a b l o c k  o f  c l a i m s  f o r  p r o f i t .  The c l a i m  h o l d e r  who 
embarked on m i n i n g  f o r  p r o f i t  was r e q u i r e d  t o  e i t h e r  pay 
r o y a l t i e s  t o  t h e  company,  l e v i e d  on a s l i d i n g  s c a l e  v a r y i n g  
f r om two and a h a l f  p e r c e n t  t o  1 \ per  cen t  o f  t he  o u t p u t ,  
o r  o f f e r  t h e  company a 30 per  cen t  u n d i v i d e d  i n t e r e s t  i n  
t he  c l a i m  i n  l i e u  o f  r o y a l t y  payment .
The d i f f e r e n c e  i n  approach i n  t he  two c o u n t r i e s  woul d 
seem t o  r e f l e c t  t h e  company ' s  p o l i c i e s  t owar ds  t he  two 
t e r r i t o r i e s  at  t h e  t i m e .  At  t he  t i m e ,  N o r t h e r n  Rhodes i a 
had j u s t  been opened t o  p r o s p e c t o r s  and t h e r e f o r e  o n l y  a 
few mi nes had a c t u a l l y  been l o c a t e d .  The company was eager  
t o  a t t r a c t  more p r o s p e c t o r s  by g i v i n g  them i n c e n t i v e s .
One o f  t h e se  i n c e n t i v e s  came i n  t he  f o r m o f  v a r y i n g  r o y a l t y  
payment s .  In Sou t he r n  Rhodes i a however ,  t he  mi n i n g  i n d u s t r y  
had a l r e a d y  made g r e a t  s t r i d e s  and had shown s t e a d i e r  pr omi se  
o f  success whi ch  t h e  company was r eady t o  e x p l o i t  i n  t he  f o r m
2 1 .  C  H e f i U j e  ( j q ^ l )  7be fte u  ,
' LfodLondon ? p, r f  4- -..
22.  Sou t her n  Rhodes i a  Mi n i ng  Or d i n an c e ,  1907,  s e c t i o n  12.
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2 3o f  r o y a l t i e s .  The company p r i m a r i l y  l ooked  t o  t h e  m i n e r a l
we a l t h  o f  t h i s  t e r r i t o r y  t o  g i v e  i t  adequat e  r e t u r n s  on i t s  
24c a p i t a l .  For  t h i s  r e a s on ,  i t  was ne c es s a r y  t o  have s p e c i f i c  
t a x a t i o n  f o r m u l a e  embodied i n  t he  mi n i n g  l e g i s l a t i o n .
The b a s i s  o f  m i n e r a l  t a x a t i o n  i n  Zambia up t o  1924 
was t h e r e f o r e ,  t he  r o y a l t y  p r o v i s i o n s  embodi ed i n  t h e  v a r i o u s  
p r o s p e c t i n g  g r a n t s  and s p e c i a l  mi n i ng  g r a n t s  made by t he 
company.  I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  assess t he  e x t e n t  o f  t he  
r evenue t he  BSA company r e c e i v e d  by way o f  r o y a l t i e s  
m a i n l y  because many p r o s p e c t i n g  g r a n t s  were never  p r o p e r l y  
kep t  by t he  company and have over  t he  y e a r s  v an i s h e d  w i t h o u t  
t r a c e .  One t h i n g  t h a t  i s  c l e a r  however ,  i s  t h a t  wha t eve r  
t h e  company r e c e i v e d t h r o u g h  r o y a l t i e s  must  have been 
s u b s t a n t i a l  a l t h o u g h  not  many mines had r eached p r o d u c t i o n  
s t age i n t he  t e r r i t o r y  by 1924.  Thus f o r  exampl e ,  t he  r e p o r t  
o f  t he  23rd o r d i n a r y  g ene r a l  meet i ng  o f  t he  company he l d  on 
J u l y  24,  1919 i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t he  company ' s  i ncome f r om 
r o y a l t i e s  i n  N o r t h e r n  Rhodes i a f o r  t h a t  y e a r  amounted t o  
£105 , 600 .
( i i i ) M i n e r a l  T a x a t i o n  L e g i s l a t i o n  
between 1924 and 1964
The p o s i t i o n  r e g a r d i n g  m i ne r a l  r o y a l t i e s  i n  N o r t h e r n  
Rhodes i a was not  changed by t he  t r a n s f e r  o f  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
o f  t h e  t e r r i t o r y  f r om t h e  company t o  t he  B r i t i s h  C o l o n i a l  
O f f i c e -  i n  1924.  The Dev o n s h i r e  agreement  t h a t  e f f e c t e d  t he  
t r a n s f e r  mer e l y  r e c o g n i z e d  t he  company ' s  t i t l e  t o  m i n e r a l
23.  Repor t  o f  t he  BSA company,  10th O r d i n a r y  General  Meet i ng  
he l d  on 22nd November 1905.  BSA Repo r t s  o f  General  
Me e t i n g s ,  London,  p . 8.
24.  I b i d . ,  a t  page 6.
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r i g h t s  i n  t he  t e r r i t o r y  and a l l o wed  t he  company t o  r e t a i n  
25t h i s  r i g h t .  The company ' s  r e t e n t i o n  o f  t h e  m i n e r a l  r i g h t s  
appears  t o  have r e s u l t e d  f r om an e a r l i e r  d e c i s i o n  o f  t he  
P r i v y  Counc i l  r e g a r d i n g  t he  owner sh i p  o f  l and i n  Sout hern  
Rhodes i a .  In t h e  P r i v y  C o u n c i l ' s  d e c i s i o n ,  t h e  Counc i l  
was o f  t h e  o p i n i o n  t h a t  l and i n  Sou t her n  Rhodes i a  was 
owned by t he  crown and t he  company had a l l  a l ong  ac t ed  as 
an agent  o f  t h e  crown i n  t he  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o f  t h a t  t e r r i t o r y .  
For  i t s  r eward  i n  t he  work i t  had done i n  t h a t  t e r r i t o r y ,  
t he  company was t o  l ook  t o  i t s  acknowl edged m i n e r a l  r i g h t s .
On t he  b a s i s  o f  t h i s  r e a s o n i n g  i t  woul d seem, t h e  B r i t i s h  
government  was w i 11i ng  t o  l e t  t he  company r e t a i n  i t s  m i n e r a l  
r i g h t s  i n  N o r t h e r n  Rhodes i a a f t e r  1924.
The r e t e n t i o n  o f  m i n e r a l  r i g h t s  by t h e  company and 
t he  assumpt i on  o f  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  powers by t he  c o l o n i a l  
o f f i c e  meant  t h a t  t h e r e  were now two i m p o r t a n t  f o r c e s  as 
f a r  as m i n e r a l  t a x a t i o n  was concer ned .  The h o l d e r s  o f  
m i n e r a l  r i g h t s ,  t h a t  i s ,  t he  BSA company c o n t i n u e d  t o  l e v y  
r o y a l t i e s ,  w h i l e  t he  l o c a l  c o l o n i a l  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  l e v i e d  
o t h e r  t a x es  whi ch i n c l u d e d  o r d i n a r y  i ncome t a x  on t he  m i n i n g  
compani es and t a x  on t he  r o y a l t i e s  r e c e i v e d  by t he  BSA 
company.  The l e g i s l a t i o n  passed a f t e r  1924 t h e r e f o r e ,  
c o n c e n t r a t e d  on d e f i n i n g  t he  n a t u r e  or  scope o f  i ncome f rom 
mi n i ng  t h a t  was t o  be s u b j e c t e d  t o  t a x  and t h e  r a t e s  o f  such 
t a x a t i o n .  Th i s  meant  t h a t  t h e r e  were two b a s i s  f o r  t he 
t a x a t i o n  i n  t he  mi n i ng  i n d u s t r y  i n  t he t e r r i t o r y .  F i r s t ,  
t h e r e  was t a x a t i o n  based on p r o d u c t i o h  whi ch  was l e v i e d  by 
t h e  company i n  t h e  f o r m o f  r o y a l t i e s ,  and s e c o n d l y , i n c o me
25.  / \  , R d ., A H i s t o r y  o f  Zamb i a , p -182-
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t a x  l e v i e d  by t he  c o l o n i a l  gover nment .  Income t a x a t i o n  
however ,  p l ayed  o n l y  a mi no r  r o l e  i n  t h e  r evenue o f  t he  
c o l o n i a l  government  b e f o r e  t he  Second Wor l d  War.  Th i s  
f a c t o r  mi gh t  e x p l a i n  t he  l a c k  o f  s u b s t a n t i a l  and e l a b o r a t e  
i ncome t a x  l e g i s l a t i o n  i n  t he  t e r r i t o r y  p r i o r  t o  1945.
In o t h e r  f o r me r  B r i t i s h  c o l o n i e s ,  t he  p o s i t i o n  
r e g a r d i n g  m i n e r a l  t a x a t i o n  was not  as c o m p l i c a t e d  as t he  
case was i n N o r t h e r n  Rhodes i a .  For  exampl e ,  i n  Sout her n  
Rhodes i a ,  m i n e r a l  r i g h t s  had by 1933 passed t o  t he  l o c a l  
gover nment .  In t hese  c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  t he  government  o f  t he  
t e r r i t o r y  c o l l e c t e d  both r o y a l t i e s  and i ncome t a x .
The f i r s t  i ncome t a x  l e g i s l a t i o n  i n  No r t h e r n
Rhodes i a t h a t  a f f e c t e d  i ncome f r om t he mi nes was t he
Income Tax Or d i nance  o f  1 9 2 1 . ^  Th i s  Or d i nance  governed
a l l  i ncome t a x a t i o n  a r r angement  i n  t he  t e r r i t o r y  u n t i l
1926 when i t  was r e p e a l e d  by t he  Income Tax Or d i nance
number 18 o f  t h a t  y e a r .  The 1926 Or d i nance  p r o v i d e d  t he
gene r a l  s t r u c t u r e  f o r  company and pe r sona l  t a x a t i o n  i n  t he
t e r r i t o r y  u n t i l  1953 when new ar rangement s  were made w i t h i n
t he  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t he  newl y  c r e a t e d  F e d e r a t i o n  o f  Rhodes i a 
? 7and Nyasa l and .
A g ene r a l  s u r vey  o f  t he  1921 Income Tax Or d i nance  and 
t he  1926 Or d i nance  r e v e a l s  one i n t e r e s t i n g  p o i n t .  F i r s t ,  
t hese  Or d i n a n c e s ,  l i k e  t hose  f ound i n  many o t h e r  f o r me r  
B r i t i s h  t e r r i t o r i e s ,  d i d  not  p r o v i d e  any c o n c e p t u a l  d e f i n i ­
t i o n  o f  i ncome but  mer e l y  enumerated t he  i t ems  whi ch were
26.  No r t h e r n  Rhodes i a Income Tax Or d i n a n c e .  Or d i nance 
N o . 13 o f  1921 .
27.  F e d e r a t i o n  o f  Rhodes i a and Nyasa l and ,  Ac t  No. 16
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c o n s i d e r e d  t o  be i ncome.  The reasons f o r  t h i s  l a c k  o f  a 
c o n c e p t u a l  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  i ncome appear  t o  have been 
h i s t o r i c a l .  The two s t a t u t e s  were based on t h e  Un i t e d  
Kingdom income t a x  l aws e x i s t i n g  at  t he  t i m e .  The Un i t e d  
Kingdom s t a t u t e s  d i d  not  a t t e mp t  t o  d e f i n e  i ncome but  were 
c o n t e n t  w i t h  me r e l y  en umer a t i ng  c e r t a i n  t y p e s  o f  i ncome.
Si nce t h e  l e g i s l a t i v e  d r a f t s me n  f o r  c o l o n i a l  l e g i s l a t i o n  
were based i n  t h e  C o l o n i a l  O f f i c e  i n  London,  t h i s  approach 
was e a s i l y  i mp o r t e d  i n t o  t he  c o l o n i e s .
The two income t a x  o r d i n a n c e s  i n  N o r t h e r n  Rhodes i a 
d e f i n e d  i ncome as i n c l u d i n g  any g a i n s ,  p r o f i t s ,  d i v i d e n d s ,  
i n t e r e s t s ,  r e n t ,  r o y a l t i e s ,  and premi ums.  Th i s  d e f i n i t i o n  
o f  i ncome enab l ed  t he  c o l o n i a l  government  i n  t h e  t e r r i t o r y ,  
no t  onl y,  t o  t a x  t h e  p r o f i t s  o f  t he  m i n i n g  compani es but  
a l s o  r o y a l t i e s  a c c r u i n g  t o  t he  BSA company.
The r a t e s  o f  company t a x a t i o n  i n  most  B r i t i s h  a d m i n i s ­
t e r e d  t e r r i t o r i e s  were v e r y  l ow.  For  exampl e ,  i n  Kenya and
Uganda d u r i n g  t he  c o l o n i a l  e r a ,  t he  r a t e  o f  i ncome t a x  l e v i e d
28on t he  company p r o f i t s  was 27 per  c e n t .  S i m i l a r l y ,  i n 
N o r t h e r n  Rhodes i a  t h e  company t a x  r a t e  was about  37 per  cen t  
by 1959.  Thus a l t h o u g h  t he  c o l o n i a l  government  had power t o  
t a x  t he  i ncome o f  mi n i n g  compani es ,  t he  l ow r a t e  o f  t a x a t i o n  
made i t  p o s s i b l e  f o r  t he  compani es t o  c o n t i n u e  r e t a i n i n g  l a r g e  
p o r t i o n s  o f  t h e  p r o f i t s .  These p r o f i t s  d i d  no t  b e n e f i t  t he  
t e r r i t o r i e s  concer ned  but  t he  s h a r e h o l d e r s  i n  t he  compan i es .  
The t e r r i t o r i a l  g o v e r n me n t ' s  f a i l u r e  t o  c a p t u r e  a s u b s t a n t i a l  
amount  o f  t h e  p r o f i t s  earned by t he  mi n i n g  compani es and
28.  O r g a n i s a t i o n  f o r  European Economic C o - o p e r a t i o n ,
T a x a t i o n  Systems a p p l i c a b l e  t o  i n v e s t m e n t s  i n  t he  
ove r seas  c o u n t r i e s  as s o c i a t e d ,  w i t h  member c o u n t r i e s  
o f  0 . E . E . C . , vol  ume 1 , P a r i s  , ^bd^HpTSTT”
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t he  r o y a l t i e s  earned by t he  BSA company does e x p l a i n  t he  
n a t u r e  o f  t he  t a x a t i o n  changes i n t r o d u c e d  by t h e  p o s t -  
i ndependence g o v e r n me n t . Be f o r e  d i s c u s s i n g  t he  t a x a t i o n  
system a f t e r  i ndependence ,  i t  woul d be w o r t h w h i l e  t o  d i s c u s s  
a n o t h e r  i m p o r t a n t  m i n e r a l  t a x a t i o n  phase,  WhteH o b t a i n e d  
d u r i n g  t he  l i f e  o f  t he  F e d e r a t i o n  o f  Rhodes i a and Nyasal and 
t o  whi ch No r t h e r n  Rhodes i a was a p a r t y .
I V . M i n e r a l  t a x a t i o n  ar rangement s  i n  t he
F e d e r a t i o n  o f  Rhodes i a and Nyasal and
The p r ob l em o f  m i n e r a l  r evenue t a x a t i o n  was made even 
more c o m p l i c a t e d  by t he  c r e a t i o n  o f  t he  F e d e r a t i o n  o f  
Rhodes i a and Nyasa l and i n  1953.  The t a x a t i o n  a r r angement  
i n  t h e  F e d e r a t i o n  was such t h a t  a l l  moneys a r i s i n g  f r om income 
t a x  and customs d u t i e s  l e v i e d  f r om 1954 were t o  be pa i d  i n  a 
c o n s o l i d a t e d  f und  by a l l  t he  t h r e e  c o n s t i t u e n t  t e r r i t o r i e s ,
2 9t h a t  i s  N o r t h e r n  Rhodes i a ,  Sou t her n  Rhodes i a and Nyasa l and .
The moneys i n  t he  c o n s o l i d a t e d  f und  were t hen  t o  be d i s t r i ­
buted amongst  t he  t h r e e  t e r r i t o r i e s  i n  t he  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  17% 
t o  No r t h e r n  Rhodes i a ,  13% t o  Sou t her n  Rhodes i a  and 6% t o  
N y a s a l a n d .
The i n a d e q u a t e  N o r t h e r n  Rhodes i a t a x a t i o n  r a t e s  on 
t he  i ncome o f  t h e  mi n i n g  compani es coup l ed  w i t h  t he  Federa l  
a r r angement s  c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  t he  d r a i n  o f  copper  r evenue f r om 
t h a t  t e r r i t o r y  whi ch  went  t o  f i n a n c e  t h e  o t h e r  two c o n s t i t u e n t  
t e r r i t o r i e s  i n  t he  F e d e r a t i o n ,  and t o  t h e  s h a r e h o l d e r s  i n  t he 
two mi n i n g  compani es who were ma i n l y  B r i t i s h ,  Amer i can and 
South A f r i c a n .  I t  was i n  an e f f o r t  t o  check t h i s  d r a i n  t h a t  t he
29.  The T e r r i t o r i a l  Revenue ( i ncome t a x  and customs d u t i e s )  
D i s t r i b u t i o n  A c t ,  1954,  s e c t i o n  3 ( 2 ) .
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Zambian government  i n t r o d u c e d  new t a x  l e g i s l a t i o n  a f t e r  
i ndependence .
V. . M i n e r a l  T a x a t i o n  l e g i s l a t i o n  i n  
pos t  i ndependence Zambia 
( a ) Roy a_l_t^es^
The f i r s t  ma j o r  s t ep  t aken by t he  pos t  i ndependence 
government  was t o  e f f e c t  a change i n  t h e  r o y a l t y  system 
a f f e c t i n g  t h e  mi n i n g  i n d u s t r y .  To ach i eve  t h i s  t h e  g o v e r n ­
ment had f i r s t  o f  a l l  t o  r epossess  m i ne r a l  r i g h t s  f r om t he  BSA 
30company.  An Ac t  o f  P a r l i a m e n t  was passed r e p o s s e s s i n g
mi n e r a l  r i g h t s  and v e s t i n g  them i n  t he  P r e s i d e n t  o f  t he
R e p u b l i c .  A l t h o u g h  t h i s  Ac t  ves t ed  mi n e r a l  r i g h t s  i n  t he
P r e s i d e n t  on b e h a l f  o f  t h e  s t a t e ,  l a r g e  m i n i n g  areas
remai ned s u b j e c t  t o  mi n i n g  r i g h t s  whi ch were he l d  i n
p e r p e t u i t y  by v a r i o u s  mi n i n g  compani es .  The government
c o u l d  t h e r e f o r e  not  c o m p u l s o r i l y  a c q u i r e  t h e s e  areas w i t h o u t
i n f r i n g i n g  t he  i ndependence c o n s t i t u t i o n  whi ch  p r o t e c t e d
31t he  r i g h t s  o f  t h e  compani es .  I t  was o f  cou r se  w i t h i n  t he  
powers o f  t he  government  t o  amend t he c o n s t i t u t i o n  excep t  
t h a t  t he  p r o v i s i o n  p r o t e c t i n g  t he  mi n i ng  compani es were 
en t r e n c h e d  and r e q u i r e d  a r e f e r endum b e f o r e  an amendment 
c o u l d  be e f f e c t e d .  De s p i t e  t h i s  h a nd i c a p ,  t he  v e s t i n g  o f  
m i ne r a l  r i g h t s  i n  t h e  s t a t e  enab l ed  t he  government  t o  g r a n t  
p r o s p e c t i n g  and mi n i n g  r i g h t s  on t hose  areas  t h a t  had not  
a l r e a d y  been a s u b j e c t  o f  mi n i n g  r i g h t s .
An o t h e r  i m p o r t a n t  aspec t  o f  t h i s  change was t o  enab l e  
t he  government  t o  c o l l e c t  m i n e r a l  r o y a l t i e s .  Under  s e c t i o n  3
30.  Ac t  number 5 o f  1965.
31.  Zambian i ndependence  c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  s e c t i o n  18.
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par agr aph  4 o f  Act  number 5 o f  1965,  a l l  i n s t r u m e n t s
r e q u i r i n g  payment  o f  r e n t ,  r o y a l t i e s  and f ees  were t o  be
r egar ded  as hav i ng  been conc l uded  w i t h  t he  government  and 
were t h e r e f o r e  t o  be pa i d  t o  t he  gover nment .  By t he  use o f  
i t s  l e g i s l a t i v e  power t h e  pos t  i ndependence government  
was ab l e  t o  check t he  d r a i n  o f  t he  i ncome a c c r u i n g  
f r om i t s  s i n g l e  most  i m p o r t a n t  n a t u r a l  r e s o u r c e ,  m i n e r a l s .
In t h i s  way i t  became p o s s i b l e  f o r  t he  s t a t e  t o  r ecoup a 
l a r g e r  p e r c en t a g e  o f  i ncome f r om i t s  m i n e r a l  w e a l t h .
The b a s i s  f o r  c a l c u l a t i n g  r o y a l t y  p ayab l e  t o  t he  g o v e r n ­
ment  remai ned t h e  same f o r m u l a  t h a t  had been used by t he  BSA
company.  Ac c o r d i n g  t o  t he  f o r m u l a  a 13|% l e v y  was c o l l e c t e d
by t he  government  on t he  p r i c e  o f  copper  l es s  K16. The 
p r i c e  f o r  purposes  o f  t h i s  f o r m u l a  was c a l c u l a t e d  on a 
mo n t h l y  average o f  t he  e i g h t  se t s  o f  p r i c e s  r u l i n g  on t he  
London Metal  Exchange.  S i nce  t he  p r i c e  was c a l c u l a t e d  on a 
mo n t h l y  average o f  t he  London Metal  Exchange p r i c e s ,  t he 
f o r m u l a  d i d  not  a l ways r e f l e c t  t he  a c t u a l  p r i c e  t he  mi n i ng  
compani es r e c e i v e d .  By t he  use o f  t h i s  f o r m u l a  t h e r e f o r e ,  
some o f  t he  i ncome managed t o  escape be i ng  t a x e d .  A f o r m u l a  
based on a p e r c en t a g e  o f  t he  sa l e s  woul d have enab l ed  t he  
government  t o  o b t a i n  a g r e a t e r  and r e a l i s t i c  share  o f  t he  
i ncome a c c r u i n g  t o  t he  mi n i n g  compani es .
A . f o r m u l a  based on s a l e s  was used i n  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  
such as Botswana whi ch  c a l c u l a t e d  i t s  r o y a l t i e s  at  a p e r c e n t ­
age o f  excess o f  sa l es  revenue over  p r o d u c t i o n .  For  exampl e, ky  
s e c t i o n  12 o f  t h e  Bamangwato Concess i ons  L t d .  M i n i n g  Lease 
Act  o f  1970,  t h e  company was r e q u i r e d  t o  pay r o y a l t i e s  at  
t he  r a t e  o f  7.5% on excess o f  r evenue over  p r o d u c t i o n .
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S i m i l a r l y ,  s e c t i o n  1 o f  t h e  De Beers Botswana Mi n i n g  Company 
Agreement  Ac t  o f  1970,  r e q u i r e d  De Beers t o  pay r o y a l t y  at  
t h e  r a t e  o f  5% on t he  gr oss  proceeds o f  di amond s a l e s .
I t  was perhaps due t o  t he  weakness o f  t h e  f o r m u l a  used 
t o  c a l c u l a t e  r o y a l t i e s  i n  Zambia t h a t  t h e  government  was 
f o r c e d  t o  t a k e  f u r t h e r  measures t o  change t h e  b a s i s  o f  
m i n e r a l  t a x a t i o n .
(b)  Mi n_e^aj_ E.x£0£ t _Tax
In 1966 t h e  government  i mposed an e x p o r t  t a x  on copper  
whi ch b a s i c a l l y  aimed at  i n c r e a s i n g  t he  g o v e r n me n t ' s  t ake  
f r om t he  mi n i n g  i n d u s t r y .  Th i s  t ype  o f  t a x  had i t s  own 
s h o r t c o mi n g s  i n  t h e  sense t h a t  i t  was no t  p o s s i b l e  t o  l e v y  
i t  i m m e d i a t e l y  t h e  e x p o r t a t i o n  t ook  p l a c e  but  had t o  w a i t  
u n t i l  t h e  mi n i n g  compan i es '  a u d i t e d  accoun t s  were made 
a v a i l a b l e  t o  t h e  t a x i n g  a u t h o r i t i e s .  Th i s  l a p s e  i n  t i me  
was i n f a c t  an unannounced t a x  h o l i d a y  for t h e  compani es .
I t  was p a r t l y  due t o  t h i s  weakness t h a t  i n  1969 a 
new m i n e r a l  t a x a t i o n  p o l i c y  was announced by P r e s i d e n t  
Kaunda.  The new p o l i c y  announcement  c a l l e d  f o r  a change on 
t he  b a s i s  o f  t a x a t i o n  f r om one based on r o y a l t y  on p r o d u c t i o n  
and e x p o r t  t a x ,  t o  one whi ch  woul d be c a l c u l a t e d  on t he  b a s i s  
o f  p r o f i t s . ^
To i mp l ement  t h e  1969 p o l i c y  d e c i s i o n  r e g a r d i n g  t he  
b a s i s  of .  m i n e r a l  t a x a t i o n ,  a M i n e r a l  Tax Ac t  was enac t e d .
Th i s  Act  r e q u i r e d  a l l  m i n i n g  compani es t o  pay a t a x  at  t he  
r a t e  o f  51% on t he  p r o f i t s  a c c r u i n g  f r om t he  s a l e  o f  coppe r .  
Ot her  m i n e r a l s  were l e v i e d  at  d i f f e r e n t  r a t e s .  For  exampl e,
32.  “ Towards Compl ete I ndependence*,  Address by P r e s i d e n t
Kaunda t o  t h e  UNIP N a t i o n a l  C o u n c i l ,  11th August  1969,  
Government  P r i n t e r s ,  Lusaka,  1969.
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t h e  r a t e  f o r  l ead and z i n c  was 20% o f  t h e  p r o f i t s .  In t he
case o f  co p pe r ,  t he  51% t a x  was t o  be l e v i e d  i n  a d d i t i o n
t o  t he  o r d i n a r y  company t a x  r e s u l t i n g  t o  t h e  e f f e c t i v e  t a x
3 3on t he  mi n i ng  compani es be i ng  about  70% o f  t h e  p r o f i t s .
By t h e  use o f  v a r i o u s  domes t i c  t a x  l e g i s l a t i o n ,  t he 
Zambian government  was ab l e  t o  change t h e  i n h e r i t e d  ba s i s  
o f  t a x a t i o n  and enab l e  i t s e l f  t o  c a p t u r e  a g r e a t e r  share o f  
t he  i ncome d e r i v i n g  f r om m i n i n g .  But  even such t a x  l e g i s ­
l a t i o n  d i d  not  seem t o  gua r an t e e  n a t i o n a l  c o n t r o l  o f  t he  
mi n i ng  i n d u s t r y  i f  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  and t he  m a r k e t i n g  aspec t s  
o f  t he  i n d u s t r y  were not  a d e q u a t e l y  r e s t r u c t u r e d . The r e ­
s t r u c t u r i n g  o f  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  process  was t a c k l e d  by t he  
use o f  d o mes t i c  l e g i s l a t i o n  i n  t he  manner t o  be d i s c u s s e d  
be l ow.
I V . Co n t r o l  o f  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  pr ocess  i n  
t h e  copper  m i n i n g  i n d u s t r y
( i ) C o n t r o l  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  i n  p r e - i n d e p e n d e n t  Zambia 
U n t i l  t h e  t i me  o f  i ndependence ,  c o n t r o l  o f  t he  
p r o d u c t i o n  p r ocess  i n  t he  Zambian mi n i n g  i n d u s t r y  was i n  t he  
hands o f  two groups  o f  t r a n s n a t i o n a l  c o r p o r a t i o n s ,  t h a t  i s  
t o  say RST and An g l o - Ame r i c a n  c o r p o r a t i o n .  The c o l o n i a l  
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  as a l r e a d y  ment i oned  above,  was c o n t e n t  t o  
use i t s  l e g i s l a t i v e  power t o  enhance i t s  r o l e  o f  t a x  c o l l e c t o r .
C o n t r o l  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  was i n  t he  main l e f t  i n  t he  hands 
o f  t he  t r a n s n a t i o n a l s .  Th i s  c o n t r o l  was e x e r c i s e d  i n  a c c o r d ­
ance w i t h  a number o f  l e g i s l a t i v e  p r o v i s i o n s .
33.  Ac t  no.  27,  o f  1970.
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One such l e g i s l a t i v e  p r o v i s i o n  r e l a t e d  t o  t he  power
o f  g r a n t i n g  p r o s p e c t i n g  and mi n i n g  r i g h t s .  As d i s c u s s e d
e a r l i e r  on,  t he  BSA company owned m i n e r a l  r i g h t s  u n t i l  t he
t i me  o f  i ndependence .  L e g i s l a t i o n  passed d u r i n g  t he  c o l o n i a l
p e r i o d  d i d  not  a f f e c t  t h i s  r i g h t  but  perhaps enhanced i t  by
g i v i n g  t h e  company t he  p r e r o g a t i v e  o f  g r a n t i n g  p r o s p e c t i n g
and mi n i n g  r i g h t s  on i t s  own t erms and w i t h o u t  r e f e r e n c e  t o
any se t  r u l e s  r e g a r d i n g  persons  t o  be i s s u e d  w i t h  such
g r a n t s .  The o n l y  l i m i t a t i o n  was t he  r e q u i r e m e n t  t h a t  such
34p r o s p e c t i n g  and mi n i ng  g r a n t s  were t o  be r e g i s t e r e d .  The
company was a l s o  by l e g i s l a t i o n  empowered t o  make o t h e r
g r a n t s  n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g  t h a t  t h e y  were i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  o t h e r
p r o v i s i o n s  o f  t h e  Mi n i ng  and M i ne r a l  l e g i s l a t i o n .  Such g r a n t s
35were known as s p e c i a l  g r a n t s .  The n a t u r a l  r e s u l t  o f  t h e se  
l e g i s l a t i v e  p r o v i s i o n s  was t o  a l l o w  t he  BSA company an 
i n d e p e n d e n t  hand i n  t he  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  per sons  and 
compani es t h a t  woul d be engaged i n m i n e r a l  p r o d u c t i o n .  In 
t h i s  way t h e  company d i d  no t  o n l y  c o n t r o l  t h e  n a t u r e  and 
p a t t e r n  o f  i n v e s t m e n t  i n  t he  c o u n t r y ' s  copper  i n d u s t r y ,  but  
a c t u a l l y  demanded p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  a l l  subsequen t  mi n i ng  
v e n t u r e s .  Every  r e g i s t e r e d  mi n i ng  l o c a t i o n  was r e q u i r e d  t o  
be he l d  on j o i n t  accoun t  w i t h  t he  company,  i n  t h e  p r o p o r t i o n  
o f  |  t o  t h e  company and I  t o  t h e  r e g i s t e r e d  h o l d e r .  In
3 6l a t e r  ye a r s  t h i s  c o u l d  be s u b s t i t u t e d  f o r  r o y a l t y  payments.
34.  No r t h e r n  Rhodes i a M i n i n g  P r o c l a m a t i o n ,  1912,  s e c t i o n  6.
35.  I b i d . , s e c t i o n  27.
36.  Muna Ndu l o ,  Requ i r ement  o f  Domest i c  P a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n
New Mi n i n g  Ven t u r es  i n  Zambi  a ctncf In te r ­
n a t i o n a l  Law J o u r n a l  o f  South Af  r i  c a , 3 .5^,
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F u r t h e r  c o n t r o l  on t he  p r o d u c t i o n  p r ocess  i n  t he
Zambian mi n i ng  i n d u s t r y  was e x e r t e d  by t h e  p r o v i s i o n s  t h a t
r e q u i r e d  t h a t  mi n i n g  l o c a t i o n s  or  s p e c i a l  g r a n t  areas be
worked f o r  p r o f i t  o n l y  w i t h  t he  p r i o r  s a n c t i o n  o f  t he  BSA 
37company.
A s i m i l a r  f i r m  ho l d  on t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  p r ocess  o f  
m i n e r a l s  was e x h i b i t e d  i n  a number o f  o t h e r  A f r i c a n  
c o u n t r i e s .  The f i r s t  m i n i n g  l e g i s l a t i o n  i n  Zimbabwe,  f o r  
exampl e,  r e q u i r e d  t h a t  ev e r y  c l a i m  be h e l d  on equal  j o i n t
Q O
account  w i t h  t he  BSA company.  The p r o p o r t i o n  o f  t he
j o i n t  accoun t  was l a t e r  r educed t o 30% by t he  Sou t her n
Rhodes i a Mines and M i n e r a l s  Or d i nance  o f  1903.  F u r t h e r
changes were made i n  1907 g i v i n g  t he  c l a i m  h o l d e r  t he  o p t i o n
o f  e i t h e r  pay i ng  a r o y a l t y  on a s l i d i n g  s c a l e  v a r y i n g  f r om
2|% t o  7|% o f  t h e  o u t p u t ,  or  o f f e r i n g  t h e  company an
39u n d i v i d e d  30% i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  c l a i m .
The power  t o  i s s u e  p r o s p e c t i n g  l i c e n c e s  and s p e c i a l  
g r a n t s ,  c oup l ed  w i t h  t h e  d e s i r e  t o  e n t e r  i n t o  j o i n t  mi n i ng  
a c t i v i t i e s  w i t h  compani es t h a t  had adequat e c a p i t a l  t o  
embark on m i n i n g ,  meant  t he  a t t r a c t i o n  o f  l a r g e  mi n i ng  
compani es i n t o  Zambia.  I t  i s  no s e c r e t  t h a t  t h e  e x p l o i t a ­
t i o n  o f  t he  m i n e r a l  r e s o u r c e s  i n  t he t e r r i t o r y  r e q u i r e d  
c a p i t a l  f a r  beyond what  c o u l d  have been l o c a l l y  a v a i l a b l e .  
I t  i s  p a r t l y  f o r  t h i s  r eason t h a t  t he  BSA company used 
i t s  s t a t u t o r y  power t o  i s s u e  p r o s p e c t i n g  and s p e c i a l  mi n i ng  
g r a n t s ,  over  l a r g e  areas o f  l and  t o  p o we r f u l  compani es t h a t
37.  N o r t h e r n  Rhodes i a Mi n i n g  P r o c l a m a t i o n ,  1912,  s e c t i o n  58.
38.  Sou t her n  Rhodes i a Mines and M i n e r a l s  Or d i n an c e .
39.  Sou t her n  Rhodes i a Or d i nance  N o . 10 o f  1907.
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had i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f i n a n c i a l  b a c k i n g .  The f i r s t  t o  b e n e f i t
f r om t h e  BSA company ' s  s t a t u t o r y  power was t h e  Rhodes i a
Congo Concess i on  L t d .  whi ch l a t e r  became p a r t  o f  Rhokana
c o r p o r a t i o n .  The second company t o  b e n e f i t  f r om t h i s
a r r angement  was t he  S e l e c t i o n  T r u s t  whi ch had been f ormed
w i t h  s u b s t a n t i a l  Amer i can c a p i t a l .  By v a r i o u s  and i n t r i c a t e
f i n a n c i a l  a r r angement s  two p o we r f u l  combi nes came t o  c o n t r o l
t he  p r o d u c t i o n  o f  m i n e r a l s  i n  Zambia.  These were t he
Rhodes i a S e l e c t i o n  T r u s t  (RST) ,  and t he  An g l o - Ame r i c a n
40c o r p o r a t i o n  (AAC).  Wi t h  t he  a t t r a c t i v e  l a b o u r  and t a x a t i o n  
l aws ,  t hese  c o n g l o m e r a t e s ,  expanded t h e i r  scope and range 
o f  a c t i v i t i e s ,  e nd i ng  up u l t i m a t e l y ,  not  o n l y  d o m i n a t i n g  and 
c o n t r o l l i n g  p r o d u c t i o n  o f  m i n e r a l s  i n  Zambi a,  bu t  i n  c o n ­
j u n c t  i on. wi  t  h o t h e r  t r a n s n a t i o n a l  c o r p o r a t i o n s ,  t he  ma j o r  
m a r k e t i n g  i n s t i t u t i o n s  by whi ch m i n e r a l s  are s o l d .
The c o n t r o l  o f  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  p r ocess  by t h e s e  t r a n s ­
n a t i o n a l  c o r p o r a t i o n s  had i m p o r t a n t  consequences f o r  t he  
Zambian m i n i n g  i n d u s t r y  a t  t h e  t i me  o f  i ndependence .  These 
c o r p o r a t i o n s  had by t he  t i me  o f  i ndependence a c q u i r e d  l a r g e  
p o r t i o n s  o f  l and  f o r  purposes  o f  p r o s p e c t i n g  and m i n i n g ,  
whi ch t h e y  he l d  i n  p e r p e t u i t y .  Th i s  meant  t h a t  t he  g o v e r n ­
ment  had no l e g a l  power  t o  d e t e r m i n e  t he  volume o f  p r o d u c t i o n ,  
r a t e  o f  i n v e s t m e n t ,  d i v i d e n d s  d i s t r i b u t e d ,  o r  t h e  r a t e  o f  
r e i n v e s t m e n t .  E q u a l l y  i m p o r t a n t ,  t he  government  d i d  not  
have any e q u i t y  shares  i n  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n s  and c o u l d  t h e r e ­
f o r e  not  l e g a l l y  i n f l u e n c e  management  d e c i s i o n s  and p o l i c i e s
40.  L.H.  Gann,  The N o r t h e r n  Rhodes i a Copper  I n d u s t r y  and 
t he  Wor l d Copper :  1 923-1 952 .£tfS5) i8 Rhodes-L i  v i  ngs t one 
J o u r n a l ,
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r e g a r d i n g  t he  p a t t e r n  o f  r e i n v e s t m e n t  and p r o d u c t i o n .  Thus 
whereas t he  s t a t e  had t h e  power t o  t a x  t h e  m i n i n g  compani es ,  
as has been e x p l a i n e d  above,  i t  d i d  not  have t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  
shape t he  p a t t e r n  o f  deve l opment  o f  t he  m i n i n g  i n d u s t r y .
Th i s  r e s u l t e d  i n t o  a s i t u a t i o n  i n  whi ch t he  power  o f  
t a x a t i o n  whi ch  t h e  government  w i e l d e d ,  was i n a d e q u a t e  t o  
i n c r e a s e  t he  s t a t e ' s  share  o f  t he  i ncome a c c r u i n g  f r om t he 
mi n i ng  i n d u s t r y  because t he  mi n i ng  c o r p o r a t i o n s  were at  
l i b e r t y  t o  m a n i p u l a t e  t he  p r o d u c t i o n  c a p a c i t y  and by t h a t  
f a c t ,  t h e  t a x a b l e  i ncome.
There are two ways a s t a t e  co u l d  f o l l o w  i n  r e c t i f y i n g  
a s i t u a t i o n  o f  t h i s  n a t u r e  and r e g a i n  c o n t r o l  o f  p r o d u c t i o n .  
F i r s t ,  t h e  s t a t e  can e f f e c t  an o u t r i g h t  n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  o f  
t h e  m i n i n g  i n d u s t r y .  S i nce  a l mos t  a l l  c o u n t r i e s  r e c o g n i z e
and s a f e g u a r d  p r o p e r t y  r i g h t s  o f  f o r e i g n e r s ,  any n a t i o n a l i z a ­
t i o n  i n v o l v e s  payment  o f  comp en s a t i o n .  A l t h o u g h  t h e r e  are 
no c l e a r  r u l e s  r e g a r d i n g  t he  amount  o f  c o mp en s a t i o n ,  i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  l aw t r a d i t i o n a l l y  r e q u i r e s  such compensa t i on  t o
41be p r ompt ,  e f f e c t i v e  and adequa t e .
In t h e  case o f  Zambi a,  t he  1964 c o n s t i t u t i o n  p r o t e c t e d  
t he  p r o p e r t y  r i g h t s  o f  f o r e i g n e r s  and any n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  
o f  t h e i r  p r o p e r t y  c o u l d  o n l y  be unde r t a k en  i f  p r ompt ,  
a dequa t e ,  and e f f e c t i v e  compensa t i on  was p a i d .  O u t r i g h t  
n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  o f  t he  mi nes t h e r e f o r e ,  r e q u i r e d  t he  g o v e r n ­
ment  t o  have enough r e s o u r c e s  t o  meet  i t s  o b l i g a t i o n s  t o  t he 
f o r e i g n  i n v e s t o r  i n  t e rms o f  c o mp en s a t i o n .  Th i s  must  have 
been beyond t h e  means o f  t he  governmdnt  a t  t h e  t i me  o f
41.  Chorzow F a c t o r y  Case , c ;lJ „  Series  A
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i ndependence .  But  perhaps even more i m p o r t a n t  i s  t h e  f a c t  
t h a t  n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  has a l ways been l ooked  at  as a f a c t o r  
t h a t  scar es  away f o r e i g n  i n v e s t o r s .  Zambia c o u l d  not  a t  t he  
t i me  a f f o r d  t o  a n t a g o n i z e  t he  f o r e i g n  i n v e s t o r  when i t  
needed f o r e i g n  i n v e s t me n t s  i n  v a r i o u s  o t h e r  aspec t s  o f  i t s  
economy.  F i n a l l y ,  an o u t r i g h t  n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  u s u a l l y  
means t he  l os s  o f  t he  e x p a t r i a t e  t e c h n i c i a n s  and management  
whi ch can have d i s a s t r o u s  e f f e c t  on t he  c o u n t r y  t h a t  d i d  
no t  have adequat e  t r a i n e d  manpower t o  t a k e o v e r  t he  r u n n i n g  
o f  t h e  i n d u s t r y  concer ned .
Zambia had at  t he  t i me  o f  i ndependence v e r y  few 
q u a l i f i e d  p e r sonne l  t o  keep t he  wheel s  o f  t he  mi n i n g  i n d u s t r y  
r u n n i n g  i n  t he  even t  o f  a sudden exodus o f  t h e  e x p a t r i a t e  
p e r s o n n e l .  I t  was f o r  t hese  and o t h e r  r easons  t h a t  Zambia 
op t ed  f o r  a n o t h e r  approach t o  r e g a i n i n g  i t s  c o n t r o l  o f  t he  
p r o d u c t i o n  p r ocess  i n  t h e  mi n i n g  i n d u s t r y .
The second approach t h a t  has been used i n  some c o u n t r i e s  
t o  ga i n  c o n t r o l  o f  t he  p r o d u c t i o n  p r ocess  i n  t he  mi n i ng  
i n d u s t r y  has been t h a t  o f  e q u i t y  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  by t he  s t a t e  
i n  e x i s t i n g  and new mi n i n g  v e n t u r e s .  For  exampl e ,  i n  
Zimbabwe,  t h e  s t a t e  op t ed  i n  1982 f o r  e q u i t y  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  
i n  a number o f  e x i s t i n g  mines i n c l u d i n g  t h e  i m p o r t a n t  Wankie 
coal  mi nes .  Zambia has a l s o  sought  t o  r e g a i n  c o n t r o l  o f  
t he  p r o d u c t i o n  p r ocess  o f  copper  and o t h e r  m i n e r a l s  by a 
c a l c u l a t e d  s t a t e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  p r o c es s .
( i i ) S t a t e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  t he  Zambian M i n i n g  I n d u s t r y
The concep t  o f  s t a t e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  became s t r o n g l y  
f a v o u r e d  by t he  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  i n  t h e  1960s when i t
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became g e n e r a l l y  accept ed  t h a t  t he  r o l e  o f  t h e  s t a t e  had
changed f r om one o f  a p a s s i v e  o b s e r v e r  i n  t h e  economi c
a c t i v i t i e s  t o  one t h a t  accept ed  f i r s t  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r
42i t s  economi c deve l opmen t .
The t e r m,  " s t a t e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n " ,  does not  seem t o  have
any s p e c i a l i z e d  meani ng o t h e r  t han a mere f u n c t i o n a l
d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  t h e  purpose o f  t he  a r r an g e men t .  There are
two main f o rms o f  s t a t e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n ;  t h e  e q u i t y  j o i n t
v e n t u r e  a l i a s  t h e  j o i n t  s t o c k  v e n t u r e ,  and t h e  c o n t r a c t u a l  
43j o i n t  v e n t u r e .  Of t he  t wo,  t he  e q u i t y  j o i n t  v e n t u r e  has
tended t o  be domi nan t  i n  t he  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  o f  t h i r d  wo r l d
s t a t e s  i n  t h e i r  m i n i n g  i n d u s t r i e s .
The l e g a l  s t r u c t u r e  and f o r m o f  any p a r t i c i p a t i o n
agreement  depends on t he  n a t u r e  o f  t he  p r o j e c t ,  t he  c h o i c e
o f  t he  p a r t i e s ,  and t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  b a r g a i n i n g  power .
In Zambia,  f o r  exampl e,  t o  i mpl ement  t h e  d e s i r e d  p o l i c y  o f
e q u i t y  p a r t i c i p a t i o n ,  t he  s t a t e  n e g o t i a t e d  f o r  a 51% e q u i t y
s h a r e h o l d i n g  i n  e x i s t i n g  mi n i n g  compani es .
The c r e a t i o n  o f  an e q u i t y  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  ar r angement
e n t a i l s  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  o f  c o n t r a c t u a l  agreements  between
t h e  p a r t i e s ,  s e t t i n g  out  t h e i r  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  r e l a t i o n s h i p ,
management  s t r u c t u r e ,  c o n t r o l  and management  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  
44and i n v e s t m e n t .  In t he  case o f  Zambia,  s t a t e  e q u i t y
42.  S. S i d e r i  and S. Johns ( e d . ) ,  M i n i ng  f o r  deve l opment  i n  
t he  t h i r d  w o r l d :  m u l t i n a t i o n a l  c o r p o r a t i o n s ,  s t a t e  
e n t e r p r i s e s  and t he  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  economy [i* l80 )fe rga rno rt
43.  W.H.E.  J a e g e r , " J o i n t  v e n t u r e s :  o r i g i n ,  n a t u r e  and 
devel  opm ent’^ W ^ /W fW j U n i v e r s i t y  Law Revi ew,  p . l .
44.  See f o r  exampl e ,  t he  case o f  s t a t e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  
I n d i a ,  K.K.  Sharma, " l BM p r epar es  t o  c l o s e  down i n  
I nd i a ' j  F i n a n c i a l  Times 11th November 1 977.  See a l s o  
K.K.  Sharma, *Sovere i  g n t y  and mul t i  n a t i  onal  s*, F i n a n c i a l  
Ti mes,  London,  11th November 1977.
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p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n v o l v e d  t he  c o n c l u s i o n  o f  a number o f  a g r e e ­
ments between t he  s t a t e  and t he  two m i n i n g  compan i es .  In 
a d d i t i o n  t o  t he  mas t e r  agreement  s e t t i n g  ou t  t h e  t erms o f  
p a r t i c i p a t i o n ,  management  and ma r k e t i n g  c o n t r a c t s  were 
c o n c l u d e d .
The a c q u i s i t i o n  o f  t he  51% e q u i t y  shar es  i n  t he  two
mi n i ng  compani es r e f l e c t e d  a d e s i r e  on t h e  p a r t  o f  t he
s t a t e  t o  c o n t r o l  m i n e r a l  e x p l o r a t i o n  and p r o d u c t i o n  i n  
45t he  c o u n t r y .
The u s e f u l n e s s  o f  t he  concep t  o f  e q u i t y  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  
i n  t he  c o n t r o l  o f  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  p r o c es s ,  seems t o  have 
i t s  b a s i s  i n  t he  g ene r a l  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  c o r p o r a t e  l aw.  One 
o f  t h e  b a s i c  r u l e s  i n  c o r p o r a t e  l aw i s  t h a t  a h o l d e r  o f  
m a j o r i t y .  shares  i n  a company e x e r c i s e s  c o n t r o l  over  t he 
a f f a i r s  o f  t he  company by v i r t u e  o f  hav i ng  t h e  m a j o r i t y  
d i r e c t o r s  i n  t he  board and c o n t r o l  o f  t he  gene r a l  mee t i ng .
In Zambi a,  i t  was t h o u g h t  t h a t  by a c q u i r i n g  at  l e a s t  
51% shares  i n  t h e  two mi n i n g  compani es ,  t h e  s t a t e  woul d be 
ab l e  t o  c o n t r o l  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  s t age o f  t h e  m i n i n g  i n d u s t r y  
by i n f i l t r a t i n g  t he  Boards o f  D i r e c t o r s  and t he  General  
Mee t i ngs  o f  t he  two compani es .  What was no t  r e a l i z e d ,  at  
l e a s t  i n i t i a l l y ,  was t h a t  i t  was p o s s i b l e  f o r  t h e  mi n i ng  
compani es t o  f r u s t r a t e  t h e  e f f o r t s  o f  t h e  s t a t e  i n  g a i n i n g  
c o n t r o l - o f  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  p rocess  t h r o u g h  a c a r e f u l l y  
p l anned m a n i p u l a t i o n  o f  t he  v e r y  c o r p o r a t e  p r i n c i p l e s .  Thus 
t he  e f f o r t s  o f  t he  Zambian government  were t h w a r t e d  by t he
45.  ^Towards Compl ete I ndependence1' Address  by P r e s i d e n t  
Kaunda t o  t he  Un i t e d  N a t i o n a l  I ndependence P a r t y  
N a t i o n a l  C o u n c i l ,  11th August  1969,  Government  
P r i n t e r ,  Lusaka,  1969.
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i n c l u s i o n  o f  a p r o v i s i o n  i n  t he  a r t i c l e s  o f  a s s o c i a t i o n  o f  
t he  two compan i es ,  t h a t  i s  RCM and NCCM, whi ch had been 
d r a f t e d  as p a r t  o f  t h e  agreement  aimed a t  f a c i l i t a t i n g  
s t a t e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n .  Th i s  p r o v i s i o n  r e q u i r e d  c e r t a i n  
i m p o r t a n t  d e c i s i o n s  o f  t he  Boards o f  D i r e c t o r s  t o  be passed 
by an a f f i r m a t i v e  vo t e  o f  t h e  "A"  d i r e c t o r s  ( a p p o i n t e d  by 
t h e  S t a t e ) ,  and "B"  d i r e c t o r s  ( a p p o i n t e d  by t h e  two com­
p a n i e s ) . ^  Th i s  r e q u i r e m e n t  made i t  p o s s i b l e  f o r  t he  
m i n o r i t y  s h a r e h o l d e r s  t o  v e t o  t h e  d e c i s i o n s  o f  t h e  m a j o r i t y  
s h a r e h o l d e r s  t h e r e b y  d e f e a t i n g  t he  whol e i dea  o f  s t a t e  
p a r t i c i p a t i o n .  A l t h o u g h  a l l  t h e  a r t i c l e s  o f  a s s o c i a t i o n  o f  
t he  two compani es f ormed p a r t  o f  t he  mas t e r  ag r eement ,  i t  
i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t he  government  agreed t o  t he  
p r o v i s i o n  knowi ng t h a t  i t  woul d have t hese  consequences .
The more l i k e l y  e x p l a n a t i o n  appears  t o  be t h a t  t h e  i n c l u s i o n  
o f  t he  p r o v i s i o n  was a c a r e f u l l y  c a l c u l a t e d  move by t he  two 
compani es t o  m a i n t a i n  f o r  t hemse l ves  a measure o f  c o n t r o l  
r e g a r d i n g  i s s u e s  such as p r o d u c t i o n  and i n v e s t m e n t  - a move
t h a t  may have escaped t he  a t t e n t i o n  o f  t he  government
. . 47n e g o t i a t  or s  .
The c o ncep t  o f  e q u i t y  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  a l s o  opens t he  
p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  t he  S t a t e  g a i n i n g  c o n t r o l  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  t h r o u g h  
t he  power t o  a p p o i n t  t op  management .  Th i s  i s  so because 
u s u a l l y  t h e  m a j o r i t y  s h a r e h o l d e r  has t he  power  t o  a p p o i n t  
t h e  t op  management  such as Managing D i r e c t o r s  and General
46.  See f o r  exampl e A r t i c l e  101 o f  Nchanga C o n s o l i d a t e d  
Copper  Mi nes a r t i c l e s  o f  a s s o c i a t i o n .
47.  For  a c r i t i c a l  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h i s  k i n d  o f  p r o v i s i o n ,  see 
M.L.O.  Faber  and J .G.  P o t t e r ,  Towards Economic I n d e ­
pendence:  Papers on t h e  n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  o f  t h e  copper  
i n d u s t r y  i n  Zambi  a G am b ia  Uni  v e r s i  t v  Pr ess ,
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Managers .  But  even i n  t h i s  case,  t he  e x p e c t a t i o n  o f  
c o n t r o l l i n g  t h e  management  d e c i s i o n s  t h r o u g h  t he  power 
o f  a p p o i n t i n g  t op  management  seems t o  be f a r  f e t c h e d  i n  
many d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  because t he  e x e r c i s e  o f  manage­
ment  powers i s  u s u a l l y  d e l e g a t e d  t o  management  compani es 
a f f i l i a t e d  t o  t h e  f o r e i g n  compani es i n  t he  j o i n t  v e n t u r e .
The d e l e g a t i o n  o f  management  a f f a i r s  i n  t h i s  way i s  a 
r e f l e c t i o n  o f  t he  s t r o n g  b a r g a i n i n g  power f o r e i g n  compani es 
w i e l d - i n  t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n  o f  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  ag r eement s .
In Zambia f o r  exampl e ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e  government  had 
m a j o r i t y  shar es  i n  t he  new j o i n t  v e n t u r e s  and was t h e r e f o r e  
e n t i t l e d  t o  a p p o i n t  t op  management  i t  c o u l d  no t  do so.
I n s t e a d  t h e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  agreement  i n c l u d e d  management  
c o n t r a c t s  whi ch  gave t he  power t o  manage RCM and NCCM t o  
management  groups  a f f i l i a t e d  t o  RST and An g l o - Ame r i c a n  
C o r p o r a t i o n  - t h e  two compani es t h a t  o p e r a t e d  i n  Zambia 
p r i o r  t o  t he  p a r t i c i p a t i o n ,  agreement .  In t h i s  r e s p e c t  t h e r e ­
f o r e ,  i t  was not  p o s s i b l e  f o r  t he  government  t o  e x e r c i s e  
adequate c o n t r o l  over  t h e  management  d e c i s i o n s  a f f e c t i n g  
i m p o r t a n t  i s s ue s  such as p r o d u c t i o n  l e v e l s  and l e v e l s  o f  
i n v e s t m e n t s ,  as w e l l  as ma r k e t i n g  p o l i c i e s .
An e f f e c t i v e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  a r r angement  t h e r e f o r e ,  
e n t a i l s  t he  c o n c l u s i o n  o f  c a r e f u l l y  d r a f t e d  i n s t r u m e n t s  o f  
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  whi ch woul d ensure  a genu i ne  c o n t r o l  o f  i s sues  
such as p r o d u c t i o n  by t h e  m a j o r i t y  s h a r e h o l d e r .  I n Zambia,  
t he  S t a t e  woul d seem t o  have ach i eved  t h i s  t h r o u g h  a l ong 
but  c a r e f u l l y  p l anned  p a t h .  F i r s t ,  i ' t  p r oceeded t o  change 
t he  a r t i c l e s  o f  a s s o c i a t i o n  o f  RCM and NCCM, and s e c o n d l y ,
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i n  1973 ab r oga t ed  t he  management  c o n t r a c t s .  F i n a l l y ,  i n  
1981 t he  p r ocess  was made compl e t e  by t h e  r e s t r u c t u r i n g  o f  
t he  m i n i n g  compani es whi ch r e s u l t e d  i n  t he  mer g i ng  o f  t he  
two compani es i n t o  t he  Zambia C o n s o l i d a t e d  Copper  Mines 
i n  wh i ch  t he  s t a t e ' s  e q u i t y  share r ose t o  60 . 3  per  c e n t .
V. C o n c l u s i o n
The d i s c u s s i o n  i n  t h i s  c h a p t e r  has h i g h l i g h t e d  t he 
l e g a l  methods a d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r y  c o u l d  empl oy i n  an 
a t t e mp t  t o  ga i n  c o n t r o l  o f  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  p r ocess  i n  t h e i r  
m i n i n g  i n d u s t r i e s .  I t  has been shown f o r  exampl e ,  t h a t  
Zambia used v a r i o u s  domes t i c  l e g i s l a t i o n  t o  r e a s s e r t  i t s  
o wne r sh i p  o f  m i n e r a l s  i n  an e f f o r t  t o  r ecoup a g r e a t e r  share  
o f  t h e  i ncome g e n e r a t e d  t h r o u g h  mi n e r a l  p r o d u c t i o n .  I t  
has a l s o  been shown t h a t  by t he  use o f  o r d i n a r y  c o r p o r a t e  
p r i n c i p l e s  t h e  c o u n t r y  was ab l e  t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  t he  r u n n i n g  
o f  t he  m i n i n g  compani es and l a t e r  c o m p l e t e l y  c o n t r o l  t he  
p r o d u c t i o n  p r o c e s s .  Th i s  has been p o s s i b l e  because t h e r e  i s  
a w e a l t h  o f  l e g a l  p r i n c i p l e s  t h a t  a s t a t e  can d o m e s t i c a l l y  
e x p l o i t  t o  c o n t r o l  m i n e r a l  o wn e r s h i p ,  t a x a t i o n ,  and 
m i ne r a l  p r o d u c t i o n .
I t  shou l d  be emphasi zed however ,  t h a t  s t a t e  owner sh i p  
o f  m i n e r a l s ,  good t a x a t i o n  l aws ,  and s t a t e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  
p r o d u c t i o n  or  even n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n ,  w i l l  no t  ensure  n a t i o n a l  
c o n t r o l  o f  t h e  r e t u r n s  reaped f r om mi n i n g  u n l e s s  t h i s  i s  
accompani ed by c o n t r o l  o f  t he  ma r k e t i n g  a s p e c t s .
The probl ems o f  m i n e r a l  ma r k e t i n g  are l i n k e d  t o  f o r c e s  
beyond t h e  bo r d e r s  o f  any one mi n e r a l  p r o d u c i n g  c o u n t r y .  
I ndeed by t he  v e r y  n a t u r e  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  m i n e r a l  mar ke t s .
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t h e  r e c e n t l y  c r e a t e d  mi n i ng  c o r p o r a t i o n s  such as ZCCM i n 
Zambi a,  r emai n h i g h l y  dependent  both i n  t h e  s h o r t  run and 
t h e  l ong  run upon f o r c e s  w e l l  beyond t he  c o n t r o l  o f  any 
s i n g l e  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s .  Thus s i n g l e  n a t i o n  domes t i c  
l e g i s l a t i o n  approach such as has been used i n  Zambia t o  
r e a s s e r t  m i n e r a l  r i g h t s ,  t o  ga i n  c o n t r o l  o f  t he  p r o d u c t i o n  
p r o c e s s ,  and t o  t a x  i ncome f r om m i n e r a l s ,  are u n l i k e l y  t o  
be s u c c e s s f u l l y  u t i l i z e d  t o  c o n t r o l  t h e  m a r k e t i n g  s t age  o f  
minerals.
As w i l l  be d i s c u s s e d  i n  Chapt er  3,  many m i n e r a l  e x p o r t ­
i ng  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s ,  i n c l u d i n g  Zambi a,  have t aken 
measures t o  t r y  and e x e r t  some i n f l u e n c e  i n  t h e  mar ke t s  f o r  
t h e i r  m i n e r a l s  by t he  c r e a t i o n  o f  n a t i o n a l  m i n e r a l  ma r k e t i n g  
c o r p o r a t i o n s .  For  exampl e,  a l l  i m p o r t a n t  copper  e x p o r t i n g  
d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  have se t  up n a t i o n a l  copper  ma r k e t i n g  
c o r p o r a t i o n s  char ged w i t h  t he  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  ma r k e t i n g  
t h e i r  co p pe r .  C h i l e  has se t  up CODELCO, Peru has o r g a n i z e d  
MINERO-PERU, Zambia has se t  up MEMACQ, and u n t i l  r e c e n t l y  
Z a i r e  m a r k e t i n g  i t s  copper  t h r o u g h  SQZAMIN. These d i s t r i ­
b u t i v e  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  were a l l  se t  up w i t h  t h e  aim o f  
a c h i e v i n g  i n  t he  l ong  r u n ,  some measure o f  i ndependence  f r om 
t he  p r i v a t e  copper  m a r k e t i n g  f i r m s  and e s t a b l i s h i n g  t h e i r  
own i n de p e nde n t  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  p u r c h a s e r s .  An argument  w i l l  
be advaaced i n  t he  nex t  c h a p t e r  t o  sugges t  t h a t  t h e  l e g a l  
b a s i s  and i n s t i t u t i o n a l  f r amewor k  o f  t h es e  n a t i o n a l  ma r k e t i n g  
c o r p o r a t i o n s  are i l l  s u i t e d  t o  t a c k l e  t he  t r a n s n a t i o n a l  
p r ob l ems o f  m i n e r a l  m a r k e t i n g  whi ch are i mmensel y  compl ex .
A l t h o u g h  t he  ba l ance  o f  power  has now s h i f t e d  f r om 
t he  t r a n s n a t i o n a l  c o r p o r a t i o n s  t o  t he s t a t e  i n  m i n e r a l
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p r o d u c i n g  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  l i k e  Zambia,  i n  as f a r  as
m i n e r a l  owne r sh i p  and p r o d u c t i o n  i s  conc e r ne d ,  t h e s e  c o u n t r i e s
are s t i l l  conf ronted by and at  the mercy of  ol i ga r c V i i  cal ly
o r g a n i z e d  p u r c h a s e r s  when i t  comes t o  t h e  i s s u e  o f  ma r k e t i n g
48o f  t he  m i n e r a l s .  F u r t h e r mo r e ,  t hese  n a t i o n a l  m i n e r a l  
ma r k e t i n g  c o r p o r a t i o n s  have a d i s a d v a n t a g e  o f  h av i ng  t o  
conduc t  t h e i r  bus i n e s s  w i t h i n  t he  f r amework  o f  e x i s t i n g  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r u l e s  and p r i n c i p l e s  t h a t  govern t he  ma r k e t i n g  
o f  m i n e r a l s ,  wh i ch  t o  say t he  l e a s t ,  r e f l e c t  t h e  l a c k  o f  
b a r g a i n i n g  power by t he  m i n e r a l  e x p o r t e r .
L a t e r  c h a p t e r s  w i l l  examine e x i s t i n g  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  . 
l e g a l  r u l e s ,  p r i n c i p l e s  and i n s t i t u t i o n s  d e a l i n g  w i t h  i s s ue s  
o f  m i n e r a l  m a r k e t i n g  i n  g ene r a l  and copper  m a r k e t i n g  i n  
p a r t i c u l a r  w i t h a v i e w  t o  advance a t h e s i s  t h a t  w i l l  advoca t e  
t he  c r e a t i o n  o f  new, more i m a g i n a t i v e  and i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y  
a c c e p t a b l e  p r i n c i p l e s ,  agreements  and i n s t i t u t i o n s  t o  govern 
i s s u e s  o f  copper  m a r k e t i n g .  I t  i s  hoped t h a t  t he  recommen­
d a t i o n s  made i n  t h e  t h e s i s  w i l l  be a p p l i c a b l e  t o  o t h e r  base 
m e t a l s .
48.  P H a w k i n g 7 R,es£a.f£h in 'Tn-terriati&nal &uiine9$
E ^ w c e .. CHW ) Volum ei, Jai ftess Inc ., ■ '
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CHAPTER THREE
THE LONDON METAL EXCHANGE AND 
THE MARKETING OF ZAMBIAN COPPER
I . Main p r i n c i p l e s  beh i nd  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  commodi t y  mar ke t s  
The g e n e r a l l y  agreed p r i n c i p l e s  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e  
p o l i c y  a f t e r  t h e  two w o r l d  wars l eaned h e a v i l y  a g a i n s t  
i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l  i n t e r v e n t i o n  i n  t he  f r e e  w o r k i n g  o f  
commodi t y  mar ke t s  excep t  on a t e mpo r a r y  and e x c e p t i o n a l  
c i r c u m s t a n c e s . ^  The b a s i c  assumpt i on  beh i nd  t h e s e  p r i n c i p l e s  
was t he  b e l i e f  t h a t  t h e  f r e e  wo r k i n g  o f  commodi t y  market s  
wou l d ,  under  normal  c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  p r o v i d e  an opt i mum a l l o c a ­
t i o n  o f  t h e  w o r l d  r e s o u r c e s .  Th i s  assumpt i on  had a f u r t h e r  
assumpt i on  t h a t  t h e  opt i mum a l l o c a t i o n  o f  r e s o u r c e s  woul d 
be a t t a i n e d  t h r o u g h  p e r f e c t  c o m p e t i t i o n  i n  t h e  commodi t y  
mar ke t s  and f r e e  r e s o u r c e  m o b i l i t y  between c o u n t r i e s .  The 
l e g a l  e x p o s i t i o n  o f  t h i s  p h i l o s o p h y  was l a t e r  embodi ed i n 
t h e  General  Agreement  on T a r i f f s  and Trade (GATT) 
whi ch r e q u i r e d  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e  t o  be c onduc t ed  on t he
b a s i s  o f  t he  " m o s t - f a v o u r e d  n a t i o n a l  t r e a t m e n t " ,  w i t h o u t
2d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ,  and on t h e  b a s i s  o f  r e c i p r o c i t y .
These p r i n c i p l e s ,  however ,  proved i n a d e q u a t e  t o  t a c k l e  
t he  p r i m a r y  commodi t y  m a r k e t i n g  p r ob l ems .  > A number o f  
p r i v a t e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a r r angement s  c o n t i n u e d  t o  be e n t e r e d  
i n t o  i n  an a t t e mp t  t o  s t a b i l i z e  commodi t y  ma r k e t s .  In t he
1. A.K.  Koul  , The Legal  Framework o f  UNCTAD i n  Wor l d T r  a d e ,(f?f s )
A . W. Si j t h o f f , Bombay, p . 75 .
2.  A r t i c l e  2 o f  t he  General  Agreement  on T a r i f f s  and Trade
(GATT)
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case of  copper ,  a number of  p r i v a t e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a r ra ng e­
ments had been entered i n t o  since the 1880s and had cont inued  
in one form or another  wel l  i n t o  the per iod a f t e r  the war.  
Examples of  these c a r t e l  l i k e  operat ions  aimed at c ont ro l  of  
the i n t e r n a t i o n a l  copper markets included the Secretan  
Syndicate which operated between 1886 and 1888,  the American 
Producers'  A s s o c i a t i o n  of the 1890s,  the Amalgamated Copper 
Company ( 1 8 9 0 s ) ,  the Copper Export  A s s o c i a t i o n  (1918 to 
1923) ,  the Copper Expor ters  I n c o r p o r a t i o n  (1928 to 1929) ,  
and the I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Copper Car te l  which began op er a t ing  in
3
1935 and o p e r a t e d  i n t e r m i t t e n t l y  u n t i l  Wor l d War Two. These 
deve l opment s  had h i g h l i g h t e d  t he  p e c u l i a r  n a t u r e  o f  commodi t y  
mar ke t s  whi ch  made i t  i m p o s s i b l e  f o r  them t o  f u n c t i o n  
e f f e c t i v e l y  under  t he  f r e e  market  p h i l o s o p h y .  A f t e r  t he 
Second Wor l d  War t h e r e f o r e ,  a t t e mp t s  were made t o  f i n d  
a c c e p t a b l e  l e g a l  c o n t r o l s  f o r  commodi t y  ma r k e t s .  The one 
s i n g l e  most  i m p o r t a n t  a t t e mp t  was made at  t he  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s '  
sponsored Havana c o n f e r e n c e  i n  1947 t o  1948,  whi ch was c a l l e d  
t o  debat e  t he  d r a f t  c h a r t e r  f o r  an I n t e r n a t i o n a l  T r ade  
O r g a n i s a t i o n .
Chap t e r  s i x  o f  t he  d r a f t  Havana C h a r t e r  r e c o g n i z e d  
t he  i n s t a b i l i t y  i n h e r e n t  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  commodi t y  mar ket s  
and p r o v i d e d  l e g a l  mechani sms f o r  c o n t r o l l e d  i n t e r v e n t i o n  
by i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l  c o n s u l t a t i o n s  and a c t i o n s .  The i m p o r t a n t  
aspec t  o f  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  e n u n c i a t e d  i n  c h a p t e r  s i x  o f  t he 
Havana C h a r t e r  was t h a t  such p r i n c i p l e s  had t o  be used o n l y  
i n  e x c e p t i o n a l  cases and f o r  purposes '  o f  p r i c e  s t a b i l i z -
3.  K.W. C l a r f i e l d  e t .  al  . , E i g h t  M i n e r a l  C a r t e l  s , ,, p '1 ^ .
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4a t i o n .  A l t h o u g h  t he  Havana c h a r t e r  was never  r a t i f i e d ,  
i t s  p r i n c i p l e  t e n e t s  r e g a r d i n g  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e  i n  
commod i t i es  have r emai ned v e r y  much e f f e c t i v e  i n  shap i ng  
t he  system o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  commodi t y  l aw.  Th i s  was 
ach i eved  m a i n l y  t h r o u g h  t h e  f r amework  o f  t h e  Un i t e d  N a t i o n s ,  
whi ch t h r o u g h  v a r i o u s  r e s o l u t i o n s  o f  i t s  organs  recommended 
t he  r e s u r r e c t i o n  o f  t hose  p r i n c i p l e s  and t h e i r  use i n  f u t u r e  
ar r angement s  r e g a r d i n g  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e  i n  c ommo d i t i e s .
One o f  t h e  i m p o r t a n t  p r i n c i p l e s  sugges t ed  t o  c o n t r o l  t he  
p e c u l i a r  b e h a v i o u r  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  commodi t y  mar ke t s  under  
c h a p t e r  s i x  o f  t he  Havana c h a r t e r  was t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  s p e c i a l  
i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l  commodi t y  c o n t r o l  agreements  i n v o l v i n g  both 
p r odu c e r s  and consumers .  Such agreements were t o  a t t e mp t  
t o  s t a b i l i z e  commodi t y  mar ke t s  w i t h o u t  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d e p a r t -
C
i ng  f r om t h e  mar ke t  f o r c e s  o f  s upp l y  and demand.
The b a s i c  assumpt i on  beh i nd  t he  Havana p r i n c i p l e s  i s  
t h a t  t he  i n s t a b i l i t y  e x p e r i e n c e d  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  commodi t y  
mar ke t s  i s  a r e s u l t  o f  t h e  s p e c i a l  n a t u r e  o f  demand and 
s u p p l y  p a t t e r n s  e x p e r i e n c e d  by a l l  p r i m a r y  c o mmo d i t i e s ,  and 
whi ch p a t t e r n s  canno t  be a d e q u a t e l y  e x p l a i n e d  t h r o u g h  
economi c t h e o r i e s . ^  To s u p p o r t  t h i s  v i ew,  i t  i s  f u r t h e r
4. See d r a f t  Havana c h a r t e r ,  c h a p t e r  V I ,  A r t i c l e  55.
A l so  F. P a r k i n s o n ,  "The Un i t e d  Na t i o n s  I n t e g r a t e d  
Programme f o r  Commodi t  i es 1 (R S I)  C u rre n t' f r c h le m S ;
p .259.
5. See f o r  exampl e ,  The Un i t e d  Na t i ons  Economic and So c i a l
Counc i l  { ECOSOC ) r e s o l u t i o n s -  512 A(XVI  I )  o f  30th A p r i l ,  
1 954;  r e s o l u t i o n  3 0 ( IV)  o f  28th March 1 947;  and r e s o ­
l u t i o n  28 - D ( X V111) o f  5 th  Aug us-1 1 954.
6.  A r t i c l e  5 7 ( c )  o f  t he  d r a f t  Havana c h a r t e r
7. Chery l  Payer ,  Commodi ty t r a d e  o f  t h e  t h i r d  wor 1 d ,(^1^1-5)
Ma c Mi l l an  Press p . i b 9 .
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argued t h a t  because o f  t h i s  somewhat  p e c u l i a r  p a t t e r n  o f  
demand and s u p p l y ,  v e r y  few p r i ma r y  commodi t y  mar ke t s  have 
ever  been f r e e l y  c o m p e t i t i v e .  They have a l ways r e f l e c t e d  
i n t e r v e n t i o n  i n  one f o r m or  t he  o t h e r  by p r i v a t e  e n t e r p r i s e s  
i n  t he  f o r m o f  c a r t e l s  and by government s  i n  t h e  f o r m o f
o
i n t  er-*go ver  nment  al  commodi t y  agr eement s .
These a s s u mp t i o n s ,  t hough s i g n i f i c a n t ,  f a i l  t o  t ake  
i n t o  account  t h e  r o l e  o f  commodi t y  m a r k e t i n g  i n s t i t u t i o n s  
t hemse l ves  i n  t h e  d e s t a b i l i z a t i o n  o f  t he  ma r k e t s .  Wi t h o u t  
t a k i n g  i n t o  accoun t  t hese  f a c t o r s ,  i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  see 
how i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l e g a l  c o n t r o l s  o f  commodi t y  mar ke t s  can 
succeed i n  c h e c k i n g  t he  me r c u r i a l  . b e h a v i o u r  o f  such 
ma r k e t s .  I t  s hou l d  be p o i n t e d  ou t  here t h a t  t h e  measures 
c o n t a i n e d  i n  t h e  Havana c h a r t e r  and whi ch s t i l l  f o r m t he  
b a s i s  o f  t he  l e g a l  c o n t r o l s  o f  commodi t y  mar ke t s  s t op  s h o r t  
o f  d e a l i n g  w i t h  t he  probl ems t h a t  are a r e s u l t  o f  t he  
f u n c t i o n i n g  o f  t h e  v a r i o u s  ma r k e t i n g  i n s t i t u t i o n s  and t h e i r  
c h i e f  a c t o r s .  In t h i s  c h a p t e r  an argument  w i l l  be advanced 
t o  show how t he  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e s  o f  commodi t y  
mar ke t s  and t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  on t hose  i n s t i t u t i o n s  may cause 
i n s t a b i l i t y  i n  t h e  ma r k e t s .  In so d o i n g ,  i t  i s  hoped t h a t  
we woul d h i g h l i g h t  t he  i nadequacy  o f  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  measures 
such as t h o s e  recommended i n  t he  Havana c h a r t e r .  No a t t e mp t  
w i l l  b e mad e  t o  examine a l l  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  commodi t y  mar ke t s  
s i n c e  most  o f  them are not  r e l e v a n t  t o  t h i s  s t u d y .  The 
d i s c u s s i o n  here w i l l  be l i m i t e d  t o  t h e  e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  mar ke t s  f o r  copper  w i t h  p a r t i c u l a r  emphasi s  t o  t he  
London Metal  Exchange (LME).
8.  A. K.  K o u l , supra  a t  p . 75.
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11 . The n a t u r e  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  copper  mar ke t s
A l a r g e  p e r c en t ag e  o f  copper  t r a d e d  i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y  
i s  produced i n  t h e  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s .  These c o u n t r i e s
9
account  f o r  over  60% o f  t o t a l  wo r l d  e x p o r t s  o f  coppe r .
The w o r l d  copper  ma r k e t i n g  i n s t i t u t i o n s  are t h e r e f o r e  o f  
g r e a t  s i g n i f i c a n c e  t o  a l l  copper  p r o d u c i n g  d e v e l o p i n g  
c o u n t r i e s .  The s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  t hese  i n s t i t u t i o n s  t o  any 
one c o u n t r y  v a r i e s  w i t h  t h a t  c o u n t r y ' s  dependence on t he 
e x p o r t s  o f  c o p p e r .  In t h e  case o f  Zambi a,  t h e s e  i n s t i ­
t u t i o n s  are o f  g r e a t  s i g n i f i c a n c e  s i n c e  copper  e x p o r t s  
accoun t  f o r  over  90% o f  i t s  t o t a l  e x p o r t s ,  and 93% o f  i t s  
t o t a l  f o r e i g n  exchange e a r n i n g s . ^
There are two ways i n  whi ch copper  i s  t r a d e d  i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l l y .  I t  i s  e i t h e r  s o l d  on commodi t y  exchanges ,  t he  
most  i m p o r t a n t  o f  wh i ch  i s  t he  LME, or  i t  i s  t r a d e d  t h r o u g h  
s p e c i a l  c o n t r a c t s  e n t e r e d  i n t o  between buyer s  and s e l l e r s .  
The b u l k  o f  t h e  copper  e x p o r t e d  by d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  i s  
s o l d  by means o f  t he  second method,  t h a t  i s  t o  say ,  d i r e c t l y  
t o  f a b r i c a t o r s  and o n l y  ma r g i n a l  amounts are s o l d  t h r o u gh  
commodi t y  exchanges .  In f a c t  a c o u n t r y  l i k e  Zambia does
not  s e l l  any o f  i t s  copper  t h r o u g h  commodi t y  exchanges but
11o n l y  d i r e c t l y  t o  f a b r i c a t o r s .  A l t h o u g h  o n l y  ma r g i n a l
amounts o f  copper  f r om d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  are t r a d e d  on
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  commodi t y  ma r k e t s ,  t h e s e  mar ke t s  remai n  ve r y
s i g n i f i c a n t  because t h e  p r i c e s  f e t c h e d  here t end  t o  d i c t a t e
1 2t he  p r i c e s  t h a t  can be f e t c h e d  e l s e wh e r e .  In t h i s
9. GATT p r ess  r e l e a s e  No.GATT/1295 o f  9 t h  September  1981,  p . 18
10.  See The Re p u b l i c  Zambi a,  mo n t h l y  d i g e s t  o f  s t a t i s t i c s ,
v o l . X V I , n o s . 10-12 .
11.  Th i s  p o i n t  was r a i s e d  by Mr.  Kataya t h e  r e s e a r c h  manager
at  MEMACO S e r v i c e s  L t d .  London,  i n  an i n t e r v i e w  w i t h
t he  w r i t e r  i n  J u l y  1982.
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r e s p e c t  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  i mp o r t a n c e  o f  t he  LME " l i e s  
i n  t he  f a c t  t h a t  any copper  sa l es  made by Zambia 
d i r e c t l y  t o  consumers must  r e f l e c t  as c l o s e l y  as p o s s i b l e  
t he  p r i c e s  quot ed  on t h e  LME. What t h i s  means i n  e f f e c t  i s  
t h a t  any i n s t a b i l i t y  i n  t h i s  i n s t i t u t i o n  i n e v i t a b l y  means 
i n s t a b i l i t y  i n  t he  e a r n i n g s  o f  a copper  e x p o r t i n g  d e v e l o p i n g  
c o u n t r y ,
I I I .  I n s t i t u t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e  f o r  
t he  London Metal  Exchange
The LME i s  an i m p o r t a n t  i n s t i t u t i o n  t o  copper  e x p o r t i n g  
d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  not  so much because t h e i r  copper  i s  
p h y s i c a l l y  t r a d e d  t h e r e  bu t  because o f  i t s  a b i l i t y  t o  f i x  
copper  p r i c e s  whi ch  are f o l l o w e d  c l o s e l y  i n  a l l  o t h e r  i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  t r a n s a c t i o n s .  Th i s  be i ng  t he  case,  i t  i s  
n ecessa r y  t o  un d e r s t a n d  i t s  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  a r r angement s  
because any i n s t a b i l i t i e s  i n  a commodi t y  mar ke t  can i n  a 
way be s a i d  t o  be a r e f l e c t i o n  o f  i t s  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  a r r a n g e ­
ment s .  To d e v i s e  l e g a l  mechani sms t o  c o n t r o l  such i n s t a ­
b i l i t i e s  w i t h o u t  pay i ng  due r e g a r d  t o  t he  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  
s t r u c t u r e s  i n  t he  mar ket  as t h e  Havana p r i n c i p l e s  s u g g e s t ,  
woul d seem t o  be a f u t i l e  exercise-*
The most  i m p o r t a n t  aspec t  o f  t he  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  
s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  LME are i t s  members because p a r t i c i p a t i o n
i n  t h e  i m p o r t a n t  f u n c t i o n s  o f  t he  exchange i s  l i m i t e d  t o
1 3members o f  t h e  exchange.  Membershi p o f  t h e  LME i s  broken
12. Raymond F. M i k e s e l l ,  The Wor l d Copper  I n d u s t r y  , ( l^ ? cl j  Tohn 
Hopk i ns  U n i v e r s i t y  Press , Bal  t  i mo r e , r~““" " p. 81.
13. Rul e no.  1,  Pa r t  one o f  t h e  London Meta l  Exchange 
r u l e s  and r e g u l a t i o n s .
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down i n t o  t h r e e  c a t e g o r i e s .  The f i r s t  c a t e g o r y  compr i ses  
o f  what  are n o r m a l l y  t ermed t h e  commerc i a l  u s e r s .  Th i s  
i n c l u d e s  t h o se  f i r m s  or  compani es t h a t  e i t h e r  produce or
CkJ~L^
r e f i n e  c o ppe r ,  and d e a l e r s .  The d e a l e r s  be>ifg t h ose  f i r m s  
and compani es t h a t  ac t  as mi ddl emen i n  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  
copper  f r om p r o du c e r s  t o  consumers.  The second c a t e g o r y  
o f  members compr i ses  o f  t hose  f i r m s  and compani es t h a t  are 
n e i t h e r  p r o du c e r s  nor  consumers but  are agent s  o f  such 
compani es .  The f i n a l  c a t e g o r y  compr i ses  o f  p r o f e s s i o n a l  
t r a d e r s  who be l ong t o  t he  exchange f o r  purposes  o f  t r a d i n g  
on t h e i r  own a c c o u n t .
For  a f i r m  or  company t o  q u a l i f y  as a member o f  t he
exchange i n  any o f  t he  t h r e e  c a t e g o r i e s ,  i t  must  be ab l e
1 4t o  be r e p r e s e n t e d  by what  are t ermed s u b s c r i b e r s .  There
are two c a t e g o r i e s  o f  s u b s c r i b e r s  on t h i s  exchange.  F i r s t ,  
t h e r e  are t h e  r e p r e s e n t  a t i v e  s u b s c r i b e r s  who are r e q u i r e d  
t o  be persons  o f  over  21 y e a r s  o f  age,  d i r e c t o r s  o f  a 
company or  p a r t n e r s  i n  a f i r m ,  whose company or  f i r m  i s  
i n c o r p o r a t e d  and d o m i c i l e d  i n  t he  U n i t e d  Ki ngdom.  The 
person e l i g i b l e  f o r  e l e c t i o n  as a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  s u b s c r i b e r  
must  be ab l e  t o  show t h a t  t he  company he r e p r e s e n t s  has 
at  l e a s t  one o f  i t s  d i r e c t o r s  d o m i c i l e d  i n  t h e  Un i t e d  
Kingdom or  t h a t  t he  m a j o r i t y  o f  t he  p a r t n e r s  i n  h i s  f i r m  
are d o m i c i l e d  i n  t he  Un i t e d  Kingdom.  The second t y p e  o f  
s u b s c r i b e r  i s  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  s u b s c r i b e r  who i s  r e q u i r e d  
t o  be a per son nomi nat ed  by a t r a d e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  connec t ed  
w i t h  t he  metal  i n d u s t r y ,  or  d i r e c t o r  o f  a company or  p a r t n e r
14. I b i d . ,  r u l e  1 .
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i n  a f i r m  whi ch  f o r  one reason or  a n o t h e r  does not  q u a l i f y
1 5him t o  t h e  s t a t u s  o f  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  s u b s c r i b e r .
I t  i s  o n l y  t hose  compani es t h a t  s a t i s f y  t he  a d d i t i o n a l  
r e q u i r e m e n t  o f  hav i ng  a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  s u b s c r i b e r  or  
i n d i v i d u a l  s u b s c r i b e r  t h a t  q u a l i f y  t o  become members o f  t he  
exchange.  The s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  between 
compani es and f i r m s  r e p r e s e n t e d  by r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  s u b s c r i b e r s  
or  i n d i v i d u a l  s u b s c r i b e r s  becomes appa r en t  when one examines 
r u l e  15 o f  p a r t  one o f  t h e  r u l e s  and r e g u l a t i o n s  o f  t he  
exchange.  Th i s  r u l e  makes i t  c l e a r  t h a t  o n l y  t h o s e  compani es 
and f i r m s  r e p r e s e n t e d  by r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  s u b s c r i b e r s  are 
p e r m i t t e d  t o  deal  i n  t he  r i n g .  The i mp o r t a n c e  o f  a company 
be i ng  ab l e  t o  deal  i n  t h e  r i n g  w i l l  be examined l a t e r  on i n  
t h e  c h a p t e r .  I t  s u f f i c e s  here t o  p o i n t  out  t h a t  t hese  
membershi p r e q u i r e m e n t s  c r e a t e  two broad c a t e g o r i e s  o f  members,  
t h a t  i s  t h o s e  f i r m s  and compani es t h a t  are a b l e  t o  deal  i n  
t he  r i n g  and t ho s e  t h a t  are members o f  t he  exchange but  
canno t  deal  i n  t h e  r i n g .
Si nce r i n g  d e a l i n g  members o f  t he  exchange are r e q u i r e d
t o  be compani es or  f i r m s  r e p r e s e n t e d  by r e p r e s e n t a t i v e
s u b s c r i b e r s ,  i n c o r p o r a t e d  or  d o m i c i l e d  i n  t he  U n i t e d  Kingdom,
and hav i ng  e i t h e r  one o f  i t s  d i r e c t o r s  d o m i c i l e d  i n  t he
c o u n t r y  o r  t h e  m a j o r i t y  o f  i t s  p a r t n e r s  d o m i c i l e d  i n  t he
c o u n t r y , -  t h e  ma r k e t i n g  e n t e r p r i s e s  o f  copper  e x p o r t i n g
d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t i r e s  have not  been ab l e  t o  q u a l i f y  as r i n g
1 £\
d e a l i n g  members o f  t he  LME. The i n a b i l i t y  o f  t hese  
n a t i o n a l  m a r k e t i n g  c o r p o r a t i o n s  t o  q u a l i f y  as r i n g  d e a l i n g
15.  I b i d . ,  r u l e s  6 ( a )  and 6 ( b ) .
16.  London Metal  Exchange membershi p l i s t  as o f  J u l y  1982.
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members on t h i s  exchange stems f r om t h e i r  l e g a l  n a t u r e .
For  exampl e ,  t h e  Zambia Metal  Ma r k e t i n g  C o r p o r a t i o n  (MEMACO) 
i s  a s u b s i d i a r y  o f  t he  Zambia I n d u s t r i a l  and Mi n i n g  C o r p o r ­
a t i o n  (ZIMCO) whi ch i s  i n c o r p o r a t e d  i n Zambi a.  The Zambian 
Companies Ac t  r e q u i r e s  t he  m a j o r i t y  o f  d i r e c t o r s  o f  any 
company i n c o r p o r a t e d  i n  Zambia t o  be d o m i c i l e d  i n  Zambia.
Thus a l t h o u g h  MEMACO has an o f f i c e  i n  London,  i t  i s  i n  
e f f e c t  a company i n c o r p o r a t e d  i n  'Zambia and does not  t h e r e f o r e  
q u a l i f y  t o  deal  on t he  r i n g .  I t  has however  q u a l i f i e d  as
1 7a non d e a l i n g  member r e p r e s e n t e d  by an i n d i v i d u a l  s u b s c r i b e r .
The s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  t h e  i n a b i l i t y  o f  copper  p r o d u c i n g  d e v e l o p i n g  
c o u n t r i e s  t o  q u a l i f y  as r i n g  d e a l i n g  members o f  t he  Exchange 
becomes appa r en t  when one examines t he  f u n c t i o n s  pe r f o r med  
by t he  Exchange.
I V . I n t e r n a t i o n a l  copper  p r i c e  s e t t i n g
Onl y a sma l l  p e r c en t a g e  o f  copper  exchanged i n t e r n a t i o n ­
a l l y  by copper  e x p o r t i n g  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  i s  a c t u a l l y
t r a d e d  on t h e  LME. Some o f  t he  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  l i k e
1 8Zambia do no t  s e l l  any o f  t h e i r  copper  on t h e  exchange.
De s p i t e  t h i s ,  t h e  LME pe r f o r ms  one ba s i c  f u n c t i o n  o f  v i t a l  
i n t e r e s t  t o  copper  e x p o r t i n g  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s .  Th i s  
f u n c t i o n  i s  one o f  s e t t i n g  t h e  p r i c e  f o r  t he  commodi t y .
The r o l e  o f  t h e  LME as a p r i c e  s e t t i n g  i n s t i t u t i o n  
appears  t o  be based on t he  t r a d i t i o n a l  economi c  t h e o r y  t h a t  
a commodi t y  exchange i s  r u l e d  by t he  f o r c e s  o f  s u p p l y  and 
demand whi ch i n  t u r n  se t  ou t  a t r u e  p r i c e  f o r  a commodi t y .
17.  I b i d .
18. An i n t e r v i e w  w i t h  Mr.  Ka t aya .  See f o o t n o t e  1,1.
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The o p e r a t i n g  mechani sms f o r  p r i c e  s e t t i n g  on t he  LME,
as f a r  as copper  i s  c oncer ned ,  are t he  copper  c o n t r a c t s .
The most  i m p o r t a n t  c o n t r a c t  on t h i s  exchange i s  t h e  " f u t u r e s
c o n t r a c t " .  Th i s  f o r m o f  c o n t r a c t  e n t a i l s  a f i r m  commi tment
by a buyer  and s e l l e r  t o  d e l i v e r  and r e c e i v e  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,
a s p e c i f i e d  amount  and q u a l i t y  o f  copper  a t  a d e s i g n a t e d
f u t u r e  d a t e .  The c o n t r a c t  i s  u s u a l l y  e n t e r e d  i n t o  l i k e  any
o t h e r  c o n t r a c t  o f  s a l e ,  when an o f f e r  by t h e  s e l l e r  i s
accept ed  by t he  buye r .  O f f e r s  and accep t ances  are u s u a l l y
1 9made t h r o u g h  open o u t c r y  made ac r oss  t he  exchange r i n g .
The p a r t i e s  c apab l e  o f  e n t e r i n g  i n t o  a f u t u r e s  copper  
c o n t r a c t  on t h e  LME must  be members o f  t h e  Exchange who are 
p e r m i t t e d  t o  deal  on t he  r i n g .  I t  w i l l  be obser ved  here 
t h a t  t h e . c o p p e r  p r o d u c i n g  c o u n t r i e s  do no t  q u a l i f y  as r i n g  
d e a l i n g  members o f  t he  exchange.  Th i s  means t h a t  t hese  
c o u n t r i e s  canno t  e n t e r  i n t o  a f u t u r e s  copper  c o n t r a c t  by
o n
way of an open ou tc ry  at  the Exchange. I t  is however,
p o s s i b l e  f o r  a m a r k e t i n g  c o r p o r a t i o n  o f  a copper  p r o d u c i n g
d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r y  t o  e n t e r  i n t o  a c o n t r a c t  o f  s a l e  w i t h  a
r i n g  d e a l i n g  member o f  t he  Exchange o u t s i d e  t he  r i n g .  Such
a c o n t r a c t  does not  however ,  a u t o m a t i c a l l y  f a l l  w i t h i n  t he
LME c o n t r a c t  r eg i me un l ess  bot h  p a r t i e s  agree t h a t  i t  f a l l s
21w i t h i n  t h a t  r e g i me .  For  purposes  o f  t h i s  c h a p t e r ,  we 
s h a l l  no t  go i n t o  t he  d e t a i l s  o f  t h i s  second t y p e  o f  c o n t r a c t  
because i t  i s  o f  l i t t l e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  as f a r  as t h e  copper  
p r i c e  s e t t i n g  i s  c o nce r ned .  Our d i s c u s s i o n  here w i l l  be
19. Rul e 17 o f  t h e  LME r u l e s  and r e g u l a t i o n s .
20.  I b i d . , r u l e  15.
21.  I b i d . ,  r u l e  30 p a r t  1 ( a ) .
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l i m i t e d  t o  t he  copper  c o n t r a c t  e n t e r e d  i n t o  between r i n g  
d e a l i n g  members o f  t h e  exchange,  because i t  i s  t h i s  t ype  
o f  c o n t r a c t  t h a t  i s  c r u c i a l  t o  t he  p r i c e  s e t t i n g  p r o c es s .
The t e r ms o f  t he  copper  c o n t r a c t  e n t e r e d  i n t o  between 
two r i n g  d e a l i n g  members,  t h a t  i s  o t h e r  t han  t h e  p r i c e  are 
s t a n d a r d i z e d ,  as i s  e v i d e n t  f r om a casual  p e r us a l  o f  t he  
LME s t a n d a r d  f o r m c o n t r a c t s .  What becomes t he  s u b j e c t  o f  
o f f e r s  and accep t ance  ac r oss  t he  f l o o r  o f  t h e  Exchange are 
t he  p r i c e s  and t he  q u a n t i t i e s  t o  be pa i d  and d e l i v e r e d  
r e s p e c t i v e l y .  Once agreement  has been r eached on t he  two 
i s s u e s ,  a c o n t r a c t  i s  conc l uded  emp l oy i ng  t he  t e rms c o n t a i n e d  
i n  t h e  s t a n d a r d  f o r m c o n t r a c t  f o r  copper .
There are b a s i c a l l y  f o u r  s t a n d a r d  f o r m copper  c o n t r a c t s
on t he  LME depend i ng  on t h e  q u a l i t y  o f  t he  meta l  be i ng
c o n t r a c t e d  f o r .  There i s  one f o r  e l e c t r o l y t i c  w i r e b a r s ,
one f o r  e l e c t r o l y t i c  c a t h o d e ,  one f o r  h i g h e r  grade coppe r ,
and one f o r  f i r e  r e f i n e d  co p pe r .  The copper  d e l i v e r e d  under
t h e  f o u r  c o n t r a c t s  must  meet  t he  q u a l i t y  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s
c o n t a i n e d  i n  t he  r e s p e c t i v e  s t an d a r d  f orms o f  c o n t r a c t .
A l l  t he  o t h e r  t erms o f  t he  f o u r  t ypes  o f  c o n t r a c t s  are s i m i l a r
and c o v e r  i s s u e s  such as w e i g h t ,  s e t t l e m e n t  on t h e  due d a t e ,
22w a r r a n t y ,  and d i s p u t e  s e t t l e m e n t .  Of p a r t i c u l a r  i n t e r e s t  
t o  our  d i s c u s s i o n  i n  t h i s  c h a p t e r  i s  t he  q u e s t i o n  o f  d i s p u t e  
s e t t l e m e n t  whi ch w i l l  be d i s c u s s e d  bel ow.
As s t a t e d  e a r l i e r ,  t he  p r i c e s  o f  copper  on t he  LME are 
a r r i v e d  at  when r i n g  d e a l i n g  members e n t e r  i n t o  c o n t r a c t s  by 
way o f  an open o u t c r y .  At  t he  end o f  t h e  day t he  average o f
22.  See specimen c o n t r a c t s  i n  p a r t  5 o f  t he  LME r u l e s  and 
r e g u l a t i  o n s .
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t he  p r i c e s  f e t c h e d  i n  t he  v a r i o u s  c o n t r a c t s  become t he  r u l i n g
p r i c e s  f o r  copper  s o l d  e l sewher e  f o r  t h e  day.  Thus f o r
exampl e ,  i f  on day A t he  average p r i c e s  f e t c h e d  at  t h e  LME
i s  £800 per  t o n ,  a c o n t r a c t  f o r  t he  s a l e  o f  copper  en t e r e d
i n t o  between say MEMACO and a Japanese f a b r i c a t i n g  f i r m  on
t h e  same day w i l l  u s u a l l y  quot e  t h a t  p r i c e  as t he  b a s i s  o f
t he  t r a n s a c t i o n .  In t h i s  pr ocess  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  p a r t i e s
r e p r e s e n t e d  on t h e  r i n g  p l a y  an i m p o r t a n t  r o l e  o f  i n f l u e n c i n g
t h e  p r i c e  t h a t  a copper  e x p o r t i n g  c o u n t r y  woul d r e c e i v e  i n
i t s  t r a n s a c t i o n s  e l s e wh e r e .  The appa r en t  danger  i n  t h i s
ar r angement  i s  t h a t  t h e  p r i c e s  a r r i v e d  a t  on t he  LME may
not  n e c e s s a r i l y  r e f l e c t  t h e  f o r c e s  o f  s u p p l y  and demand bu t
may be i n f l u e n c e d  by t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  t h e  v a r i o u s  r i n g
d e a l i n g  members.  I ndeed a number o f  s t u d i e s  have shown t h a t
t h e r e  i s  a g r e a t  danger  o f  p r i c e s  o f  c o mmod i t i es  be i ng
i n f l u e n c e d  by a few compani es t a k i n g  c o n t r o l  o f  d e a l i n g s
on t he  exchange.  Th i s  has been shown t o  o c c u r  t h r o u g h  a
pr ocess  c a l l e d  t h e  “ squeeze" .  A “ squeeze"  i s  s a i d  t o
occu r  when one or  more i n f l u e n t i a l  t r a d e r s  c o n t r o l  a
s u b s t a n t i a l  segment  o f  t he  c o n t r a c t s  t r a d e d  on t h e  exchange
f l o o r  as w e l l  as a s i z e a b l e  p o r t i o n  o f  d e l i v e r a b l e  s u p p l i e s
and uses t h e  c o n t r o l  o f  t h ese  two vant age p o i n t s  t o  a l t e r  
23f u t u r e  p r i c e s .
I f  t h e  dangers  o f  t h e  LME be i ng  m a n i p u l a t e d  by t he  
p a r t i e s  i n v o l v e d  i n  t h e  f o r m a t i o n  o f  t h e  copper  c o n t r a c t s  
are r e a l ,  as t h e y  seem t o  be,  t hen two i s s u e s  a r i s e .  F i r s t ,
23.  See f o r  exampl e ,  C l a i r m o n t e  and J.  Cavanagh,  The iAI.oHcf. 
m Their Web LH%'l) Lcptidon > pp, 53  -  68... . j
Al so  see UNCTAD, Ma r k e t !  ng “ ati<r d i sT ;riT )u ti on o f  
t o b a c c o " ,  Doc.  No. T D / B / C . 1/205 ( 1 9 7 8 ) .
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i t  becomes i m p o r t a n t  t o  d e t e r mi n e  whe t he r  t h e r e  are any 
l e g a l  c o n t r o l s  aimed at  r e g u l a t i n g  t he  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  t hose  
r e p r e s e n t e d  on t h e  r i n g  and whe t he r  such c o n t r o l s  are 
e f f e c t i v e .  Se c o nd l y ,  whe t he r  t h e  i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l  r e g u l a t i o n s  
employed i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  commodi t y  t r a d e  do e f f e c t i v e l y  
p e n e t r a t e  t he  i n t e r n a l  a r r angement s  o f  commodi t y  ma r k e t s .
Our d i s c u s s i o n  i n  t h i s  c h a p t e r  w i l l  be l i m i t e d  t o  t h e  f i r s t  
o f  t hese  two p o i n t s  l e a v i n g  t h e  second p o i n t  f o r  d i s c u s s i o n  
i n  t he  nex t  c h a p t e r .
V . R e g u l a t o r y  c o n t r o l s  ove r  t he  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  t he  LME
As men t i oned  above,  t he  most  i m p o r t a n t  aspec t  o f  t he  
f u n c t i o n s  o f  t he  LME i s  t h a t  o f  copper  p r i c e  s e t t i n g .  The 
i mp o r t a n t -  ac t  or s  i n  t h i s  p rocess  are t h e  r i n g  d e a l i n g  members.
Of s i g n i f i c a n c e  about  t h e  r i n g  d e a l i n g  members are t he 
membershi p r u l e s  whi ch  e x c l u d e  t he  m a r k e t i n g  i n s t i t u t i o n s  
o f  d e v e l o p i n g  copper  e x p o r t i n g  c o u n t r i e s .  Lack o f  p a r t i c i ­
p a t i o n  by t h e s e  c o u n t r i e s  means t h e y  canno t  i n f l u e n c e  
a d e q u a t e l y  t he  o p e r a t i o n s  o f  t h e  market  a l t h o u g h  t he  p r i c e s  
se t  t h e r e  g r e a t l y  a f f e c t  t h e i r  i ncome f r om t h e i r  copper  e x p o r t s .  
Si nce  t he  p a r t i c i p a n t s  on t h e  6xchange p r i c e  s e t t i n g  p r ocess  
are f i r m s  and compani es whi ch have an i n t e r e s t  i n  t he  copper  
i n d u s t r y  bu t  not  n e c e s s a r i l y  p r o d u c e r s ,  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  f o r  
t h e  Exchange t o  be used t o  t he  d e t r i m e n t  o f  t he  p r o d u c i n g  
c o u n t r i e s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  t hose  i n  t he  d e v e l o p i n g  w o r l d .  I f  
t h i s  be t he  case,  i t  becomes necessar y  t o  d e t e r m i n e  whe t he r  
t h e r e  are adequat e  r e g u l a t o r y  c o n t r o l s  t h a t  seek t o  m i n i m i s e  
such p o s s i b l e  abuses on t he  Exchange.
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B a s i c a l l y  a commodi t y  Exchange i s  s u b j e c t  t o  t he  
domes t i c  l aws o f  t he  c o u n t r y  where i t  i s  s i t u a t e d .  W i t h i n  
t h a t  domes t i c  j u r i s d i c t i o n ,  t h e  Exchange i s  t hen  e i t h e r  
s e l f  r e g u l a t o r y  t h r o u g h  i t s  own r u l e s  or  i s  s u b j e c t  t o  an 
i n d e p e nde n t  r e g u l a t o r y  agency.  In t he  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  f o r  
exampl e,  a l l  commodi t y  Exchanges are r e g u l a t e d  by an 
i nd e p end e n t  f e d e r a l  r e g u l a t o r y  agency c a l l e d  t h e  Commodi ty 
Fu t u r e s  T r a d i n g  Commi ssi on (CFTC).  The c r e a t i o n  o f  t h i s  
Commi ssi on i n  1974 appears  t o  have been a r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  t he  
v i ew t h a t  t he  bes t  c o n t r o l  o f  a commodi t y  Exchange d o m e s t i c ­
a l l y ,  l i e s  i n  an i nd e pe nd e n t  body whi ch i s  charged w i t h  t he  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  o v e r s e e i n g  t he  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  a l l  t he  
commodi t y  Exchanges.  At  t he  Con g r e s s i o n a l  h e a r i n g s  i n  1973,  
v a r i o u s  w i t n e s s e s  t e s t i f i e d  t h a t  t h e r e  had been a s i g n i f i c a n t
i n c r e a s e  i n t he  i n c i d e n t s  o f  abus i v e  p r a c t i c e s  on a l l  t he
24commodi t y  mar ke t s  i n  t h a t  c o u n t r y .  As a r e s u l t  o f  t hese
r e p o r t s ,  t h e  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  commi t t ee  c o nc l uded  t h a t  s e l f
r e g u l a t i o n  c o u l d  not  c o n t i n u e  t o  f u n c t i o n  i n  t h e  commodi t y
i n d u s t r y  w i t h o u t  a s t r o n g  f e d e r a l  r e g u l a t o r y  u m b r e l l a  over
s e l f  r e g u l a t o r y  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  t h e  commodi t y  ma r k e t s .  Si nce
2 51974 t h e r e f o r e ,  t he  Commodi ty Exchange Act  i n  t h a t  c o u n t r y  
p r o v i d e s  f o r  gove r nmen t a l  c o n t r o l  over  a l l  commodi t y  ma r k e t s .
The main aim o f  t h i s  gover nment a l  c o n t r o l  i s  t o  p r o v i d e  
gover nmen t a l  s u r v e i l l a n c e  o f  t he  commodi t y  exchanges f o r  
purposes  o f  maki ng sure  t h a t  t he y  f u n c t i o n  p r o p e r l y  and 
are f r e e  f r om m a n i p u l a t i o n  by t hose  r e p r e s e n t e d  on t he  exchanges.
24.  Un i t e d  S t a t e s  Senate Re p o r t s ,  N o . 1131 (1973)  at  page 33.
25.  The U n i t e d  S t a t e s  Commodi ty F u t u r es  T r a d i n g  Commission 
Act  o f  1974,  Pub. L.  No. 93-463 S t a t .  para 1389.
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The basic assumption here being t h a t  i t  is  only through some 
kind of governmental  s uper v is ion  t h a t  commodity Exchanges can 
r e f l e c t  as a c c u r a t e l y  as po ss ib le  the basic c on d i t i o n s  a f f e c t ­
ing a commodity and t h e r e f o r e  perform t h e i r  p r i c e  s e t t i n g  
f u n c t i o n  in a f a i r  manner.
In t he  case o f  t h e  Un i t e d  Kingdom i n  wh i ch  c o u n t r y  
t h e  London Metal  Exchange i s  s i t u a t e d ,  p a r l i a m e n t  has l e f t  
c o n t r o l  over  commodi t y  exchanges i n  t h e  hands o f  t he  Exchanges 
t h e ms e l v e s .  The p h i l o s o p h y  i n  t h i s  c o u n t r y  f a v o u r s  s e l f  
r e g u l a t i o n  by t he  commodi t y  Exchanges.  Th i s  had not  a l ways 
been t he  p o s i t i o n  because as e a r l y  as 1947,  t h e  Bank o f  
Engl and had o b t a i n e d  g ene r a l  s u p e r v i s o r y  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  over
n  r
a l l  commodi t y  mar ke t s  and exchanges.  Under  t h e  Exchange
C o n t r o l  Ac t  o f  t h a t  y e a r ,  t h e  Bank o f  Engl and was g i ve n  powers
o f  s u r v e i l l a n c e  over  t h e  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  a l l  commodi t y  exchanges
i n  t h e  U n i t e d  Ki ngdom.  In Oc t ober  1979,  however ,  an Ac t  o f
p a r l i a m e n t  was passed r e p e a l i n g  t he  p r o v i s i o n s  a p p l y i n g  t o
the r e g u l a t i o n  of  commodity Exchanges under the 1947 Act .
Th i s  meant  t h a t  t he  Bank o f  Engl and no l o n g e r  had s u p e r v i s o r y
a u t h o r i t y  over  t h e  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  t h e  London Met a l  Exchange.
Thus a l t h o u g h  u n o f f i c i a l  c o n s u l t a t i o n s  do o c c u r  between
t he  Bank and t h e  Exchange r e g a r d i n g  such m a t t e r s  as t he
degree o f  s p e c u l a t i v e  a c t i v i t i e s  on t he  exchange and i t s
e f f e c t  an t he  f i n a n c i a l  i n t e g r i t y  o f  t h e  m a r k e t ,  a l l  r e g u l a t o r y
c o n t r o l s  on the a c t i v i t i e s  of  the Exchange are e s s e n t i a l l y
? 1s e l f  i mposed and s e l f  a d m i n i s t e r e d .
26.  See t h e  U n i t e d  Kingdom Exchange C o n t r o l  Ac t  o f  1947.
10 and 11 Geo. 6,  C. 14 ,  s e c t i o n  1.
27.  C h r i s t i n e  A. Rock,  “ R e g u l a t o r y  c o n t r o l  over  t h e  Un i t e d
S t a t e s ,  Canad i an ,  and Un i t e d  Kingdom f u t u r e s  m a r k e t s " ,
B u s i n e s s  L a w y e r  , Ho „ p - & 13 .
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The advan tages  o f  t h e  r e g u l a t o r y  system employed i n  
t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  l i e s  i n  t he  f a c t  t h a t  a d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r y  
u t i l i z i n g  t h e  commodi ty  Exchanges i n  t h a t  c o u n t r y  can be 
a b l e  t o  i n f l u e n c e  t he  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  t h e  Exchanges by means 
o f  i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l  c o n s u l t a t i o n s  or  t h r o u g h  d i p l o m a t i c  
means. The s e l f  r e g u l a t o r y  reg ime o f  t h e  London Metal  
Exchange,  on t he  o t h e r  hand,  would seem t o  make i t  d i f f i c u l t  
f o r  t h i s  avenue t o  be used.  S i nce  the  c r i t i c a l  i s s u e  f o r  
t h e  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  e x p o r t i n g  copper  i s  t h e  s t a b i l i t y  
o f  t he  London Meta l  Exchange which  f o r  t h e  most  p a r t  d e t e r ­
mines t h e  p r i c e s  t h e i r  c opper  would f e t c h ,  s e l f  r e g u l a t i o n  
does not  seem t o  p r o v i d e  t he s e  c o u n t r i e s  w i t h  a ma ch in er y  
t h r o u g h  which  t h e y  c o u l d  e x e r c i s e  a measure o f  c o n t r o l  on 
t h e  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  t h e  exchange.  To u n d e r s t a n d  t h e  s h o r t ­
comings o f  t h e  LME r e g u l a t o r y  r e g i m e ,  i t  i s  n e ce s s a r y  to  
examine v a r i o u s  r u l e s  and r e g u l a t i o n s  g o v e r n i n g  t h e  c onduc t  
o f  b u s i n e s s ,  c o n t r a c t  f o r m a t i o n  and d i s p u t e  s e t t l e m e n t  on 
t h e  exchange.
V I . The London Meta l  Exchange C o n t r a c t
The most  i m p o r t a n t  i n s t r u m e n t  used f o r  c opper  p r i c e  
s e t t i n g  on t h e  LME i s  t h e  so c a l l e d  copper  c o n t r a c t .  Th i s  
c o n t r a c t  i s  e n t e r e d  i n t o  between r i n g  d e a l i n g  members o f  
t h e  Exchange d u r i n g  t he  t i m e s  se t  a s i d e  e v e r y d a y  f o r  purposes 
o f  copper  t r a d i n g .  I t  sh o u l d  be r e c a l l e d  t h a t  m a r k e t i n g  
i n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  copper  e x p o r t i n g  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  do not  
q u a l i f y  under  t h e  Exchange r u l e s  t o  deal  on t h e  r i n g .  Th i s  
means t h a t  such i n s t i t u t i o n s  canno t  e n t e r  i n t o  t h e  copper  
c o n t r a c t  as d e f i n e d  by t h e  Exchange r u l e s  and r e g u l a t i o n s .
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The i n a b i l i t y  o f  copper  p r o d u c i n g  c o u n t r i e s  t o  e n t e r  i n t o
such c o n t r a c t s  i s  r e g r e t t a b l e  p a r t i c u l a r l y  when one c o n s i d e r s
t h a t  i t  i s  t he  average p r i c e  o f  t he  p r i c e s  quoted  i n  t hes e
c o n t r a c t s  wh i ch  e v e n t u a l l y  fo rms t he  b a s i s  o f  t h e  p r i c e  o f
copper  f o r  any one g i v e n  day.  For  a copper  e x p o r t i n g
! ,
d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r y  t h e r e f o r e ,  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  t h i s  p r i c e  
s e t t i n g  p rocess  i s  o f  c r i t i c a l  i m p o r t a n c e .  To d e t e r m i n e  
t he  b es t  approach o f  i n c r e a s i n g  t he  p r o d u c e r  c o u n t r i e s '  
b a r g a i n i n g  l e v e r a g e  on t h e  Exchange,  i t  i s  n e ce s s a r y  t o  
examine more c l o s e l y  some o f  t he  r u l e s  g o v e r n i n g  t he  copper  
c o n t r a c t .
{ i ) N at u r e  o f  t h e  c o n t r a c t
One o f  t h e  s i g n i f i c a n t  a spec t s  o f  t h e  LME copper  
c o n t r a c t  i s  t h a t  i t  i s  i n  t he  fo rm o f  a s t a n d a r d  c o n t r a c t .  
The c o n t r a c t  b a s i c a l l y  d e a l s  w i t h  t h r e e  i s s u e s  o f  i m po r t a n c e  
t o  t h i s  d i s c u s s i o n .  F i r s t ,  i t  s p e c i f i e s  t h e  q u a l i t y  o f  t he  
metal  t o  be d e l i v e r e d ,  t h a t  i s  t o  say,  w he t h e r  i t  i s  h igh  
grade c o p p e r ,  c a t h o d e s ,  w i r e b a r s ,  or  f i r e  r e f i n e d  c o ppe r .
The i m p o r t a n t  i s s u e  about  q u a l i t y  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  i n  the  
copper  c o n t r a c t  l i e s  i n  t he  f a c t  t h a t  a l l  t h e  copper  s o l d  
on t he  LME must con fo r m t o  c e r t a i n  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s .  These 
s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  do r a i s e  prob lems t o  a c o u n t r y  w i s h i n g  t o  
marke t  copper  o f  d i f f e r e n t  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s .  Such a c o u n t r y  
would f i n d  i t  d i f f i c u l t  t o  q uo t e  t he  LME p r i c e s  because 
t h a t  exchange does not  deal  w i t h  c o n t r a c t s  f o r  t he  d e l i v e r y  
o f  copper  o t h e r  t han i n  t h e  s p e c i f i e d  f o r m .  T h i s  p rob lem
28. See t he  r e v i s e d  copper  c o n t r a c t s ,  p a r t  5 o f  t he  LME 
r u l e s  and r e g u l a t i o n s .
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has a l r e a d y  a f f e c t e d  b l i s t e r  copper  produced by Papua New 
Guinea.
A second asp ec t  o f  t he  q u a l i t y  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  r e l a t e s  
t o  m a r k e t i n g  prob l ems t h a t  may f a c e  a c o u n t r y  w i s h i n g  t o  
e x p o r t  copper  o f  h i g h e r  q u a l i t y  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  t ha n  t ho se  
me nt i oned  on t he  LME c o n t r a c t .  S ince  t h e  c o n t r a c t s  are 
r i g i d  i n  t h e i r  q u a l i t y  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s ,  an a t t e m p t  by a 
copper  p r o d u c i n g  c o u n t r y  t o  mar ke t  copper  o f  a h i g h e r  
grade than  t h a t  s p e c i f i e d  i n  t h e  c o n t r a c t s  i s  bound t o  l ead  
t o  t h e  p rob l em o f  d e t e r m i n i n g  t he  a p p r o p r i a t e  p r i c e  f o r  such 
c op p e r .  In r e c e n t  y e a r s ,  t he  I n t e r g o v e r n m e n t  a 1 Counc i l  o f  
Copper e x p o r t i n g  C o u n t r i e s  (CIPEC) has been ca nvas tn g  t he  
LME t o  change i t s  q u a l i t y  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  r u l e s  t o  a l l o w  f o r
2 9o t h e r  gra.des o f  c opper  t o  be i n c l u d e d  on t h e  copper  c o n t r a c t .
The second i s s u e  s p e c i f i e d  i n  t h e  LME c opper  c o n t r a c t  
are the  s e t t l e m e n t  t e r m s .  Under t he s e  t e r m s ,  t h e  c o n t r a c t s  
are r e q u i r e d  t o  s p e c i f y  t h e  q u a n t i t i e s  i n v o l v e d  i n  m u l t i p l e s  
o f  25 t o n s ,  a t  t h e  p r i c e  r u l i n g  on t h e  Exchange on t he  day 
o f  d e l i v e r y  o r  t h e  day t h e  c o n t r a c t  i s  c o n c l u d e d .  I t  sh ou l d  
be p o i n t e d  o u t  here  t h a t  t h i s  r e q u i r e m e n t  p r o v i d e s  an o p t i o n  
t o  t h e  buyers  and s e l l e r s  t o  quot e  i n  t h e i r  c o n t r a c t s  the  
p r i c e  o f  copper  r u l i n g  on t h e  day o f  t h e  c o n t r a c t  o r  t he  
p r i c e  r u l i n g  on t h e  day t h e  c o n t r a c t  i s  s e t t l e d .  I h i s  o p t i o n  
works i n . f a v o u r  o f  s p e c u l a t i v e  t e n d e n c i e s  on t h e  marke t  which 
u l t i m a t e l y  have t h e  e f f e c t  o f  f u r t h e r  d e s t a b i l i z i n g  the  
m a r k e t .  S i nce  t h e  LME i s  f o r  a l l  p r a c t i c a l  pu rposes  a p r i c e  
s e t t i n g  i n s t i t u t i o n  f o r  c o p p e r ,  t he  d e s t a b i l i z i n g  e f f e c t s
29. T h i s  p o i n t  was r a i s e d  by Mr.  P e t e r  P a r k i n s o n ,  D i r e c t o r  
o f  m a r k e t i n g  p o l i c y  f o r  CIPEC i n  an i n t e r v i e w  w i t h  t he  
w r i t e r .  I n t e r v i e w  c onduc t ed  i n  P a r i s  i n  December 1982.
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r e s u l t i n g  f r om s p e c u l a t i v e  a c t i v i t i e s  t en d  t o  be f e l t  m o s t l y  
by t he  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  p r o d u c i n g  c o p p e r .  The I n t e r ­
g ov er nme nt a l  C ou n c i l  o f  Copper E x p o r t i n g  C o u n t r i e s  (CIPEC) 
has i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s  been a d v o c a t i n g  a change i n  t h i s  LME 
c o n t r a c t  r e q u i r e m e n t .  I t  has c a l l e d  f o r  t h e  use o f  m o n t h l y  
average p r i c e s  as t he  b a s i s  f o r  a l l  copper  c o n t r a c t s  e n t e r e d  
i n t o  by i t s  members. 30
( i i ) Agency r u l e s  on t h e  LME
P a r t i e s  t o  a copper  c o n t r a c t  on t h e  London Metal  
Exchange deal  w i t h  one a n o t h e r  as p r i n c i p a l s  and are t h e r e ­
f o r e  e n t i t l e d  t o  c l a i m  a g a i n s t  one a n o t h e r  o n l y  f o r  the
31f u l f i l l m e n t  o f  t h e  c o n t r a c t .  Th i s  r u l e  a p p l i e s  t o  a 
s i t u a t i o n  where a r i n g  d e a l i n g  member e n t e r s  i n t o  a
• t
c o n t r a c t  on b e h a l f  o f  a'principal who i s  not  a r i n g  d e a l i n g
member. Under t h e  E n g l i s h  common law o f  agency ,  a r i n g
d e a l i n g  member a c t i n g  as an agent  o f  a non r i n g  d e a l i n g
p a r t y  would be r e g a r d e d  as a d i s c l o s e d  agent  who would
no t  be s u b j e c t  t o  c o n t r a c t u a l  l i a b i l i t y  i n  t h e  e ve nt  o f  h i s
3 2p r i n c i p a l  i n  t h e  t r a n s a c t i o n  d e f a u l t i n g .  T h i s  does no t  
seem t o  be t h e  p o s i t i o n  under  t h e  exchange r u l e s  and 
r e g u l a t i o n s .  Under t he s e  r u l e s  and r e g u l a t i o n s ,  such a 
member i s  l i a b l e  t o  t he  o p p o s i t e  p a r t y  i n  t he  t r a n s a c t i o n  
as p r i n c i p a l  even though  t h e y  may have a c ted  as a g en t s .
S i nce  LME r i n g  d e a l i n g  members who r e p r e s e n t  non 
d e a l i n g  p a r t i e s  i n  t h e  copper  c o n t r a c t  are r e g a r d e d  as
30. I b i d .
31.  Rule A, p a r t  2 o f  t h e  LME r u l e s  and r e g u l a t i o n s .
32.  C l # r k s o n ; S o o k e f  Lbcj, V* Arxd je l 0  £?-6 -
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p r i n c i p a l s ,  t h e  p e r f o r m an c e  o f  t h e i r  d u t i e s  as agen ts  are
bound t o  be i m p a i r e d .  One o f  t he  i m p o r t a n t  d u t i e s  o f  an
agent  under  E n g l i s h  common law i s  t h a t  o f  c a r r y i n g  o u t  h i s
p r i n c i p a l ' s  i n s t r u c t i o n s .  I f  t he  agency a r r angement  i s  f o r
c o n s i d e r a t i o n ,  as most LME agency r e l a t i o n s  a r e ,  t he
agent  must c a r r y  ou t  any e xp res s  i n s t r u c t i o n s  g i v e n  t o  him
by h i s  p r i n c i p a l ,  even though  he may r e a s o n a b l y  b e l i e v e
t h a t  i n  d e p a r t i n g  f ro m them he would be p r o m o t i n g  h i s
33p r i n c i p a l ' s  i n t e r e s t s .  But  s i n c e  on t h e  LME such an 
agent  i s  s o l e l y  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  t he  f u l f i l l m e n t  o f  t he  
c o n t r a c t ,  t h e  agent  i s  bound t o  f o l l o w  t h o s e  i n s t r u c t i o n s  
wh i ch  he can p e r s o n a l l y  meet i n  t he  eve nt  o f  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  
d e f a u l t i n g .  In t he s e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s , t he  powers o f  t h e  agent  
become v e r y  g r e a t  i n  t h e  sense t h a t  he can d e t e r m i n e  what  
i n s t r u c t i o n s  o f  h i s  p r i n c i p a l  he would f o l l o w  and which  he 
would n o t .
T h i s  somewhat s t r a n g e  r u l e  has i m p o r t a n t  consequences 
on t he  p o s i t i o n  :of t h e  copper  p r o d u c i n g  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s .  
As men t i oned  e a r l i e r  t he se  c o u n t r i e s  are p r e c l u d e d  f rom 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  on t h e  LME i n  t h e  c a p a c i t y  o f  r i n g  d e a l i n g  
members. T h i s  p r e c l u s i o n  means t h a t  t h e  o n l y  avenue open 
t o  them w i t h i n  t h e  f ramework  o f  t he  LME t o  i n f l u e n c e  the  
copper  marke t  i s  t h r o u g h  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  as n o n - r i n g  d e a l i n g  
members- In t h i s  c a p a c i t y  t h e y  can p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  t h e  p r i c e  
s e t t i n g  mechanism o f  t h e  exchange by u s i n g  t h e  r i n g  d e a l i n g  
members as t h e i r  agents  i n  t he  copper  c o n t r a c t s .  The agency 
r u l e s  on t h e  exchange however ,  seem t o  e rode  t h e  powers o f
33. Larsen v.  A n g l o - A m e r i c a n  O i l  Company L t d . (1924)
20 LL.  L. Rep. 39 a t  page 67.
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t he  p r i n c i p a l  t o  c o n t r o l  h i s  a g en t .  T h i s  makes i t  e x t r e m e l y  
d i f f i c u l t  f o r  t h e  m a r k e t i n g  i n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  c opper  p r o d u c i n g  
c o u n t r i e s  t o  e x e r t  any s u b s t a n t i a l  i n f l u e n c e  on t h e  copper  
p r i c e  s e t t i n g  i n s t i t u t i o n  on t h e  LME. The c o n t r o l  o f  t he  
p r i c e  s e t t i n g  mechanism seems t o  l i e  s q u a r e l y  on t h e  r i n g  
d e a l i n g  members who c anno t  be s a i d  t o  r e p r e s e n t  t he  i n t e r e s t s  
o f  p r o d u c e r  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s .  In such a s i t u a t i o n ,  t he  
l i k e l i h o o d  o f  t he se  members m a n i p u l a t i n g  t h e  exchange t o  
t h e i r  own i n t e r e s t  and i n  some cases t o  t h e  d e t r i m e n t  o f  t he  
p r o d u c e r  c o u n t r i e s  canno t  c o m p l e t e l y  be e x c l u d e d .  1 o m i n i m i z e  
t he  i n c i d e n t s  o f  market  m a n i p u l a t i o n  by r i n g  d e a l i n g  members, 
t he  L M E ' s s e l f  r e g u l a t o r y  reg ime has p r e s c r i b e d  c e r t a i n  r u l e s  
t o  be f o l l o w e d  by t h e  r i n g  d e a l i n g  members. The e f f i c a c y  o f  
t he se  r u l e s  are c e r t a i n l y  d o u b t f u l .  The r u l e s  aimed a t  
m i n i m i z i n g  m a n i p u l a t i o n  o f  t he  market  g i v e  power t o  one organ 
o f  t he  Exchange t o  m o n i t o r  t h e  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  t h e  r i n g  d e a l i n g  
members. T h i s  organ i s  t h e  m o n i t o r i n g  c o mm i t t ee  which  w i l l  
b r i e f l y  be d i s c u s s e d  be low.
V I I .  The Meta l  Exchange M o n i t o r i n g  O p e r a t i o n  (MEMO)
The LME has e s t a b l i s h e d  a m o n i t o r i n g  o p e r a t i o n  which 
aims at  p r o v i d i n g  a s u p e r v i s o r y  a r r angement  o ve r  t h e  a c t i v i t i e s  
o f  i t s  r i n g  d e a l i n g  members. The m o n i t o r i n g  a c t i v i t i e s  are 
c o ndu c t ed  by t he  m o n i t o r i n g  commi t tee  wh i ch  c o n s i s t s  o f
o 4
t h r e e  members drawn f r om a c ommi t tee  o f  s u b s c r i b e r s .
The b a s i c  aim o f  t h i s  commi t tee  i s  t o  m o n i t o r  t he  
c o n t r a c t u a l  p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  r i n g  d e a l i n g  members,  so t h a t
LME r u l e s  and r e g u l a t i o n s ,  p a r t  4 r u l e  1
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i t  can d e t e r m i n e  a t  any one t i m e  whe the r  a r i n g  d e a l i n g
member 's  c o n t r a c t u a l  o b l i g a t i o n s  exceed what  i s  j u s t i f i e d
by h i s  f i n a n c i a l  p o s i t i o n  and t h e r e f o r e  d i s t o r t i n g  t h e  f r e e
i n t e r p l a y  o f  t h e  market  f o r c e s .  ^  The M o n i t o r i n g  Commi t tee
a ch i e v e s  t h i s  purpose by r e q u i r i n g  a l l  r i n g  d e a l i n g  members
t o  r e p o r t  a l l  c o n t r a c t s  t h e y  e n t e r  i n t o  under  t h e  s t a n d a r d
c o n t r a c t  terms of the E x c h a n g e . A l l  such c on t r a c t s  have
t o  be r e p o r t e d  t o  a d e s i g n a t e d  computer  bureau by t h e  c l o s e
37o f  each t r a d i n g  day.
In the  e ven t  o f  a r i n g  member c a r r y i n g  p o s i t i o n s  which 
are above what  i s  j u s t i f i e d  by h i s  f i n a n c i a l  p o s i t i o n ,  t he  
co mm i t t ee  i s  e n t i t l e d  t o  t a ke  one o f  two s t e p s .  E i t h e r  t o  
r e q u i r e  t he  member t o  i n c r e a s e  h i s  b a s i c  p e r m i t t e d  i n d e b t e d ­
ness o r  t o  deal  w i t h  such a member s um mar i l y  by way o f
i mpo s i ng  a f i n e  no t  ex ce ed in g  £100 or  s u sp en d i ng  t h e  member
3 8f r om t h e  r i n g  f o r  f o u r t e e n  days .  In t h e  e v e n t  o f  a member 
repeatedly c o n t r a v e n i n g  t h e s e  r u l e s ,  the  c o mm i t t ee  i s  empowered 
t o  r e f e r  t h e  m a t t e r  t o  a j o i n t  co mmi t tee  o f  t h e  d i r e c t o r s  o f  
t he  exchange and co mm i t t ee  o f  s u b s c r i b e r s .  T h i s  j o i n t  s e s s i o n  
has t h e  power t o  f i n e  such a member, t he  f i n e  n o t  ex ce ed in g  
£5000,  suspend h i s  membership o r  even expe l  such a member 
f r om the  E xchange . 39
The i n t e r e s t i n g  a s pe c t  o f  t he se  r e g u l a t o r y  c o n t r o l s  i s  
t h a t  t h e y  seek t o  remedy t h e  s i t u a t i o n  a f t e r  i t  has o c c u r r e d  
and no t  b e f o r e .  When a member i s  f i n e d ,  suspended,  or
35. I b i d . , r u l e  4 ( 1 ) .
36. I b i d . , r u l e  4 ( 1 ) .
37- I b i d . , r u l e s  3 and 4 ( 4 ) .
38.  I b i d . , r u l e s  4 (1 0 )  and 5 ( 3 ) .
39.  LME r u l e s  and r e g u l a t i o n s ,  p a r t  1 r u l e  27.
e x p e l l e d ,  h i s  a c t i v i t i e s  w i l l  have a l r e a d y  d e s t a b i l i z e d  t h e  
mar ke t  and t h e  e f f e c t  w i l l  have a l r e a d y  been f e l t  by p r o d u c i n g  
c o u n t r i e s .  A f i n e  f o r  such a member or  i ndeed  e x p u l s i o n  are 
o f  l i t t l e  c o n s o l a t i o n  t o  a copper  p r o d u c i n g  c o u n t r y  which 
m igh t  be e x p e r i e n c i n g  f o r e i g n  exchange d i f f i c u l t i e s  as a 
r e s u l t  o f  such a membe/s marke t  m a n i p u l a t i o n  a c t i v i t i e s .  
S e c o n d l y ,  i f  t h e  o f f e n d i n g  member i s  an i n f l u e n t i a l  member 
o f  t h e  exchange,  t h e  l i k e l i h o o d  o f  t he  v a r i o u s  d i s c i p l i n a r y  
commi t te es  b e in g  i n f l u e n c e d  by such a member c anno t  be r u l e d  
o u t .  T h i s  i ndeed  appears t o  be one o f  t h e  s e r i o u s  s h o r t f a l l s  
o f  any s e l f  r e g u l a t o r y  sys tem.  An i n d e p e n d e n t  r e g u l a t o r y  
sys tem such as t h a t  e x i s t i n g  i n  t he  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  would 
appear  t o  be more s u i t e d  t o  t h e  c o n t r o l  o f  mark et  m a n i p u l a t i o n .
V I I I .  A r b i t r a t i o n  p r o c ed u re s
G e n e r a l l y  t h e r e  are two ways i n  wh i ch  commerc ia l  
d i s p u t e s  are s e t t l e d .  They are e i t h e r  s e t t l e d  i n  o r d i n a r y  
m u n i c i p a l  c o u r t s  or  t h r o u g h  a r b i t r a t i o n .  Where an i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  commerc i a l  t r a n s a c t i o n  i s  r e f e r r e d  t o  a d j u d i c a t i o n  
i n  a c o u r t  o f  law w i t h i n  a p a r t i c u l a r  c o u n t r y ,  t h e  c r u c i a l  
l e g a l  i s s u e s  t h a t  u s u a l l y  emerge as p r e l i m i n a r y  i s s u e s  are 
q u e s t i o n s  o f  j u r i s d i c t i o n  and the  a p p l i c a b l e  l a w . ^  Most 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  commerc ia l  d i s p u t e s  however ,  t e n d  t o  be 
r e f e r r e d  t o  a r b i t r a t i o n .  Th i s  i s  because a r b i t r a t i o n  appears 
t o  have s e v e r a l  advantages  over  c o u r t  a d j u d i c a t i o n .  B u s i n e s s ­
men r e g a r d  a r b i t r a t i o n  as s i m p l e r ,  and l e s s  s u b j e c t  t o  r u l e s
40.  A . F .  L o w e n f e l d ,  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  p r i v a t e  t r  ade / j w f )  
Bender ,  Rev ised e d i t i o n  ’ p . 8 0 .  ~
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o f  p r o c e d u r e s  and e v id e nc e  t h a t  t end  t o  v a r y  f r om p l a c e  
t o  p l a c e .  T h i s  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  t r u e  where f o r e i g n  p a r t i e s  
c o n t e m p l a t e  l i t i g a t i o n  i n  f o r e i g n  c o u r t s  whose p ro c ed u re s  
m i g h t  be w h o l l y  u n f a m i l i a r  t o  them. I t  i s  perhaps because 
o f  t he  r e l a t i v e  ease o f  a r b i t r a t i o n  over  a d j u d i c a t i o n  t h a t  
t he  LME p r e f e r s  t o  r e f e r  a l l  d i s p u t e s  a r i s i n g  ou t  or  i n  
r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  exchange c o n t r a c t s ,  t o  a r b i t r a t i o n .  In t h i s  
r e s p e c t  e v e r y  r i n g  d e a l i n g  member o f  t h e  exchange e n t e r i n g  
i n t o  a c o n t r a c t  w i t h i n  t h e  f ramework  o f  t h e  LME i m p l i c i t l y  
a ccep t s  t o  r e f e r  any d i s p u t e  t o  t he  a r b i t r a t i o n  p ro c ed u re s  
s e t  ou t  i n  t he  Exch ang e ' s  r u l e s  and r e g u l a t i o n s .
The r u l e s  f o r  a r b i t r a t i o n  on t he  London Metal  Exchange 
i n v o l v e  f i r s t  t he  n o t i f i c a t i o n  o f  t he  d i s p u t e  t o  the  
E x e c u t i v e  S e c r e t a r y  o f  t he  Exchange who i n  t u r n  s h a l l  r e f e r  
such a d i s p u t e  t o  two ' a r b i t r a t o r s . The two a r b i t r a t o r s  
would be a p p o i n t e d  by t h e  two p a r t i e s  t o  t h e  d i s p u t e ,  t h a t  
i s  t o  say ,  each p a r t y  a p p o i n t i n g  one member. The a r b i t r a t o r s  
are drawn f r om  a panel  o f  a r b i t r a t o r s  nomina ted  by t h e  exchange.  
The two a r b i t r a t o r s  have t he  power t o  a p p o i n t  a t h i r d  a r b i ­
t r a t o r  a l s o  nomina ted  by the  E x c h a n g e . ^
The p l a c e  o f  a r b i t r a t i o n  i n  t he  case o f  d i s p u t e  between 
p a r t i e s  t o  a LME c o n t r a c t  i s  r e q u i r e d  t o  be L o n d o n . ^  The 
p l a c e  o f  a r b i t r a t i o n  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  not  o n l y  because r i n g  
d e a l i n g  .members o f  t he  Exchange are r e q u i r e d  t o  be d o m i c i l e d  
i n  t h e  U n i t e d  Kingdom, bu t  a l s o  i n  te rms o f  t h e  a p p l i c a b l e  
law and t h e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  j u d i c i a l  r e v i e w .  In  te rms o f  t h e
.41. LME r u l e s  and r e g u l a t i o n s ,  r u l e  1, p a r t  t h r e e .
42.  See Raymond F. MikeseU , supra a t  page 80.
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B r i t i s h  A r b i t r a t i o n  Act  o f  1950,  t he  a r b i t r a t o r s  may make 
f i n d i n g s  o f  f a c t  and r e n d e r  a provis/o^a 1 award based on t h e i r  
v iew o f  t h e  l aw.  t h i s  award would be s u b j e c t  t o  r e v i e w  o f  
t h e  l e g a l  i s s u e s  by t he  High Cou r t  . w i t h  t he
p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  appeal  t o  t h e  Cour t  o f  Appeal  or  even t o  the  
House o f  L o r d s .  The advantage o f  h av ing  a j u d i c i a l  r e v i e w  
o f  a r b i t r a l  d e c i s i o n s  appears t o  l i e  i n  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  an 
o p p o r t u n i t y  i s  c r e a t e d  f o r  an e x t e r n a l  check on t h e  s e l f -  
r e g u l a t o r y  system employed by t he  exchange.  A member o f  t he  
exchange can t h r o u g h  t h i s  p ro c ed u re  c h a l l e n g e  t h e  l e g a l i t y  
o f  t h e  e x c h a n g e ' s  r u l e s  and r e g u l a t i o n s  whenever  t h e y  r e s u l t  
i n  absurd and u n f a i r  d e c i s i o n s .  Th i s  p r o c e d u r e  would seem 
t o  be o f  i n t e r e s t  t o  copper  e x p o r t i n g  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  
s hou l d  t h e y  be a b l e  t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  on the  LME i n  f u t u r e .
But t he  a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  j u d i c i a l  r e v i e w  as an advantage 
s h ou ld  not  be o ve remphas i zed  because i n  c e r t a i n  cases i t  may 
t end  t o  d i s c o u r a g e  compromise between p a r t i e s ,  wh i ch  i s  
supposed t o  be t h e  essence o f  a r b i t r a t i o n .
I X . Copper m a r k e t i n g  o u t s i d e  t he  LME f r amewor k
As e x p l a i n e d  i n  t h e  e a r l i e r  s e c t i o n s  o f  t h i s  c h a p t e r ,
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s a l es  by copper  p r o d u c e r  c o u n t r i e s  are based
on t he  LME p r i c e s .  The b a s i s  f o r  the  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e s e
p r i c e s  are t he  LME copper  c o n t r a c t s .  A s u b s t a n t i a l  p o r t i o n
o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  copper  s a l e s  are however ,  made o u t s i d e  t he
f ramewor k  o f  t h e  LME c o n t r a c t  r e g i me .  The l a t e r  s a l e s  are
made t h r o u g h  a v a r i e t y  o f  c o n t r a c t u a l  a r r an ge me nt s  between
t h e  p r o d u c e r s  and t h e  consumers .  The b a s i c  f e a t u r e s  o f  t he se
c o n t r a c t s  are such f a c t o r s  as t he  da te  o f  d e l i v e r y ,  t h e  p r i c e  
This j u d ic ia l  rev*€u/ now re s tr ic te d  to m a tte rs  o f  la w  by A rtic le  I o f  
lc Arbi t rat ion} A c t, Hals hu rijk  Lou**? Of fcncjiand, Annual Abridgement
p a ra
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f o r  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  grade o f  c o pp e r ,  a f o r c e  ma j eu r e  c l a u s e ,  
and s h i pmen t  a r r a n g e m e n t s .  One s i g n i f i c a n t  f a c t o r  however ,  
i s  t h a t  t he s e  c o n t r a c t s  quot e  or  f o l l o w  c l o s e l y  t h e  p r i c e s  
o f  copper  s e t  on t h e  LME. One c o u n t r y  t h a t  employs t h i s  
l a t e r  t y p e  o f  c o n t r a c t  i s  Zambia.
The s o l e  m a r k e t i n g  i n s t i t u t i o n  f o r  Zambian copper  on 
t he  w o r l d  marke t  i s  The Zambia Metal  M a r k e t i n g  C o r p o r a t i o n  
(MEMACO). T h i s  i s  a s u b s i d i a r y  o f  t he  Zambia I n d u s t r i a l  and 
M i n i n g  C o r p o r a t i o n  (ZIMCO) which i s  charged  w i t h  t h e  o v e r a l l  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  s u p e r v i s i n g  a l l  i n d u s t r i a l  and m i n i n g  
a c t i v i t i e s  i n  t h e  c o u n t r y .  MEMACO i s  charged  w i t h  the  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  c o n d u c t i n g  a l l  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  copper  s a l e s  
on b e h a l f  o f  t h e  Zambia C o n s o l i d a t e d  Copper M i n i n g  Company 
(ZCCM). P r i o r  t o  t he  f o r m a t i o n  o fZCCM, MEMACO s o l d  a l l  t he  
copper  produced by t he  two p r ed ec e s s o r s  t o  ZCCM, t h a t  i s  t o  
say t h e  Nchanga C o n s o l i d a t e d  Copper Mines L t d . ,  and Rhokana 
Copper Mines L t d .  At  t h a t  t i m e  t h i s  a r r angement  was made 
p o s s i b l e  by t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  o f  s a l e s  agreements  between 
MEMACO and t he  two m i n i n g  companies .  R e c e n t l y  MEMACO has 
n e g o t i a t e d  a new s a l e s  agreement  w i t h  t h e  new company,  ZCCM. 
The terms o f  t h i s  agreement  i n v o l v e  m a i n l y  p r o v i s i o n s  d e a l i n g  
w i t h  t h e  commiss i on  a c c r u i n g  t o  MEMACO i n  i t s  c a p a c i t y  as a 
s a l e s  agen t  f o r  ZCCM. The commiss ion a c c r u i n g  t o  MEMACO f r om 
th e  sale.s o f  copper  i s  a t  t he  r a t e  o f  0.25% f o r  copper  and 
2 . 0% f o r  c o b a l t .
X. The Zambia Meta l  M a r k e t i n g  C o r p o r a t i o n
MEMACO m a i n t a i n s  two o f f i c e s ,  one i n  Lusaka and a n o t h e r  
i n  London.  The head o f f i c e  i s  i n  Lusaka and t h e  s e r v i c e s
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o f f i c e  i s  based i n  London.  The main f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  head 
o f f i c e  i n  Lusaka i s  t o  m o n i t o r  a l l  t he  s a l e s  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  
t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n  and t o  c o n c l u d e  a l l  c o n t r a c t s  o f  s a l e  
w i t h  t h e  consumers .  The London o f f i c e  on t h e  o t h e r  hand,  
c a r r i e s  ou t  t h e  te r ms  o f  t he  c o n t r a c t  as t h e y  a f f e c t  t he  
c o r p o r a t i o n .  The s t r u c t u r e  o f  the  c o r p o r a t i o n  i s  
i l l u s t r a t e d  by t he  o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  c h a r t  be low:
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( i ) C o n t r a c t s  f o r  t he  s a l e  o f  copper  by MEMACO
C o n t r a c t s  f o r  t he  s a l e  o f  copper  are n e g o t i a t e d  
a n n u a l l y  between MEMACO on t h e  one hand and t h e  ma jo r  
consumers o f  Zambian c o p p e r .  The p a t t e r n  o f  t he s e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  
i s  w e l l  e s t a b l i s h e d  and t he  ma jo r  p e r i m e t e r s  o f  t h e  c o n t r a c t s  
are w e l l  e s t a b l i s h e d .  Only a few v a r i a b l e s  t h a t  i n c l u d e  t he
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q u a n t i t y  and manner o f  payment v a r y  f r om one y e a r  t o  t he  
o t h e r .  In  t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n  o f  t he s e  c o n t r a c t s  t h e r e  i s  
u s u a l l y  no p r i c e s  i n v o l v e d  because Zambian copper  i s  s o l d  on 
t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e  LME p r i c e s ,  a l t h o u g h  d epend i ng  on t h e  q u a l i t y  
o f  t he  meta l  as w e l l  as t he  s e r v i c e  p r o v i d e d ,  a commiss ion  or  
premium i s  u s u a l l y  n e g o t i a t e d  and added t o  t h e  quot ed  LME 
p r i c e .
( i 1 ) The te rms o f  t he  c o n t r a c t s
The c o n t r a c t  te rms are more or  l e s s  s t a n d a r d i z e d  and
i n c l u d e  q u a l i t y  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s ,  q u a n t i t y ,  p e r i o d  o f  d e l i v e r y ,
and t h e  premium.  The p r i c e  quoted i n  t h e s e  c o n t r a c t s  i s
u s u a l l y  t he  average p r i c e  o f  t he  LME p r i c e s  f o r  t h e  month
i n  which t he  copper  i s  t o  be d e l i v e r e d .  I t  w i l l  be observed
here t h a t  t h e  c o n t r a c t  te rms used by MEMACO i n  as f a r  as p r i c e
i s  concerned  d i f f e r  s l i g h t l y  f r om t h a t  u t i l i z e d  by the  LME.
On t h e  LME, c o n t r a c t s  p r o v i d e  t he  buyer  w i t h  an o p t i o n  t o
employ any p r i c e  p r e v a i l i n g  between t he  d a t e  o f  d e l i v e r y  and
say t h r e e  months f o l l o w i n g  s h i p m e n t .  In t h e s e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s
t h e  buyer  o b v i o u s l y  has advantage i n  b e i ng  a b l e  t o  choose t he
da te  on wh i ch  t he  p r i c e  i s  l o w e s t .  I f  MEMACO was t o  employ
t h i s  f o r m u l a 5 i t  would put  i t s e l f  a t  t h e  mercy o f  s p e c u l a t o r s
and t he  r e s u l t i n g  p r i c e  f l u c t u a t i o n s  and p o s s i b l e  l o s s  o f
s a l e s  r e v e nu e .  To a v o i d  t he s e  d i s a s t r o u s  c onsequences ,  copper
p r o d u c e r s  who are members o f  CIPEC have r e c e n t l y  been
d i s c u s s i n g  t h e  a d o p t i o n  o f  a u n i f o r m  c o n t r a c t  wh i ch  would
g i v e  t h e  b uy er  l e s s  leeway i n  s e l e c t i n g  t h e  q u o t a t i o n  p e r i o d
44-f o r  t h e  c o n t r a c t .
44'. See C h a i r m a n ' s  s t a t e m e n t  i n  MEMACO Annual  Repor t  ( 1 978) 
a t  page 4.
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The second i m p o r t a n t  t e rm i n  t h e  MEMACO c o n t r a c t  i s  
t he  f o r c e  ma jeu r e  c l a u s e .  Th i s  c l a u s e  i s  g e n e r a l l y  w r i t t e n  
i n t o  a c o n t r a c t  t o  p r e v e n t  e i t h e r  p a r t y  t o  a c o n t r a c t  be ing  
l i a b l e  t o  t he  o t h e r  f o r  i n a b i l i t y  t o  meet c o n t r a c t  te rms due 
t o  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  beyond t h e i r  c o n t r o l .  T h i s  c l a u s e  proved 
v e r y  u s e f u l  t o  Zambia r e c e n t l y .  In 1978 f o r  example ,  Zambia 
d e c l a r e d  a f o r c e  majeure  o f  15% on a l l  copper  s a l e s  i n  
c o n j u n c t i o n  w i t h  the  m a r k e t i n g  companies o f  Peru and Z a i r e ,  
i n  o r d e r  t o  t a c k l e  t he  p rob l em o f  w o r l d  s u r p l u s  i n  s t oc k s  
which t h r e a t e n e d  t o  f u r t h e r  depress  copper  p r i c e s .
A l t h o u g h  Zambia t h r o u g h  i t s  m a r k e t i n g  c o r p o r a t i o n ,
MEMACO e n t e r s  i n t o  i n de p en de n t  s a l es  c o n t r a c t s  f o r  t he  s a l e  
o f  c o p p e r ,  t h e  p r i c e s  quoted  i n  t he se  c o n t r a c t s  r e f l e c t  t he  
p r i c e s  r u l i n g  on t h e  London Meta l  Exchange.  T h i s  means 
t h a t  any f l u c t u a t i o n s  or  i n s t a b i l i t y  i n  t he  copper  p r i c e s  on 
t h i s  exchange w i l l  i n e v i t a b l y  be r e f l e c t e d  i n  t h e  p r i c e s  
f e t c h e d  i n  t h e  i n de p en de n t  copper  c o n t r a c t s  e n t e r e d  i n t o  
by MEMACO. The terms employed i n  the  MEMACO c o n t r a c t  though 
s l i g h t l y  d i f f e r e n t  f r om t ho s e  o f  t he  LME copper  c o n t r a c t ,  
do not  go f a r  i n  c h e c k i n g  t he  b a s i c  p rob l em f a c i n g  i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  copper  m a r k e t s ,  t h a t  o f  p r i c e  i n s t a b i l i t y .
X I . C o n c l u s i o n
The i n h e r e n t  i n s t a b i l i t y  i n  the  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  copper  
marke t s  has l ong  been a r e c o g n i z e d  f a c t .  As f a r  back as 
t he  p e r i o d  o f  t h e  war ,  e f f o r t s  have been made t o  s t a b i l i z e  
t he  p r i c e s  and mar ke t s  f o r  c o p pe r .  The b a s i c  l e g a l  p r i n c i p l e s  
t h a t  have been employed i n  an e f f o r t  t o  s t a b i l i z e  t he s e  markets  
have been i n  t h e  fo r m o f  i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l  commodi ty  s t a b i l i z ­
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a t i o n  a r rangement s  or  p r o d u c e r s  a s s o c i a t i o n s .  The q u e s t i o n  
i s  w he t he r  t he se  l e g a l  mechanisms have r e a l l y  a t t e m p t e d  t o  
t a c k l e  t h e  source  o f  t he s e  i n s t a b i l i t i e s .  In t h i s  c h a p t e r  
a t t e m p t  has been made t o  examine t he  i m p o r t a n t  copper  p r i c e  
s e t t i n g  i n s t i t u t i o n ,  t he  LME, and i t s  p o s s i b l e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  
t o  copper  p r i c e  i n s t a b i l i t y .  T h i s  e x a m i n a t i o n  was made 
w i t h  a v iew t o  a t t e m p t i n g  i n  t he  nex t  c h a p t e r ,  t o  d e t e r m i n e  
whe the r  t h e  l e g a l  mechanisms f o r  commodi ty  mar ke t  s t a b i l i z a ­
t i o n  do a c t u a l l y  t a k e  i n t o  accoun t  t he  r o l e  p l a y e d  by 
m a r k e t i n g  i n s t i t u t i o n s  t he mse lv es  i n  t he  d e s t a b i l i z a t i o n  
o f  t h e  p r i c e s .
As f a r  as Zambia i s  c o ncer ne d ,  an e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  t he  
London Meta l  Exchange ' s  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e ,  f u n c t i o n s ,  
c o n t r a c t s . ,  and r e g u l a t o r y  c o n t r o l s ,  r e v e a l s  t h a t  c o u n t r y ' s  
l a c k  o f  c o n t r o l  o f  an i n s t i t u t i o n  t h a t  d e t e r m i n e s  i t s  copper  
p r i c e s .  A l t h o u g h  t h e  c o u n t r y  has now r e a s s e r t e d  i t s  r i g h t  
t o  marke t  i t s  own copper  by t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  MEMACO, the  
s a l e s  c o n t r a c t s  i t  employs do not  g i v e  i t  c o n t r o l  o ve r  t he  
p r i c i n g  o f  i t s  c o pp e r .
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CHAPTER FOUR 
INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY AGREEMENT MECHANISM
I . Copper p r i c e  i n s t a b i l i t y  and 
t he  search  f o r  a s o l u t i o n
As r e v e a l e d  i n  Chap te r  3, Zambia ' s  l a c k  o f  c o n t r o l  
and n o n - p a r t i c i p a t i o n  on t he  LME means t h a t  i t  does not  
e x e r c i s e  any c o n s i d e r a b l e  i n f l u e n c e  on t h e  p r i c e  f e t c h e d  
by i t s  c o p p e r .  Th i s  p r i c e  i s  d e t e r m in e d  by t h e  v a r i o u s  
i n t e r e s t  groups r e p r e s e n t e d  on t he  LME. S i nce  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  
o f  t he s e  groups  may not  i n  many cases r e f l e c t  t he  i n t e r e s t s  
o f  Zambia as a p r o d u c e r ,  t h e  p r i c e  a r r i v e d  a t  may no t  a lways 
r e p r e s e n t  a f a i r  p r i c e  t o  Zambia.  The group i n t e r e s t s  on 
t he  exchange may t h r o u g h  c o l l u s i v e  a c t i o n  push p r i c e s  up 
or  down depend ing  on what  appears t o  s u i t  t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s .
The d i c t a t e s  o f  t he se  i n t e r e s t  groups on t h e  LME f i n d  
e x p r e s s i o n  i n  p e r s i s t e n t  i n s t a b i l i t y  i n  c opper  p r i c e s  which  
i n  t u r n  t r a n s l a t e  t h e ms e lv e s  i n t o  u n s t a b l e  e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s
I
f o r  Zambia.
A l t h o u g h  i t  i s  u s u a l l y  assumed t h a t  t h e  LME i s  based 
on the  p r i n c i p l e  o f  f r e e  c o m p e t i t i o n  and t h a t  t h i s  compe­
t i t i o n  would p roduce e q u i v a l e n t  advantages f o r  bo th  p r odu ce rs  
2and consumers ,  i t s  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  se t  up and r u l e s  employed
1. For  a d i s c u s s i o n  o f  marke t  o r g a n i z a t i o n  and i n s t a b i l i t y  
see L .N.  R a n g ar a j an ,  Commodi ty C o n f l i c t :  The p o l i t i c a l  
economy o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  commodi ty  n e g o t i a t i o n s  .(j<q j  
Croom Helm, London,  " p . 203.
2. S t u a r t  H a r r i s , " T h e  co mmod i t i es  p rob l em and the  i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  economic o r d e r :  what r u l e s  o f  what  game?"
In P e t e r  Oppenheimer ( e d . ) ,  I ssues  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
economi  cs . ( H f l Q ) , Or 1 el  ,Londons p. 199,
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produce q u i t e  t h e  o p p o s i t e  r e s u l t .  Th i s  c o m b i n a t i o n  i s  
i n  many ways a r e s u l t  o f  unequal  b a r g a i n i n g  power between 
p r o d u ce r s  l i k e  Zambia and consumers on t h e  LME. For  
Zambia t o  g e t  a f a i r  p r i c e  a t  t he  LME t h e r e f o r e ,  one o f  
two t h i n g s  have t o  be done.  E i t h e r  i t  s h o u l d  be a l l o w e d  
t o  j o i n  t he  Exchange t o g e t h e r  w i t h  o t h e r  p r o d u c e r s  so as 
t o  i n c r e a s e  i t s  b a r g a i n i n g  power o r  some k i n d  o f  c o r r e c t i v e  
mechanism s h o u l d  be fo un d  t o  cu rb  t he  u n d e s i r a b l e  a c t i v i t i e s  
o f  t h e  Exchange.  As d i s c u s s e d  i n  t he  l a s t  c h a p t e r ,  the  
LME a r r angement s  make i t  i m p o s s i b l e  f o r  t he  f i r s t  o p t i o n  
t o  be employed.  Th i s  l e ave s  us w i t h  t h e  o p t i o n  f o r  some 
k i n d  o f  c o r r e c t i v e  measures.  The q u e s t i o n  however  i s  what  
k i n d  o f  measures.
At  t h e  n a t i o n a l  l e v e l ,  t h e r e  i s  a t  l e a s t  one mechanism 
t h a t  can e f f e c t i v e l y  be employed t o  s a f e g u a r d  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  
o f  a weaker  t r a d i n g  p a r t n e r .  L e g i s l a t i o n  can be passed 
p r e v e n t i n g  e c o n o m i c a l l y  s t r o n g e r  p a r t i e s  f r om  a d v e r s e l y  
a f f e c t i n g  t h e  e c o n o m i c a l l y  weaker  groups i n  t h a t  s o c i e t y .  
Such s o c i a l  l e g i s l a t i o n  may seek t o  cu r b  r e s t r i c t i v e  or  
d i s c r i m i n a t o r y  commerc ia l  p r a c t i c e s  and aim a t  t h e  
r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  p r o p e r t y  t o  s a t i s f y  t h e  e l e m e n t a r y  
d i c t a t e s  o f  s o c i a l  j u s t i c e .
For  o b v io u s  r easons  t h i s  l e g i s l a t i v e  c o r r e c t i v e  
a p p r o a c h . c anno t  be p r a c t i c a l  i n  c o r r e c t i n g  t he  i mba l ance  
e x i s t i n g  on t h e  LME between p r o d uc e r s  and consumers o f  
c o p pe r .  The p rob l em here i s  one t h a t  t r a n s c e n d s  n a t i o n a l  
b o u n d a r i e s  and t h e r e f o r e  r e q u i r e s  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s o l u t i o n .  
The search  f o r  t h i s  s o l u t i o n  has f o r  many y e a r s  now c e n t r e d
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on a number o f  mechanisms.  One o f  t he  p o s s i b l e  s o l u t i o n s  
o f t e n  sugges t ed  i s  t h e  use o f  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  commodi ty  
agreement  mechanism.
Th is  c h a p t e r  a t t e m p t s  t o  examine t h i s  mechanism 
and i t s  p o s s i b l e  use i n  t h e  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  o f  copper  p r i c e s .
11 • E a r l y  a t t e m p t s  at  copper  p r i c e  s t a b i l i z a t i o n
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  copper  p r i c e  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  e f f o r t s  
p r i o r  t o  t h e  Second Wor ld War t o o k  t h e  f o r m o f  c a r t e l  
a r r a n g e m e n t s .  C a r t e l s  have been d e f i n e d  i n  a number o f  
ways.  Many w r i t e r s  who made s t u d i e s  b e f o r e  t he  end o f  
t he  Second Wor ld  War d e f i n e d  c a r t e l s  as o r g a n i z a t i o n s  or  
agreements  i n v o l v i n g  a p l u r a l i t y  o f  p r i v a t e  e n t e r p r i s e s ,  
i n v o l v e d  i n  b u s i n e s s  w i t h i n  t he  same i n d u s t r y ,  and whose 
main aim i s  t h e  r e g u l a t i o n  or  c o n t r o l  o f  t he  commodi ty
3
mar ke t s  o f  i n t e r e s t  t o  t h e i r  i n d u s t r y .  In r e c e n t  y ea rs
a number o f  w r i t e r s  have ex tended  t he  d e f i n i t i o n  t o  i n c l u d e
c o l l u s i v e  p r i c e  f i x i n g  a r r angement s  by p r o d u c e r  c o u n t r i e s
t h a t  e x c l u d e  o r  do no t  t a k e  i n t o  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  t h e  i n t e r e s t s
4o f  consumer c o u n t r i e s .  T h i s  e x t e n s i o n  o f  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  
o f  c a r t e l  c l e a r l y  i n t e n d s  t o  s t r e t c h  t h e  i d e a  o f  a c a r t e l
3. For  v a r i o u s  d e f i n i t i o n s  o f  a c a r t e l ,  see E r v i n  Hexner ,  
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  C a r t e l  s o f  N. C a r o l i n a
G o t t f r i e d  H a b e r i e r ,  The t h e o r y  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e j H ^ ? )  
New York . , p .327.
P r o f e s s o r  Edward Mason, "The f u t u r e  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
c a r t e l s , "  ( M j  F o r e t ^ r f  p. 604.
4. See f o r  example ,  Paul  Hal 1 wood. . S t a b i 1 i z a t i o n  o f  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  commodi ty  marke t  s , n c o r -
p o r a t i o n ,  C o n n e c t i c u t ,  USA, p . 177.
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t o  i n c l u d e  m a r k e t i n g  agreements not  o n l y  o f  p u b l i c  agenc i es  
bu t  a l s o  t h o s e  e s t a b l i s h e d  under  i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l  a g r e e ­
ments .  A s s o c i a t i o n s  o f  p r o d u ce r  c o u n t r i e s  have t h e r e f o r e  
been branded as c a r t e l s  a l t h o u g h  s t r i c t l y  s p e ak i n g  not  
a l l  o f  them d i s r e g a r d  t he  i n t e r e s t s  o f  consumers .  For  
our  purposes t h e  te rm c a r t e l  w i l l  be r e s t r i c t e d  t o  
c o l l u s i v e  a c t i o n  by p r i v a t e  e n t e r p r i s e s  r a t h e r  than 
i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l  c o n t r o l  schemes i n v o l v i n g  p r o d u c e r s .
Commodi ty c a r t e l s  were f i r s t  deve l oped  i n  response
t o  e xp an s io n  o f  p r i m a r y  commodi ty  p r o d u c t i o n  d u r i n g  t he
5
i n t e r - w a r  y e a r s .  The demands f o r  me ta l s  d u r i n g  t he  
p e r i o d  meant new mines and p l a n t s  were opened i n  a number 
o f  c o u n t r i e s .  A f t e r  t he  war t he  commodi ty  p r o d u c e r s  
were i n  a p o s i t i o n  t o  produce f a r  more than  was demanded 
r e s u l t i n g  i n  a s t e a d y  d e c l i n e  o f  p r i c e s  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
m a r k e t s .  I t  i s  t h r o u g h  e f f o r t s  t o  c o n t r o l  t h i s  t r e n d
C
t h a t  c a r t e l s  were e s t a b l i s h e d .  In t h e  case o f  c o p pe r ,  
a number o f  c a r t e l  a r r angement s  have been e n t e r e d  i n t o  
between v a r i o u s  p r o d u c e r s  b e g i n n i n g  w i t h  t h e  dawn o f  
t h e  c e n t u r y .  Thus f o r  example a c a r t e l  a r r angement  i n
5. See, U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  Depar tment  o f  Economic A f f a i r s ,  
" I n t e r n a t i o n a l  C a r t e l s " ,  24 UN Pub. Sa les  No.
1 9 4 8 . I I . D . 2 ( 1 9 4 7  ) ,  p . 5 .
6 . For  a g ene ra l  d i s c u s s i o n  on t he  d eve l opmen t  o f
c a r t e l s ,  see Kopper ,  "The i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e p u t a t i o n  
o f  c a r t e l s  - c u r r e n t  propos al  s " ,  fro Uaia/
Rev i ewT {QoS*
A'i s o , Koch , " C a r t e l s  as i n s t r u m e n t s  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
economic o r g a n i  z a t  i ons " ,  ( / W ) £  Modern law  Review^ iSQ ,
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t he  fo r m o f  t h e  Amalgamated Copper  Company was formed i n  
1900 w i t h  t h e  aim o f  r a i s i n g  t he  p r i c e s  o f  c opper  t h r o u g h  
t h e  use o f  p r o d u c t i o n  c u t s  and s u p p l y  management .  Between 
1918 and 1923 a n o t h e r  copper  c a r t e l  was i n  o p e r a t i o n .  Th i s  
was t h e  Copper  Expor t  A s s o c i a t i o n  c o v e r i n g  a number o f  
copper  p r o d u c i n g  f i r m s  m a i n l y  t ho se  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  
and Europe,  and h av in g  as i t s  main aim t h e  r e g u l a t i o n  o f  
copper  p r i c e s  t h r o u g h  t h e  use o f  e x p o r t  r e s t r i c t i o n s  as 
w e l l  as s t o c k p i l i n g  o f  t h e  m e t a l .  Be fo r e  t h e  Second Wor ld 
War, two more c a r t e l  a r r angement s  i n  copper  o p e r a t e d .
Between 1928 and 1929 t h e  Copper  E x p o r t e r s  I n c o r p o r a t i o n  
which i n c l u d e d  p r o d u c e r s  f r om t he  U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  Europe,  
and t he  Congo, was i n  o p e r a t i o n .  The main aim o f  t h i s  
c a r t e l  wa.s t o  boos t  copper  p r i c e s  t h r o u g h  t h e  use o f  
e x p o r t  quo tas  and a system o f  p r od u c e r  p r i c e s .  The 
l a s t  copper  c a r t e l  b e f o r e  t he  Second Wor ld War was t he  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c opper  c a r t e l  which encompassed many copper  
p r o d u c i n g  c o u n t r i e s  o u t s i d e  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  and aimed
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at  r e g u l a t i o n  o f  copper  p r i c e s .  For  purposes  o f  our  
d i s c u s s i o n  i n  t h i s  c h a p t e r ,  i t  i s  n e ces sa ry  t o  b r i e f l y  
d i s c u s s  t he  n a t u r e  o f  a c a r t e l  a r r an g em en ts .
I I I .  The n a t u r e  o f  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l
c a r t e l  agreement
B a s i c a l l y  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c a r t e l  agreements  s e t s  o u t  a 
c o n t r a c t u a l  system t h a t  would govern t he  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between
7. For amore d e t a i l e d  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  e a r l y  co ppe r  c a r t e l s ,  
See H e i n r i c h  K r o n s t e i n ,  The Law o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
c a r t e l s  (1 973 ) ,  p.  1 54-1 56.
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t h e  p a r t i e s .  In most  cases the  aims o f  t h e  c a r t e l ,  t he  methods
t o  be employed i n  a c h i e v i n g  t hose  a ims,  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l
s t r u c t u r e  f o r  t h e  c a r t e l ,  and d i s p u t e  s e t t l e m e n t  p r o c e d u r e s ,  
are a l l  s t a t e d  i n  t h e  agreement .
The most  i m p o r t a n t  aim o f  any c a r t e l  agreement  i s  t o  
r e g u l a t e  t h e  ma rke t s  f o r  t he  commodi ty o f  i n t e r e s t  t o  i t s  
members.  Thus f o r  example ,  t h e  aims o f  t h e  Copper  E x p o r t e r s
I n c o r p o r a t i o n  was s t a t e d  i n  i t s  agreement  as t o  r e g u l a t e  t he
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  copper  mar ke t s  w i t h  a v iew o f  r a i s i n g  copper  
p r i c e s .  In a d d i t i o n  t o  s e t t i n g  out  t h e  aims o f  t h e  c a r t e l  
a r r an g e m e n t ,  a c a r t e l  agreement  e s t a b l i s h e s  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  
d e v i c e s  t h a t  wou l d be charged w i t h  t he  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  
i m p l e m e n t i n g  and e n f o r c i n g  t h e  p lanned ma rk e t  r e g u l a t i o n .
The i n s t i t u t i o n a l  a r r angement s  f o r  t he  i n t e r w a r  copper  c a r t e l s  
were r e s t r i c t e d  t o  a c o u n c i l  which was t o  meet as need arose
t o  s e t t l e  d i s p u t e s  between t h e  p a r t i e s  t o  t he  agreement .  In
t h i s  r e g a r d ,  t h e  b i n d i n g  n a t u r e  o f  c a r t e l s  becomes an i m p o r t a n t  
i s s u e ,  t h e i r  b i n d i n g  n a t u r e  depends v e r y  much on w he t he r  t he  
members o f  t h e  c a r t e l  c o n s i d e r  t he  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  t he  a g r e e ­
ment as b i n d i n g .  The f a c t  t h a t  i t  m i gh t  n o t  be e n f o r c e a b l e  
under  t h e  d o me s t i c  laws o f  some c o n t r a c t i n g  p a r t i e s  i s  
i m m a t e r i a l  because such ag r eemen ts ,  as a m a t t e r  o f  f a c t
e s t a b l i s h  t h e i r  own l e g a l  o r d e r .  I t  i s  because o f  t h i s  reason 
t h a t  some c o n t r a c t u a l  r e l a t i o n s  not  r e c o g n i z e d  i n  some 
d om es t i c  j u r i s d i c t i o n s  such as what  are te rmed g e n t l e m e n ' s  
ag r eements ,  f ound  a p l a c e  i n  t he  conc ep t  o f  a c o n t r a c t  under  
c a r t e l  a g r e e m e n t s .
A n o t h e r  i m p o r t a n t  a s pe c t  o f  a c a r t e l  agreement  i n v o l v e s  
t he  methods p r e s c r i b e d  i n  t h e  agreement  t o  c o n t r o l  t h e  d e s i r e d
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m a r k e t .  The usua l  mechanisms embodied i n  c a r t e l  agreements 
t o  c o n t r o l  t h e  m a r k e t ,  can be o f  t h r e e  d i f f e r e n t  t y p e s .  F i r s t ,  
a c a r t e l  agreement  may p r o v i d e  f o r  p r o d u c t i o n  c u t s  o r  p r o d u c t i o n  
r e s t r i c t i o n s .  In t h i s  r e g a r d  p r o d u c t i o n  q uo t as  may be a l l o c a t e d  
t o  t h e  v a r i o u s  members o f  a c a r t e l .  Such qu ot as  are imposed 
so as t o  c o n t r o l  t h e  s u p p l y  o f  a p a r t i c u l a r  commodi ty  on t he  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  m a r k e t .  Th i s  s u p p l y  r e s t r i c t i o n  i s  t hen  hoped 
t o  r e s u l t  i n  i n f l u e n c i n g  t h e  p r i c e s  o f  t h e  commod i ty .
Secondly,  a c a r t e l  might provide f o r  the i mp o si t io n  of sales
quotas.  Under such an arrangement ,  each member of  the c a r t e l
agreement would be r e q u i r e d  to s e l l  i t s  commodity only to 
the maximum of the quota a l l o c a t e d  to i t .  The t h i r d  mechanism 
used in c a r t e l  agreements is the producer p r i c e .  Under t h i s  
arrangement ,  the members of the c a r t e l  would agree to a 
producer p r i c e  f o r  t h e i r  commodity thereby denying the market
o
f o r c e s  t he  r i g h t  t o  s e t  p r i c e s .
I V . E v a l u a t i o n  o f  t h e  i n t e r - w a r  copper  c a r t e l s
There are t h r e e  b a s i c  i s s u e s  t h a t  l a y  a t  t he  co re  o f  t he  
i n t e r - w a r  copper  c a r t e l  a r r a n g e m e n t s .  F i r s t ,  t he s e  a r r a n g e ­
ments r e p r e s e n t e d  c o l l u s i v e  p r i c e  f i x i n g  a c t i o n  by p r o du c e r s  
a lone  w i t h o u t  consumer  p a r t i c i p a t i o n .  T h i s  c o n t r o l  o f  t he  
m ar k e t s  f o r  copper  by t h e  c o l l u s i v e  a c t i o n s  o f  p r o d u c e r s  a l one  
ran c o n t r a r y  t o  t h e  f r e e  t r a d e  p r i n c i p l e s ,  and t h e r e f o r e  
i n v i t e d  much c r i t i c i s m  f ro m t h e  " f r e e  m a r k e t "  o r i e n t e d
8 . For  a d e t a i l e d  e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  t he  v a r i o u s  p r i c e  c o n t r o l  
mechanisms used i n  e a r l y  c a r t e l  a g ree me nt s ,  see U n i t e d  
N a t i o n s  Depar tment  o f  Economic A f f a i r s ,  " I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
C a r t e l s , "  24 UN P u b ! . Sales No. 1 9 4 8 . I I . D . 2 (1947)  at  
p . 7.
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c o u n t r i e s .  Such c r i t i c i s m s  were l a t e r  t r a n s l a t e d  i n t o  
a n t i t r u s t  l a ws ,  d i s c u s s e d  on t h e  n ex t  page and which
g
r e s t r i c t  o r  p r o h i b i t  t h e  use o f  c a r t e l  ag r eemen ts .
The second b a s i c  f e a t u r e  o f  t he  i n t e r - w a r  c a r t e l  
agreements  i n  copper  was t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e y  i n v o l v e d  p r i v a t e  
p r o d u c e r  e n t e r p r i s e s  as opposed t o  gover nme nt a l  o r  p u b l i c  
c o n t r o l l e d  e n t e r p r i s e s .  T h i s  r e f l e c t e d  t h e  p r e v a i l i n g  p h i l ­
osophy o f  t h e  t i m e  which  advoca ted  f o r  minimum g over nmen ta l  
c o n t r o l  i n  t r a d e  m a t t e r s .  The i n t e r - w a r  p e r i o d  was the  era  
o f  t he  p r i v a t e  e n t e r p r i s e  and c a r t e l  agreements  were m er e l y  
a r e f l e c t i o n  o f  t h e  power o f  p r i v a t e  e n t e r p r i s e  i n  t he  m a r k e t ­
i n g  o f  t h e  c o mm od i t i e s  i t  p rodu ce d .  The p rob l em w i t h  such 
c a r t e l  a r r angement s  however ,  was t h a t  more o f t e n  t han  not  t he  
i n t e r e s t s ,  o f  t h e  p r i v a t e  p r o d u c e r s  i n  t he  c a r t e l  were c a r r i e d  
t o o  f a r  and r e s u l t e d  i n  t h e  r e s t r i c t i o n  o f  t r a d e .  The 
p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  t h e  s e l f  i n t e r e s t  o f  t h e  c a r t e l  members w o r k i n g  
t o  r e s t r i c t  t r a d e  i n  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  commodi ty  c o n s t i t u t e d  
a n o t h e r  reason f o r  t h e  deve l opmen t  o f  a n t i t r u s t  laws in  
v a r i o u s  c o u n t r i e s .
The t h i r d  f e a t u r e  r e l a t e s  t o  t he  methods employed i n  
t h e  c a r t e l  agreements  i n  o r d e r  t o  c o n t r o l  t h e  m a r k e t s .  The 
methods used i n  a l l  t he  i n t e r - w a r  copper  c a r t e l s  were 
p r o d u c t i o n  and s a l e s  c o n t r o l .  By t h e i r  v e r y  n a t u r e  p r o d u c t i o n  
and s a l e s  c o n t r o l s  are aimed a t  p r o v i d i n g  a t e m p o r a r y  
s o l u t i o n  t o  t h e  prob l ems o f  p r i c e  i n s t a b i l i t y .  T h i s
9. tA/.Fri edman, " A n t i t r u s t  Law and J o i n t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
b u s in e s s  v e n t u r e s  i n  e c o n o m i c a l l y  u n d e r d ev e l o p e d  
c o u n t r i e s , "  CHkOj feo Columbia Law Kevieirt 0 780 .
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t e m p o r a r y  r e l i e f  came by way o f  s u p p l y  a d j u s t m e n t  t h r o u g h  
p r o d u c t i o n  c u t s  o r  s a l e s  r e s t r i c t i o n s  t h u s  c r e a t i n g  s c a r c i t y  
which i n  t u r n  t e m p o r a r i l y  r a i s e d  t he  p r i c e s  o f  t h e  commodi t y .  
O the r  t ha n  such a t e m p o r a r y  r e l i e f ,  t h e  c a r t e l  agreements  d i d  
no t  a t t e m p t  t o  t a c k l e  t he  p rob l em o f  marke t  i n s t a b i l i t y  on a 
permanent  b a s i s .  T h i s  p iecemeal  approach d i d  on many 
o c c a s i o n s  cause d i s a g r e e m e n t s  among t he  members o f  t he  c a r t e l s  
t h e m s e l v e s  and c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  s h o r t  l i v e s  o f  t he  i n t e r ­
war copper  c a r t e l  ag reements .
As a r e a c t i o n  t o  c a r t e l  a r rangements  g e n e r a l l y ,  many 
governments  sough t  t o  i n t r o d u c e  d omes t i c  measures which would 
r e s t r i c t  t h e  use o f  c a r t e l  a r rangement s  t o  c o n t r o l  commodi ty  
m a r k e t s .  The measures advanced were i n  t h e  fo rm o f  a n t i t r u s t  
laws which s ough t  t o  c o n t r o l  c o l l u s i v e  mar ke t  a c t i o n  t h r o u g h  
d om es t i c  l e g i s l a t i o n .  These a n t i t r u s t  laws have i n  
a number o f  ways i n f l u e n c e d  t he  deve l opment  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
l e g a l  c o n t r o l s  on t h e  commodi ty  m a r k e t s .  I t  i s  f o r  t h i s  reason 
t h a t  a s h o r t  d i s u c s s i o n  o f  a n t i t r u s t  laws w i l l  be made h er e .
V. A n t i t r u s t  Laws
There are two broad approaches t o  a n t i t r u s t  l aws .  The
f i r s t  approach r e l a t e s  t o  a c o mp le te  a b o l i t i o n  o f  p r i v a t e
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  m a r k e t i n g  schemes by p r i v a t e  e n t r e p r e n e u e r s
by m u n i c i p a l  a c t i o n  c omparab le  t o  t h a t  e n v i s a g e d  by the  Sherman
1 0Act  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s .  The second approach i s  
r e p r e s e n t e d  by v a r i o u s  examples o f  a n t i t r u s t  l e g i s l a t i o n  found
10. TkeSherman A c t .  Jib 2 0 ^  a m e n d e d f IS
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i n  ma j o r  w e s t e rn  European c o u n t r i e s .  These laws g e n e r a l l y  
s p eak i ng  p r o v i d e  f o r  t o l e r a n c e  o f  c o o p e r a t i o n  between 
p r i v a t e  p r o d u c e r  e n t r e p r e n e u r s :  but  p r o v i d i n g  f o r  c e r t a i n  
p u b l i c  r e g u l a t i o n  o f  such a r r an ge me nt s .
The b a s i c  p h i l o s o p h y  beh i nd  a n t i t r u s t  l e g i s l a t i o n  
seems t o  be t o  assure  t h a t  t h e  market  w i l l  remain  c o m p e t i t i v e .  
The l o g i c  beh i nd  t he  l e g a l  p remi se  u n d e r l y i n g  marke t  o r d e r i n g  
i t s e l f  su gge s t s  some r e g u l a t i o n  o f  t he  mar ke t  t o  cu rb  a n t i ­
c o m p e t i t i v e  p r a c t i c e s .  I t  i s  s e l f  e v i d e n t  i n  mar ke t  t h e o r y  
t h a t  p r i v a t e  e n t r e p r e n e u r s  seek t o  max imize t h e i r  p r o f i t  
m o t i v e s .  Th i s  p r o f i t  m a x i m i z a t i o n  may be a ch ie ve d  w i t h i n  t h e  
r u l e s  o f  t he  c o m p e t i t i v e  marke t  o r  i n  ways d e s t r u c t i v e  o f  
marke t  o r d e r i n g ,  f o r  example ,  t h r o u g h  c o e r c i v e  and dominant  
marke t  power ,  o r  t h r o u g h  c o l l u s i v e  a c t i o n  w i t h  o t h e r s .  
F u r t h e r m o r e ,  t h e r e  i s  an i m p o r t a n t  l e g a l  p o s t u l a t e  u n d e r l y i n g  
marke t  t h e o r y ,  t h a t  o f  maximum f reedom o f  c o n t r a c t .  Th i s  
f reedom however  can be abused t h r o u g h  c o l l u s i v e  agreements 
such as c a r t e l s  which d e s t r o y  b a s i c  a sp ec ts  o f  mar ke t  o r d e r i n g .  
The i s s u e  t h e r e f o r e  i s  w he the r  p r i v a t e  e n t r e p r e n e u r s  i n  
e x e r c i s i n g  p r o f i t  m a x i m i z a t i o n  and f reedom o f  c o n t r a c t  do 
o p e r a t e  w i t h i n  t h e  economic and l e g a l  p r i n c i p l e s  u n d e r l y i n g  
t h e  marke t  or  i n  v i o l a t i o n  o f  them. S e l f  i n t e r e s t  o f  c a r t e l  
members a p p e a r f t o  have o p e r a t e d  i n  ways d e s t r u c t i v e  o f  marke t  
o r d e r i n g .  T h i s  r e s t r i c t i o n  o f  c o m p e t i t i o n  r e q u i r e d  g o v e r n ­
mental  a c t i o n  t o  p r o t e c t  t h e  marke t  s t r u c t u r e .  I t  i s  o n l y  i n  
t h i s  sense t h a t  a n t i t r u s t  laws may be s a i d  t o  be j u s t i f i e d  
as an a t t e m p t  t o  c o n t r o l  a n t i c o m p e t i t i v e  p r a c t i c e s  among 
f i r m s .  The p h i l o s o p h i c a l  a sp ec t s  o f  t h e  a n t i t r u s t  laws were 
s u c c i n c t l y  d e s c r i b e d  by Judge Learned Hand i n  U n i t e d  S t a t e s
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11v.  A l umi n i um Company o f  A m e r i c a . In c o n s i d e r i n g  t h e  g o v e r n ­
m e n t ' s  charge  t h a t  t h e  d e f e n d a n t  had m o nop o l i z ed  t h e  d omes t i c  
mar ke t  i n  a l u m i n i u m  i n g o t  i n  v i o l a t i o n  o f  t h e  Sherman A c t ,  
Judge Hand s t a t e d :
" . . .  i t  i s  no excuse f o r  m o n o p o l i z i n g  a mar ke t  
t h a t  t h e  monopoly  has no t  been used t o  e x t r a c t  
f r o m t h e  consumer more than a " f a i r "  p r o f i t .
The Ac t  has w i d e r  p u r po s es .  Indeed ,  even though 
we d i s r e g a r d e d  a l l  bu t  economic c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,  
i t  would by no means f o l l o w  t h a t  such c o n c e n t r a ­
t i o n  o f  p r o d u c i n g  power i s  t o  be d e s i r e d ,  when 
i t  has n o t  been used e x t o r t i o n a t e 1y . Many peop l e  
b e l i e v e  t h a t  p o s s e s s i o n  o f  u n c h a l l e n g e d  economic 
power deadens i n i t i a t i v e ,  d i s c o u r a g e s  t h r i f t  and 
d epres ses  e n e r g y ;  t h a t  i mmun i t y  f rom c o m p e t i t i o n  
i s  a n a r c o t i c ,  and r i v a l r y  i s  a s t i m u l a n t  t o  
i n d u s t r i a l  p r o g r e s s ;  t h a t  t h e  spur  o f  c o n s t a n t  
s t r e s s  i s  n ec es sa r y  t o  c o u n t e r a c t  an i n e v i t a b l e  
d i s p o s i t i o n  t o  l e t  w e l l  enough a l o n e .  . . . "
In p u r s u i t  o f  t h e s e  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  g o a l s ,  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s
Congress .has o ve r  t h e  y e a r s  deve l oped  a n e t wo rk  o f  s t a t u t e s ,
o f  wh ich  the  b a s i c  p r o v i s i o n s  are c o n t a i n e d  i n  s e c t i o n s  one
and two o f  t he  Sherman A c t .  S e c t i o n  1 s t a t e s  t h a t ,
" E v e r y  c o n t r a c t ,  c o m b i n a t i o n  i n  t h e  f o r m o f  t r u s t  
o r  o t h e r w i s e ,  or  c o n s p i r a c y  i n  r e s t r a i n t  o f  
t r a d e  o r  commerce among t h e  s e v e r a l  s t a t e s ,  or  
w i t h  f o r e i g n  n a t i o n s ,  i s  d e c l a r e d  t o  be i l l e g a l  
. . .  Every  person who s h a l l  make any c o n t r a c t  
o r  engage i n  any c o m b i n a t i o n  or  c o n s p i r a c y  
d e c l a r e d  by t h i s  ( A c t )  t o  be i l l e g a l  s h a l l  be 
deemed g u i l t y  o f  a misdemeanor  . . . "
S e c t i o n  2 o f  t h e  Sherman Ac t  p r o v i d e s  t h a t ,
" E ve ry  person who s h a l l  m o n o p o l i z e ,  or  a t t e m p t  
t o  m o n o p o l i z e ,  o r  combine or  c o n s p i r e  w i t h  any 
o t h e r  person or  p e r s o n s ,  t o  mo no po l i z e  any p a r t  
o f  t he  t r a d e  or  commerce among t h e  s e v e r a l  s t a t e s  
or  w i t h  f o r e i g n  n a t i o n s  s h a l l  be deemed g u i l t y  
o f  mi sdemeanor . . . . "
J u d i c i a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  t he  above two p r o v i s i o n s  makes i t
c l e a r  t h a t  any agreements  between U n i t e d  S t a t e s  f i r m s  or
11• The U n i t e d  S t a t e s  v . A l umi n i um company o f  Am er i c a .  
148 F . 2 d .  (Sd.  C i r .  19.45) 416 at  p . 427.
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between U n i t e d  S t a t e s  f i r m s  and f o r e i g n  f i r m s  which aim i n
one way or  t h e  o t h e r  t o  c o n t r o l  a commodi ty  marke t  or  r e s t r i c t
1 2c o m p e t i t i o n  on such a m a r k e t ,  are p r o h i b i t e d .  Th i s  means 
t h a t  a l l  c a r t e l  a r rangement s  i n v o l v i n g  an Amer ican p r o d u c i n g  
f i r m  would be s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  Sherman Act  and t h e r e f o r e  
s u b j e c t  t o  c h a l l e n g e  in  t h e  Amer ican c o u r t s .
V I . A n t i t r u s t  Laws in  Europe
Most a n t i t r u s t  l e g i s l a t i o n  i n  Europe were e n a c t e d ,  a f t e r  
Wor ld War I I  as a r e s u l t  o f  renewed a t t e n t i o n  t o  p rob lems o f  
r e s t o r i n g  c o m p e t i t i o n  i n  v a r i o u s  d omes t i c  m a r k e t s .  In 
B r i t a i n  f o r  example ,  a R e s t r i c t i v e  Trade P r a c t i c e s  Act  was 
passed i n  1956 and l e g i s l a t i o n  r e l a t i n g  t o  m o no po l i e s  and 
mergers  was passed i n  1965.  Most o f  t h e  a n t i t r u s t  laws in  
European c o u n t r i e s  have more r e c e n t l y  been supp l emented  by 
A r t i c l e s  85 t o  90 o f  t he  Rome t r e a t y  c r e a t i n g  t h e  EEC. 
G e n e r a l l y  s p e ak i n g  most European a n t i t r u s t  l e g i s l a t i o n  p e r m i t  
more j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  c o l l u s i v e  agreements amongst  p r od uc e rs  
than t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  Sherman A c t .  The reason f o r  t h i s  
approach i n  Europe seems t o  l i e  i n  t he  economic systems 
and p h i l o s o p h y  t h a t  t he s e  c o u n t r i e s  s t r i v e  t o  b u i l d .  Many 
o f  t h e s e  c o u n t r i e s  b e l i e v e  t h a t  r e s t r i c t i o n  o f  c o m p e t i t i o n  
may be b e n e f i c i a l  i n  c e r t a i n  c i r c u m s t a n c e s .  I t  i s  f o r  t h i s  
reason t h a t  t h e se  c o u n t r i e s  p r o v i d e  exp ress  o r  i m p l i e d  
e xempt ions  f r om t h e  normal  a n t i t r u s t  r u l e s  f o r  c e r t a i n  
i n d u s t r i e s .  In c e r t a i n  i n s t a n c e s  t he se  e x empt io ns  go as
12. See f o r  example ,  N o r t h e r n  P a c i f i c  R a i l w a y  Company v.  
U n i t e d  S t a t e s  356 U . S . I .  5, 785.  C t .  5 1 4- 51 8 ,  2L. Ed 
(1958)
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f a r  as s u g g e s t i n g  t h a t  t h e  a n t i t r u s t  laws t o l e r a t e  the
1 3o r g a n i z a t i o n  o f  c a r t e l s .
The d i f f e r e n t  approaches t aken  by t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  
and European c o u n t r i e s  c l e a r l y  show t h a t  a n t i t r u s t  laws are 
u l t i m a t e l y  a p r o d u c t  o f  a p a r t i c u l a r  c o u n t r y ' s  economic 
p o l i c i e s  and p h i l o s o p h y .  T h i s  be ing  t h e  cas e,  i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  
t o  e nv i s a ge  a p a t t e r n  o f  a n t i t r u s t  laws t h a t  would  be 
a p p l i c a b l e  t o  a l l  c o u n t r i e s .  Wh i l e  c o u n t r i e s  l i k e  t he  U n i t e d  
S t a t e s  m i g h t  f a v o u r  laws t h a t  r e s t r i c t  c o l l u s i v e  market  
c o n t r o l s  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  m i gh t  argue i n  f a v o u r  o f  c o o p e r a ­
t i o n  among e x p o r t e r s .  Thus d i f f e r e n t  economic c i r c u m s t a n c e s  
and p o l i t i c a l  b e l i e f s  may l ead  t o  d i f f e r e n t  p o l i i c e s  towar ds  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  marke t  o r g a n i z a t i o n .  E f f o r t s  t o  f i n d  a common 
d e n o m i n a t o r  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  marke t  r e g u l a t i o n  s i n c e  the  
Second Wor ld  War have t h e r e f o r e  c e n t r e d  on i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l  
commodi ty  ag r eements .
V I I .  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Commodi ty Agreements
The f i r s t  a t t e m p t  t o  b r i n g  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  commodi ty  t r a d e  
under  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l e g a l  c o n t r o l  was made i n  1947-48 a t  t he  
Havana C on fe r en ce  where a d r a f t  c h a r t e r  f o r  an I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
Trade O r g a n i z a t i o n  ( ITO)  was t o  be n e g o t i a t e d .  C hap te r  VI 
o f  t he  d r a f t  Havana c h a r t e r  wh i ch  was f i n a l l y  never  adop ted ,  
f ormed t h e  b a s i s  o f  t he  commodi ty  d i s c u s s i o n  a t  t h e  c o n f e r e n c e .  
T h i s  c h a p t e r  s i n g l e d  ou t  p rob l ems r e l a t e d  t o  commodi ty  m a r k e t ­
i ng  and i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  r e c o g n i z e d  t he  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  concep t
See H . J .  S t e i n e r  and D.F.  Va g t s ,  T r a n s n a t i o n a l  Legal  
Prob l  ems . ( iTTkl '  fVetv i/ork , pp.  99 7 - 8 .
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o f  f reedom o f  c o m p e t i t i o n  was no t  p a r t i c u l a r l y  s u i t a b l e  f o r
1 4a p p l i c a t i o n  t o  commodi ty  m a r k e t s .  The c h a p t e r  was t h e r e ­
f o r e  d evo t ed  t o  t he  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  p r i n c i p l e s  and m ach in er y  
t o  be used i n  e f f e c t i n g  i n t e r - g o v e r n m e n t a l  a c t i o n .  One o f  
t h e  most i m p o r t a n t  measures recommended was t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  
o f  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Commodi ty Agreements .  Over t h e  y e a r s  
f o l l o w i n g  t he  Havana c o n f e r e n c e ,  many o f  t he  r e g u l a t o r y  
p r i n c i p l e s  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  commodi ty  mar ke t s  have been 
e v o l v e d  t h r o u g h  t h e  use o f  commodi ty agreements .
( i ) Legal  b a s i s  f o r  c o n c l u s i o n  o f  commodi ty  agreements
C hap te r  VI o f  t he  d r a f t  ITO c h a r t e r  fo rmed t he  b a s i s
1 5f o r  p r i n c i p l e s  o b t a i n i n g  i n  commodi ty a g r eemen ts .  The
c h a p t e r  was devo t ed  t o  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  p r i n c i p l e s  and
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  ma c h i ne r y  f o r  e f f e c t i n g  i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l
a c t i o n  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  commodi ty  m a r k e t s .  Of p a r t i c u l a r
i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  c h a p t e r  was a r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  t h e  s e r i o u s
adverse  e f f e c t s  p rob l ems o f  commodi ty mar ke t s  m i g h t  have
1 £
on both p r o d u c e r s  and consumers o f  such c o m m o d i t i e s .
T h i s  r e c o g n i t i o n  has come t o  fo rm one b a s i c  p r i n c i p l e  t h a t  
r e q u i r e s  t h e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  o f  both p r o d u c e r s  and consumers 
i n  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  o f  any commodi ty agreement .
A l t h o u g h  t h e  ITO c h a r t e r  never  came i n t o  f o r c e  due t o  
l a c k  o f  r a t i f i c a t i o n ,  i t s  i d e a l s ,  p r i n c i p l e s  and i n s t i t u t i o n a l  
a r rangement s  a p p l i c a b l e  t o  commodi ty agreements  managed t o
14. A r t i c l e  55 o f  t he  d r a f t  ITO c h a r t e r .  For  an o f f i c i a l
t e x t  see S.D. M e t z g & r v s Law o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e  -
Documents and r e a d i n g s , v o l .  2 ( 1 966 ) ,  p.  1166.
15. U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  Document No. E / C o n f . 2 / 7 8  UN Pub. Sales
No. 1 948.  I I . D . 4.
15. I b i d . ,  no te  15.
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s u r v i v e .  The a d o p t i o n  o f  t h e  Havana p r i n c i p l e s  was made
p o s s i b l e  by a number o f  t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  Economic and
S o c i a l  C o u n c i l  (ECOSOC) r e s o l u t i o n s  which  c a l l e d  f o r  t he  use
o f  t h e  ITO p r i n c i p l e s  i n  a l l  f u t u r e  commodi ty  agreements  as
a g e ne r a l  g u i d e  t o  a l l  f u t u r e  i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l  a c t i o n  i n
1 7m a t t e r s  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  commodi ty  t r a d e .  S i nce  the  
powers o f  ECOSOC have t h e i r  own l i m i t a t i o n s  i n  t h e  sense t h a t  
i t s  a c t i o n s  are n o t  b i n d i n g  upon members o f  t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s ,  
i t s  r e s o l u t i o n  r e g a r d i n g  commodi ty  agreements  was made by 
way o f  a r ecommendat ion  t o  member c o u n t r i e s .  T h i s  recom­
menda t i on  has fo rmed t he  b a s i s  upon which  t h e  Havana p r i n c i p l e s  
have been a p p l i e d  i n  t he  few commodi ty  agreements  t h a t  have 
been c o nc l u d e d  i n  t h e  1960s and 1970s.  There are  t h r e e  
i m p o r t a n t  s e t s  o f  p r i n c i p l e s  t h a t  fo rmed t he  b a s i s  o f  c h a p t e r  
VI o f  t h e  Havana c h a r t e r .  These were t h e  p r o c e d u r a l  p r i n c i p l e s  
f o r  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  o f  commodi ty  agreements ,  p r i n c i p l e s  
r e l a t i n g  t o  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  a r ra n g e me n t s ,  and p r i n c i p l e s  
r e l a t i n g  t o  t h e  marke t  c o n t r o l  mechanisms t o  be employed.
These p r i n c i p l e s  w i l l  b r i e f l y  be d i s c u s s e d  h er e .
( i i ) P r o c e d u r a l  a r r angement s
The most  i m p o r t a n t  p r o c e d u r a l  p r i n c i p l e  r e l a t e s  t o  t h e  
p ro cess  o f  c r e a t i n g  a commodi ty  agreement .  The i s s u e s  t h a t  
wou ld  t r i g g e r  t he  p ro cess  o f  c r e a t i n g  a commodi t y  agreement  
have been based on t h e  " f i n d i n g s "  r e q u i r e d  under  A r t i c l e  62 
o f  t h e  ITO c h a r t e r .  The r e q u i s i t e  " f i n d i n g s "  under  t h i s
17. U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  Economic and S o c i a l  C o u n c i l ,  r e s o l u t i o n  
3 0 ( i v ) o f  March 28 , 1 947.
A l so  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  General  Assembly r e s o l u t i o n  623,
7 UN 6 AOR S u p p l . 20 p . 15.
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A r t i c l e  were t o  be e i t h e r  a burdensome s u r p l u s  o f  t he  
commodi t y ,  undue h a r d s h i p  t o  smalt p r o d u c e r s , and p r i c e  
i n e l a s t i c i t y  or  w i d e s p r e ad  unemployment ,  undue h a r d s h i p  to  
wo rk e rs  and i n e l a s t i c i t y  o f  p r i c e s .
A f t e r  t h i s  p r e r e q u i s i t e  f i n d i n g  had been made, t he
ITO c h a r t e r  s e t  o u t  two b a s i c  p r o c e d u r a l  p r i n c i p l e s  f o r
t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  and o p e r a t i o n  o f  commodi ty  agreements  which
have been s t r i c t l y  adhered to  i n  n e g o t i a t i n g  commodi ty
agreemen ts .  The f i r s t  p r i n c i p l e  r e q u i r e d  t h a t  p a r t i c i p a t i o n
i n  a l l  commodi ty  agreements  be open t o  t ho s e  c o u n t r i e s
" s u b s t a n t i a l l y  i n t e r e s t e d "  i n  t he  p a r t i c u l a r  commodi ty
f o r m i n g  the  s u b j e c t  o f  t h e  agreement .  The te rm " s u b s t a n t i -
a l l y  i n t e r e s t e d "  has g e n e r a l l y  come t o  be u n d e r s t o o d  t o
i n c l u d e  both p r o d u ce r s  and consumers o f  t h e  commodi ty  
1 8i n  q u e s t i o n . .
The second i m p o r t a n t  p r i n c i p l e  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  v o t i n g  
power i n  t h e s e  ag r eemen ts .  In t h i s  r e g a r d  i t  was r e q u i r e d  
t h a t  c o u n t r i e s  w i t h  i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  i m p o r t  o f  t h e  commodi ty 
i n  q u e s t i o n ,  s ho u l d  have v o t i n g  power on s u b s t a n t i v e  m a t t e r s  
equal  t o  t ho s e  c o u n t r i e s  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  e x p o r t s .  T h i s  
l a t t e r  p r i n c i p l e  has been c o n s i d e r e d  t o  be a v a s t  i mprovement  
over  p r e - w a r  p r i v a t e  c a r t e l s  i n  which consumers were g e n e r a l l y  
e x c l ud e d  f r om t h e  d e c i s i o n  making p r o c e s s .  The b a s i c  
p r e m i s o u nd e r  1y i n g  t h e  two p r i n c i p l e s  i s  p r o d u c e r  and consumer 
c o o p e r a t i o n  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  commodi ty marke t  c o n t r o l .
The n o t i o n  o f  c o n s u m e r - p r o d u c e r  c o o p e r a t i o n  has however ,  
had i t s  own s h o r t c o m i n g s .  F i r s t ,  because b a s i c  agreement
IS.  A r t i c l e s  60 and 63 o f  t h e  d r a f t  ITO c h a r t e r .
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has t o  be reached  between p r o du c e r s  and consumers b e f o r e  
a commodi ty  agreement  can be e n t e r e d  i n t o ,  i t  has been
d i f f i c u l t  f o r  p r o d u c e r s  and consumers i n  a number o f  com-.
19m o d i f i e s  t o  c o n c l u d e  ag r eements .  The b a s i c  p r ob l em 
i n  r e a c h i n g  agreement  between p r od uc e rs  and consumers 
as t o  t he  need f o r  a commodi ty  agreement  l i e s  i n  t h e  c o n f l i c t  
o f  i n t e r e s t  t h a t  u s u a l l y  c h a r a c t e r i z e s  p r o d u c e r s  and consumers.  
Second,  even where t he  need f o r  c o n s u m e r - p r o d u c e r  c o o p e r a t i o n  
has been r e c o g n i z e d  and a commodi ty  agreement  has been 
c o n c l u d e d ,  t h e  s u c c e s s f u l  o p e r a t i o n  o f  such an agreement  
c o n t i n u e s  t o  depend on c o n t i n u e d  c o o p e r a t i o n  between the  
two s i d e s .  The l a c k  o f  acknowledged common i n t e r e s t  between 
e x p o r t e r s  and i m p o r t e r s  d u r i n g  t he  d u r a t i o n  o f  t h e  agreement  
i s  bound .to d e s t r o y  t he  essence o f  t he  agreement .
The s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  c o o p e r a t i o n  between p r o du c e r s  
and consumers l i e s  i n  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  w i t h o u t  t h i s  c o o p e r a t i o n  
no commodi ty  agreement  can be c o n c l u d e d .  For  example ,  
i n  t h e  case o f  c o p p e r ,  a l t h o u g h  i t  was r e c o g n i z e d  i n  c e r t a i n  
q u a r t e r s  t h a t  copper  marke t  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  was ne ces sa ry  
as e a r l y  as t he  1960s,  i t  was not  u n t i l  1976 t h a t  a c t i v e  
n e g o t i a t i o n s  f o r  a commodi ty  agreement  i n  copper  b e g a n . ^
T h i s  d e l a y  can o n l y  be e x p l a i n e d  i n  te rms o f  c o n f l i c t i n g  
i n t e r e s t s  between p r o d u c e r s  and consumers .  Consuming 
n a t i o n s  i n  g e ne r a l  s u s p e c t  t h a t  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  agreement  
i n  copper  would be used i n  t h e  l ong  run t o  r a i s e  t h e  p r i c e s  
o f  t he  meta l  above t h e  l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m .  T h i s  f e a r  
by consuming c o u n t r i e s  i s  no t  e n t i r e l y  w i t h o u t  f o u n d a t i o n
19. Only f i v e  commodi ty  agreements have o p e r a t e d  t o  d a t e .  
These are a g r e e m e n t s . f o r  t i n ,  cocoa,  c o f f e e ,  sugar  and 
wheat .
20, "Face t o  f a c e " ,  CIPEC Q u a r t e r l y  R e v i e w , J a n . - M a r .1976,  
pp.  7 - 8 .
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because p r o d u c i n g  c o u n t r i e s  g e n e r a l l y  are i n c l i n e d  t o  
seek h i g h e r  p r i c e s  f o r  t h e i r  c o m m od i t i e s .  Consuming c o u n t r i e s  
are a l s o  under  p r e s s u r e  f r om  v a r i o u s  i n t e r e s t  g roups  not  
t o  f a v o u r  commodi ty  agreements  because t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  
o f  a r e g u l a t o r y  i n s t i t u t i o n  does c h a l l e n g e  t h e i r  i n d e p e n d ­
ence.  Rio T i n t o  Z i n c ,  t he  g i a n t  m i n i n g  m u l t i n a t i o n a l
has i nv o k e d  t h i s  argument  a g a i n s t  t he  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f
21an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  copper  agreement .  I t  i s  f o r  t h i s  reason 
t h a t  u n t i l  t h e r e  was o f f i c i a l  b ac k i ng  t o  t h e  i d e a  o f  a 
copper  commodi ty  agreement  between Z a i r e  on t he  p r o d u c i n g  
s i d e  and France on t he  consuming s i d e ,  t h a t  a c t i v e  p a r t i c i ­
p a t i o n  o f  t he  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  Confe rence  f o r  Trade and 
Development  (UNCTAD) was o b t a i n e d  and n e g o t i a t i o n s  began.
( i i i ) Mar ke t  c o n t r o l  mechanisms
To a d egr ee ,  t h e  main aim o f  commodi ty  agreements 
i s  t o  i n t r o d u c e  r e g u l a t o r y  measures t h a t  bypass t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  
o f  f reedom o f  c o m p e t i t i o n  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  commodi ty  m a r k e t s .  
The degree o f  p l a n n i n g  i n t r o d u c e d  f o r  t h i s  purpose  would 
v a r y  f rom commodi ty  t o  commodi ty  a l t h o u g h  i n  each case 
t h e y  would aim at  p r e v e n t i n g  e x c e s s i v e  s h o r t - t e r m  p r i c e  
f l u c t u a t i o n s  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  c o m m o d i t i e s .
In g e n e r a l  t h e r e  are t h r e e  marke t  c o n t r o l  mechanisms 
en v i sa g ed  by c h a p t e r  VI o f  t h e  Havana c h a r t e r .  These 
are c o n t r o l s  on p r o d u c t i o n ,  q u a n t i t a t i v e  c o n t r o l s  on e x p o r t s  
and i m p o r t s ,  and c o n t r o l s  on p r i c e  l e v e l s .  Cha p t e r  VI
21.  See Paul  H a i l w o o d ,  S t a b i l i z a t i o n  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
commodi ty  m a r k e t s . (iq-pT)J$i Fresx inc.  Connecticut >
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however ,  d i d  no t  i n c l u d e  s p e c i f i c  p r o v i s i o n s  t h a t  c l a r i f i e d  
what  c o n t r o l  method was t o  be used f o r  what  commod i ty .
Because o f  t h i s  l a c k  o f  s p e c i f i c i t y ,  t he  c o n t r o l  methods 
t o  be adop ted  were l e f t  t o  be de c i de d  on a commodi ty  by 
commodi ty  b a s i s  and c h a p t e r  s i x  m er e l y  p r o v i d e d  t h e  g u i d i n g  
p r i n c i p l e s .  As a r e s u l t  o f  t h i s  commodi ty  by commodi ty  
approach i n  d e c i d i n g  t h e  c o n t r o l  mechanism t o  be used,  
a number o f  c o n t r o l  d e v i c e s  emerged.  I t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  
i d e n t i f y  at  l e a s t  f o u r  commodi ty  market  c o n t r o l  d e v i c e s  
w i t h i n  t h e  f ramewor k  o f  t h e  Havana C h a r t e r .  These are 
t he  e x p o r t  quot a  mechanism,  t h e  b u f f e r  s t o c k  mechanism,  
t he  i m p o r t  and e x p o r t  c o n t r o l  mechanism,  and t h e  m u l t i ­
l a t e r a l  c o n t r a c t  mechanism.
(a)  The. e.xP£r 't _ cl i i o t £  me£ha.ni_sm
The main aim o f  an e x p o r t  quota  mechanism i s  t o  
c o n t r o l  a commodi ty  mar ke t  by p r e v e n t i n g  s u r p l u s e s  o f  
a commodi ty  r e a c h i n g  i t .  A commodi ty  agreement  u t i l i z i n g
t h i s  mechanism p r o v i d e s  f o r  s p e c i f i e d  q uo t as  a ss ig n ed
2 2t o  each p a r t i c i p a t i n g  c o u n t r y .  The q uo t a  a s s i g n ed  to
each c o u n t r y  r e p r e s e n t s  t h a t  c o u n t r y ' s  share  o f  t he  p r o j e c t e d
2 3f r e e  ma rke t  r e q u i r e m e n t  o f  t h e  commodi t y .  To a t t a i n  
t he  o b j e c t i v e  o f  p r i c e  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  t h e  e x p o r t  quota  
mechanism o p e r a t e s  by way o f  a d j u s t i n g  t he  v a r i o u s  quotas  
a ss ig ne d  t o  member c o u n t r i e s  by e i t h e r  i n c r e a s i n g  or  d e c r e a s ­
i ng  them when m ar k e t  c o n d i t i o n s  so d e s i r e ,  t h e r e b y  m a i n t a i n ­
i ng  t h e  p r i c e s  i n  a d e s i r e d  r a nge .  A good example i n  t h i s
22. For  exampl e,  t he  1958 Sugar Agreements A r t i c l e  14.
23. I b i d . ,  A r t i c l e s  14 and 18.
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r e g a r d  was t h e  1958 Sugar agreement  which  had as i t s  main
o b j e c t i v e  t o  m a i n t a i n  w o r l d  sugar  p r i c e s  w i t h i n  t h e  range o f
243.15 t o  4 c e n t s  per  pound.  Th i s  goal  was t o  be a ch ie ve d  by 
e i t h e r  i n c r e a s i n g  or  d e c r e a s i n g  t h e  v a r i o u s  qu ot as  a ss igned  
t o  members,  when t h e  p r i c e s  t h r e a t e n e d  t o  go below or  above 
t he  r an ge .
The e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  t h i s  c o n t r o l  mechanism i n  commodi ty  
p r i c e  s t a b i l i z a t i o n ,  depends t o  a l a r g e  e x t e n t  on t he  
measures t he  commodi ty  agreement  i t s e l f  p r o v i d e s  t o  c o n t r o l  
two i n h e r e n t  p r ob l e m s .  F i r s t ,  an agreement  e m p l o y i n g  an 
e x p o r t  quot a  mechanism has t o  con tend  w i t h  t h o s e  members t h a t  
f a i l  t o  adhere t o  t h e i r  quo t a  a l l o c a t i o n s .  F a i l u r e  t o  adhere 
t o  t he  a l l o c a t e d  quotas  may l ead  t o  some p a r t i c i p a t i n g  
p r o d u ce r s  e x p o r t i n g  f a r  more than t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  q u o t a s .
In such a s i t u a t i o n ,  t h e  v e r y  o b j e c t i v e  sough t  by t h e  mechanism 
would be d e f e a t e d .  I t  i s  t h e r e f o r e ,  o f  c r u c i a l  i m p o r t a n c e  
t h a t  an agreement  o f  t h i s  n a t u r e  p r o v i d e s  f o r  measures 
t h a t  would ensur e  t h a t  e x p o r t i n g  c o u n t i r e s  s t ay e d  w i t h i n  t h e i r
expor t  quota l i m i t s .  The 1958 Sugar Agreement f o r  example,
2 5d i d  p r o v i d e  f o r  such measures.  The second p rob l em t h a t  has 
t o  be t a c k l e d  by a commodi ty  agreement  t h a t  u t i l i z e s  t h i s  
mechanism r e l a t e s  t o  n o n - p a r t i c i p a t i n g  e x p o r t i n g  c o u n t r i e s .
Such c o u n t r i e s ,  o p e r a t i n g  o u t s i d e  t he  f r amewor k  o f  t he  a g r e e ­
ment may t a k e  advan tage  o f  t he  s u p p l y  c u t s  c r e a t e d  by t he  
members qu ot a  a l l o c a t i o n s ,  by i n c r e a s i n g  t h e i r  e x p o r t s .  I f  
such a s i t u a t i o n  happened,  t hen  excess s u p p l i e s  would  be
24.
25.
I b i d . ,  A r t i c l e  21. 
I b i d . , A r t  i c 1e 8 ( 1 ) .
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a v a i l a b l e  on t he  marke t  and t he  p r i c e s  would  be suppressed 
d e f e a t i n g  t h e  v e r y  purpose o f  t he  e x p o r t  quo t a  agreement .
T h i s  p r ob l em can be t a c k l e d  by the  agreement  encompassing 
as many e x p o r t i n g  and i m p o r t i n g  c o u n t r i e s  as p o s s i b l e .
F a i l u r e  t o  t h i s ,  t h e  agreement  c o u l d  make p r o v i s i o n s  r e q u i r i n g  
p a r t i c i p a t i n g  consuming n a t i o n s  not  t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e i r  
pu rchases  o f  t h e  commodi ty  f r om t h e  n o n - p a r t i c i p a t i n g  c o u n t r i e s  
beyond a s p e c i f i e d  a m o u n t . ^
( b ) The b u f f e r _ s t o c k _ m e c h a n i s m
An agreement  u t i l i z i n g  t h e  b u f f e r  s t o c k ,  makes p r o ­
v i s i o n  f o r  t he  c r e a t i o n  o f  an a u t h o r i t y  t h a t  i s  charged w i t h  
t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  m a i n t a i n i n g  t he  p r i c e s  o f  t he  commodi ty  
i n  q u e s t i o n  w i t h i n  a s p e c i f i e d  and agreed r a n ge .  The S i x t h  
t i n  agreement  f o r  example ,  u t i l i z e s  t h i s  mechanism and p r o v i d e s
f o r  a f l o o r  and c e i l i n g  p r i c e s  which  t h e  b u f f e r  s t o c k  has 
27t o  m a i n t a i n .  The b u f f e r  s t o c k  a u t h o r i t y  m a i n t a i n s  the  
agreed range by way o f  making purchases o f  t h e  commodi ty  
f rom t h e  mar ke t  when t he  marke t  p r i c e s  drop t o  an agreed 
l e v e l ,  and s e l l i n g  i n t o  t he  marke t  when p r i c e s  r i s e  beyond 
t h e  agreed c e i l i n g .  A smooth o p e r a t i o n  o f  t h i s  p rocess  would 
h e l p  s t a b i l i z e  a c o m m o d i t y ' s  p r i c e s  t o  a d e s i r e d  r ange .
The d i f f i c u l t y  t h a t  u s u a l l y  f m l s  an agreement  which 
seeks t o  u t i l i z e  t h i s  agreement  r e l a t e s  t o  t h e  f i n a n c i n g  o f  
t h e  b u f f e r  s t o c k .  A b u f f e r  s t o c k  a u t h o r i t y  r e q u i r e s  s u b s t a n ­
t i a l  f un ds  t o  be a b l e  t o  e f f e c t i v e l y  c o n t r o l  a commodi ty  
m a r k e t .  By t he  v e r y  n a t u r e  o f  commodi ty  a g r e e m e n t s , i t  wou1d 
appear  t h a t  t he  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t he  f i n a n c i n g  o f  a b u f f e r
26. i b i d . , A r t i c l e s  7 ( 1 )  and ( i i ) ,
27. I b i d . ,  A r t i c l e  2 7 { i ) .
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s t o c k ,  f i r s t  and f o r e m o s t  l i e s  on the  members o f  t h e  a g r e e ­
ment .  U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  i m p o r t i n g  c o u n t r i e s  are u s u a l l y  r e l u c t a n t  
t o  c o n t r i b u t e  to wa r ds  t h e  f i n a n c i n g  o f  t h e  b u f f e r  s t o c k .
Th i s  r e l u c t a n c e  has i t s  r o o t s  i n  an i d e o l o g i c a l  s t an ce  h e l d  
by t he  de ve l op ed  consuming n a t i o n s  a g a i n s t  ma rke t  c o n t r o l ,  
an i s s u e  t h a t  f o r  a l ong  t i m e  domina ted  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  and 
West German g o ver nme nt a l  a t t i t u d e s  t o  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  commodi ty 
agreements .  A n o t h e r  c o n t r i b u t i n g  f a c t o r  t o  t h e s e  c o u n t r i e s '  
r e l u c t a n c e  t o  f i n a n c e  b u f f e r  s t o c k s ,  i s  t h e  a ss umpt ion  t h e y  
h o l d  t h a t  t h e  e x p o r t e r  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  s t an d  t o  ga i n  
more than  consumer  deve l oped  c o u n t r i e s  as a r e s u l t  o f  s u c c e s s ­
f u l  o p e r a t i o n  o f  commodi ty  agreements .  S i nce  t h e  d e v e l o p i n g  
e x p o r t e r  c o u n t r i e s  s tand  t o  g a i n  more,  t h e y  s h o u l d  bear  a 
h e a v i e r  f i n a n c i a l  burden as f a r  as the  o p e r a t i o n  o f  commodi ty  
agreements  i s  co n ce rn e d .  However ,  s i n c e  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  
have f i n a n c i a l  p rob lems o f  t h e i r  own, b u f f e r  s t o c k  f i n a n c i n g  
p r o v i s i o n s  have been i n a d e q u a t e  i n  a number o f  cases t h e r e b y
c o n t r i b u t i n g  t o  t h e  f a i l u r e  o f  some agreements  b  t h e i r
2 8p r i c e  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  g o a l .
A marked r e l u c t a n c e  t o  f i n a n c e  b u f f e r  s t o c k s  by d eve l oped
consuming c o u n t r i e s  i s  e x e m p l i f i e d  by t h e  f i f t h  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
29t i n  ag reement .  Under t h a t  agreement  t i n  p r o d u c i n g  members
o f  t he  a gr ee me nt ; who are m a i n l y  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s ,  were
r e q u i r e d  t o  make s u b s t a n t i a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  t h e  f o r m a t i o n
30and ma in ten an ce  o f  a t i n  b u f f e r  s t o c k .  Consumer c o u n t r i e s
28. T h i s  s i t u a t i o n  has c e r t a i n l y  a r i s e n  on a number o f  
o c c a s i o n s  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  the  T i n  Agreement ,  when t i n  
s t o c k s  have been e x h au s t e d .
29.  The f i f t h  T in  Agreement  came i n t o  f o r c e  p r o v i s i o n a l l y  on
1s t  J u l y  1976 and d e f i n i t i v e l y  on 14th June 1977.
30. A r t i c l e  2 0 ( 6 ) ( i ) o f  t he  S i x t h  T i n  Agreement .
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on t he  o t h e r  hand were no t  o b l i g e d  t o  make such c o n t r i ­
b u t i o n s  bu t  c o u l d  do so by way o f  v o l u n t a r y  c o n t r i b u t i o n s
which remained under  t h e  c o n t r o l  o f  t he  donors  who c o u l d
3 Tat  any t i m e  ask f o r  t he  d o n a t i o n s  t o  be r e f u n d e d .  In 
t o t a l ,  t h e  f i f t h  t i n  agreement  p laced  t h e  e n t i r e  f i n a n c i n g  
o f  t he  b u f f e r  s t o c k  i n  t h e  hands o f  p r o d u c e r  d e v e l o p i n g  
c o u n t r i e s  who are i l l  e q u i p p e d ,  f i n a n c i a l l y ,  t o  f i n a n c e  a 
b u f f e r  s t o c k  such as t h a t  e n v i sa ge d  i n  t h e  agr eement .  I t  
i s  a c t u a l l y  a g a i n s t  t h i s  background o f  a marked r e l u c t a n c e  
on t h e  p a r t  o f  t h e  i m p o r t e r s  t o  make f i n a n c i a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  
t h a t  t h e  key i m p o r t a n c e  o f  UNCTAD's Commond Fund i s  b r o u g h t  
i n t o  f o c u s .  The p r i n c i p l e s  and r o l e  o f  t h e  Common Fund 
w i l l  be d i s c u s s e d  i n  a l a t e r  c h a p t e r .  However ,  one p o i n t  
needs t o - be made h e r e .  I t  seems v e r y  l i k e l y  t h a t  t he  
n e g o t i a t i o n s  f o r  a Common Fund i n  UNCTAD m i g h t  have had 
i n f l u e n c e  on t he  consuming c o u n t r i e s '  w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  c o n t r i ­
bu te  to wa r ds  t he  t i n  b u f f e r  s t o c k  under  t h e  6 th  t i n  a g r e e ­
ment .  Under t h a t  agreement  t he  f i n a n c i n g  o f  t h e  b u f f e r
s t o c k  i s  r e q u i r e d  t o  be shared  e q u a l l y  between p r o d u c i n g
32and consuming members.  T h i s  agreement  appears  t o  have 
made a g r e a t  s t e p  by a c t u a l l y  c o m m i t t i n g  d e ve l op ed  consumer 
c o u n t r i e s  t o  an equal  share  o f  t he  f i n a n c i n g  o f  t h e  b u f f e r  
s t o c k .  I t  sh o u l d  be no ted  t h a t  d u r i n g  t h e  e n t i r e  d u r a t i o n  
o f  t he  4 th  agreement  o n l y  two consumer c o u n t r i e s ,  t h a t  i s  
France and t h e  N e t h e r l a n d s  had made v o l u n t a r y  c o n t r i b u t i o n s .
* I b i d . , A r t i c l e  22.
32.  I b i d . ,  A r t i c l e  2 2 ( 1 ) .
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In t h e  5 th  agreement  t he  two consumer c o u n t r i e s  were j o i n e d
by Be l g i u m,  U n i t e d  Kingdom, Japan,  Norway,  Canada, and t he  
33U n i t e d  S t a t e s .  T h i s  r e p r e s e n t s  o n l y  abou t  a q u a r t e r  o f
34t he  t o t a l  consuming members o f  t he  t i n  ag reement .
On a second l e v e l ,  t h e  p rob l em t h a t  a r i s e s  ou t  o f  t h e  
use o f  a b u f f e r  s t o c k  mechanism r e l a t e s  t o  t h e  p r i c e  range 
t h a t  i s  t o  be m a i n t a i n e d  by t he  b u f f e r  s t o c k .  P r od uc i ng  
c o u n t r i e s ,  members o f  a commodi ty  agreement  u t i l i z i n g  t he  
b u f f e r  s t o c k  mechanism u s u a l l y  p r e f e r  a h ig h  f l o o r  and 
c e i l i n g  p r i c e  o r  even no c e i l i n g  p r i c e  a t  a l l ,  w h i l e  t he  
consuming c o u n t r i e s  t a k e  an a lmo s t  o p p o s i t e  v i e w .  D e s p i t e  
t h i s  c o n f l i c t  o f  i n t e r e s t ,  t h e  f l o o r  and c e i l i n g  p r i c e s  
are no t  f i x e d  a r b i t r a r i l y .  For  example ,  i n  t h e  T i n  A g r e e ­
ments t h e  f l o o r  and c e i l i n g  p r i c e s  are a r r i v e d  a t  by a 
Counc i l  m a j o r i t y  d e c i s i o n  i n  which consuming c o u n t r i e s  and 
p r o d u c i n g  c o u n t r i e s  have 50% o f  t he  t o t a l  v o t e s  each.  In 
t he  S i x t h  T i n  4 g r e e me n t ,  t h e  C ou nc i l  i s  r e q u i r e d  t o  t a k e  
i n t o  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  a number o f  i s s ue s  when d e t e r m i n i n g  t he  
f l o o r  and c e i l i n g  p r i c e s .  The f a c t o r s  t o  be t a k e n  i n t o  
accoun t  i n c l u d e  t r e n d s  i n  t i n  p r o d u c t i o n  and c o n s u m p t i o n ,  
p r o d u c t i o n  c o s t s ,  and t h e  adequacy o f  c u r r e n t  p r i c e s  to  
m a i n t a i n  s u f f i c i e n t  f u t u r e  mine p r o d u c t i o n .  The prob lem 
however ,  i s  t h a t  t he s e  f a c t o r s  are bound t o  be l oo ke d  at
33. The I n t e r n a t i o n a l  l i n  C o u n c i l ,  Annual  R epor t  f o r  
1979-80 a t  p . 24.
34. The number o f  consumer c o u n t r i e s  i n  bo th  t h e  f o u r t h  
and f i f t h  t i n  agreements  was 23.
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f rom d i f f e r e n t  a ng l es  by p r o d u c i n g  c o u n t r i e s  on t h e  one hand,
and consuming c o u n t r i e s  on t he  o t h e r .  The r e s u l t  o f  t h i s
c o n f l i c t  o f  i n t e r e s t  m i g h t  be t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  a r t i f i c i a l
f l o o r  and c e i l i n g  p r i c e s  t h a t  d i d  no t  a d e q u a t e l y  r e p r e s e n t
an unb i ased  v i ew o f  t he  t r e n d s  i n  t he  m a r k e t .  T h i s  c e r t a i n l y
appears t o  have been t he  prob l em i n  t h e  f i f t h  t i n  agreement
when t h e  c e i l i n g  and f l o o r  p r i c e s  were a d j u s t e d  no l ess
than t h r e e  t i m e s .  The f i r s t  r e v i s i o n  was made i n  J u l y  o f
1978 when t he  f l o o r  p r i c e  was f i x e d  a t  1 ,350 M a l a y s i a n
d o l l a r s  per  p i k u l  and the  c e i l i n g  p r i c e  1 ,700 M a l a y s i a n
d o l l a r s  per  p i k u l .  A y e a r  l a t e r ,  i n  J u l y  1979 t he  f l o o r
p r i c e  was a d j u s t e d  t o  1 ,500 M a la y s i a n  d o l l a r s  per  p i k u l
and t he  c e i l i n g  1,950 M a l a y s i a n  d o l l a r s .  In  March 1980 t he
f l o o r  p r i c e  was i n c r e a s e d  t o  1 ,650 and t h e  c e i l i n g  p r i c e  t o
352,145 M a l a y s i a n  d o l l a r s  per  p i k u l .  In t h e  f i n a l  a n a l y s i s ,
t h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  agreed f l o o r  and c e i l i n g  p r i c e s  were more a
r e s u l t  o f  compromise and perhaps c o e r c i o n  wh i ch  i s  t o  be
exp ec te d  at  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o n f e r e n c e s  than  a n y t h i n g  e l s e .
( c ) Th£ J_mj)0£ t_a j i d_ ex p£ r t ,  _cont ro_l_ me£ha.nj_sm
T h i s  p r i c e  c o n t r o l  mechanism has been u t i l i z e d  i n  the
f o u r  c o f f e e  agreements  t h a t  have o p e r a t e d  s i n c e  1963. The
mechanism o p e r a t e s  on t he  b a s i s  o f  e s t i m a t e d  w o r l d  i m p o r t s .
The e s t i m a t e d  f i g u r e  i s  t hen  a p p o r t i o n e d  among e x p o r t i n g
36c o u n t r i e s  as t h e i r  b a s i c  e x p o r t  q u o t a s .  To m a i n t a i n  a 
d e s i r e d  l e v e l  o f  p r i c e s  t h e  a l l o c a t e d  q uo t as  would be 
i n c r e a s e d  o r  dec r eased  depend ing  on the  d e s i r e d  g o a l .
35. See the I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Tin Counci l ,  Annual Report  f o r  
1979-80 ,  pp. 2 4- 26 .
3 6 . See f o r  example ,  A r t i c l e s  29 and 30 o f  t h e  1976 C of f ee  
a g r e e m e n t .
See a l s o  a r t i c l e s  29 and 30 o f  t he  1983 C o f f e e  agreement .
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The o b v io u s  d i f f i c u l t y  w i t h  t h i s  mechanism r e l a t e s  t o  
making sure  t h a t  no e x p o r t i n g  member e x p o r t s  more than i t s  
a l l o c a t e d  q u o t a .  T h i s  p rob l em became g l a r i n g l y  o b v io u s  i n  
t h e  f i r s t  two c o f f e e  agreements when e x p o r t e r s  exceeded 
t h e i r  quo t as  and s o l d  c o f f e e  s e c r e t l y  i n  v i o l a t i o n  o f  l e g a l  
p r o v i s i o n s  o f  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  ag reement .  E f f e c t i v e  m o n i t o r ­
i ng  o f  adherence t o  t h e  a l l o c a t e d  quo t as  by p r o d u c i n g  
member c o u n t r i e s  appears t o  depend on c o o p e r a t i o n  by 
consuming c o u n t r i e s .  Thus f o r  example ,  t h e  p o l i c i n g  p r o ­
cedur es  employed by t h e  1976 and 1983 I n t e r n a t i o n a l  C o f f e e  
agreements r e q u i r e  "a c e r t i f i c a t e  o f  o r i g i n "  and " c e r t i f i c a t e  
o f  r e - e x p o r t "  t o  accompany a l l  sh ipmen ts  o f  c o f f e e  f rom
o 7
member c o u n t r i e s .  The purpose o f  t he s e  c e r t i f i c a t e s  i s  
t o  e s t a b l i s h  t he  o r i g i n  o f  t he  c o f f e e  produced or  p rocessed 
so t h a t  t he  C o f f e e  C ou n c i l  c o u l d  be a b l e  t o  check c o mp l i ance  
w i t h  t he  a l l o c a t e d  q u o t a s .  The consuming member c o u n t r i e s  
are charged w i t h  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  p o l i c i n g  co mp l i a nc e  
by r e f u s i n g  t o  purchase  c o f f e e  no t  accompanied by v a l i d  
c e r t i f i c a t e s .  P e n a l t i e s  are p r o v i d e d  f o r  bo th  e x p o r t e r s  who 
exceed t h e i r  quo t a  a l l o c a t i o n s  and consuming c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  
exceed i m p o r t  l i m i t s  f rom non member c o u n t r i e s .  These 
p e n a l t i e s  may u l t i m a t e l y  mean s us pens ion  o f  v o t i n g  r i g h t s
o o
f o r  the member concerned.  But since no other  p e n a l t i e s  
are provided f o r  e i t h e r  impor t ing or  e xp or t in g  members who 
v i o l a t e  other  r u l es  of  the I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Cof fee  Agreement  
the system is  l i k e l y  to be abused through the f o r g i n g  of  
c e r t i f i c a t e s  of  o r i g i n .
37. I b i d . , A r t i c l e  43.
38. A r t i c l e s  42 and 45 o f  t he  1983 C o f f e e  agreement .
mThe second p rob l em t h a t  i s  l i k e l y  t o  o c c u r  under  a 
commodi ty  agreement  u t i l i z i n g  an e x p o r t  and i m p o r t  c o n t r o l  
mechanism i s  t h a t  wh i ch  r e l a t e s  t o  a b u i l d  up o f  t h e  
commodi ty  i n  t h e  p r o d u c i n g  c o u n t r i e s .  S i nce  e x p o r t  quotas  
would v a r y  f rom y e a r  t o  y e a r ,  t he  l i k e l i h o o d  o f  p r o d u c e r  
c o u n t r i e s  f i n d i n g  t h em se lve s  w i t h  excess q u a n t i t i e s  o f  t he  
commodi ty  f a r  beyond t h e i r  quotas  i s  a r e a l  p o s s i b i l i t y .
T h i s  i s  so because o f  t he  d i f f i c u l t y  o f  a d j u s t i n g  p r o d u c t i o n  
a t  t he  same r a t e  as changes i n  marke t  demand. A p o s s i b l e  
s o l u t i o n  t o  t h i s  p rob l em may l i e  i n  t he  i n c o r p o r a t i o n  o f  
p r o d u c t i o n  p r o v i s i o n s  i n t o  t h e  commodi ty a g r eemen t ,  so t h a t  
t h e  Commodi ty C o un c i l  c o u l d  o r d e r  a d j u s t m e n t  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  
t a k i n g  i n t o  c o n s i d e r a t  i on  p r o j e c t e d  mark e t  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  
demand. .Th i s  agreement  w ou ld ,  i f  w e l l  p o l i c e d ,  a v o i d  t he  
dangers  o f  e x c e s s i v e  p r o d u c t i o n  t h a t  would l e a v e  p r o du c e r s  
w i t h  l a r g e  s t o c k s .  But  as t h e  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  t h e  f i r s t  two 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o f f e e  agreements  r e v e a l e d  e n f o r c e m e n t  o f  such 
p r o d u c t i o n  t a r g e t s  i s  a d i f f i c u l t  i s s u e .  C o u n t r i e s  t h a t  
depended h e a v i l y  on c o f f e e  e x p o r t s  f o r  t h e i r  f o r e i g n  e a r n i n g s  
were a lways tempted  t o  i n c r e a s e  p r o d u c t i o n  so as t o  t a k e  
advan tage  o f  p r i c e  i n c r e a s e s  on t he  m a r k e t .  Because o f  t h i s  
k i n d  o f  d i f f i c u l t y ,  t h e  p r o c e d u r e s  aimed a t  e s t a b l i s h i n g  l o n g ­
te rm p r o d u c t i o n  g o a l s  i n  t h e  f i r s t  two c o f f e e  agreements  were 
abandoned i n  t h e  1976 and 1983 agreements ,  because t h e y  had 
p r o v ed ,  by and l a r g e ^ t o  be i n e f f e c t i v e .  S i nce  t h e  l a t e s t  
c o f f e e  agreement  does no t  have p r o v i s i o n s  aimed a t  c o n t r o l  
o f  p r o d u c t i o n ,  t he  i m p o s i t i o n  o f  e x p o r t  q uo t as  may e v e n t u a l l y  
l ead  t o  an unp l anned  b u i l d  up o f  n a t i o n a l  c o f f e e  s t o c k s  which 
i n  t u r n  would t end  t o  have a p r i c e  d e p r e s s i n g  e f f e c t  on the  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  m a r k e t s .
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(d)  The^ Mu J_ t i _ l a te r £ l _C£nt r£ l _M£c h^ rn  sm
The f i n a l  mechanism employed i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  commodi ty 
agreements  i n  an e f f o r t  t o  s t a b i l i z e  p r i c e s ,  i s  t he  
m u l t i l a t e r a l  c o n t r a c t .  T h i s  c o n t r o l  mechanism r e p r e s e n t s  
an agreement  by which  i m p o r t i n g  c o u n t r i e s  agree t o  purchase 
a s p e c i f i e d  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  t h e i r  t o t a l  commerc ia l  i m p o r t s  o f  
a commodi ty  f rom p a r t i c i p a t i n g  e x p o r t i n g  c o u n t r i e s  w i t h i n  
a se t  p r i c e  r a n ge .  E x p o r t i n g  member c o u n t r i e s  on t he  o t h e r  
hand would u n d e r t a k e  t o  make a v a i l a b l e  t o  i m p o r t i n g  c o u n t r i e s  
a s u f f i c i e n t  q u a n t i t y  o f  t he  commodi ty at  an agreed p r i c e .
The o n l y  commodi ty  agreement  t o  have u t i l i z e d  t h i s  
mechanism i s  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  Wheat Agreement ,  wh ich  i s  o f  
l i t t l e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  t o  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  s i n c e  i t  i n v o l v e s  
m a i n l y  d ev e l oped  wheat  p r o d u c i n g  and consuming c o u n t r i e s .
I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  e n v i sa g e  t h e  use o f  t h i s  mechanism f o r  
any o t h e r  commodi ty  p a r t i c u l a r l y  because most c ommod i t i es  
are produced by d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  and consumed by 
d ev e l oped  c o u n t r i e s .  Th i s  s i t u a t i o n  and t h e  r e s u l t i n g  
c o n f l i c t  between t h e  two s i d e s  makes i t  u n l i k e l y  t h a t  a g r e e ­
ment would be reached  where such a mechanism would be used.
I t  i s  perhaps due t o  a r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  t h i s  f a c t  t h a t  the'  
I n t e g r a t e d  Programme f o r  Commodi t ies d e v i s e d  by UNCTAD does 
no t  recommend t he  use o f  t h i s  mechanism i n  commodi ty  
n e g o t i a t i o n s .  For  t h i s  reason t he  mechanism w i l l  no t  be 
d i s c u s s e d  f u r t h e r .
{ i v ) F i n a n c i a l  P r o v i s i o n s  i n  Commodi ty agreements
One o f  t he  most i m p o r t a n t  aspec t s  o f  any commodi ty  
agreement  i s  t he  q u e s t i o n  o f  f i n a n c i n g  t h e  o p e r a t i o n  o f  t h e
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agreement .  O b v i o u s l y  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  p r o v i s i o n s  
w i l l  v a r y  w i t h  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  commodi ty  and t he  c o n t r o l  
mechanism t o  be used.  In t h e  commodi ty  agreements  t h a t  
have o p e r a t e d  so f a r ,  t h e r e  have been two t y p e s  o f  f i n a n c i a l  
p r o v i s i o n s .  F i r s t  t h e r e  have been t he  p r o v i s i o n s  d e a l i n g  
w i t h  f i n a n c i n g  o f  t h e  g e ne r a l  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o f  t h e  a g r e e ­
ment ,  and s e c o n d l y  t ho s e  p r o v i s i o n s  p r o v i d i n g  f o r  the  
f i n a n c i n g  o f  b u f f e r  s t o c k s .
The f i r s t  t y p e  o f  p r o v i s i o n s  have been u t i l i z e d  i n  
v a r y i n g  fo rms i n  a l l  commodi ty  agreements t h a t  have o p e r a te d  
t o  d a t e .  A l l  t h e s e  agreements  have made t h e  r a t e  o f  c o n t r i ­
b u t i o n  towa rds  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o f  t h e  agreement  dependent  
on t h e  v o t i n g  power o f  each member i n  t h e  agreement .  Thus 
f o r  example ,  t he  1976 C o f f e e  agreement  r e q u i r e s  c o n t r i b u t i o n s
t o  be made by bo th  p r o du c e r s  and consumers i n  accordance  w i t h
1 3 9each members v o t i n g  power .  S ince  bo th  t h e  1976 and
1983 C o f f e e  agreements p r o v i d e  f o r  an equal  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f
v o t e s  between p r o d u c e r  c o u n t r i e s  on t h e  one hand and
consumer c o u n t r i e s  on t h e  o t h e r ,  t h e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  made by
40t h e  two groups must be e q u a l .  The same a r ran ge me nt  a p p l i e s
i n  t h e  case o f  t h e  Cocoa and t h e  t i n  agreements
These f i n a n c i a l  p r o v i s i o n s  do no t  p r e s e n t  a p a r t i c u ­
l a r l y  s e r i o u s  p rob l em because t h e r e  seems t o  be a g ene ra l  
consensus t h a t  any i n t e r n a t i o n a l  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  a r rangement  
has t o  meet i t s  expenses f ro m member c o n t r i b u t i o n s  .42
D i f f i c u l t  p rob l ems do a r i s e  however ,  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o
39.  I b i d . , a r t i c l e s  2 5 ( 2 ) .
40.  I b i d . ,  a r t i c l e  13.
41.  See A r t i c l e  2 3 ( 2)  o f  t he  1980 I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Cocoa 
Agreement  as w e l l  as a r t i c l e  20 ( 2)  o f  t h e  s i x  T i n  A q ^ n ^ n t
4 2 . C e r t a i n  Expenses o f  t he  U n i t ed  N a t i o n s , ^  1>3~J I C  T jo
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f i n a n c i a l  p r o v i s i o ns  aimed at  r a i s i n g  funds f o r  f i n a n c i n g  
b u f f e r  stock arrangements.  Two agreements t h a t  make use of  
the b u f f e r  stock mechanism are the I n t e r n a t i o n a l  T i n  Agree-
a q
ment ( IT A)  and the I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Cocoa Agreement { I CCA ) .
The m a j o r  p r o b 1ems t h a t  have been e n c ou n t e r e d  i n  t h e s e  two 
agreements  i s  f o r  t h e  p a r t i e s  t o  agree on t he  s i z e  o f  t he  
b u f f e r  s t o c k .  The consuming c o u n t r i e s  g e n e r a l l y  advance 
the  v i ew t h a t  a l a r g e  b u f f e r  s t o c k  would be e x p e n s i v e  
t o  m a i n t a i n  and because t he  b e l i e f i S t h a t  such a b u f f e r  s t o c k  
would u l t i m a t e l y  be t o  t he  advantage o f  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s ,  
t h e y  do n o t  want  t o  agree t o  a l a r g e  s c a l e  b u f f e r  s t o c k .
This l i n e  of  t h i n k i n g  appears to have c o n t r i b u t e d  to the 
slow progress in the negot at ions  f o r  an I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
Copper Agreemen t .. The s i x t h  p r e p a r a t o r y  meet ing f o r  an 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  agreement on copper appointed a second i n t e r ­
governmental  group of  e x p e r t s .  This group was to examine 
the best  c o nt r o l  mechanism t h a t  could be employed in an 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Copper Agreement and the costs and b e n e f i t s  
of such an arrangement to both producers and consumers.^
I t  was t o  examine ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  such q u e s t i o n s  as t he  
s i z e  o f  t h e  b u f f e r  s t o c k ,  t h e  p r i c e  r a n ge ,  and f i n a n c i a l
r e q u i r e m e n t s .  In t h e . e n d  t h e  consumers on t h e  one hand and
producers on the o ther  f a i l e d  to agree on the s i z e  of  the
45s t o c k s  and p r i c e  r a ng es .
Adequate f i n a n c i a l  p r o v i s i o n s  f o r  a f u t u r e  copper
43.  A r t i c l e  35,  1 980 Cocoa / Igreement  which  e n t e r e d  i n t o
f o r c e  p r o v i s i o n a l l y  on 1 s t  August  1981.
A l s o  A r t i c l e s  22-24 o f  t h e  S i x t h  J i n  Agreement .
44.  See UNCTAD Document TD/B/1 P C / C o p p e r / 16.
CIPEC Q u a r t e r l y  R ev i ew , A p r i l - J u n e  ( 1 9 7 9 ) ,  p . 7.
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commodi ty  agreement  w i l l  t h e r e f o r e  depend on two t h i n g s .
F i r s t ,  i t  w i l l  depend on t he  r e c o g n i t i o n  by bo th  consumers 
and p r o d u c e r s  t h a t  a commodi ty  agreement  i s  u l t i m a t e l y  
b e n e f i c i a l  t o  both  o f  them,  and s e c o n d l y ,  on t h e  s u c c e s s f u l  
o p e r a t i o n  o f  t he  Common f un d  under  t he  i n t e g r a t e d  programme 
f o r  c o m m o d i t i e s .
( v ) C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r o v i s i o n s  
( a ) Membership_andmd i_ s t H  b u t t o n  £ f _ v o t <3s
By t h e i r  v e r y  n a t u r e  commodi ty agreements  are r e q u i r e d  
t o  c o n s i s t  o f  both  p r o d u c i n g  and e x p o r t i n g  c o u n t r i e s .  In 
f a c t  t h e  s u c c e s s f u l  o p e r a t i o n  o f  any commodi ty  agreement  
depends on t he  c o o p e r a t i o n  e x i s t i n g  between p r o d u c e r  c o u n t r i e s  
and consumer c o u n t r i e s .  A l l  e x i s t i n g  commodi ty  agreements 
have membership open t o  a l l  p r o d u c i n g  and consuming n a t i o n s  
s u b s t a n t i a l l y  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  c o m m od i t i e s . ^ ^
Th i s  i s  i n  acco r dance  w i t h  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  e n u n c i a t e d  under  
c h a p t e r  VI o f  t he  d r a f t  Havana c h a r t e r .
S ince  t he  i n t e r e s t s  o f  both p r o d u c e r  c o u n t r i e s  and 
consumer c o u n t r i e s  have t o  be t aken  i n t o  a c c ou n t  i n  any 
commodi ty  agreement ,  t he  q u e s t i o n  o f  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  vo tes  
between the  two groups becomes o f  c r i t i c a l  i m p o r t a n c e  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  when one r e a l i z e s  t h a t  i n  most cases consumers 
o f  a commodi ty  w i l l  su r pass  t h e  number o f  p r o d u c e r s .  Th i s  
s i t u a t i o n  has e x i s t e d  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  a l l  t h e  commodi ty  a g r e e ­
ments t h a t  have o p e r a t e d  to  da te  e x ce pt  f o r  t h a t  o f  c o f f e e  
where you have 42 e x p o r t i n g  c o u n t r i e s  as compared t o  21 
i m p o r t i n g  members. ^  In t h e  case o f  t he  6 th  t i n  agreement ,
46. See f o r  example ,  A r t i c l e s  3 (6 )  and (7)  o f  t he  c o f f e e  
agreement  { 1 983 ) .
47. Annex 2, C o f f e e  agreement  1976.
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t h e  p r o d u c i n g  member c o u n t r i e s  number seven w h i l e  i m p o r t i n g
48c o u n t r i e s  number 23. Aga in  i n  t he  case o f  t he  1980 Cocoa
agreement  which  e n t e r e d  i n t o  f o r c e  on 1 s t  August  1981, i t s
membership c o n s t i t u t e d  15 e x p o r t i n g  c o u n t r i e s  and 20
49i m p o r t i n g  c o u n t r i e s .  The d r a f t  Havana c h a r t e r  must  have 
a n t i c i p a t e d  t h i s  d i s p a r i t y  between the  numbers o f  p r od uc e rs  
and consumers .  To keep t h e  ba la nce  between t h e  two s i d e s ,  
t h e  d r a f t  c h a r t e r  r e q u i r e d  each commodi ty  agreement  t o  
p r o v i d e  f o r  an equal  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  v o t es  between the  two 
g r o u p s .  In f a c t  a l l  commodi ty  agreements t h a t  have e x i s t e d  
t o  da te  have adhered t o  t h i s  r e q u i r e m e n t  and have p r o v i d e d  
f o r  equal  v o te s  f o r  p r o d u c e r  c o u n t r i e s  on t he  one hand,  and 
consumer c o u n t r i e s  on t h e  o t h e r .  For  example ,  t h e  t i n ,  
cocoa and c o f f e e  agreements a l l  a s s i gn  1 ,000 v o te s  t o  
p r o d u c e r  c o u n t r i e s  and a n o t h e r  1,000 t o  consuming c o u n t r i e s . 50 
The s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  t h i s  v o t e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  appears  t o  l i e  
i n  t he  f a c t  t h a t  i t  g u ar a n t e e s  equal  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  t he  
i n t e r e s t s  o f  t he  two p r i n c i p a l  p a r t i e s  t o  any commodi ty  
agreement  - t h e  consumers and p r o d u c e r s .
The d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  v o t es  between t h e  members o f  each 
p r i n c i p a l  g r o up ,  has i n  a l l  t h e  agreements been based on 
t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  each member c o u n t r y  as p r o d u c e r  or  consumer 
o f  t he  commod i ty .  The p r o p o r t i o n a l  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  a c o u n t r y ' s  
e x p o r t s  o r  i m p o r t s  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t o t a l  w o r l d  e x p o r t s  and
48. I n t e r n a t i o n a l  T i n  C o u n c i l ,  Annual  R epor t  £l 9 7 9 -1 9 8 oj,
pp . 5 - 6 .
49.  I n t e r n a t i  onal  Cocoa C o u n c i l ,  Annual  R e p o r t / l  980-1 98l),
p . 10.
50. A r t i c l e  14 paras 1 and 2 o f  t he  6 th  t i n  agreement ,  and 
A r t i c l e  10 para 1 o f  t he  Cocoa agreement  ( 1 9 8 0 ) .
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i m p o r t s  i s  used as a b a s i s  f o r  the  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  v o tes  i n  
a l l  commodi ty  agreements .  In t he  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  T i n  A g re e ­
ment ,  each p r o d u c i n g  c o u n t r y  i s  i n i t i a l l y  a l l o c a t e d  5 v o t es  
ou t  o f  t h e  1 ,000 v o t es  f o r  t h e  g r oup .  The r e m a i n i n g  v o te s
are then d i v i d e d  as c l o s e l y  as p o s s i b l e  i n  p r o p o r t i o n  to
51i n d i v i d u a l  p e r ce n t ag e s  o f  p r o d u c t i o n .  The same v o te  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  a p p l i e s  i n  t h e  case o f  consumer c o u n t r i e s  
who r e c e i v e  f i v e  i n i t i a l  v o t es  each and share  t he  r e m a i n i n g  
vo t es  i n  p r o p o r t i o n  t o  t h e i r  p e r c en ta g e  o f  c onsumpt i on  o f  
t he  commodi t y .  The C o f f e e  agreement  a l s o  f o l l o w s  t h i s  
p a t t e r n  o f  v o t e  d i s t r i b u t i o n .
The i m p o r t a n c e  o f  p r o p o r t i o n a l  v o t e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  i n  
each o f  t he  two p a r t i e s  i n  a commodi ty agreement  appears 
to  be t h a t  i t  p r o v i d e s  p r o p o r t i o n a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  t he  
i n t e r e s t s  o f  bo th  consumers and p r o d u c e r s .  The b a s i c  
assumpt ion  here b e i ng  t h a t  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  p a r t i e s  t o  a 
commodi ty  agreement  are b es t  d e t e r m in e d  by t h e  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  
t he  communi ty  o f  p r o d u c e r s  or  consumers.  But  t h i s  assumpt ion  
does no t  n e c e s s a r i l y  r e f l e c t  t h e  r e a l i t i e s  o f  t he  s i t u a t i o n .  
C e r t a i n  p r o d u c e r s  f o r  example ,  m i gh t  produce a h i gh  p e r c e n t ­
age o f  a p a r t i c u l a r  commodi ty  which i s  r e g u l a t e d  by a com­
m o d i t y  ag r eemen t .  Under normal  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  such a 
p r o d u c e r  would  be a l l o c a t e d  a g r e a t e r  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  vo tes  
compared t o  t he  s m a l l e r  p r o d u c e r s .  Th i s  would  mean g r e a t e r  
power ,  f o r  such a p r o d u c e r  a l t h o u g h  t he  commodi ty  which i s
51. A r t i c l e  1 4 ( 1 ) ,  S i x t h  t i n  agreement .
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a s u b j e c t  o f  agreement  m i g h t  o n l y  p l a y  a v e r y  smal l  r o l e  
i n  t h e  o v e r a l l  economy o f  t h a t  p r o d u c e r .  The o p p o s i t e  m i gh t  
be s a i d  i n  t he  case o f  a smal l  p r od u c e r  who i s  t h e r e f o r e  
a l l o c a t e d  few v o t es  bu t  t h e  a f f a i r s  o f  t he  commodi ty  a g r e e ­
ment are o f  c r i t i c a l  i m p o r t a n c e  t o  i t  because i t s  economy 
depends a lmos t  e n t i r e l y  on t h e  commoidty i n  q u e s t i o n .  
However ,  s i n c e  a commodi ty  agreement  concer ns  i t s e l f  w i t h  
s t a b i l i z i n g  t he  ma rk e t s  o f  one p a r t i c u l a r  commod i ty ,  t h e  
i s s u e  o f  t he  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  t h e  commodi ty  t o  t h e  economy 
o f  a p a r t i c u l a r  member c o u n t r y  would appear  t o  o v e r s t r e t c h  
t he  essence o f  a commodi ty  agreement .
( v i ) O r g a n i z a t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e  and d e c i s i o n  making 
(a)  Commodi ty £oun£i_l_
The o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e  o f  any commodi ty  a g r e e ­
ment i s  c h a r a c t e r i s e d  by one main p o l i c y  making o r g a n ,  t he  
commodi ty  C o u n c i l .  A l l  commodi ty  agreements  t h a t  have 
o p e r a t e d  so f a r  have p r o v i d e d  f o r  t he  c r e a t i o n  o f  commodi ty
C o u n c i l s  as t he  main p o l i c y  making organs r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r
5 2t h e  r u n n i n g  o f  t h e  ag r eements .
The c o m p o s i t i o n  o f  t he s e  C o u n c i l s  r e f l e c t s  t h e  n a t u r e  
o f  t he  f u n c t i o n s  a s s i gn ed  t o  them.  A l l  t h e  commodi ty  
c o u n c i l s  that  e x i s t  t od a y  are composed o f  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  
o f  a l l  p a r t i c i p a t i n g  c o u n t r i e s  i n  t he  agreements  Such 
a c o m p o s i t i o n  means i n e v i t a b l y  t h a t  t h e  commodi ty  C o u n c i l s  
are v e r y  l a r g e  i n  s i z e  and canno t  be p e r m a n e n t l y  based at
52. See f o r  example ,  A r t i c l e  6 ( 1)  o f  t h e  Cocoa Agr eemen t ,  
A r t i c l e  7 o f  t he  6 th  'Tin Agreement ,  and A r t i c l e  9 (1 )  
o f  t h e  C o f f e e  agreement  o f  1983.
53. A r t i c l e  4 ( a ) ,  S i x t h  Tin Agreement ,  A r t i c l e  9 o f  t he  
1983 C o f f e e  Agr eemen t ,  and the  1981 Cocoa A g r ee me n t ' s  
a r t i  c l e  6 .
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t h e  h e a d q u a r t e r s  o f  t h e  commodi ty agreemen ts .  S i nce  i t  i s
n ec es sa r y  f o r  c e r t a i n  d e c i s i o n s  t o  be t ak e n  a t  s h o r t  n o t i c e ,
t he  commodi ty  agreements  have made p r o v i s i o n  f o r  commodi ty
C o u n c i l s  t o  d e l e g a t e  some o f  t h e i r  powers o r  f u n c t i o n s  t o
s m a l l e r  o r g an s .  The n a t u r e  o f  t hese  s u b s i d i a r y  organs v a r i e s
f rom one agreement  t o  t h e  o t h e r .  The 1980 Cocoa agreement
f o r  example ,  p r o v i d e s  f o r  two s u b s l ^  a r y  o rgans  t o  which some
o f  t he  Cocoa C o u n c i l ' s  f u n c t i o n s  are d e l e g a t e d .  These two
organs are the Execut ive C-ommittee and the Execut ive
b i r e c t o r . 5^ The t i n  agreement  e s t a b l i s h e s  a number o f
s u b s i d i a r y  b od ie s  i n  t he  f o r m o f  c o m m i t t e e s ,  each be ing
d e l e g a t e d  w i t h  c e r t a i n  s p e c i a l i z e d  a spec ts  o f  t h e  t i n
C o u n c i l ' s  f u n c t i o n s .  Th i s  agreement  e s t a b l i s h e s ,  t he
economic and p r i c e  r e v i e w  p a n e l ,  the  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  c o m m i t t e e ,
the  b u f f e r  s t o c k  f i n a n c e  c o m m i t t e e ,  c ommi t tee  on c o s t s  and
p r i c e s ,  c ommi t tee  on d ev e l o pm en t ,  c r e d e n t i a l s  c o m m i t t e e ,
55and a s t a t i s t i c a l  c o m m i t t e e .  The c o f f e e  agreement  on the
o t h e r  hand p r o v i d e s  f o r  t he  c r e a t i o n  o f  an e x e c u t i v e
56b oar d ,  and t he  e x e c u t i v e  d i r e c t o r .
The sma l l  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  s u b s i d i a r y  organs  o f  a commodi ty
C ou n c i l  means few members o f  an agreement  can be r e p r e s e n t e d
on any one such o r gan .  Thus f o r  example i n  t h e  case o f  the
t i n  agreement  o n l y  17 ou t  o f  t h e  t o t a l  membership o f  30 are
members o f  t h e  b u f f e r  f i n a n c e  c o mm i t t ee .  Twelve members are
5 7r e p r e s e n t e d  on t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  c o m m i t t e e .  Because o f  the
54.  A r t i c l e  5 o f  t he  Cocoa agreement .
55.  A r t i c l e  9,  S i x t h  t i n  agreement .
56. A r t i c l e  8 ( 3 ) ,  1983 C o f f ee  agreement .
57. T i n  C o u n c i l  Annual  r e p o r t  1979-1980.
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n a t u r e  o f  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  on t he s e  s u b s i d i a r y  o r g a n s ,  i t  i s  
n ec es s ar y  f o r  a commodi ty  agreement  t o  s a f e g u a r d  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  
o f  t he  u n r e p r e s e n t e d  members o f  t he  agreement .  To do t h i s ,  
a l l  e x i s t i n g  commodi ty  agreements e i t h e r  r e s t r i c t  t he  
f u n c t i o n s  t h a t  can be d e l e g a t e d  or  r e q u i r e  a s t r i c t  
s p e c i a l  v o t e  b e f o r e  a s u b s i d i a r y  organ can be fo rmed and 
g i ve n  c e r t a i n  f u n c t i o n s .
Both t he  c o f f e e  and Cocoa agreements p r o v i d e  a l i s t  
o f  f u n c t i o n s  t h a t  canno t  be d e l e g a t e d  t o  any o t h e r  organ 
and are r e q u i r e d  t o  be u n d e r ta k en  by t he  r e s p e c t i v e  Commodi ty 
C o u n c i l s .  The f u n c t i o n s  t h a t  canno t  be d e l e g a t e d  by t he  
C ou nc i l  i n c l u d e :  suspens i  on of '  a. member's v o t i n g  r i g h t s ;  
a p pr o va l  o f  t he  budget  and assessment  o f  c o n t r i b u t i o n s ;
58amendments or  r e n e g o t i a t i o n s  o r  t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  t he  agreement ;
r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  v o t e s ;  r e v i s i o n  o f  f l o o r  and c e i l i n g  p r i c e s ;
d e c i s i o n  o f  d i s p u t e s ;  and e x c l u s i o n  o f  a member f r om  t he  
59a g r e e m e n t .
Where d e l e g a t i o n  o f  a f u n c t i o n  has no t  been s p e c i f i c a l l y  
p r o h i b i t e d  by an agreement ,  t h e r e  are s t r i n g e n t  v o t i n g  
m e a s u r e * r e q u i r e d  b e f o r e  such d e l e g a t i o n  can be made. Thus 
i n  t he  T i n  agreement  any power which t he  T i n  C o u n c i l  can 
e x e r c i s e  by a s i m p l e  d i s t r i b u t e d  m a j o r i t y  ( t h a t  i s  a s i m p l e  
m a j o r i t y  o f  consumers and p r o d uc e r s  v o t i n g  s e p a r a t e l y )  can 
be d e l e g a t e  t o  a s u b s i d i a r y  body p r o v i d e d  t h a t  a t w o - t h i r d s  
d i s t r i b u t e d  m a j o r i t y  ( t w o - t h i r d s  m a j o r i t y  o f  consumers and
C A
p r o du c e r s  v o t i n g  s e p a r a t e l y )  i s  o b t a i n e d .  S i nce  a l l
58. A r t i c l e  1 8 ( 2 ) ,  1983 C o f f e e  agreement .
59.  A r t i c l e  17(3)  o f  t h e  Cocoa agreement .
60.  A r t i c l e  8 ( c ) ( i ) ,  6 th  t i n  agreement .
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i m p o r t a n t  i s s u e s  r e q u i r e  t w o - t h i r d s  d i s t r i b u t e d  m a j o r i t y ,  
i t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  i s s u e  o f  d e l e g a t i o n  o f  t h e  C o u n c i l ' s  
f u n c t i o n s  i n  t h e  t i n  agreement  i s  r eg a r d ed  as an i m p o r t a n t  
i s s u e  t h a t  r e q u i r e s  a s p e c i a l  v o t e .  I t  does no t  t h e r e f o r e  
m a t t e r  w he t h e r  t h e  i s s u e  t o  be d e l e g a t e d  i s  r e g a r d e d  as o f  
m i no r  i m p o r t a n c e  as t o  r e q u i r e  o n l y  a s i m p l e  d i s t r i b u t e d  
m a j o r i t y .
In t he  Cocoa agreement  however ,  d i s t i n c t i o n  i s  made
between m i no r  and i m p o r t a n t  i s s u e s .  M i no r  i s s u e s  be ing
d e l e g a t e d  t o  a s u b s i d i a r y  body r e q u i r e  a s i m p l e  m a j o r i t y
d i s t r i b u t e d  v o t e  w h i l e  t h e  i m p o r t a n t  i s s u e s  r e q u i r e  a
61s p e c i a l  v o t e  o f  t w o - t h i r d s  d i s t r i b u t e d  m a j o r i t y .
The Cof fee agreement l i k e  the Tin agreement considers
t he  i s s u e  o f  d e l e g a t i o n  o f  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  by t h e  Co f f ee
c o u n c i l  as an i m p o r t a n t  i s s u e  t h a t  r e q u i r e s  on e v e r y  o c ca s i o n
a s p e c i a l  v o t e  o f  t h e  c o u n c i l ,  t h a t  i s ,  a t w o - t h i r d s
62d i s t r i b u t e d  m a j o r i t y .
The r e s t r i c t i o n s  on t h e  powers o f  d e l e g a t i o n  i n  t he  
v a r i o u s  commodi ty  agreements  m er e l y  s e r ve  t o  emphasize t he  
i m p o r t a n c e  and supremacy o f  t he  commodi ty C o u n c i l s  i n  $o 
f a r  as p o l i c y  f o r m u l a t i o n  i s  conc er ne d .  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  t he  
supremacy o f  t he  commodi ty  c o u n c i l  where a l l  p r o d u c e r  and 
consumers who are members o f  a commodi ty  agreement  meet ,  
se r ves  t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  such an agreement  f ro m c a r t e l s  which 
were i n t e r e s t e d  i n  s a f e g u a r d i n g  o n l y  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  
p r o d u c e r s .
61.  A r t i c l e  1 7 ( 3 ) ,  1980 Cocoa agreement .
62. A r t i c l e  1 8 ( 2 ) ,  1983 C o f f e e  agreement .
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( b ) D e£ i £ i  on_Mak i_n£
The c a p a c i t y  o f  members o f  an i n t e n a t i o n a l  commodi ty  
agreement  t o  reach d e c i s i o n s  on i s s u e s  t h a t  a f f e c t  them under  
t h e  agreement  i s  o f  c r u c i a l  i m p o r t a n c e  t o  t h e  smooth r u n n i n g  
o f  such an agreement .  V o t i n g  p ro c ed u re s  t h a t  t end  t o  i n h i b i t  
mutual  d e c i s i o n  making are t h e r e f o r e  c o u n t e r  p r o d u c t i v e  
and w i l l  t end  t o  i n h i b i t  t h e  a g r e e m e n t ' s  c a p a c i t y  t o  e f f e c t  
marke t  c o n t r o l .
One fu nd ame nt a l  p r i n c i p l e  t h a t  runs  t h r o u g h  a l l  
commodi ty  agreemen ts ,  i s  t h a t  t h e  v o t es  f o r  purposes  o f  
d e c i s i o n  making are d i s t r i b u t e d  e q u a l l y  between consuming 
and p r o d u c i n g  member c o u n t r i e s .  Th i s  i s  aimed at  e n s u r i n g  
an equal  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  p r od uc e rs  and consumer  i n t e r e s t s  
- a f a c t o r  t h a t  se rves  to  d i s t i n g u i s h  a commodi ty  agreement  
f rom t he  much dreaded c a r t e l  a r r an g em e nt s .
In f u r t h e r i n g  t h i s  b a s i c  p r i n c i p l e ,  a l l  commodi ty  
agreements i n  e x i s t e n c e  r e q u i r e  a l l  d e c i s i o n s ,  m i no r  and 
i m p o r t a n t ,  t o  be reached by a d i s t r i b u t e d  m a j o r i t y  o f  i t s  
members. A d i s t r i b u t e d  m a j o r i t y  i s  d e f i n e d  i n  t he s e  a g r e e ­
ments t o  mean a r e q u i s i t e  m a j o r i t y  o f  t he  v o te s  c a s t  by 
p r o d u c e r  and consumer members v o t i n g  s e p a r a t e l y .  Th i s  
v o t i n g  p r o c e d u r e  a p p l i e s  t o  two t yp es  o f  i s s u e s .  There are 
t h e  s i m p l e  and i m p o r t a n t  i s s u e s .  The mi no r  i s s u e s  g e n e r a l l y  
sp eak i ng  r e q u i r e ,  a s i m p l e  d i s t r i b u t e d  m a j o r i t y  v o t e .  T h i s  
means t h a t  f o r  a d e c i s i o n  on a s i m p l e  or  m i no r  i s s u e  to  be 
made, a s i m p l e  m a j o r i t y  o f  bo th  p r od uc e rs  and consumers
63.  Supra c o f f e e  agreement ,  A r t i c l e  3 para 9 and 10; 
Cocoa A r t i c l e  2 ( n)  and ) o ) ;  and T i n ,  A r t i c l e  2.
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v o t i n g  s e p a r a t e l y  must be o b t a i n e d .  The i m p o r t a n t  d e c i s i o n s  
on t h e  o t h e r  hand,  r e q u i r e  a s p e c i a l  v o t e .  In a l l  cases 
t he  s p e c i a l  v o t e  means a t w o - t h i r d s  d i s t r i b u t e d  m a j o r i t y  
o f  p r o d u c e r  and consumer c o u n t r i e s  v o t i n g  s e p a r a t e l y .
D e c i s i o n s  r e q u i r i n g  t h i s  s p e c i a l  v o t e  i n c l u d e  a l l  d e c i s i o n s  
r e g a r d i n g  t h e  c o n t r o l  mechanism t o  be used;  s u sp en s i on  and 
o t h e r  d i s c i p l i n a r y  measures t o  be imposed on a member; 
d e l e g a t i o n  o f  powers t o  a s u b o r d i n a t e  body by t he  C o u n c i l ;  
and d e c i s i o n s  r e g a r d i n g  renewal  or  t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  t he  a g r e e ­
ments t h e m s e l v e s .  Thus f o r  example ,  t he  C o f f e e  agreement  
r e q u i r e s  a t w o - t h i r d s  d i s t r i b u t e d  m a j o r i t y  f o r  a l l  d e c i s i o n s  
r e g a r d i n g  t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  q u o t a s ,  s us pe ns i on  or  r e a l l o c a ­
t i o n  o f  such q u o t a s ,  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  p r i c e  r a n g e s ;  r e g u l a t i o n  
64o f  i m p o r t s ;  measures r e l a t i n g  t o  s t o c k s ;  and measures
65r e l a t e d  t o  c o o r d i n a t i o n  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  p o l i c i e s .
The i m p o r t a n t  asp ec t  o f  . t he  d e c i s i o n  making p rocess  
i n  commodi ty  agreements  r e l a t e s  t o  t he  b a l a n c i n g  o f  t he  
i n t e r e s t s  o f  consumers and t ho s e  o f  p r o d u c e r s .  In both  
m i no r  and i m p o r t a n t  i s s u e s ,  i t  i s  p r a c t i c a l l y  no t  p o s s i b l e  
f o r  e i t h e r  p r o d u c e r s  or  consumers t o  pass a d e c i s i o n  t h a t  
i s  no t  f a v o u r e d  by t h e  o t h e r  s i d e .  Indeed t h i s  p o i n t  has 
been advanced i n  s u p p o r t  o f  t h e  use o f  commodi ty  agreements .  
But  as w i l l  be seen l a t e r  i n  t he  c h a p t e r ,  a r i g i d  a p p l i c a t i o n  
o f  t h e  - p r i n c i p i e  o f  c o n s u m e r - p r o d u c e r  e q u a l i t y  i n  commodi ty  
agreements  has c o n t r i b u t e d  i n  most cases t o  a breakdown o f  
agreements  and non c o n c l u s i o n  o f  c e r t a i n  a gr eemen ts .
6^* S u p r a , C o f f e e  agreement ,  A r t i c l e  2 8 ( 1 ) .
65. I b i d . ,  A r t i c l e s  50 and 51.
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( v i i )  D i s p u t e  s e t t l e m e n t  i n  commodi ty agreements
The d i s p u t e  s e t t l e m e n t  p r oc ed ur es  i n  commodi ty  
a g r eemen ts ,  f o l l o w  g e n e r a l l y  t h e  p a t t e r n  f o l l o w e d  i n  o t h e r  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  - e xce pt  t h a t  i n  t h e  case o f  
t hes e agreements  no r e c o u r s e  can be had t o  i nd e p e n d e n t  
a d j u d i c a t i o n .
There are two d i s p u t e  s e t t l e m e n t  p r o c e d u r e s  found i n
commodi ty  a g r eemen ts .  F i r s t ,  some agreements  p r o v i d e  f o r
c o n s u l t a t i o n s  between p a r t i e s  i n  d i s p u t e .  In f a c i l i t a t i n g
t he se  c o n s u l t a t i o n s ,  a p p r o p r i a t e  c o n c i l i a t i o n  p r o c ed u r es
would be employed w i t h  a v iew t o  c o n c i l i a t i n g  t h e  p a r t i e s
c o n c er n ed .  A l l  t h e  t h r e e  e x i s t i n g  commodi ty  agreements  o f
i n t e r e s t  t o  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  encourage t he  use o f
c o n c i l i a t i o n  p r o c e d u r e s  b e f o r e  t he  d i s p u t e  can move t o  t he
n ex t  s t a g e .  The C o f f e e  and Cocoa agreements  r e q u i r e  member
c o u n t r i e s  t o  a cco rd  s y m p a t h e t i c  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  and adequate
c o n s u l t a t i o n  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  whenever  a n o t h e r  member makes
a c o m p l a i n t  r e l a t i n g  t o  t h e  agreement .  To f a c i l i t a t e  a
smooth c o n c i l i a t i o n ,  t he  members i n  d i s p u t e  may r e q u e s t  t he
E x e c u t i v e  d i r e c t o r s  t o  e s t a b l i s h  i n d e p e nd e n t  c o n c i l i a t i o n  
6 6p a n e l s .  Th i s  o f  co ur se  does not  p r e c l u d e  such members
f r om u s i n g  o t h e r  c o n c i l i a t o r y  means or  good o f f i c e s .  The
t i n  agreement  emphas izes t h i s  p o i n t  by l e a v i n g  t he  q u e s t i o n
o f  c o n c i l i a t i o n  o u t s i d e  t he  f ramework  o f  t he  agreement  and
me r e l y  p r o v i d e s  mechanism f o r  h a n d l i n g  such d i s p u t e s  as
57are no t  s e t t l e d  by c o n c i l i a t i o n  or  n e g o t i a t i o n .
66. I b i d . ,  A r t i c l e  57.
67. T i n  ag reemen t ,  A r t i c l e  49.
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Where c o n c i l i a t i o n  has f a i l e d ,  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  
s e t t l i n g  t h e  d i s p u t e  f a l l s  on the  supreme organs o f  t he se  
agreements  - t he  v a r i o u s  commodi ty  c o u n c i l s .  The b a s i s  o f  
t he  C o u n c i l ' s  j u r i s d i c t i o n  r e s t s  on t h e  m a t t e r  b e i ng  r e f e r r e d
6 pt o  i t  by e i t h e r  p a r t y  t o  the  d i s p u t e .  In t h i s  r e g a r d
6 9u n l i k e  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  C ou r t  o f  J u s t i c e , 1 commodi ty 
c o u n c i l s  do no t  have c o mp ul so ry  j u r i s d i c t i o n  o ve r  d i s p u t e s  
between i t s  members. J u r i s d i c t i o n  can o n l y  be i nv o ke d  at  
a s p e c i f i c  r e q u e s t  o f  one o f  t h e  p a r t i e s  t o  t h e  d i s p u t e .
A d i s p u t e  t h a t  has p r o p e r l y  been r e f e r r e d  t o  a 
commodi ty  C o u n c i l  f o l l o w s  a p ro c ed u re  t h a t  seems t o  be 
p e c u l i a r  t o  commodi ty  agreements .  The C o u n c i l  would 
d i s c u s s  t he  m a t t e r ,  and may seek t h e  a d v i c e o f  an a d v i s o r y  
panel  composed o f  f o u r  members two o f  who*^ are nominated  
by p r o d u c e r  members, and t he  o t h e r  two nomina ted  by 
i m p o r t i n g  members.  The f o u r  members are u n an i m ou s l y
r e q u i r e d  t o  s e l e c t  a f i f t h  person t o  a c t  as cha i rman o f
t h e  p a n e l .  I f  t h e  f o u r  members f a i l  t o  agree on t he
c h a i r m a n ,  h&- would  be a p p o i n t e d  by t he  cha i r man  o f  t he
commodi ty  c o u n c i l .  The f o u r  members o f  t h e  p a n e l ,  t h a t  i s
e x c l u d i n g  t h e  cha i r man  are r e q u i r e d  t o  be men o f  e x p e r i e n c e  
i n  t he  m a t t e r  a t  d i s p u t e  or  hav ing  c o n s i d e r a b l e  l e g a l  
e x p e r i e n c e . ^  The o p i n i o n  o f  t he  panel  i s  s u b m i t t e d  t o  t h e
68. Supra,  C o f f e e  agreement  A r t i c l e  5 8 ( 1 ) ;  Cocoa,  A r t i c l e
5 8 ( 1 ) ;  and T i n ,  A r t i c l e  49.
69.  See t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Cour t  o f  J u s t i c e  S t a t u t e ,
A r t i  c 1e 36(1 ) .
70. S u p r a , C o f f e e  agr eement ,  A r t i c l e  5 8 ( 3 ) ;  Cocoa,
A r t i c l e  5 8 ( 3 ) ,  and t i n  agreement  A r t i c l e  4 9 ( 3 ) .
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C ou n c i l  t h a t  f i n a l l y  makes a d e c i s i o n  on t h e  d i s p u t e  
a f t e r  c o n s i d e r i n g  a l l  t h e  r e l e v a n t  i n f o r m a t i o n .
There are  a few p o i n t s  w or t h  n o t i n g  abou t  t h e  d i s p u t e  
s e t t l e m e n t  p r o c e d u r e s  i n  commodi ty  ag r eemen ts .  F i r s t ,  
a l t h o u g h  t h e  panel  e s t a b l i s h e d  to  deal  w i t h  a d i s p u t e  i s  
composed v e r y  much i n  t h e  same way dS o r d i n a r y  i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  a r b i t r a t i o n  t r i b u n a l s ,  i t s  a u t h o r i t y  does not  go 
beyond t h a t  o f  an a d v i s o r y  n a t u r e .  S e c o n d l y ,  i n  t h e  whole 
p r o c e s s ,  emphasis  i s  p l a ce d  on t he  b a l a n c i n g  o f  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  
o f  bo th  consumers and p r o d u c e r s .  T h i s  i s  e v i d e n t  i n  the  
r e q u i r e m e n t  o f  t h e  two panel  members t o  be a p p o i n t e d  by each 
group and t h e  cha i rman t o  be a p p o i n t e d  by them j o i n t l y .  
F u r t h e r m o r e ,  t he  r e q u i r e m e n t  t h a t  t he  f i n a l  d e c i s i o n  must 
be made .by t h e  c o u n c i l ,  i s  des i gn ed  to  p o r t r a y  a semblance 
o f  i m p a r t i a l i t y  because t h e  v o te s  i n  t h e  c o u n c i l  are 
d i v i d e d  e q u a l l y  between the  two g r ou p s .  F i n a l l y ,  t he  
d e c i s i o n  r eached  i n  t h e  C o u n c i l  r e g a r d i n g  a d i s p u t e  and 
l i a b i l i t y  f o r  a members breach o f  i t s  o b l i g a t i o n s  under  t he  
agreements  r e q u i r e s  a d i s t r i b u t e d  s i m p l e  m a j o r i t y  vo te  o f  
t h e  members.  Here aga i n  t he  i d e a  o f  b a l a n c i n g  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  
o f  p r o d u c e r s  and consumers seems t o  domina te  t h e  d i s p u t e  
s e t t l e m e n t  p r o c e s s .
V I I I .  E v a l u a t i o n  o f  t h e  commodi ty  agreement  mechanism
E f f o r t s  a t  commodi ty  marke t  management t h r o u g h  t he  
medium o f  commodi ty  agreements  have been c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by 
p r o g r e s s i v e l y  g r e a t e r  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  combined consumer and 
p r o d u c e r  i n t e r e s t s .  These f e a t u r e s  are c l e a r l y  o b v io u s
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f r om t h e  d e c l a r e d  o b j e c t i v e s  o f  t he se  a g r e e m e n t s A m o n g  
t h e  d e c l a r e d  i n t e n t i o n s  o f  e x i s t i n g  commodi ty  agreements 
i s  t he  p r e v e n t i o n  o f  e x c e s s i v e  f l u c t u a t i o n s  i n  commodi ty  
p r i c e s  which a f f e c t  a d v e r s e l y  both p r o d u c e r s  and consumers;  
t o  a c h i e v e  a r e a s o n a b l e  ba la nce  between w o r l d  s u p p l y  and 
demand o f  a commodi ty  w h i l e  a t  t he  same t i m e  a s s u r i n g  
consumers o f  f a i r  p r i c e s  and p r o d u c e r s ,  a r e n u m e r a t i v e  
p r i c e ;  t o  assure  t h e  consumers o f  adequate  s u p p l i e s  a t  a 
r e a s o n a b l e  p r i c e ;  and t o  f a c i l i t a t e  an i n c r e a s e  i n  t he  
e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s  o f  p r o d u c i n g  member c o u n t r i e s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
d e v e l o p i n g  ones.
A l l  t h e  o b j e c t i v e s  above are aimed a t  s t r i k i n g  a 
ba l ance  between t he  i n t e r e s t s  o f  t he  p r o d u c e r  and consumer 
c o u n t r i e s .  In f a c t  t h e  problems t h a t  have c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  
t he  c o n c l u s i o n  o f  o n l y  a few commodi ty agreements  and the  
f a i l u r e  o f  o t h e r s  seem t o  be a p r o d u c t  of  t h i s  d e l i c a t e  
b a l a n c e .
(a)  The f i r s t  ma j o r  p rob l em t h a t  has c o n f r o n t e d  commodi ty
agrements  r e l a t e s  t o  t he  o b j e c t i v e  o f  i n c r e a s i n g  t h e  e x p o r t
e a r n i n g s  o f  e x p o r t i n g  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s .  Th i s  d e c l a r e d
o b j e c t i v e  has been expr essed  i n  d i f f e r e n t  f o r m s .  Some
agreements have c a l l e d  f o r  " f a i r  and e q u i t a b l e  p r i c e s "  and
7 2o t h e r s  f o r  " r e n u m e r a t i v e  p r i c e s "  t o  p r o d u c e r s .  Such 
phrases  however  w e l l  i n t e n t i o n e d  have come t o  mean d i f f e r e n t  
t h i n g s  t o  p r o d u c e r s  and consumers.  The consumer n a t i o n s  
g e n e r a l l y  have exp res se d  the  f e a r  t h a t  such phrases  would
71.  ECOSOC R e s o l u t i o n  3 0) i v ) o f  28th  March 1 974 as w e l l  as 
the  o b j e c t i v e s  o f  t he  t i n ,  C o f f e e ,  and Cocoa agreements .
72.  Supra ,  C o f f e e  agreement ,  A r t i c l e  1, and Cocoa agreement  
A r  1 1c 1e 1 ( d ) .
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l ead  t o  commodi ty  agreements be ing  used t o  r a i s e  p r i c e s .
The p r o d u c e r s  on t h e  o t h e r  hand exp r ess  t he  v iew t h a t  such 
t e r m i n o l o g y  would r e s u l t  i n  them e a r n i n g  what  i s  r i g h t l y
due t o  them.  T h i s  c o n f l i c t  o f  i n t e r e s t  fo rms t h e  core  o f
t h e  commodi ty  agreement  i s s u e .
Once an agreement  has been e s t a b l i s h e d ,  t h i s  c o n f l i c t
o f  i n t e r e s t  t r a n s f o r m s  i t s e l f  i n t o  a more c o n c r e t e  p r ob l em,  
t h a t  o f  d e t e r m i n i n g  t he  w i d t h  o f  t he  i n t e r v e n t i o n  p r i c e  
band.  E x p o r t e r s  whose i n t e r e s t  i s  i n  h i g h e r  commodi ty  
p r i c e s ,  u s u a l l y  p r e f e r  a h ig h  f l o o r  and c e i l i n g  p r i c e  or  
even no c e i l i n g  a t  a l l .  I m p o r t e r s  on t h e  o t h e r  hand,  are 
i n t e r e s t e d  i n  a s te a dy  s u p p l y  o f  t he  commodi ty  a t  a low 
p r i c e  and w i l l  t h e r e f o r e  t a k e  an a lmo s t  o p p o s i t e  v iew t o  
t h a t  t ak en  by e x p o r t e r s .
( b } The second p rob l em e nc ou n te r ed  by commodi ty  agreements
are p r e s s u r e  groups t h a t  e x e r t  i n f l u e n c e  on consumer c o u n t r i e s .
These p r e s s u r e  groups b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f
r e g u l a t o r y  c o n t r o l s  such as commodi ty  ag ree me nt s ,  i s  a
c h a l l e n g e  t o  t h e i r  i ndependence i n  t h e  m a r k e t s .  These
p r e s s u r e  groups  i n c l u d e  consumers o f  i n t e r m e d i a t e  p r o d u c t s
such as t h e  Amer ican and West German t i n  p l a t e  p r o d u ce r s
who worked hard t o  i n f l u e n c e  consumers t o  b l o c k  t h e  i n t r o -
7 3duct ion of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Tin Agreement.  In the case 
of  copper ,  the mining company Rio T i n t o  Zinc (RTZ) have 
invoked t h i s  arguement aga ins t  the e s tab l i shm ent  of an 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Copper Agreement.  ^
73. T i n :  The Work ing o f  a commodi ty  a g r e e m e n t .
( ! ^ W )  M i n i n g  j o u r n a l  Books,  pp . 260-61 .
74.  HM^O j o£ the Koi?fe t>-f jjo-rdi Qeleci OomnH'fag ow
prices 1 ( J W j  j>>53£ .
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( c )  The t h i r d  reason t h a t  has l ed  t o  t h e  f a i l u r e  or  
non c o n c l u s i o n  o f  commodi ty  agreements i s  a b y - p r o d u c t  o f  
t h e  two prob l ems s t a t e d  above.  The l a c k  o f  a d e c l a r e d  
common i n t e r e s t  between p r o d u c e r s  and consumers ,  and the  
p r e s s u r e  e x e r t e d  by i n t e r e s t  groups on consumer  n a t i o n s  
t r a n s f o r m  t h e ms e l v es  i n t o  a b a t t l e  over  t h e  f i n a n c i n g  o f  
commodi ty  a g r eemen ts .  In commodi ty  agreement  n e g o t i a t i o n s ,  
t h e r e  i s  a marked r e l u c t a n c e  by i m p o r t e r  n a t i o n s  t o  c o n t r i ­
b u t e  to wa r ds  t h e  f i n a n c i n g  o f  such ag ree me nt s .  The r e l u c t ­
ance i s  n o t  o n l y  born o f  t he  f e a r  t h a t  such agreements  
would be used by p r o d u c e r s  t o  r a i s e  p r i c e s  bu t  i s  a l s o  a 
r e s u l t  o f  i d e o l o g i c a l  b e l i e f s  a g a i n s t  i n t e r f e r e n c e  i n  t he  
f r e e  mar ke t  mechanism.  Indeed t h i s  i d e o l o g i c a l  b e l i e f  
domina ted  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  and West German g overnmen ta l  
a t t i t u d e s  t o  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  commodi ty  agreements  u n t i l  
r e c e n t  1y .
The r e l u c t a n c e  o f  i m p o r t e r s  t o  f i n a n c e  t h e  o p e r a t i o n  
o f  commodi ty  agreements  u s u a l l y  means t h a t  t h e  burden f a l l s  
on e x p o r t e r  n a t i o n s  who are m a i n l y  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  
and i l l  eq u i pp ed  f i n a n c i a l l y  t o  p r o v i d e  s u b s t a n t i a l  f unds  
f o r  t h e  o p e r a t i o n  o f  such agreements .  In most  cases t h e r e ­
f o r e ,  f i n a n c i a l  p r o v i s i o n s  have been v e r y  i n a d e q u a t e  and 
have r e s u l t e d  i n  t h e  f a i l u r e  o f  agreements  t o  meet t h e i r  
o b j e c t i v e s .  For  example t h e  T i n  C o u n c i l ' s  b u f f e r  s t o c k  has 
r e p e a t e d l y  f a i l e d  t o  de fend  t he  c e i l i n g  p r i c e  l e v e l ,  w h i l e  
t h e  c o f f e e  agreement  has no t  even made p r o v i s i o n  f o r  a b u f f e r  
s t o c k  .
R e c e n t l y ,  t h e  consumer  n a t i o n s  have a c ce pt ed  some 
r e s p o n s i b i 1 i t y  i n  t he  f i n a n c i n g  o f  commodi ty  agreements .
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Thus f o r  t h e  f i r s t  t i m e  t he  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  f i n a n c i n g  
th e  t i n  b u f f e r  s t o c k  under  t he  S i x t h  t i n  agreement  i s  
p la c ed  on bo th  p r o d u c e r s  and consumers.  A l l  e a r l i e r  a g r e e ­
ments r e q u i r e d  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  f r om p r o d u c e r s  o n l y  a l t h o u g h  
consumers c o u l d  make v o l u n t a r y  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  i f  t h e y  so 
w i sh e d .  T h i s  change o f  a t t i t u d e  however ,  has not  meant 
adequate  f un ds  f o r  commodi ty  agreements because consumers 
are o n l y  w i l l i n g  t o  commit  sma l l  amounts o f  money t o  t hes e  
ag r eemen ts .  I t  i s  a g a i n s t  t h i s  background  t h a t  a l o t  o f  
i n t e r e s t  has been g e ne r a t e d  i n  UNCTAD's Commond Fund.
A l t h o u g h  t h e r e  may be advantages  w i t h  t h e  approach t ake n  
under  the  Common Fund a r ra n g e m e n t ,  t h e r e  i s  a b s o l u t e l y  no 
g u a r a n t e e  t h a t  t he  q u e s t i o n  o f  f i n a n c i n g  t h e  f u n d  w i l l  no t  
e n c o u n t e r  t h e  same c o n s e r v a t i s m  on the  p a r t  o f  consumer 
c o u n t r i e s  as has so f a r  been e n c o u n t e r e d  by i n d i v i d u a l  
commodi ty  agreemen ts .
Even i f  t h e  Common Fund came i n t o  o p e r a t i o n ,  t he  
r e l u c t a n c e  o f  consumer c o u n t r i e s  t o  commi t  f i n a n c e s  t o  t he  
prob lems o f  c om mo d i t i e s  and t h e i r  o v e r r i d i n g  s e l f  i n t e r e s t  
w i l l  c o n t i n u e  t o  h i n d e r  t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  new commodi ty  
agreements  and t h e  smooth r u n n i n g  o f  e x i s t i n g  ones.  The 
case o f  copper  w i l l  be used t o  i l l u s t r a t e  t h e s e  d i f f i c u l t i e s .
I X . A Copper Commodi ty Agreement?
A l t h o u g h  e f f o r t s  t o  d e v i s e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  c o n t r o l s  on 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  copper  marke t s  can be t r a c e d  back t o  t he  1920s 
and 1930s,  t he  f i r s t  ma jo r  a t t e m p t  t o  e s t a b l i s h  an i n t e r ­
go ve r nme nt a l  agreement  on copper  has been c o ndu c t ed  under  
t he  U N - I n t e g r a t e d  Programme f o r  Co mm od i t i es .  The g ene s i s
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o f  t he s e  e f f o r t s  can be t r a c e d  t o  t he  r a d i c a l  change o f
d i r e c t i o n  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  economic r e l a t i o n s  i n t r o d u c e d
by t he  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  General  Assembly a t  i t s  6 th  S p e c i a l
7 5Ses s i on  i n  1974.  D u r i n g  t h i s  s e s s io n  a programme o f  
a c t i o n  on t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  a New I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
Economic Order  (NIEO) was adop ted .  The main aim o f  t h i s  
programme o f  a c t i o n  as f a r  as our  d i s c u s s i o n  i s  c o n c e r n e d ,  
i s  t o  r e s t r u c t u r e  t he  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  income i n  f a v o u r  o f  
d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s .  The d e c l a r e d  sphere  o f  a c t i o n  i n  
t h i s  r e g a r d  i s  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  and m a r k e t i n g  o f  p r i m a r y  
c o m m o d i t i e s .  Two y e a r s  l a t e r  a ve r y  s i g n i f i c a n t  p o l i c y  
i n s t r u m e n t  aimed a t  a c h i e v i n g  t he  d e c l a r e d  NIEO goal  was 
adopted  by UNCTAD a t  i t s  f o u r t h  s e s s i o n  i n  N a i r o b i .  T h i s  
was the .  i n t e g r a t e d  programme f o r  c o mm od i t i e s  ( I P C ) .  The 
most i m p o r t a n t  o b j e c t i v e  o f  IPC was s t a t e d  i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
t e r m s :
"To a c h i e v e  s t a b l e  c o n d i t i o n s  i n  commodi t y  t r a d e ,  
i n c l u d i n g  t h e  a v o i da nce  o f  e x c e s s i v e  p r i c e  f l u c t u ­
a t i o n s ,  a t  l e v e l s  wh ich  wou ld :  (a)  be r e m u n e r a t i v e  
and j u s t  t o  p r o d u c e r s  and e q u i t a b l e  t o  consumers 
(b)  . . .  ( c )  promote e q u i l i b r i u m  between s u p p l y  and 
demand w i t h i n  e xpand i ng  w o r l d  commodi t y  t r a d e . "  ?6
From t h i s  r e s o l u t i o n ,  i t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  main concer n  o f  
t h e  IPC i s  t o  p r o v i d e  measures t h a t  would h e l p  c o n t r o l  
commodi t y  m a r k e t s .  The measures recommended i n  t h e  IPC 
f o r  t h i s  purpose i n c l u d e  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  a common f und  f o r  
f i n a n c i n g  o f  b u f f e r  s t o c k s  c r e a t e d  under  v a r i o u s  commodi ty  
agreements  t o  be n e g o t i a t e d  f o r  a s e l e c t e d  number o f  com­
m o d i t i e s .  Copper happens t o  be one o f  such c o m m o d i t i e s .
75.  General  Assembly r e s o l u t i o n ,  3201 ( S - V I ) .
76.  UNCTAD R e s o l u t i o n  9 3 ( IV)  adopted on 30 th  May 1976.
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The emphasis  i n  t h e  IPC as f a r  as copper  i s  c oncer ned  
t h e r e f o r e  i s  p l a c e d  on t h r e e  i s s u e s .  F i r s t  t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n  
o f  a commodi ty  agreement  f o r  copper  t h a t  wou ld  u t i l i z e  a 
b u f f e r  s t o c k  and s u p p l y  management mechanism.  S e c o n d l y ,  t h e  
s e t t i n g  up o f  a Common Fund which a copper  commodi ty  
C o u n c i l  and o t h e r  commodi ty  C o u n c i l s  wou ld  bo r ro w t o  f i n a n c e  
t h e  s t o c k i n g  measures .  And f i n a l l y  t he  i mprovement  o f  
comp en sa to ry  f i n a n c i n g  f a c i l i t i e s  f o r  t h e  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  o f  
e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s  o f  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s .  The f i r s t  i s s u e  
i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i m p o r t a n t  t o  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n  i n  t h i s  c h a p t e r  
w h i l e  t h e  o t h e r  two w i l l  be d i s c u s s e d  i n  l a t e r  c h a p t e r s .
The f i r s t  s te p  r e q u i r e d  by t h e  IPC i s  t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n  
o f  a commodi ty  agreement  f o r  c o p p e r .  Such an agreement  when 
c o n c l u d e d  would  then  o b t a i n  i t s  f i n a n c e s  f o r  r u n n i n g  t he  
copper  b u f f e r  s t o c k  f r om t he  proposed Common Fund. T h i s  
a r r angement  c l e a r l y  r a i s e s  t he  same p r ob l ems  t h a t  commodi ty  
agreements  n e g o t i a t e d  o u t s i d e  t he  f ramework  o f  t h e  IPC 
f a c e d .  These p rob l ems i n c l u d e  t he  l a c k  o f  common i n t e r e s t  
between p r o d u c e r s  and consumers ,  p r e s s u r e  f r om  i n t e r e s t  
g r o u p s ,  and f i n a n c i n g  o f  t he  o p e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  b u f f e r  s t o c k .
( i ) Lack o f  common i n t e r e s t  between
p r o d u c e r s  and consumers
The IPC c a l l s  f o r  t he  c r e a t i o n  o f  a co ppe r  commodi ty  
agreement  t o  be n e g o t i a t e d  between p r o d u c e r s  and consumers .  
The f i r s t  s te p  t o w a rd s  such n e g o t i a t i o n s  began w i t h  an 
i n i t i a t i v e  t a k e n  by t he  P r e s i d e n t s  of  France and Z a i r e  i n  
l a t e  1975 when t h e y  both  d e c l a r e d  t h e m s e l v e s  i n  f a v o u r  o f  
c o n ve n i n g  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o n f e r e n c e  on c o p p e r .  L a t e r  t h a t
133
y e a r ,  t h e  CIPEC m i n i s t e r i a l  c o n f e r e n c e s  h e l d  i n  Lima,  Peru 
d e c id e d  t o  t a k e  an a c t i v e  r o l e  i n  s ee i ng  t h a t  such a c o n ­
f e r e n c e  i s  convened .  Thus w i t h  t he  o f f i c i a l  b a c k i n g  o f  
one consumer  c o u n t r y  ( F r an ce )  and one p r o d u c e r  c o u n t r y  
( Z a i r e ) ,  CIPEC r e q u e s t e d  t he  S e c r e t a r y  General  o f  UNCTAD 
t o  convene an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  copper  c o n f e r e n c e .
S i nce  t h e  f i r s t  p r e p a r a t o r y  m ee t i ng  i n  March 1976,  
t h e  d i s c u s s i o n s  on the  c r e a t i o n  o f  a copper  commodi ty  a g r e e ­
ment have n o t  l ed  t o  a consensus between p r o d u c e r s  and 
consumers .  And by t h e  end o f  1982,  no s u b s t a n t i a l  headway 
had been made to wa r ds  t he  c o n c l u s i o n  o f  such an agreement .
In f a c t  no m e et i ng  on copper  had t ak en  p l a c e  s i n c e  F eb r u a r y  
1 9 8 0 . ^  One o f  t h e  ma jo r  p o i n t s  o f  d i s a g r e e m e n t  between 
p r o d u c e r s  and consumers i s  t h e  d e s i r e a b i 1 i t y  o f  a copper  
agreement  i t s e l f .
There are  a number o f  consumers who do n o t  b e l i e v e  i n  
t he  b e n e f i c i a l  e f f e c t s  o f  a commodi ty  agreement  f o r  c o p p e r .  
Thus f o r  exampl e,  a t  t he  seven t h  p r e p a r a t o r y  m e et i ng  on 
copper  h e l d  i n  September  1979 a p r o po s a l  was made which 
r e c o g n i z e d  t he  m e r i t s  Of t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
commodi ty  agr eement .  Such an agreement ,  i t  was p ropo se d ,  
was t o  be a f u l l  f l e d g e d  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  commodi ty  agreement ;  
hav ing  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  p r o v i s i o n s ,  economic p r o v i s i o n ;  and 
an e s t a b l i s h e d  c o u n c i l  t o  a d m i n i s t e r  t h e  a g r e e m e n t . ^  A f t e r  
c o n s i d e r a b l e  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t he se  p r o p o s a l s  a t  t h e  Seventh 
p r e p a r a t o r y  m e e t i n g  h e l d  i n  F e b r u a r y  1980,  m a jo r  consumers,
7 7 . CIPEC Q u a r t e r l y  R ev i e w , Jan-March 1982.
78.  I b i d . ,  J u l y - S e p t e m b e r  1979.
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i n c l u d i n g  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  and Japan t h o u g h t  such a
p r o po s a l  was p r e m a t u r e .  The m a j o r i t y  o f  t h e  CIPEC c o u n t r i e s ,
t h e  P h i l i p p i n e s ,  t h e  EEC, Ch i na ,  and Russ ia  spoke i n  f a v o u r
o f  t h e  p r o p o s a l .  A f t e r  f u r t h e r  d i s c u s s i o n  t h e r e  was a
d e ad l o c k  w i t h  o n e - t h i r d  o f  c o u n t r i e s  f a v o u r i n g  t h e  c r e a t i o n
o f  an ag r eemen t ,  o n e - t h i r d  a g a i n s t ,  and t h e  o t h e r  o n e - t h i r d  
79n e u t r a l .  The d e a d l o c k  emphasized t he  b e l i e f  o f  many copper  
consuming c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  commodi t y  agreement in 
c opper  w i l l  no t  be a b l e  t o  s t a b i l i z e  copper  mar ke t s  t o  a 
r e a s o n a b l e  d e g r e e ,  i t  w i l l  be t oo  e x p e n s i v e  t o  r u n ,  and t h e  
o l d  c o n s e r v a t i s m  t h a t  i t  w i l l  go a g a i n s t  t h e i r  f r e e  t r a d e  
p r i  nc i p 1es .
An o t h e r  p rob l em t h a t  was h i g h l i g h t e d  by t h i s  d ead lo ck
was t he  l a c k  o f  a common i n t e r e s t  as between t h e  p r o d u c e r s .
I t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  t h r e e  o u t  o f  t he  e i g h t  CIPEC members di  d
not  f a v o u r  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  copper  ag ree -  
8 0ment .  The l a c k  o f  a common i n t e r e s t  between p r o d u c e r s  
makes the  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a commodi ty  agreement  i n  copper  
v e r y  d i f f i c u l t  t o  a t t a i n .  T h i s  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  so because 
p r o d u c e r s  need a common v i ew b e f o r e  t h e y  can s t r o n g l y  
n e g o t i a t e  w i t h  consumers who i n  some cases have a d e c l a r e d  
i n t e r e s t  a g a i n s t  commodi ty  agreements .
{ i i ) P r e s s u r e  f r om i n t e r e s t  groups i n  consumer  c o u n t r i e s  
The c r e a t i o n  o f  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  commodi ty  agreement  
t o  r e g u l a t e  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  copper  ma rke t s  w i l l  i n e v i t a b l y  
have e f f e c t  on a number o f  groups i n  consumer  c o u n t r i e s .
79. I b i d . , J a n ua r y - M ar c h  1 982 , p . 11.
80.  For  exampl e,  A u s t r a l i a .
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Among t h e  groups  t h a t  w i l l  i n e v i t a b l y  f e e l  t h e  e f f e c t  are 
m u l t i n a t i o n a l  m i n i n g  c o r p o r a t i o n s ,  i n t e r m e d i a r y  users  o f  
c o p p e r ,  and t h e  o p e r a t o r s  o f  e s t a b l i s h e d  commodi ty  marke ts  
such as the  London Metal  Exchange.
Some o f  t h e s e  i n t e r e s t  groups have shown s u p p o r t  f o r  
a copper  ag r eemen t .  Such s u p p o r t  has been made c h i e f l y  by 
t he  I n t e r n  at  ion.al  Wrought  Copper C ou nc i l  ( IWCC) ^  which 
r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  w es t e r n  Europe and Japanese 
f a b r i c a t o r s .  T h i s  group r e c o g n i z e s  t h a t  a d u r a b l e  s o l u t i o n  
t o  t he  p rob l ems o f  copper  mar ke t  i n s t a b i l i t y  i s  most  l i k e l y  
t o  be fo un d  i n  e f f o r t s  co ndu c t ed  a t  i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l  l e v e l .
o p
Other  i n t e r e s t  groups such as t he  Rio T i n t o  Z i n c  (RTZ) 
m i n i n g  company b e l i e v e  t h a t  an i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l  approach 
t o  t he s e  prob l ems would impede t he  i ndependence  o f  t he  
copper  i n d u s t r y  and would  i n v i t e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c a l  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  copper  m a r k e t s .  T h i s  
p o s i t i o n  s e r ve s  t o  emphasize t h e  f e a r  t h a t  m i n i n g  c o r p o r a ­
t i o n s  i n  t he  consumer c o u n t r i e s  have r e g a r d i n g  commodi ty  
ag r eemen ts .  They r e g a r d  t he s e  agreements as a p r ocess  o f  
e r o d i n g  t h e i r  power o ve r  t he  copper  i n d u s t r y  - a power t h a t  
has a l r e a d y  been d i m i n i s h e d  by v a r i o u s  n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  
measures i n  c o u n t r i e s  where t h e y  f o r m a l l y  o p e r a t e d .  RTZ's 
o p p o s i t i o n  t o  a copper  commodi ty  agreement  i s  based on i t s  
b e l i e f  t h a t  i f  a commodi ty  agreement  i s  c o n c l u d e d  f o r  copper  
then the
" . . .  h e a l t h  o f  t h e  copper  i n d u s t r y  would  be t o t a l l y  
s u b o r d i n a t e d  t o  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c a l  c o n s i d e r a ­
t i o n s . "  83
81.  House o f  L o r d s ,  s u p r a , n o te  78 a t  p . 159.
82 . I b i d . , p .169
83 . I b i d . ,  p . 532.
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These p r e s s u r e  groups have i n  many ways i n f l u e n c e d  
t h e  a t t i t u d e  o f  consumer c o u n t r i e s  i n  t he  n e g o t i a t i o n s  o f  
commodi ty  agreemen ts .
( i i i )  Lack o f  common g o a l s  and commi tment  by p r o d u c e r s
The n a t u r e  o f  commodi ty  agreements i s  such t h a t  i n  
o r d e r  t o  be e f f e c t i v e  a l a r g e  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  p r o d u c e r s  must 
p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  t he  agr eement .  In o t h e r  words a l a r g e  
p e r c e n t a g e  o f  a l l  p r o d u c t i o n  o f  t h e  commodi ty  must  be 
c o n t r o l l e d .  T h i s  appears  t o  be a f i r s t  s t e p  to wa r ds  a 
s u c c e s s f u l  and w o r t h w h i l e  commodi ty  agr eement .
As f a r  as copper  i s  c o nc er n ed ,  p r o d u c t i o n  i s  not  
r e s t r i c t e d  t o  t h e  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  a l o n e .  Wor ld p r o ­
d u c t i o n  o f  r e f i n e d  c o p p e r ,  i n  1973 f o r  example was 
8 .5  m i l l i o n  t o n s .  The p r i n c i p a l  p r o d u c e r s  were t h e  U n i t e d  
S t a t e s ,  USSR, t h e  EEC, Japan,  Canada, C h i l e ,  Zambia and 
Z a i r e .  The d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r y  p r o d u c e r s  however ,  show a 
marked dependence on t h e  e x p o r t  o f  copper  compared t o  t he  
d ev e l oped  c o u n t r y  p r o d u c e r s .  Thus o f  t h e  t o t a l  e x p o r t  
e a r n i n g s  o f  f o u r  o f  t h e  CIPEC c o u n t r i e s  - Zambia,  Z a i r e ,
C h i l e  and Papua New Guinea - copper  c o n t r i b u t e s  f rom about  
50 t o  95 p e r c e n t .  In Peru copper  c o n t r i b u t e s  t o  up 20 per  
c e n t  o f  t h a t  c o u n t r y ' s  e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s .
The i m p o r t a n t  f e a t u r e  about  t h e  p a t t e r n  o f  copper  
p r o d u c t i o n  i s  t h a t  t h r e e  ma j or  p r o d u c e r s ,  t h e  USA, USSR, 
and Canada f a l l  o u t s i d e  t h e  f ramework  o f  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s .  
These p r o du c e r s  have t h e r e f o r e  d i f f e r e n t  v i ews  about  a copper  
agreement  f rom t h o s e  h e l d  by d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  who produce 
c o p p e r .  The d ev e l oped  c o u n t r i e s  g e n e r a l l y  are opposed t o
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t o  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  commodi t y  agreements  which  t h e y  r e f e r  t o
84as c h a r i t y  i n  d i s g u i s e .
Among t h e  copper  p r o d u c i n g  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  t h e r e  
has a l s o  no t  been a consensus on t he  need f o r  a copper  a g r e e ­
ment .  t h i s  l a c k  o f  agreement  became a p p a r e n t  d u r i n g  t he  
m ee t i ng s  o f  t h e  e x p e r t  g roup on c o p p e r .  T h i s  g roup  c o n s i s t e d  
o f  e x p e r t s  n omi na ted  by 28 c o u n t r i e s  - 14 c op pe r  e x p o r t i n g  
and 14 copper  i m p o r t i n g ,  as w e l l  as CIPEC and t h e  European 
Economic Communi ty nomina ted  e x p e r t s .  One o f  t h e  main 
i s s u e s  upon wh i ch  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  p r o d u c i n g  copper  
showed no agreement  r e l a t e d  t o  w he the r  t h e r e  was need f o r  a 
commodi t y  agreement  o r  n o t .  Z a i r e  and C h i l e  shared  t h e  v i ew 
h e l d  by most  d eve lo p ed  consumers ,  t h a t  what  was needed was
a consume. r -p r oducer  f o r u m .  The o t h e r  two i m p o r t a n t  e x p o r t e r s ,
8 5Peru and Zambia f a v o u r e d  c o n c l u s i o n  o f  a commodi t y  agreement .
In 1978 a t t e m p t s  were made t o  work ou t  a j o i n t  p o s i t i o n  f o r  
p r o d u c e r s  a t  a m e e t i ng  o f  co ppe r  p r o d u c e r s  h e l d  i n  P a r i s .
Th i s  m e et i ng  b r o u g h t  t o g e t h e r  no t  o n l y  CIPEC members but  
o t h e r  p r o d u c e r s  such as Canada,  F i n  nd,  Norway,  t h e  P h i l i p ­
p i ne s  and P o l an d .  T h i s  m ee t i n g  c o u l d  o n l y  agree  on the  
e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  a " s t a n d i n g  i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l  c o n s u l t a t i v e  
c opper  body"  and no t  a co ppe r  agreement .  A t l h o u g h  CIPEC 
members were p a r t  o f  t h i s  d e c i s i o n ,  i t  soon became c l e a r  t h a t  
f o r  t h e s e  c o u n t r i e s  t h e  u l t i m a t e  goal  was a copper  agreement .
At  i t s  X I I  I t h  s e s s i o n ’, t h e  CIPEC c o n f e r e n c e  o f  M i n i s t e r s ,
84.  J.  Rowe, P r i m a r y  c o mm od i t i e s  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e  
( 1 9 6 5 ) ,  p p . 2 - 3 .
85.  U r s u l a  Wasermann, " Commodi t i es  i n  UNCTAD: P r e l i m i n a r y  
m e e t i n g s  on c o p p e r " ,  ^  iqT’O  Journa l uf W oM Trade la w
1 Z y l V - q S .  ’
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e x pr es s ed  d i s a p p o i n t m e n t  a t  t h e  l a c k  o f  p r o g r e s s  i n  t a l k s  
t o w ar ds  a c opper  agreement  and r e a f f i r m e d  i t s  b a s i c  
o b j e c t i v e  o f  w o r k i n g  to wa r ds  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  agreement  
wh i ch  would r e s u l t  i n  r e n u m e r a t i v e  and s t a b i l i z e d  p r i c e s  
f o r  c o p p e r .
The l a c k  o f  d e f i n i t i v e  and c o n c e r t e d  approach t o  t he  
p r ob l em o f  co ppe r  p r i c e  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  seems t o  have been 
r e s p o n s i b l e  t o  a g r e a t  e x t e n t  {o r  t h e  s l ow p r o g r e s s  i n  t he  
p ro ces s  o f  e s t a b l i s h i n g  a copper  agreement .  A commodi ty  
agreement  f o r  c opper  w i l l  t h e r e f o r e  depend t o  a g r e a t  
e x t e n t ,  on t h e  s t r e n g t h e n i n g  o f  t he  n e g o t i a t i n g  p o s i t i o n  o f  
p r o d u c e r  c o u n t r i e s .  T h i s  would  be made p o s s i b l e  t h r o u g h  
p r o d u c e r s  h a v i n g  a common s ta nd  on t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  a copper  
commodi ty  ag ree me nt .  S t r e n g t h e n i n g  o f  CIPEC wou ld  appear  
t o  be one e f f e c t i v e  way o f  i m p r o v i n g  t h e  p r o d u c e r s  n e g o t i ­
a t i n g  p o s i t i o n .
( i v ) F i n a n c i n g  o f  a copper  b u f f e r  s t o c k
One o f  t h e  c r u c i a l  i s s u e s  i n  t he  n e g o t i a t i o n s  f o r  a 
copper  agreement  r e l a t e s  t o  t h e  c o n t r o l  mechanism t o  be 
i n c o r p o r a t e d  i n  such an a gr eemen t .  Among p o s s i b l e  
measures t h a t  have been d i s c u s s e d  i n  t h i s  r e g a r d  a r e ,  
an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  b u f f e r  s t o c k  scheme, i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y  
c o - o r d i n a t e d  n a t i o n a l  s t o c k s ,  e x p o r t  c o n t r o l s ,  p r o d u c t i o n  
c o n t r o l s ,  t h e  exchange o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  on p r o d u c t i o n ,  con-
O 7
s ump t i on  and s t o c k s ,  and s u p p l y  and p ur chas e commi tments .
8 6 . CIPEC Q u a r t e r l y  R ev i e w , A p r i l - J u n e  1978 a t  p p . 10-11.
87.  See te r ms  o f  r e f e r e n c e  o f  t he  second i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l  
g roup o f  e x p e r t s  on copper  se t  up by t h e  V l t h  p r e ­
p a r a t o r y  m e e t i n g  f o r  c o p p e r .  UNCTAD Doc. No. I D / B/  
I P C / C o p p e r / A C . 2 / L . 7 .
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A number o f  s t u d i e s  t h a t  have-been co ndu c t ed  i n  r e l a t i o n
t o  copper  f a v o u r  a b u f f e r  s t o c k  mechanism,  used a l one  or
c o up l ed  w i t h  s u p p l y  management as t he  b es t  c o n t r o l  mechanism 
8 8f o r  c o p p e r .  These s t u d i e s  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  b u f f e r  s t o ck  
o p e r a t i o n s  i n  a c opper  agreement  would e f f e c t i v e l y  reduce 
copper  p r i c e  f l u c t u a t i o n s  around t h e  l o n g - t e r m  mar ke t  t r e n d .
The p r o d u c e r s  and c onsumer ^o f  copper  agree b a s i c a l l y  t h a t  t he  
b es t  mechanism t h a t  s hou l d  be employed i n  t h e  case o f  an a g r e e ­
ment b e i ng  r eached  i s  a b u f f e r  s t o c k .  The s ou rce  o f  ma jo r  
concern  however ,  i s  t h e  c o s t  o f  o p e r a t i n g  such a b u f f e r  
s t o c k  and who i s  t o  meet such a c o s t .  T h i s  i s  t he  same o l d  
p rob l em t h a t  e a r l i e r  commodi ty  agreements have e n c ou n t e r e d  
a t  one t i m e  o r  a n o t h e r .
T h e - c o s t  o f  a copper  b u f f e r  s t o c k  appear^ t o  be v e r y  h igh  
a c c o r d i n g  t o  e s t i m a t e s  t h a t  have been p r e p a r ed  by e x p e r t s .  
Roughly  s p e a k i n g ,  i t  i s  e s t i m a t e d  t h a t ,  f o r  a copper  b u f f e r  
s t o c k  t o  have t he  d e s i r e d  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  e f f e c t ,  about  
4 b i l l i o n  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  d o l l a r s  i s  r e q u i r e d .  T h i s  i s  an 
enormous a m oun t  o f  money e s p e c i a l l y  when one compares i t  
w i t h  t he  t i n  b u f f e r  s t o c k  which r e q u i r e s  abou t  0 .4  b i l l i o n  
US d o l l a r s .  In v iew o f  t he  enormous amounts o f  money t h a t  
m i gh t  be r e q u i r e d  f o r  a b u f f e r  s t o c k ,  some consumer c o u n t r i e s  
have a dvoca t ed  a s t u d y  o f  o t h e r  approaches t o  t he
s o l u t i o n  o f  copper  mar ke t  p r ob l e m s .  In t h i s  r e g a r d  t he y  
s t r o n g l y  b e l i e v e  t h a t  a s m a l l e r  b u f f e r  s t o c k  c o u l d  a ch ie v e  t he  
d e s i r e d  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  g o a l s  i f  i t  was coupled wi th s u p p l y  manage­
ment measures.  Supp l y  management i s  no t  f a v o u r e d  by d e v e l o p i n g
8 8 . CIPEC Q u a r t e r l y  Rev iew,  J u l y - S e p t e m b e r  1979.
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c o u n t r i e s  who depend h e a v i l y  on copper  f o r  t h e i r  f o r e i g n  
e a r n i  n g s .
Assuming t h a t  e v e n t u a l l y  an agreement  wou ld  be reached 
on t he  s i z e  o f  t he  b u f f e r  s t o c k ,  t he  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  f i n a n c i n g  
p r o v i s i o n s  are bound t o  r e f l e c t  t h e  u n w i l l i n g n e s s  o f  consumer 
c o u n t r i e s  t o  f i n a n c e  b u f f e r  s t o c k s .  Too smal l  a f i n a n c i a l  
commi tment  by consumers i n  a copper  agreement  w i l l  make t he  
f a i l u r e  o f  a copper  agreement  to  s t a b i l i z e  p r i c e s  more l i k e l y .  
T h i s  would be so d e s p i t e  t he  p resence o f  t he  I PC 's  Common 
Fund f rom which  a copper  commodi ty  agreement  would  be a b l e  t o  
draw.  The p r ob l em w i t h  t he  Common Fund as w i l l  be d i s c u s s e d  
i n  a l a t e r  c h a p t e r  i s  t h a t  i t  depends on t h e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  
f rom member c o u n t r i e s  as w e l l  as t he  f un ds  a v a i l a b l e  under  
v a r i o u s  commodi ty  agreements .  I f  t he  a v a i l a b l e  f unds  f rom 
t h e  commodi ty  agreements are i n a d e q u a t e ,  t h e  Commond Fund 
w i l l  n o t  be a b l e  t o  s u p p o r t  t he  b u f f e r  s t o c k  r e q u i r e m e n t s  
o f  t he  v a r i o u s  commod i t i es  and t h e r e f o r e  s i g n a l l i n g  a f a i l u r e  
o f  such agreements .
A s u c c e s s f u l  copper  agreement  t h e r e f o r e ,  w i l l  r e q u i r e  
f i n a n c i a l  p r o v i s i o n s  t h a t  would show more commi tment  on t he  
consumers t o  s u p p o r t  an adequate b u f f e r  s t o c k ,  t h a t  would 
r e a l i s t i c a l l y  he l p  t o  s t a b i l i z e  copper  p r i c e s .  S i nce  
commodi ty  agreements  are a p r o d u c t  o f  c o n s u m e r - p r o d u c e r  
c o o p e r a t i o n ,  t h e  p r o d u c e r s  w i l l  have t o  be p r i m a r i l y  
commi t t ed  t o  t h e  f i n a n c i n g  o f  t h e  b u f f e r  s t o c k .
X . C o n c l u s i o n
The need f o r  i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l  r e g u l a t i o n  o f  commodi ty 
t r a d e  was r e c o g n i z e d  as way back as the  f i r s t  q u a r t e r  o f  t h i s
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c e n t u r y  b u t  i t  was o n l y  a f t e r  t h e  Second Wor ld  War t h a t  t he  
n a t u r e  and s t r u c t u r e  o f  such agreements were o u t l i n e d .
Cha p t e r  VI o f  t h e  Havana c h a r t e r  forms t h e  l e g a l  b a s i s  f o r  
t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  o f  commodi ty  agreements .  A l t h o u g h  no l e g a l  
o b l i g a t i o n  has l a i n  on s t a t e s  t o  a p p l y  t he se  p r i n c i p l e s ,  
s t a t e s  have u n i f o r m l y  adhered to  them ever  s i n c e .  Indeed 
a t  p r e s e n t  i t  appears as though  s t a t e s  have a d u t y  t o  a p p l y  
t h e s e  p r i n c i p l e s .  The c h a r t e r  o f  economic r i g h t s  and d u t i e s  
now d e s c r i b e s  i t  as a d u t y  o f  s t a t e s  t o  c o n c l u d e  commodi ty 
a g r e e m e n t s . ^
The b a s i c  p a t t e r n  f o l l o w e d  i n  a l l  commodi ty  agreements 
t h a t  have been c o nc l ud e d  t o  da te  has been t h e  same and f o l l o w s  
t h e  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  t he  Havana c h a r t e r  c l o s e l y .  A l l  agreements 
p r o v i d e  f o r  economi  c p r o v i s i o n s  aimed a t  p r o v i d i n g  a mechanism 
f o r  t h e  de f en ce  and r e g u l a t i o n  o f  p r i c e s .  S e c o n d l y ,  s i n c e  
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  o f  p r o d u c e r s  and consumers i s  i m p o r t a n t  f o r  
t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  a g r eemen ts ,  a l l  agreements  have member­
s h i p  p r o v i s i o n s  t h a t  make membership open t o  a l l  " s u b s t a n t i a l l y "  
i n t e r e s t e d  p a r t i e s .  The i n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r o v i s i o n s  p r o v i d e  f o r  
a g en er a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  body - t h e  C ou n c i l  wh i ch  e x e r c i s e s  
e xp ress  and i n  some cases i m p l i e d  powers .  U n l i k e  many 
o t h e r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  t he se  agreements  p r o v i d e  
f o r  i n t e r n a l i s e d  d i s p u t e  s e t t l e m e n t  p r o c e d u r e s .  D e c i s i o n s  
i n  a l l  commodi ty  agreements  are made by way o f  a d i s t r i b u t e d  
w e i g h t e d  v o t i n g  and p a r t i c i p a t i n g  c o u n t r i e s  u n d e r t a k e  to  
a c ce p t  as b i n ^ n g  a l l  d e c i s i o n s  made w i t h i n  t h e  f ramework  
o f  t h e  agreement .
89.  See General  Assembly r e s o l u t i o n  3287(XXIX)  o f  15th 
Ja nua ry  1976,  a r t i c l e  6 .
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Copper has o n l y  been a s u b j e c t  o f  d i s c u s s i o n  as f a r  as 
a commodi ty  agreement  i s  concerned i n  t he  p a s t  s i x  
y e a r s .  U n t i l  t he  end o f  1982 no s u b s t a n t i a l  p r o g r e s s  had been 
made t owa rds  c o n c l u s i o n  o f  a copper  agreement .  The main 
s t u m b l i n g  b l o c k s  have been l a c k  o f  commi tment  by consumers 
t o  commit  t he ms e l ve s  t o  me et i ng  t he  c o s t  o f  f i n a n c i n g  a b u f f e r  
s t o c k ,  t h e  l a c k  o f  a u n i f i e d  p r o du c e r  s tand  i n  t he  n e g o t i a t i o n s ,  
t h e  l a c k  o f  a common i n t e r e s t  between p r o d u c e r s  and consumers.  
Members o f  CIPEC have an immense p o t e n t i a l  b a r g a i n i n g  power 
which i f  w e l l  o r g a n i s e d  would  he lp  a c c e l e r a t e  t h e  p rocess  o f  
n e g o t i a t i o n  f o r  a copper  agreement .  I f  and when such an 
agreement  i s  c o n c l u d e d ,  t he  p a t t e r n  e s t a b l i s h e d  by o t h e r  
agreements  such as the  t i n  agreement  i s  most  l i k e l y  t o  be 
f o l l o w e d .  A copper  agreement  i s  most  l i k e l y  t o  p r o v i d e  f o r  
a C o u n c i l  as t he  main p o l i c y  making body,  w e i g h t e d  v o t i n g ,  
i n t e r n a l i s e d  d i s p u t e  s e t t l e m e n t  p r o c e d u r e s ,  economic p r o ­
v i s i o n s  c o m m i t t i n g  both p r o d u c e r s  and consumers t o  t he  
f i n a n c i n g  o f  t h e  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  t he  agreement .
The d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  t h e  n e g o t i a t i n g  p r oc ess  however ,  
are v e r y  f u nd a me n ta l  and stem f ro m t he  b a s i c  d i f f e r e n c e  i n  
o p i n i o n  between p r o d u c e r s  and consumers ove r  t h e  d e s i r a b i l i t y  
o f  commodi ty  agreements  and t he  fo rm t h e y  s ho u l d  t a k e .  Th i s  
f u nd ame nt a l  p rob l em has been r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  n o n - c o n c l u s i o n  
o f  a number o f  commodi ty  agreements and i n  t h e  b reak  o f  some 
o f  t he  few t h a t  have been c o n c l u d e d .  The copper  n e g o t i a t i o n s  
are u n l i k e l y  t o  r e s o l v e  t h i s  p rob l em because i t  f o r ms  the  
b a s i c  d e f i c i e n c y  o f  a c o n s u m e r - p r o d u c e r  commodi ty  agreement .
I t  i s  f o r  t h i s  reason t h a t  a commodi ty  agreement  f o r  copper  
s hou l d  be r e g a r d e d  as no t  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  s o l v e  copper  m a r k e t i n g
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problems.  To solve the problems encountered in the use of  
the commodity agreement mechanism p a r t i c u l a r l y  in r e l a t i o n  
to the f i n a n c i n g  of  such agreements,  an I n t e g r a t e d  Programme 
f o r  Commodities and a Common fund to f i n a n c e  i t  has been 
worked out under the auspices of UNCTAD. C h a p t e r s  seeks 
to e v a l u a t e  the prospects f o r  such a fund in s t a b i l i z i n g  
copper p r i c e s .
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE UNITED NATIONS COMMON FUND
I . The Common Fund approach
Copper p r i c e  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  t h r o u g h  t he  medium o f  a 
commodi ty agreement  as has been d i s c u s s e d  i n  Cha p t e r  IV,  
has i t s  own p r ob l e m s .  One o f  t he  ma jo r  p rob l ems t h a t  has 
c o n t r i b u t e d  t o w a rd s  a f a i l u r e  to  c on c lu d e  a copper  commodi ty  
agreement  has been one r e l a t i n g  t o  the  f i n a n c i n g  o f  a copper  
b u f f e r  s t o c k .
The p rob l ems o f  f i n a n c i n g  a b u f f e r  s t o c k  m e r e l y  
r e f l e c t s  one o f  t he  b a s i c  d e f i c i e n c i e s  o f  t he  who le  concep t  
o f  commodi ty  ag ree me nt s .  S ince  t he se  agreements  b r i n g  t o ­
g e t h e r  p r o d u c i n g  n a t i o n s  and consuming n a t i o n s ,  t he  d i f f e r e n c e s  
i n  the  p e r c e p t i o n  o f  t h e  r o l e  o f  such an agreement  i s  
u s u a l l y  t a i n t e d  by t he  i n t e r e s t s  o f  n a t i o n s  depend ing  on 
which  s i d e  t h e y  f a l l ,  t h a t  i s  w he t he r  consumers or  p r o d u c e r s .
I t  i s  t h i s  f u nd ame nt a l  d i f f e r e n c e  which has t r a n s f o r m e d  
i t s e l f  i n t o  d i s a g r e e m e n t s  over  t he  s t a b i l i z i n g  mechanism 
t o  be used and how t o  f i n a n c e  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  commodi ty 
agreement  f o r  c o p p e r .
These prob l ems have been at  t h e  co re  o f  t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  
t h a t  c o n f r o n t e d  t h e  few e x i s t i n g  commodi ty  agreements  t h a t  
had been e n t e r e d  i n t o  under  t he  Havana p r i n c i p l e s ,  and 
t h e  breakdown o f  n e g o t i a t i o n s  aimed a t  t he  c o n c l u s i o n  o f  
o t h e r s .
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The Common Fund which  was c r e a t e d  i n  1980 was aimed 
a t  f i l l i n g  t h i s  v o i d .  The approach t ak en  under  t he  Common 
Fund has been t o  t r y  and r e p l a c e  what f o r  many y e a r s  was a 
commodi ty  by commodi ty  e f f o r t  at  p r i c e  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  w i t h  
an i n t e g r a t e d  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i c y  f o r  p r i c e  s t a b i l i z a t i o n .
The i n t e g r a t e d  approach env is ag ed  under  t h e  U n i t e d  
N a t i o n s  I n t e g r a t e d  f r og ra mme  f o r  Commod i t i es  ( IPC)  was the  
c r e a t i o n  o f  agreements  f o r  18 co mmod i t i e s  t o  employ whenever  
p o s s i b l e ,  t he  b u f f e r  s t o c k  mechanism. I n c l u d e d  i n  t he  
18 c o mmo d i t i e s  was c o p p e r .  Such i n t e r n a t i o n a l  commodi ty 
o r g a n i z a t i o n s  were then t o  be r e l a t e d  t h r o u g h  t he  Common 
Fund wh i ch  would  have t h r e e  f u n c t i o n s ,  t h a t  i s  t o  f i n a n c e  
b u f f e r  s t o c k s ,  t o  t r a d e  on i t s  own accoun t  i n  c e r t a i n  
l i m i t e d  . c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  and to  p r o v i d e  l oa ns  o r  g r a n t s  t o  
a i d  commodi ty  p r o d u c i n g  c o u n t r i e s  i n  d i v e r s i f y i n g  t h e i r  
economi e s .
One o f  t he  main p o i n t s  beh ind  the  c r e a t i o n  o f  a Common 
Fund t h e r e f o r e ,  was t h a t  t h e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  f i n a n c e  i n  
such a f un d  would  remove one o f  t he  d i f f i c u l t i e s  t h a t  has 
ac ted  as a c o n s t r a i n t  i n  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  o f  commodi ty  a g r e e ­
ments i n  many c o m m o d i t i e s .  T h i s  a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  f unds  
would i t  was hoped encourage the  c o n c l u s i o n  o f  commodi ty 
agreements  i n  a t  l e a s t  t he  18 co mmod i t i es  i n c l u d e d  i n  t he  
i n t e g r a t e d  programme f o r  c o m m o d i t i e s .
As d i s c u s s e d  i n  Chap te r  IV ,  one o f  t h e  p r i m a r y  
o b j e c t i v e s  i n  n e g o t i a t i n g  and e s t a b l i s h i n g  any commodi ty 
agreement  i s  p r i c e  s t a b i l i z a t i o n .  The Common Fund seeks 
t o  enhance t h i s  p r ocess  by making a v a i l a b l e  f i n a n c i a l
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r e s o u r c e s  t o  v a r i o u s  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  commodi ty  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  
so as t o  e n ab le  them t o  o p e r a t e  b u f f e r  s t o c k s  and e n t e r  
ma rke t s  t o  p u r c h a s e r s  when p r i c e s  go beyond an agreed 
maximum.
T h i s  c h a p t e r  examines t h e  Common Fund approach w i t h  
a v i ew t o  d e t e r m i n i n g  how u s e f u l  t he  approach m i g h t  be i n  
s t a b i l i z i n g  c opper  p r i c e s .
1 1 . The p l a c e  o f  t h e  Common Fund i n  t he  NIEQ
The Common Fund must be l ooked  a t  i n  t h e  w i d e r  
c o n t e x t  o f  t h e ^ l e w  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Economic O r d e r  (NIEO) 
t h r o u g h  wh i ch  t h e  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  p r o d u c e r s  o f  
p r i m a r y  c o mm od i t i e s  hope t o  l e g i t i m a t e  t h e i r  case a g a i n s t  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  economic e x p l o i t a t i o n  by t h e  r e p l a c e m e n t  o r  
r e s t r u c t u r i n g  o f  e x i s t i n g  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  
so as t o  accommodate t h e i r  l e g i t i m a t e  r i g h t s  and i n t e r e s t s .
The NIEO e n v i s a g e d  by t he s e  c o u n t r i e s  must  be v iewed 
i n  te rms o f  t h r e e  i m p o r t a n t  r e s o l u t i o n s  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  
General  Assembly  passed i n  1974,  t h a t  i s  t o  say ,  t h e  
d e c l a r a t i o n  on t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  NIEO, t h e  programme o f  
a c t i o n  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  NIEO, and t h e  c h a r t e r
I
o f  economic r i g h t s  and d u t i e s  o f  s t a t e s .
The o v e r a l l  o b j e c t i v e  o f  t he  t h r e e  documents i s  a 
r e s t r u c t u r i n g  o f  economic r e l a t i o n s  between t h e  d eve l oped  
and d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  based on s t a n d a r d s  o f  j u s t i c e ,
1. U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  General  Assembly r e s o l u t i o n s  3 2 0 ( S - V I ) ,  
May 1, 1974;  r e s o l u t i o n  320 2 ( S- VI ) o f  May 1, 1974; 
and r e s o l u t i o n  3281-XXIX o f  December 12,  1974.
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e q u a l i t y  and mutua l  r e s p e c t .  The p r e s e n t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
economic o r d e r  c o n s i s t s  o f  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r i n c i p l e s ,  
norms,  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  p r o c e d u r e s ,  and p a t t e r n s  o f  b e h a v i o u r  
t h a t  c o n t r o l  among o t h e r  t h i n g s  t r a d e  r e l a t i o n s  between 
s t a t e s .  What i s  c a l l e d  f o r  i n  t he  NIEO documents t h e r e f o r e ,  
i s  t h e  r e s t r u c t u r i n g  o f  t h e s e  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  norms and 
p a t t e r n s  o f  b e h a v i o u r  t a k i n g  i n t o  acco un t  c e r t a i n  i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  p o l i c y  o b j e c t i v e s .  In t h i s  case ,  " r e s t r u c t u r i n g "  
ca n no t  be u n d e r s t o o d  as a p r ocess  aimed a t  o v e r t h r o w i n g  o f  
t h e  p r e s e n t  o r d e r  b u t  s i m p l y  as a p rocess  o f  r e d e f i n i n g  
o r  r e o r g a n i z i n g  o f  t he  e x i s t i n g  o r d e r .  I f  t h i s  be t h e  
cas e ,  i t  i s  o b v i o u s  t h a t  any r e s t r u c t u r i n g  o f  t r a d e  
r e l a t i o n s  must  have i t s  s t a r t i n g  p o i n t  i n  t h e  e x i s t i n g  
i  n t e r  na t  i .onal  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  f r a me wo r k .
The NIEO documents p r o v i d e  a range o f  p o s s i b l e  a c t i o n  
f o r  t h e  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  o f  commodi ty  p r i c e s .  One such a c t i o n  
i s  t he  c o n c l u s i o n  o f  commodi ty  ag r eements .  These a g re e -
9
ments b e in g  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r e a t i e s ,  must  be r e g a r d e d  as 
i n s t r u m e n t s  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law i n  wh i ch  as J.  Fa wce t t  
p o i n t s  o u t ,
"Law i s  seen a t  work both  i n  t he  c r e a t i o n  o f  such 
agreements  and i n  t he  o p e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
o r g a n i z a t i o n s  t h e y  c r e a t e . "3
S i nce  1980,  commodi t y  agreements  are  t o  be r e i n f o r c e d  by
an o v e r a l l  i n t e g r a t e d  programme f o r  c o mm o d i t i e s  w i t h  a
two pronged s t r u c t u r e  based on i n t e r n a t i o n a l  commodi ty
2. See A r t i c l e  63 o f  t h e  Vienna C o n v e n t i o n  on t h e  Law 
o f  t r e a t i e s .
3. J.  F a w c e t t ,  "The f u n c t i o n  o f  law i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
commodi ty  a g r e e m e n t s " ,  44 B Y I L , p . 157.
148
o r g a n i z a t i o n s  and a proposed Common Fund to f in a n c e  t h e i r  
4o p e r a t i o n s .  T h i s  o v e r a l l  i n t e g r a t e d  programme i s  no t  i n  
any way a r a d i c a l  o v e r t h r a w a l  o f  t he  e x i s t i n g  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  
p r i n c i p l e s ,  norms and p a t t e r n s  o f  b e h a v i o u r  g o v e r n i n g  t r a d e  
i n  c o mmod i t i es  b u t  m e r e l y  an a t t e m p t  a t  r e s t r u c t u r i n g  the  
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  o r d e r .
The q u e s t i o n  t h a t  needs to  be answered t h e r e f o r e  i s  
how t h e  Common Fund approach seeks t o  a t t a i n  t h i s  r e s t r u c ­
t u r i n g ?  There i s  a t  l e a s t  one way i n  which t h i s  r e s t r u c ­
t u r i n g  i s  e n v i s a ge d  i n  t h e  Common Fund a ppr oa ch .  I t  seeks 
t o  c r e a t e  a new i n s t i t u t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e  t o  a c t  as a f i n a n c i n g  
house f o r  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Commodi ty O r g a n i z a t i o n s .  The c r e a t i o n  
o f  t he  Common Fund as a new i n s t i t u t i o n  may be r e ga rd e d  as 
an at tempt ;  t o  i mp l ement  NIEO p r i n c i p l e s .
The C h a r t e r  of  Economic l i g h t s  and d u t i e s  of  S t a t e s  
provides in the preamble i t s  main purpose.  I t  s t a t e s  the 
purpose as,
" . . .  t o  promote t he  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  t h e  new i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  economic o r d e r ,  based on e q u i t y ,  s o v e r e i g n  
e q u a l i t y ,  i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e ,  common i n t e r e s t ,  and 
c o - o p e r a t i o n  among a l l  s t a t e s ,  i r r e s p e c t i v e  o f  
t h e i r  economic and s o c i a l  s y s t e m s . "5
In s e e k in g  t o  pu t  i n t o  p r a c t i c e  t h i s  p r i n c i p l e ,  t h e  c h a r t e r
p r o v i d e s  a t  l e a s t  one l e g a l  mechanism.  A r t i c l e  10 sugges t s
t h a t  s o l u t i o n s  t o  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  economi c ,  f i n a n c i a l ,  and
monet ar y  p r ob l ems  must  be sought  w i t h i n  t h e  f ramewor k  o f
4.  UN Doc. I D / I P C / C 0 N F . / 1 9  o f  March 21, 1979.
5 . See C h a r t e r  o f  Economic R i g h t s  and .Dut ies o f  S t a t e s .  
General  Assembly r e s o l u t i o n  3281-XXIX o f  December 12, 
1 974.
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ex i  s t i  ng
" . . .  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  i n  acc or da nc e  w i t h  
t h e i r  e x i s t i n g  and e v o l v i n g  r u l e s  . . . "
T h i s  phrase would  seem t o  sugge s t  t h a t  any a p p l i c a t i o n  o f
s o l u t i o n s  t o  p rob lems f a c i n g  commodi ty  t r a d e  must  be
u n d e r t a k e n  w i t h i n  t h e  e x i s t i n g  system o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l
o r g a n i z a t i o n s .  T h i s  o f  co ur se  does n o t  mean t h a t  new
o r g a n i z a t i o n s  c an no t  be c r e a t e d  i f  t h e y  c on fo rm t o  the
e x i s t i n g  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  sys tem.  I f  t h i s
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  i s  c o r r e c t ,  then  t he  c r e a t i o n  o f  t he
Common Fund as a c o m p l e t e l y  new i n s t i t u t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e
i s  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  a s p i r a t i o n s  o f  t h e  NIEO.
I I I .  The need f o r  a Common Fund as an 
i n d e p e n d e n t  i n s t i t u t i o n
I t  has been s ugges t ed  i n  some l i t e r a t u r e  t h a t  t h e  
Common Fund as a new i n s t i t u t i o n  d e a l i n g  w i t h  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
commodi ty  p rob l ems such as t h o s e  a f f e c t i n g  Zambian copper  
was n o t  n e c e s s a r y .  I t  has been argued t h a t  p r o v i s i o n  f o r  
such a Fund would have been made a t  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  l e s s e r  
c o s t  w i t h i n  t h e  f r amewor k  o f  e i t h e r  t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
Monet ary  Fund or  t h e  General  Agreement  on T a r i f f s  and 
Tr ade .  Fa wc e t t  and P a r r y  f o r  example argue t h a t  t he  
proposed Common Fund f o r  c ommod i t i es  has purposes  which 
are c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  some a sp ec t s  o f  t he  IMF and i n  
p a r t i c u l a r ,  a r t i c l e  V pa r ag ra ph  2 ( b)  which  s t a t e s  t h a t :
6 . T h i s  argument  i s  f o r  example made i n  J . E .  Fawc et t  
and Audrey P a r r y ,  Law and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e s o u r c e  
c o n f 1i c t s , ( 1 9 8 1 ) ,  C la r endon  P r es s ,  O x f o r d .
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" I f  r e q u e s t e d ,  t h e  Fund may d e c i d e  t o  p e r f o r m  
f i n a n c i a l  and t e c h n i c a l  s e r v i c e s ,  i n c l u d i n g  t he  
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o f  r e s o u r c e s  c o n t r i b u t e d  by members, 
t h a t  are c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t he  purposes  o f  t he  Fund. 
O p e r a t i o n s  i n v o l v e d  i n  t h e  p e r f o r m a n c e  o f  such 
f i n a n c i a l  s e r v i c e s  s ho u l d  no t  be on t h e  acco un t  o f  
t h e  Fund.  S e r v i c e s  under  t h i s  s u b s e c t i o n  s h a l l  no t  
impose any o b l i g a t i o n  on a member w i t h o u t  i t s  
c o n s e n t . "
There i s  no doub t  t h a t  t h e  proposed Common Fund c o u l d  be 
accommodated under  t h i s  s u b s e c t i o n  and t h a t  t h e  p e r fo rm an ce  
by t h e  IMF o f  t he s e  p u r e l y  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  and t e c h n i c a l  
d u t i e s  would  have proved a cheaper  a l t e r n a t i v e  t o  t he  
e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  a c o m p l e t e l y  new i n s t i t u t i o n  l i k e  t he  
Common Fund.  What t h i s  argument  f a i l s  t o  r e v e a l  however ,  
are t h e  i n h e r e n t  and fu n da me n ta l  p r i n c i p l e  d i f f e r e n c e s  
beh i nd  t h e  two i n s t i t u t i o n s .
As r e c o r d s  o f  t he  B r e t t o n  Woods c o n f e r e n c e  o f  1944 
upon wh i ch  t h e  IMF a r t i c l e s  o f  agreement  are  based show, 
t he  p r i m a r y  concer n  a t  t h e  t i m e  was t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  an 
i n s t i t u t i o n  d e s i gn ed  t o  deal  w i t h  c u r r e n c y  exchange prob lems 
and no t  commodi ty  p r o b l e m s .  ^ The e x p e r i e n c e  o f  t h e  IMF 
t h e r e f o r e ,  l ea ns  h e a v i l y  on monetary  m a t t e r s  and has 
r e l a t i v e l y  l i t t l e  t o  do w i t h  t a c k l i n g  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  commodi ty  
p r o b l e m s .  These l a t e r  p rob l ems i t  wou ld  appear  are  bes t  
t a c k l e d  by a s p e c i a l i z e d  i n s t i t u t i o n  l i k e  t h e  proposed CF.
In a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  IMF was e s t a b l i s h e d  a t  a t i m e  when 
th e  g o v e r n i n g  p r i n c i p l e  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  economic law was 
t h a t  o f  e q u a l i t y  as i s  e x e m p l i f i e d  by i t s  w e i g h t e d  v o t i n g  
p r o c e d u r e s .  T h i s  p r i n c i p l e  has now been t r a n s f o r m e d  i n t o  
one o f  s o l i d a r i t y  p a r t l y  because o f  o b j e c t i o n s  r a i s e d  by
7. U.N. mo net ar y  and f i n a n c i a l  c o n f e r e n c e ,  p r o c e e d i n g s  
and documents ( 1944 ) .
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d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  t o  t h e  e a r l i e r  p r i n c i p l e .  I t  i s  
d i f f i c u l t  t o  see how t h e s e  c o u n t r i e s  would  have accep t ed  
t o  e n t r u s t  t h e  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  t h e  p roposed CF t o  an i n s t i ­
t u t i o n  based on p r i n c i p l e s  t o  wh ich  t h e y  t a k e  e x c e p t i o n .
F u r t h e r m o r e ,  t h e  p o l i c y  o f  t h e  IMF i t s e l f  does 
not  p e r m i t  t h e  e x t e n s i o n  o f  b u f f e r  s t o c k i n g  f a c i l i t i e s  t o  
t h e  e x t e n t  e n v i s a g e d  by t h e  Common Fund.  The main p o l i c i e s  
o f  t h e  IMF r e g a r d i n g  use o f  i t s  r e s o u r c e s  are  d e t e r m i n e d  
by a r t i c l e  V p a rag ra ph  3 ( a ) .  T h i s  p r o v i d e s  t h a t :
"The Fund s h a l l  adopt  p o l i c i e s  on t h e  use o f  i t s  
g e n e r a l  r e s o u r c e s ,  i n c l u d i n g  p o l i c i e s  on s t a n d - b y  
o r  s i m i l a r  a r r a n g e m e n t s , >and may adop t  s p e c i a l  
b a l a nc e  o f  payments p o l i c i e s  , t h a t  w i l l  a s s i s t  
members t o  s o l v e  t h e i r  b a la nc e  o f  payments 
p rob l ems i n  a manner c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  p r o v i s i o n s  
o f  t h i s  ag reement ,  and t h a t  w i l l  e s t a b l i s h  adequate  
s a f e g u a r d s  f o r  t h e  t e m p o r a r y  use o f  t h e  g en er a l  
r e s o u r c e s  o f  t h e  F u n d . "
T h i s  p r o v i s i o n  q u i t e  c l e a r l y  e x c l u d e s  t h e  us'e o f  t he  IMF
r e s o u r c e s  f o r  purposes  o f  e x t e n d i n g  t h e  b u f f e r  s t o c k  f a c i l i t y
t o  t h e  e x t e n t  c a l l e d  f o r  i n  t he  Common Fund.  T h i s  a p a r t
however ,  t he  quot ed  p r o v i s i o n  goes t o  i n d i c a t e  f u r t h e r  t he
f u n d am en ta l  d i f f e r e n c e s  between t he  two i n s t i t u t i o n s  and
t h e  near  i m p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  i n c o r p o r a t i n g  t h e  proposed
a c t i v i t i e s  o f  t h e  Common Fund i n t o  t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l
Monet ar y  Fund.
I t  has a l s o  been argued t h a t  t he  p r oposed  Common Fund
a c t i v i t i e s  c o u l d  have been c a r r i e d  ou t  w i t h i n  t h e  f ramework
o f  t h e  GATT on t h e  l i n e s  o f  c h a p t e r  VI t h a t  i s ,  a r t i c l e s  55
t o  70 o f  t h e  i l l  f a t e d  Havana c h a r t e r .  The p r o p o n e n t s  o f
t h i s  v iew  argue t h a t  i f  t h e  v a r i o u s  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  c h a p t e r  VI
o f  t he  Havana C h a r t e r  were t o  be i n c o r p o r a t e d  i n  t h e  GATT,
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i t  would be p o s s i b l e  f o r  t h e  GATT t o  a c q u i r e  some measure 
o f  c o n t r o l  over  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  commodi ty  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  i n  an 
i n t e g r a t e d  f a s h i o n  i n  t h e  same way t he  Common Fund i s  
i n t e n d e d  t o  do.  I t  i s  argued f o r  example t h a t  i f  a r t i c l e  
59 o f  t he  Havana c h a r t e r  was t o  be i n c o r p o r a t e d  i n  t h e  GATT, 
i t  would make i t  p o s s i b l e  f o r  t he  use o f  i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l  
commodi ty  c o n f e r e n c e s  t o  d i s c u s s  w i t h i n  t h e  f ramewor k  o f  
GATT,
"measures d e s i gn ed  t o  meet t h e  s p e c i a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  
wh i ch  e x i s t  o r  are e xpec t ed  t o  a r i s e  c o n c e r n i n g  
a p a r t i c u l a r  p r i m a r y  c o m m o d i t y . "  8
The i n c o r p o r a t i o n  o f  a r t i c l e  64 o f  t h e  Havana c h a r t e r  i n t o
t h e  GATT i t  i s  argued w i l l  a l l o w  the  o p e r a t i o n  o f  commodi ty
c o u n c i l s  w i t h i n  t h e  GATT and would g i v e  t h i s  o r g a n i z a t i o n
s u p e r v i s o r y  powers over  commodi ty  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  i n  v e r y
much t h e  same way as i s  proposed i n  t he  Common Fund.
In t h e o r y ,  t he s e  changes can be made t o  t h e  GATT and
would  t r a n s f o r m  t h i s  i n s t i t u t i o n  i n  such a way t h a t  i t  can
accommodate what  i s  proposed f o r  t he  Common Fund.  In
r e a l i t y  however  t h e r e  appears to  be a number o f  d i f f i c u l t i e s
i n  a c h i e v i n g  t h i s  change.  One o f  t he  d i f f i c u l t i e s  stems
f rom t h e  a t t i t u d e  o f  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  t o  t he  GATT.
There i s  a w e a l t h  o f  l i t e r a t u r e  which i n d i c a t e s  t h a t
d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  have l o s t  f a i t h  i n  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  upon
which t h i s  i n s t i t u t i o n  i s  based.  One o f  t h e s e  p r i n c i p l e s  i s
t h a t  o f  e q u a l i t y  and a l t h o u g h  t h e r e  has been a number o f
m i t i g a t i n g  p r o v i s i o n s  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  a gr eemen t ,  t h i s
8 . A r t i c l e  59 o f  t h e  Havana c h a r t e r .
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p r i n c i p l e  s t i l l  r ema i ns  t he  backbone o f  t h e  agreement .
T h i s  p r i n c i p l e  does n o t  p e r m i t  a sense o f  common p u r po se ,  
i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e  and common i n t e r e s t  bu t  r a t h e r  pu ts  
emphasis on t he  e q u a l i t y  o f  s t a t e s .  S i nce  t he  i deas  
beh i nd  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  t he  Common Fund are based on t he  
sense o f  s o l i d a r i t y ,  i t  would be d i f f i c u l t  t o  persuade 
d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  t o  e n t r u s t  thdr a c t i v i t i e s  t o  an 
i n s t i t u t i o n  whose f o u n d a t i o n  i s  b u i l t  on o t h e r  p r i n c i p l e s .
F u r t h e r m o r e ,  t h e  GATT l a c k s  t h a t  u n i v e r s a l  a ccep t ance  
t h a t  t h e  Common Fund i s  l i k e l y  t o  e n j o y .  I t  s ho u l d  be 
r e c a l l e d  t h a t  many o f  t h e  c o u n t r i e s  w i t h  p lanned  economies 
are n o t  members o f  t he  GATT b a s i c a l l y  because t h e  GATT i s  
based on t h e  premi  se o f  marke t  economy. The proposed Common 
Fund on. t he  o t h e r  hand,  does n o t  r e s t r i c t  i t s e l f  i n  t h i s  
way. In f a c t  as s t a t e d  above,  t he  Fund i s  based on t he  
p r i n c i p l e  o f  s o l i d a r i t y .
In v iew o f  a l l  t h i s ,  i t  i s  s u b m i t t e d  here  t h a t  t he  
proposed Common Fund as a new i n s t i t u t i o n  t o  deal  w i t h  
commodi ty  p r i c e  f l u c t u a t i o n s  was n ec es sa r y  a t  l e a s t  i n  
p u t t i n g  a sense o f  r e a l i t y  t o  t he  i d e a l s  o f  t h e  New 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Economic O r d e r .  The e x i s t i n g  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
i n s t i t u t i o n s  such as t h e  IMF and t he  GATT appear  t o  be 
i n a d e q u a t e  or  i n a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  f o s t e r  t h i s  sense o f  
s o l i d a r i t y  t h a t  t he  New I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Economic Order  seeks 
t o  r e a l i  z e .
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I V . The o r i g i n s  o f  t h e  Common Fund
The p r i n c i p l e  o f  s o l i d a r i t y  i n  t h e  C h a r t e r  o f  Economic 
R i g h t s  and D u t i e s  o f  s t a t e s  fo rms t h e  j u r i s p r u d e n t i a l  b a s i s  
f o r  t he  Common Fund and i ndeed  t he  e n t i r e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  
I n t e g r a t e d  Programme f o r  C om m o d i t i e s .  I t  s h o u l d  be p o i n t e d  
ou t  a t  t h i s  s tage  t h a t  a number o f  a u t h o r s  agree t h a t  t he  
c h a r t e r  i s  a l e g a l  document  o f  some s i g n i f i c a n t  i m p o r t a n c e  
and t h a t  most  o f  i t s  p r o v i s i o n s  are a r e s t a t e m e n t  o f  e x i s t i n g  
p r i n c i p l e s  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law w h i l e  o t h e r s  r e p r e s e n t  new
q
p r i n c i p l e s .  The new p r i n c i p l e s  i t  i s  s a i d ,  r e p r e s e n t  
or  are e v i d e n c e  o f  t he  p r o g r e s s i v e  deve l opmen t  o f  i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  l aw.  The p r i n c i p l e  o f  s o l i d a r i t y  
i n  t he  c h a r t e r  i s  n o t  an e n t i r e l y  new one bu t  i s  a r e s u l t  o f  
t he  p r o g r e s s i v e  deve l opment  o f  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  e q u a l i t y .
The f i r s t  h i n t  o f  t he  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a p p l y i n g  t h i s  
p r i n c i p l e  t o  m a t t e r s  o f  commodi ty  t r a d e  was made at  t he  
U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  Con fe r en ce  on Trade and Deve lopment  h e l d  
i n  1964.  The f i n a l  Ac t  o f  t h a t  c o n f e r e n c e  c a l l e d  f o r  t he  
e xp an s i on  o f  t he  Havana p r i n c i p l e s  g o v e r n i n g  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  
o f  commodi ty  agreements  i n  o r d e r  no t  o n l y  t o  c o v e r  i n d i v i d u a l  
co mm od i t i e s  bu t  groups o f  c o m m o d i t i e s . ^  In t h i s  r e s p e c t ,  
t he  f i n a l  Ac t  r e q u i r e d  UNCTAD t o  c r e a t e  a Commission charged 
w i t h  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i 1i t y  o f  f o r m u l a t i n g  a scheme f o r  a g en er a l  
and i n t e g r a t e d  p o l i c y  f o r  c ommod i t i es  as w e l l  as w o r k i n g  
o u t  a g e ne r a l  agreement  on commodi ty  m a t t e r s . ^
10. Address t o  t h e  w o r k i n g  group by i t s  ch a i rma n Jorge 
Cas t aneda ,  M e x i c o ' s  ambassador  t o  t h e  UN i n  Geneva,
Doc. TD/B/AC.12 /1  page 4.
1 1 . See p r o c e e d i n g s  o f  UNCTAD I ,  F i n a l  A c t ,  second p a r t ,  
1964.
I b i d . ,  Annexes A . I I . I .  pages 26 -28 .
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I t  was however ,  no t  u n t i l  t en  y e a r s  l a t e r  i n  1974 
t h a t  UNCTAD pr oceeded t o  t a k e  a c t i o n .  In t h a t  y e a r  i t  
passed a r e s o l u t i o n  c a l l i n g  f o r
" . . .  t h e  p r e p a r a t i o n  o f  an o v e r a l l  i n t e g r a t e d  
programme f o r  c o m m o d i t i e s ."1 2
Th is  was f o l l o w e d  by t h e  a d o p t i o n  i n  Augus t  1974 o f  t he
I n t e g r a t e d  Programme f o r  Commodities which in i t s  f i n a l
f o rm  c a l l e d  f o r  a c o n c e r t e d  approach by a l l  c o u n t r i e s  i n
1 3t a c k l i n g  t h e  commodi ty  p r ob l em .  A f t e r  y e a r s  o f  e x t e n s i v e  
n e g o t i a t i o n s ,  an agreement  was reached i n  1980 on t he  
fo rm o f  t h e  i n t e g r a t e d  programme. What emerged i n  t he  
f i n a l  agreement  was an i n t e g r a t e d  programme ;based on 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  commodi ty  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  t o  be v o l u n t a r i l y  
c o nc l ud e d  by bo th  p r o d u c e r s  and consumers ,  and s u p p o r t e d  
by a common f u n d .
The l e g a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  t h i s  agreement  was t h a t  i n  
l i n e  w i t h  t h e  NIEO documents ,  i t  c r e a t e d  a new i n s t i t u t i o n a l  
s t r u c t u r e  t o  deal  w i t h  commodi ty  p r o b l e m s .  T h i s  new 
i n s t i t u t i o n  i s  t h e  Common Fund. Th i s  f un d  was c r e a t e d  
m a i n l y  t o  c o - o r d i n a t e  t he  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  t h e  v a r i o u s  i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  commodi ty  o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  t o  g i v e  g u i d a nc e  to  
i n d i v i d u a l  ICOs, as w e l l  as a c t i n g  as a c a t a l y s t  f o r  t he  
c o n c l u s i o n  o f  more i n t e r n a t i o n a l  commodi ty  agreements  by 
p r o v i d i n g  f i n a n c i a l  i n c e n t i v e s .
Preambu l a r  p a r ag ra ph  1 o f  t he  agreement  c r e a t i n g  t he  
Common Fund,  s t a t e s  t he  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  member c o u n t r i e s  
t o  promote economic c o - o p e r a t i o n  based on t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  o f
12. See UN General  Assembly R e s o l u t u i o n  3203 ( s - V I ) .
13. See UNCTAD Document TD/B/498 o f  Augus t  1974.
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e q u i t y  and s o v e r e i g n  e q u a l i t y .  In many i n t e r n a t i o n a l
o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e se  two p r i n c i p l e s  i s
u s u a l l y  m a n i f e s t e d  i n  p r o v i s i o n  such as t h o s e  on equal  r i g h t s
1 4o f  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  and th o se  on equal  v o t e s  f o r  members.
In a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  two p r i n c i p l e s  above,  many i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
o r g a n i z a t i o n s  a l s o  based t h e i r  a c t i v i t i e s  on common sub­
s t a n t i v e  norms.  Examples o f  such norms are r e c i p r o c i t y ,  
t h e  m o s t - f a v o u r e d  n a t i o n  c l a u s e ,  t he  p r i n c i p l e  o f  open d o o r ,  
and t h a t  o f  f a i r  t r e a t m e n t .  For  example t h e  GATT b a s i c a l l y  
aims a t  t h e  c r e a t i o n  and ma in t enance  o f  a m u l t i l a t e r a l  f r a m e ­
work f o r  n e g o t i a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  o f  w o r l d  t r a d e .  
Among t h e  b a s i c  p r i n c i p l e s  employed by GATT i n  t h i s  r e s p e c t  
are f o r  example the  u n c o n d i t i o n a l  m o s t - f a v o u r e d  n a t i o n  
c 1a u s e . .
In t he  case o f  t h e  proposed Common Fund,  t h e  o b j e c t  i s  
t o  encourage t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  o f  commodi ty  agreements  by 
p r o v i s i o n  o f  f i n a n c e s .  T h i s  a r r angement  i t  i s  hoped would 
e nab l e  t he  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  communi ty  t o  e x e r t  some c o n t r o l  
on t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  commodi ty  m a r k e t s .  I t  s ho u l d  be 
obser ved  t h a t  t he  emphasis i s  on t he  c o - o r d i n a t i o n  o f  
commodi ty  t r a d e  p o l i c y  by t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  commun i ty .
In t h i s  r e s p e c t  t he  key o b l i g a t i o n  o f  t h e  members i s  t o  
c o - o p e r a t e  i n  g l o b a l  a c t i o n  t o  i mprove mar ke t  s t r u c t u r e s .
V . R e g u l a t o r y  measures t o  be employed by t he  Common Fund 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  economic and f i n a n c i a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  
t h a t  have as t h e i r  main aim i n f l u e n c i n g  t h e  p r i c e s  o f
14. See f o r  example ,  A r t i c l e  2 p a r ag ra ph  1 o f  t h e  UN c h a r t e r .
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c o mm o d i t e s , or  t h e  c o - o r d i n a t i o n  o f  economic and f i n a n c i a l  
p o l i c i e s  f o r  a group o f  c o u n t r i e s ,  t end  t o  employ i n  t h e i r  
l e g a l  i n s t r u m e n t s  one o f  a number o f  measures .  These 
measures i n c l u d e  the  exchange o f  i n f o r m a t i o n ,  c o n s u l t a t i o n ,  
and f i n a n c i a l  i n c e n t i v e s .
F i n a n c i a l  i n c e n t i v e s  i n  gene ra l  have p l a y e d  an 
i m p o r t a n t  r o l e  i n  h e l p i n g  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f i n a n c i a l  o r g a n i z a ­
t i o n s  a c h i e v e  a d e s i r e d  c ou r se  o f  a c t i o n .  In o r d e r  t o  
u n d e r s t a n d  f u l l y  t h e  system o f  f i n a n c i a l  i n c e n t i v e s  t h a t  
t h e  Common Fund seeks t o  employ ,  i t  i s  n e ce s s a r y  t o  
me nt i on  t h a t  t h e  Fu nd 's  f i n a n c i a l  means are o b t a i n e d  on 
t h e  one hand f r om c o n t r i b u t i o n s  by members i n  t h e  fo rm
o f  shares  and i n  accordance  w i t h  a f o r m u l a  w r i t t e n  i n  t h e
1 5agreement  c r e a t i n g  t he  Fund.  On t he  o t h e r  hand,  p a r t
o f  i t s  r e s o u r c e s  w i l l  be o b t a i n e d  f rom c o n t r i b u t i o n s  made 
by members,  r e s o u r c e s  c o n t r i b u t e d  by I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Commodi ty 
O r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  and b o r r o w i n g s  made by t h e  Common Fund i t s e l f
1 f if rom i n t e r n a t i o n a l  money m a r k e t s .
These r e s o u r c e s  are t o  be d i v i d e d  i n t o  two a c c o u n t s ,  
t h e  f i r s t  a cc oun t  and t he  second a c c o u n t .  The f i r s t  
accoun t  i s  t o  c o n s i s t  o f  t h o s e  r e s o u r c e s  d e r i v i n g  f rom 
members'  s u b s c r i p t i o n s  t owa rds  t he  d i r e c t l y  c o n t r i b u t e d  
c a p i t a l ,  d e p o s i t s  made by I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Commodi ty O r g a n i z a ­
t i o n s ,  v o l u n t a r y  c o n t r i b u t i o n s ,  and b o r r o w i n g s  made by t h e
1 7Fund f r om  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  money m a r k e t s .  The r e s o u r c e s  o f
15. See A r t i c l e  10 and s c he du le  A o f  t h e  agreement  
c r e a t i n g  t h e  Common Fund.
16. I b i d . ,  A r t i c l e s  13 and 14.
17. I b i d . ,  A r t  i c 1e 1 7 ( A ) .
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t he  second a cc oun t  s h a l l  c omp r i s e  o f  d i r e c t l y  c o n t r i b u t e d
c a p i t a l  wh ich  members may f r om t i m e  t o  t i m e  a l l o c a t e  t o  t he
1 Rsecond a cc o un t  i n  acco r dance  w i t h  a r t i c l e  1 0 , v o l u n t a r y  
c o n t r i b u t i o n s ,  t o  t h i s  a c c o u n t ,  b o r r o w i n g s  and any o t h e r  
r e s o u r c e s  p l a c e d  a t  t he  d i s p o s a l  o f  t h e  Fund f o r  t h e  second 
acco un t  o p e r a t i o n s .
To da te  f i n a n c i a l  i n c e n t i v e s  have been employed by 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  as i n s t r u m e n t s  o f  economic 
p o l i c y  so f a r  as t h e y  are i n t e n d e d  t o  p r o v i d e  an i n c e n t i v e  
or  d i s i n c e n t i v e  f o r  a p a r t i c u l a r  economic c o u r s e  o f  a c t i o n  
d e s i r e d  by a group o f  s t a t e s .  The p r o m o t i o n  o f  any 
p a r t i c u l a r  c o u rs e  o f  a c t i o n  i s  u s u a l l y  r e v e a l e d  by t he  
c o n d i t i o n s  a t t a c h e d  f o r  t h e  use o f  such f i n a n c e s .  An 
example o f  such c o n d i t i o n s  are a p p l i e d  by t h e  IMF. These 
c o n d i t i o n s  as a p p l i e d  i n  t h e  IMF do p r o v i d e  f o r  t he  
r e c i p i e n t  s t a t e  t o  f o l l o w  a c e r t a i n  c o u rs e  o f  economic 
a c t i o n  f a i l u r e  t o  wh ich  t he  i n c e n t i v e s  p r o v i d e d  would  be 
wi t h d r a w n .
In t h e  case o f  t h e  Common Fund,  t h e  r e s o u r c e s  o f
i t s  f i r s t  a cco un t  are t o  be used m a i n l y  t o  p r o v i d e  l oans
to associ a t ed  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Commodity O r g a n i z a t i o n s
1 9( ICO) a t  a low c o s t  o f  i n t e r e s t .  The l oa ns  are t o  be 
made t h r o u g h  a l e g a l  a r r angement  i n  t h e  f o rm  o f  an a s s o c i ­
a t i o n  agreement  t o  be co nc lu d ed  between t h e  Common Fund
18. T h i s  a r t i c l e  s t a t e s  t h a t ,
"Each member may a l l o c a t e  t o  t h e  second accoun t  
a p a r t  o f  i t s  s u b s c r i p t i o n  under  para 1 (a)  o f  
t h i s  a r t i c l e  w i t h  a v i ew t o  an a g g r e g a t e  a l l o ­
c a t i o n  t o  t he  second a c c o u n t ,  on a v o l u n t a r y
b a s i s ,  o f  no t  l e s s  t han  $70 m i l l i o n . "
19. A r t i c l e  17 para B(4)  o f  the  agreement  c r e a t i n g  the
Common Fund.
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on t h e  one hand,  and the  r e c i p i e n t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  commodi ty  
o r g a n i z a t i o n  on t h e  o t h e r .  Such l e g a l  a r r an ge me nt s  have 
been employed i n  a number o f  o t h e r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r g a n i z a ­
t i o n s  such as i s  t h e  case w i t h  t he  r e s e a r c h  c o n t r a c t s  i n
1 Rt he  Euroatom t r e a t y 10 and t he  IMF " l e t t e r s  o f  i n t e n t " .
The d e t a i l e d  l e g a l  a r r angement s  f o r  t he  use o f  t he  f i r s t  
accoun t  r e s o u r c e s  are y e t  t o  be worked ou t  bu t  t he  b a s i c  
p r i n c i p l e s  have been l a i d  down i n  t he  agreement  c r e a t i n g  
t he  Fund.
F i r s t  i t  i s  c l e a r  f rom t h e  agreement  t h a t  t he  terms
under  wh i ch  any ICO would  be a l l o w e d  t o  bo r r ow f r om t he
Fund wou ld  be embodied i n  agreements t o  be c o n c l u d e d  between
t h e  Fund and t h e  ICOs s p e c i f y i n g  t h e  te r ms  and c o n d i t i o n s
upon whi.ch t h e  l oan  i s  made i n c l u d i n g  t h e  r epayment  t e r m s .
Se c o nd l y ,  t he  g e ne r a l  purpose  f o r  which l o a n s  would be
g r a n t e d  f r om t h e  f i r s t  a c c o u n t ,  i s  t o  e n ab l e  t h e  a s s o c i a t e d
ICOs t o  f i n a n c e  the  pu r chase  o f  commodi ty  s t o c k s  t o  enab l e
them c o n t r o l  t h e  f l u c t u a t i o n s  i n  t h e  p r i c e s  o f  commod i t i es
1 9o f  i n t e r e s t  t o  them.  The f i n a n c i a l  r e s o u r c e s  o f  t he
Common Fund may no t  be used f o r  any o t h e r  p u r p o s e .  In t h i s
r e s p e c t  t he  Fund i s  r e q u i r e d  t o  make a r r an ge me nt s  to
" e n s u r e  t h a t  t h e  p roceeds  o f  any l oa n  o r  g r a n t  made 
or  p a r t i c i p a t e d  i n  by t he  Fund i s  used o n l y  f o r  
t h e  purposes  f o r  wh i ch  t h e  l oan  or  g r a n t  was made. "
F i n a l l y ,  any ICO w i s h i n g  t o  b e n e f i t  f r om t h e  r e s o u r c e s  o f
the  Fund i s  r e q u i r e d  t o  e n t e r  i n t o  an a s s o c i a t i o n  agreement
w i t h  t h e  f un d  s p e c i f y i n g  among o t h e r  t h i n g s  t h a t  t h e  ICO
18. See A r t i c l e  6 o f  t he  Euroatom t r e a t y .
19. A r t i c l e  16 para B (2)  and A r t i c l e  17 para  D s e c t i o n  
9 ( d )  o f  t he  Common Fund Agreement .
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c oncer ned  w i l l  n o t  bor row f rom any t h i r d  p a r t y  f o r  i t s  
b u f f e r  s t o c k i n g  u n le s s  t h e r e  i s  agreement  t o  t h a t  e f f e c t  
by t h e  Fund . ^
The te rms t h a t  are r e q u i r e d  t o  be i n c l u d e d  i n  both 
the  l oan agreement  and t h e  a s s o c i a t i o n  agreement  do tend 
t o  su gge s t  t h a t  t h e  l oans  t o  be o f f e r e d  by t h e  Fund are t o  
be c o n d i t i o n a l .  Such c o n d i t i o n a l  f i n a n c i a l  i n c e n t i v e s  have 
been a source  o f  a l o t  o f  f r i c t i o n  between t he  IMF and i t s  
b o r r o w i n g  members i n  t he  p a s t .  One hopes t h e r e f o r e  t h a t  
when the  r u l e s  and r e g u l a t i o n s  f o r  b o r r o w i n g  f ro m t he  
Common Fund are f i n a l l y  worked o u t ,  some s e r i o u s  t h o u g h t  
w i l l  have been made t o  p r o v i d e  l e g a l  s e c u r i t y  t h a t  w i l l  
p r e v e n t  a r b i t r a r y  d e c i s i o n s  be ing  made by t h e  CF t o  t he  
d e t r i m e n t  o f  some o f  i t s  members.
VI . Legal  s a f e g u a r d s  and c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  use o f
r e s o u r c e s  o f  t h e  Fund
As s t a t e d  above,  t h e  p r i m a r y  purpose o f  t he  Common 
Fund i s  t o  p r o v i d e  f i n a n c i n g  t o  ICOs i n  o r d e r  t o  enab l e  
them meet t he  c o s t s  o f  o p e r a t i n g  b u f f e r  s t o c k s .  T h i s  r o l e  
o f  t h e  Fund i s  aimed a t  t a c k l i n g  one o f  t h e  main prob lems 
t h a t  has c o n t r i b u t e d  t owa rds  t h e  f a i l u r e  o f  a number o f  
commodi ty  a g r eemen ts ,  and has proved a s t u m b l i n g  b l o c k  
i n  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  o f  f u r t h e r  agreements .  In t h e  T i n  
agreement  f o r  exampl e,  t h e  prob l em over  t h e  y e a r s  had been 
one o f  t r y i n g  t o  f i n d  t he  b es t  way o f  f i n a n c i n g  t he  a c t i v i t i e s
20. See A r t i c l e  16 para  E(7)  and A r t i c l e  17 para D 
s ub pa ra gr ap h  (b)  o f  t he  Common Fund Agreement .
16.1
o f  t he  T in  C o u n c i l .  T h i s  p rob l em o f  f i n a n c i n g  had been 
so s e r i o u s  t h a t  when i n  1976 t h e  F i f t h  t i n  agreement  was 
c o n c l u d e d ,  B o l i v i a  r e f u s e d  t o  r a t i f y  t he  agreement  a r g u i n g  
t h a t  i t  l ack ed  f i n a n c i a l  r e s o u r c e s  t o  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  the  
o p e r a t i o n s  o f  t he  o r g a n i z a t i o n . ^  S i m i l a r l y  one o f  t he  
d i f f i c u l t i e s  f a c i n g  t he  c o n c l u s i o n  o f  t h e  c opper  commodi ty  
agreement  i s  t h a t  o f  l a c k  o f  adequate f i n a n c e s  t o  meet t he  
c o s t  o f  o p e r a t i n g  a b u f f e r  s t o c k .
The F un d ' s  f i r s t  account  seeks t h e r e f o r e  t o  remove 
t h i s  s t u m b l i n g  b l o c k  by p r o v i d i n g  t he  ICOs w i t h  t he  
n e cess ar y  f i n a n c e s  f o r  t h e  o p e r a t i o n  o f  b u f f e r  s t o c k s .
Wh i l e  t he  f i r s t  accoun t  seeks t o  deal  w i t h  t h e  p rob l em o f  
p r i c e  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  by way o f  b u f f e r  s t o c k i n g ,  t he  second 
account ,  seeks t o  c o mp l i me nt  t h o se  e f f o r t s  t h r o u g h  f i n a n c i n g  
t he  programmes o f  d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  and i mprovements  i n  t he  
m a r k e t i n g  t e c h n i q u e s .
In o r d e r  t o  s a f e g u a r d  t he  p o s i t i o n  o f  t he  Fund v i s - a -  
v i s  t he  b o r r o w i n g  ICOs and i n  o r d e r  t o  ensure  t h a t  t h e  
Fund ' s  r e s o u r c e s  are no t  d e p l e t e d  by t h e  non repayment  o f  
l o a n s ,  t h e  Fund agreement  p r o v i d e s  c e r t a i n  s a f e g u a r d s .
The f i r s t  s a f e g u a r d  concer ns  t he  maximum amount each 
a s s o c i a t e d  ICO i s  t o  be p e r m i t t e d  t o  b o r r o w .  Th i s  
b o r r o w i n g  l i m i t  i s  r e f e r r e d  t o  as t he  "maximum f i n a n c i a l  
r e q u i r e m e n t  (MFR)" .  Th i s  MFR would v a r y  f ro m one ICO to  
a n o t h e r  depend ing  on t he  s i z e  o f  b u f f e r  s t o c k  t h e y  i n t e n d  
t o  b u i l d .  The s i z e  o f  t he  b u f f e r  s t o c k  f o r  each ICO i s
21. See F ac ts  on F i l e ,  March 12, 1977 a t  page 169.
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t o  be d e t e r m i n e d  by t he  r e s p e c t i v e  ICOs. The e x a c t  f o r m u l a  
f o r  t h e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  t he  maximum l i m i t  o f  b o r r o w i n g  
f o r  each ICO w i l l  be t h e  c o s t  o f  a c q u i s i t o n  o f  s t o c k s
which  w i l l  be d e t e r m i n e d  by m u l t i p l y i n g  t h e  a u t h o r i s e d
2 2s i z e  o f  i t s  s t o c k s  by an a p p r o p r i a t e  p ur chase  p r i c e .
The second s a f e g u a r d  i s  t h a t  p r o v i d e d  f o r  under
a r t i c l e  16 p ar ag r ap h  7 o f  t h e  agreement  wh i ch  r e q u i r e s  t he
Fund t o  make a r r angement s  t h a t  would e nsur e  t h a t  l oans  or
grants made by the Fund are used only f o r  the purposes f o r
23whi ch  t h e y  were made. I t  i s  however ,  no t  c l e a r  as t o  
what  a r r an ge me nt s  t h e  Fund i s  p e r m i t t e d  t o  make t o  ensure  
t h a t  a l l  l oa ns  are used f o r  t h e  purpose t o  wh i ch  t h e y  
were p r o c u r e d .  The q u e s t i o n  i s  as t o  w he t h e r  such 
a r r an ge me nt s  c o u l d  be made i n t e r n a l l y  w i t h i n  t h e  Fund ' s  
d e c i s i o n  making p ro cess  or  w he the r  such a d e c i s i o n  s ho u l d  
be made by t h e  Fund i n  c o n s u l t a t i o n  w i t h  t h e  a s s o c i a t e d  
ICOs. T h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n  i s  i m p o r t a n t  because i f  t he s e  
a r r angement s  are made by t h e  Fund a l o n e ,  t hen  t h e y  may 
be l oo k ed  upon as c o n d i t i o n s  imposed f ro m t h e  t o p  and may 
t h e r e f o r e  cause r e s e n t m e n t  among t h e  ICOS. On t h e  o t h e r  
hand i f  t h e  ICOS are a l l o w e d  t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  t h e  f o r m u l a ­
t i o n  o f  t he  a r r a n g e m e n t s ,  t he  prob lem o f  r e s e n t m e n t  may 
no t  o c c u r .
2 2 . A r t i c l e  17 para 8 o f  t he  Common Fund A g r e em e n t .
23.  A r t i c l e  16 para 7 p r o v i d e s  i n t e r  a l i a  t h a t ,
"The Fund s h a l l  make a r r angement s  t o  ensure  
t h a t  t h e  proceeds o f  any l oan  or  g r a n t  
made or  p a r t i c i p a t e d  i n  by t h e  Fund i s  
used o n l y  f o r  t h e  purpose f o r  wh i ch  t h e  
l o an  or  g r a n t  was made. "
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The t h i r d  s a f e g u a r d  seeks t o  p r o v i d e  t h e  Fund w i t h  
some measure o f  c o n t r o l  ove r  t he  s t o c k i n g  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  t he  
ICOs. Th i s  c o n t r o l  i s  n e c es sa r y  because a l t h o u g h  the  
Fund s ho u l d  no t  be a b l e  t o  d i c t a t e  d e c i s i o n s  on such 
m a t t e r s  as s t o c k  s i z e s ,  g rades  s t o c k e d ,  o r  t h e  l o c a t i o n  o f  
s t o c k  s t o r a g e  s i t e s ,  i t  s h o u l d  be a b l e  t o  e x e r c i s e  some 
i n f l u e n c e  on t h e  m a t t e r s  because u l t i m a t e l y  t h e s e  i s s u e s  
a f f e c t  t h e  amounts t he  ICOs w i l l  r e q u i r e  t o  bo r r ow  f r om 
t he  Fund.  To g i v e  l e g a l  f o rm  to  t h i s  s a f e g u a r d ,  a l l  
a s s o c i a t i o n  agreements  c o nc l u d e d  between t h e  Fund and t h e  
ICOs must s t a t e  t h a t  t h e  ICOs are l i a b l e  t o  t h e  Fund f o r  
a l l  a c t i v i t i e s  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  m a i n t e n a n c e ,  p r e s e r v a t i o n  
o f  s t o c k s ,  h a n d l i n g  and h o l d i n g  o f  such s t o c k s .
As an added d i m e ns i on  t o  t he  above s a f e g u a r d s ,  are
a number o f  l e n d i n g  c o n d i t i o n s  which  appear  t o  be aimed at
e n s u r i n g  t h a t  b o r r o w i n g s  are  made and used i n  such a
manner as t o  make prompt  r epayments  o f  l oa ns
more l i k e l y .  These l e n d i n g  c o n d i t i o n s ,  as i s  t he  case w i t h
most  o t h e r  f i n a n c i a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  are t o  be embodied i n
a f o r m a l  agreement  t o  be c on c l ud e d  between t h e  Fund on t he
one hand and t h e  b o r r o w i n g  ICO on t he  o t h e r .  These a g r ee -
? 4ments are  r e f e r r e d  t o  as " c r e d i t  a g r e e m e n t s . "
The c o n t e n t s  o f  t h e  c r e d i t  agreement  would  be the  
l e g a l  r e f l e c t i o n  o f  t he  F u nd ' s  p o l i c i e s  and d e c i s i o n s  
r e g a r d i n g  such m a t t e r s  as t h e  terms o f  t h e  l o a n  i n c l u d i n g  
t he  d u r a t i o n ,  repayment  p e r i o d ,  and t he  i n t e r e s t  on t he
24.  In t h e  IBRD, t h e  main f o r m a l  agreements  are t h e
1oan , a g r e e m e n t , t h e  p r o j e c t  a g r eemen t ,  t h e  g u a r a n t e e  
ag ree me nt ,  t h e  a d d i t i o n a l  c o n t r a c t u a l  a r r a n g e m e n t s , 
and t h e  so c a l l e d  s u p p l e m e n t a r y  l e t t e r s .
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l o a n . 25 At  t h e  moment i t  i s  n o t  p o s s i b l e  t o  p r e d i c t  w i t h  
any measure o f  c e r t a i n t y  as t o  what  t h e s e  c r e d i t  agreements  
w i l l  c o n t a i n ,  bu t  o n l y  sugges t  what  t h e y  may c o n t a i n  on 
t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  o t h e r  f i n a n c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s .
The IBRD f o r  example ,  has as i t s  main purpose t he  
f i n a n c i n g  o f  d eve l opmen t  p r o j e c t s  i n  member c o u n t r i e s  t h r o u g h  
t h e  p r o m o t i o n  o f  p r i v a t e  i n v e s t m e n t  by g u a r a n t e e i n g  or 
p a r t i c i p a t i n g  i n  l oa ns  and o t h e r  i n v e s t m e n t s ,  and e n c o u r a g i n g  
t h e  d ev e l opmen t  o f  p r o d u c t i v e  r e s o u r c e s  o f  members by way
9  no f  g u a r a n t e e i n g  or  p a r t i c i p a t i n g  i n  l o an s  and i n v e s t m e n t s .  
S i m i l a r l y ,  t h e  IDA, and t h e  IMF a l l  p r o v i d e  f i n a n c i a l
27r e s o u r c e s  t o  s t a t e s  who are members o f  t h o s e  o r g a n i z a t i o n s .  
The Common Fund has t h e r e f o r e  go t  s p e c i a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  
i n  t he  .sense t h a t  most  o f  i t s  r e s o u r c e s ,  u n l i k e  t he  case 
w i t h  t h e  IBRD, IDA and t he  IMF are f o r  t h e  use o f  I n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  Commodi ty O r g a n i z a t i o n s  r a t h e r  t ha n  i n d i v i d u a l  
member s t a t e s .  In t h i s  r e s p e c t ,  t he  p r a c t i c e  o f  t he  CF 
r e g a r d i n g  i t s  c r e d i t  agreements  may n o t  f o l l o w  t h e  e x a c t  
p a t t e r n  e x i s t i n g  i n  t h e s e  o t h e r  o r g a n i z a t i o n s .  A l t h o u g h  
t h e  CF may no t  f o l l o w  t he  e x a c t  p a t t e r n  s e t  i n  t he  p r a c t i c e  
o f  t he s e  o t h e r  o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  i t  i s  bound t o  p o r t r a y  some 
s i m i l a r i t i e s  w i t h  t he s e  o r g a n i z a t i o n s .  T h i s  i s  because 
t he  CF r e v e a l s  many shared a sp ec ts  w i t h  t h e  o t h e r  i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  f i n a n c i a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n s .  For  example l i k e  a l l
25. A r t i c l e  17 para  9 ( d )  and A r t i c l e  18 para  3 ( h )  o f
t h e  Common Fund agreement .
26.  A r t i c l e  1 o f  the IBRD A r t i c l e s  o f  Agreement .
2 7 . See A r t i c l e s  I and V of the IDA A r t i c l e s  of Agreement,
September 24,  1960;  also a r t i c l e  l ( v )  of the IMF 
A r t i c l e s  of  Agreement .
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such o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  t h e  CF i s  a l e n d e r  o f  f i n a n c e  . T h i s
s i m i l a r i t y  i n  n a t u r e  may r e s u l t  i n  common i s s u e s  a r i s i n g
i n  t h e  CF b e in g  t a c k l e d  i n  v e r y  much t h e  same way as t h e y
are t a c k l e d  i n  t h e  o t h e r  o r g a n i z a t i o n s .  I t  i s  o n l y  i n  t h i s
l i m i t e d  sense t h a t  p o s s i b l e  c o n d i t i o n s  t o  be i n c l u d e d  i n
t he  CF c r e d i t  agreement  w i l l  be d i s c u s s e d  and compared
w i t h  t h o s e  employed i n  t he  o t h e r  o r g a n i z a t i o n s .
A l l  f i n a n c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  i n  t h e  t t for ld 0ank Qroup
p r o v i d e  i n  t h e i r  l oan  agreements  f o r  what  would  be termed
i n i t i a l  c o n d i t i o n s .  These are c o n d i t i o n s  t h a t  have t o  be
met b e f o r e  t h e  agreement  f i n a l l y  becomes e f f e c t i v e .  For
exampl e,  t h e  IDA deve l opment  c r e d i t  agreements  are n o t  t o
be e f f e c t i v e  u n t i l  s a t i s f a c t o r y  e v i d e n c e  i s  f u r n i s h e d  to
t h e  A s s o c i a t i o n  t o  t he  e f f e c t  t h a t  t h e  e x e c u t i o n  and
d e l i v e r y  o f  t h e  agreement  on b e h a l f  o f  t h e  b o r r o w e r  has
been d u l y  a u t h o r i z e d  o r  r a t i f i e d  by a l l  n e c e s s a r y  g o v e r n - 
? ftmenta l  a c t i o n .  As p a r t  o f  t he  e v i d e n c e  t o  be f u r n i s h e d  
i s  a l e g a l  o p i n i o n  s a t i s f y i n g  t he  A s s o c i a t i o n  t h a t  t h e  
agreement  has been d u l y  a u t h o r i z e d  and e x ec u t e d  and t h a t  i t  
f o rms a v a l i d  b i n d i n g  o b l i g a t i o n .  These i n i t i a l  and 
g en er a l  c o n d i t i o n s  a p p l y  t o  a l l  l oan  and g u a r a n t e e  a g r ee -  
ments made by t h e  IBRD and t h e  IFC.
There i s  no reason  t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  CF w i l l  d e p a r t  
f rom t h i s  p r a c t i c e  because i t  i s  a lm os t  o b v i o u s  t h a t  t he
28. See A r t i c l e  X s e c t i o n  10.01 o f  t h e  g e n e r a l  c o n d i t i o n s
a p p l i c a b l e  t o  deve l opmen t  c r e d i t  agreements  da ted  Jan 
31,  1969,  UN T r e a t y  S e r i e s ,  volume 73 a t  page 244.
.29. See f o r  exampl e ,  A r t i c l e  11 o f  t he  g e n e r a l  c o n d i t i o n s
a p p l i c a b l e  t o  l oan  and g u a r a n t e e  ag ree me nt s ,  January  
31,  1969,  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  T r e a t y  S e r i e s ,  volume 691 
a t  page 300^ " """
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Fund would want  t o  s a t i s f y  i t s e l f  t h a t  i t  i s  d e a l i n g  w i t h  
a u t h o r i z e d  o f f i c i a l s  o f  t he  ICOs. T h i s  a v o i d s  a s i t u a t i o n  
whereby t h e  l e g a l  v a l i d i t y  o f  t he  c r e d i t  agreement  i s  
b r o u g h t  i n t o  q u e s t i o n  a f t e r  f unds  have a l r e a d y  been 
e x p en d ed .
In a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e s e  i n i t i a l  c o n d i t i o n s ,  t he  l oan
agreements  and g u a r a n t e e  agreements made by t h e  IBRD; the
deve l opment  c r e d i t  agreements o f  t he  IDA c o n t a i n  f u r t h e r
p r o v i s i o n s  t h a t  s p e l l  o u t  t h e  c o n d i t o n s  upon which  the
loans  are made. These c o n d i t i o n s  i n c l u d e  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r
w i t h d r a w a l  f rom t h e  l oan a c c o u n t ,  payment  o f  i n t e r e s t ,  pay-
3 O’ment o f  commi tment  c h a r g e s ,  an.d t h e  use o f  t h e  l o an . _  A l l  
t h e se  p r o v i s i o n s  p r o v i d e  t he  o p e r a t i o n a l  m o d a l i t i e s  f o r  t h e  
use o f  t h e  r e s o u r c e s  o f  t h e  l e n d i n g  i n s t i t u t i o n .
I t  i s  o b v i o u s  t h a t  t he  CF w i l l  want  t o  make sure t h a t
th e se  o p e r a t i o n a l  m o d a l i t i e s  are i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  c r e d i t
agreements  because t he s e  m a t t e r s  are i m p o r t a n t  i n  e n s u r i n g  
t h a t  t he  r e s o u r c e s  o f  t h e  Fund are not  p u t  t o  a use o t h e r  
t han  f o r  what  i t  was i n t e n d e d  and a l s o  t o  a v o i d  a s i t u a t i o n  
where i t s  r e s o u r c e s  are d e p l e t e d  q u i c k l y  due t o  non r e p a y ­
ment o f  t h e  l o a n s .  One can t h e r e f o r e  c o n c l u d e  by s a y i ng  
t h a t  t he  c o n d i t i o n s  t o  be i n c l u d e d  i n  t he  CF c r e d i t  a g r e e ­
ments are l i k e l y  t o  be v e r y  s i m i l a r  t o  t h o s e  c u r r e n t l y
employed by o t h e r  f i n a n c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  w i t h i n  t he  
Wor ld Bank g r oup .
30. For  an example o f  t he s e  c o n d i t i o n s ,  see A R t i c l e  I I  
s e c t i o n  2 . 0 1 ;  A r t i c l e  2 s e c t i o n  2 . 0 6 ;  A r t i c l e  I I I ;  
and A r t i c l e  V o f  t h e  IBRD-Zambia l oan  agreement  on 
e d u c a t i o n a l  p r o j e c t s ,  s i gned  at  Wash ing ton  on 11th 
A p r i l  1969,  UN T r e a t y  S e r i e s , volume 691 a t  page 240.
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. V I I .  The Common Fu nd 's  r e g u l a t o r y  reg ime and 
co ppe r  p r i c e  s t a b i l i z a t i o n
( i ) C o n c l u s i o n  o f  a c opper  commodi ty  agreement
As me nt i oned  above,  t h e  Common Fund seeks t o  employ 
a sys tem o f  f i n a n c i a l  i n c e n t i v e s  t o  a c h i e v e  commodi t y  p r i c e  
s t a b i l i z a t i o n .  Wi th  r e s p e c t  t o  copper  t h e r e f o r e ,  t he  Common 
Fund e n v i s a g e s  f i r s t  o f  a l l  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
copper  agreement  c o nc l ud e d  between p r o d u c e r s  and consumers .  
The a c t i v i t i e s  o f  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  copper  o r g a n i z a t i o n  would 
then  be s u p e r v i s e d  and c o - o r d i n a t e d  by t h e  Common Fund.
The i d e a  here i s  t h a t  t h e  c o - o r d i n a t i o n  and s u p e r v i s o r y  r o l e  
o f  t he  Common Fund would h e l p  c o n t r o l  t h e  f l u c t u a t i o n s  i n  
copper  p r i c e s  i n  so f a r  as t h e  Fund would  p r o v i d e  f i n a n c i a l  
r e s o u r c e s  t o  such an I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Copper  O r g a n i z a t i o n  
e n a b l i n g  i t  t o  purchase  c opper  f rom t h e  ma rke t  i n  t h e  eve nt  
o f  a downswing i n  t he  p r i c e s  so as t o  s u p p o r t  an e f f e c t i v e  
demand. In p e r i o d s  o f  upswing i n  p r i c e s ,  t h e  Common Fund 
would c o - o r d i n a t e  t he  r e l e a s e  o f  copper  s t o c k s  by t h e  o r g a n ­
i z a t i o n .  Put  a n o t h e r  way,  t h e  i dea  be h i nd  a Common Fund 
i s  t h a t  t h e  p r i c e  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  p r ocess  f o r  a commodi ty  
l i k e  copper  would  b e s t  be a c h i ev ed  t h r o u g h  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  
o f  an X n t e r n a t i  onal  Copper  Agreement  encompassing both  
p r o d u c e r s  and consumers o f  c o p p e r ,  wh ich  would  p r o v i d e  f o r  
a b u f f e r  s t o c k .  Such a b u f f e r  s t o c k  would  t he n  be s u p p o r t e d  
by t h e  Common Fund t h e r e b y  e n a b l i n g  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  copper  
o r g a n i z a t i o n  t o  e n t e r  t h e  mar ke t  as p u r c h a s e r  when p r i c e s  go 
below an agreed minimum and as s e l l e r  when t h e y  r i s e  beyond 
an agreed maximum.
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Copper appears  t o  be one o f  t h o s e  c o mm o d i t i e s  t h a t  
m i gh t  b e n e f i t  v e r y  l i t t l e  f r om t he  o p e r a t i o n  o f  t he  Common 
Fund.  T h i s  i s  a r e s u l t  o f  t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  e n c o u n t e r i n g  
t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  o f  a copper  commodi ty  agr eement .  S i nce  
1976,  n e g o t i a t i o n s  have been t a k i n g  p l a c e  w i t h  a v iew 
t o  c o n c l u d i n g  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  copper  agreement  bu t  t o  
da te  no t a n g i b l e  r e s u l t s  have been a c h i e v e d .  The main 
o b s t a c l e s  t o  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  o f  such an agreement  appear  
t o  be t wo .  The f i r s t  a r i s e s  f r om t he  v e r y  n a t u r e  o f  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  commodi ty  agreements where t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  
t he  e x p o r t i n g  c o u n t r i e s  are assumed by governments  and t ho s e  
o f  consumers by compan i es .  These i n t e r e s t s  have c o n t i n u o u s l y  
been c o n f l i c t i n g  r e s u l t i n g  i n  d e ad lo ck s  i n  n e g o t i a t i o n s .
The second o b s t a c l e  r e l a t e s  t o  t he  mechanism f o r  p r i c e  
s t a b i l i s a t i o n  t o  be i n c l u d e d  i n  a copper  ag r eemen t .  In 
t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  t h a t  t o o k  p l a c e  between r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  
o f  e x p o r t i n g  and consuming c o u n t r i e s  i n  1979 f o r  example,  
i t  became a p p a r e n t  t h a t  t he  two s i d es  were n o t  i n  agreement  
as t o  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  l e g a l  mechanisms f o r  t h e  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  
o f  copper  p r i c e s  t o  be i n c l u d e d  i n  a c opper  agreement .
The second i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l  group o f  e x p e r t s  on c o p p e r ,  
a p p o i n t e d  by t h e  s i x t h  p r e p a r a t o r y  m e e t i ng  on copper  met 
i n  Geneva f ro m June 15 t o  J u l y  6t h ,  1979.  The t a s k  o f  t he  
group o f  e x p e r t s  was t o  examine i s s u e s  r e l a t i n g  t o  t he  
p r i c e  r a n g e ,  t h e  b u f f e r  s t o c k  s i z e  and f i n a n c i a l  r e q u i r e ­
ments ,  f o r  a p o s s i b l e  c opper  agreement .
Two v iews emerged a t  t he  m e e t i n g .  The f i r s t  v i ew 
which was p r e s e n t e d  by most o f  t he  consuming n a t i o n s ,  was 
t h a t  t he  p r e s e n t  mar ke t  system f o r  copper  was s a t i s f a c t o r y
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and t h e r e f o r e  t h a t  what  was needed was t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  a
m a ch i ne r y  f o r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o n s u l t a t i o n .  The second v iew
which  was shared by most e x p o r t i n g  c o u n t r i e s ,  i n c l u d i n g
Zambia,  was t h a t  i t  was n ecess ar y  t o  c o r r e c t  t h e  market
mechanism t h r o u g h  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  copper  agreement
e m p l oy ing  t he  b u f f e r  s t o c k  mechanism a lo n e  o r  i n  c o m b i n a t i o n
31w i t h  o t h e r  measures such as s u p p l y  management .
At  t h e  s even t h  p r e p a r a t o r y  me et i ng  on copper  however ,  
t h e  two v iews were r e c o n c i l e d  and i t  was agreed t h a t  what  
was needed f o r  copper  p r i c e  s t a b i l i s a t i o n  was an i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  copper  agreement .  A l t h o u g h  t he  need f o r  a copper  
commodi ty  agreement  has now been agreed upon t h e  mechanism 
t o  be employed by such an agreement  has y e t  t o  be agreed 
upon.  The main i s s u e s  t h a t  remain  u n r e s o l v e d  i n c l u d e  t he  
s i z e  o f  t h e  b u f f e r  s t o c k ,  t h e  p r i c e  band t o  be s u p p o r t e d  
by such a b u f f e r  s t o c k ,  and whe the r  o r  n o t  t h e  b u f f e r  s t o c k  
s ho u l d  be used a lo ne  o r  be complemented by s u p p l y  management .
Unless t h e r e f o r e ,  e x po r t in g  and consuming nat ions  
reach agreement on these issues t he re  can be no I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
Copper Agreement and wi t hout  i t ,  t he r e  can be no hope of  
copper p r i c e  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  proceeding through the i n t e ­
grated programme f o r  commodit ies and the common fund.
( i i ) The Common Fund as an i n c e n t i v e  f o r  t h e  
c o n c l u s i o n  o f  a copper  agreement
Advocat es  o f  t h e  Common Fund have argued t h a t  t he  
Fund w ou l d ,  when o p e r a t i o n a l  work t o  s t i m u l a t e  t h e  c r e a t i o n
31. CIPEC S e c r e t a r i a t ,  "Copper  E x p e r t s  m e e t i ng  i n  Geneva 
i n c o n c l u s i v e " ,  CIPEC Q u a r t e r l y  R e v i e w , A p r i l - J u n e  
1 979,  pages 7 - 9 7™  — — —
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o f  f u r t h e r  commodi ty  a g r eemen ts .  T h i s  argument  i s  based 
on t h e  a ss umpt ion  t h a t  t h e  c o s t  t o  members o f  an i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n  i n  te rms o f  m a i n t a i n i n g  a b u f f e r  
s t o c k  t o  s t a b i l i z e  p r i c e s  would s u b s t a n t i a l l y  be reduced 
i f  t h e y  u t i l i z e  t h e  Common Fund.  The argument  i s  t h a t  
w i t h o u t  t he  Fund,  p r o d u c e r  c o u n t r i e s  e n t e r i n g  i n t o  a 
commodi t y  o r g a n i z a t i o n  would have t o  s hare  e q u a l l y  t he  
f i n a n c i a l  burden o f  b u f f e r  s t o c k i n g  w i t h  consumer  c o u n t r i e s .  
T h i s  b e i ng  t h e  case ,  i t  i s  argued t h a t  consumers and 
p r o d u c e r  c o u n t r i e s  would f i n d  i t  f i t  t o  e n t e r  i n t o  i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  commodi ty  agreements  and a s s o c i a t e  them w i t h  t h e  
Common Fund i n  o r d e r  t o  t a k e  advantage o f  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  
musc le p r o v i d e d  by t h e  Fund.
In t h e  case o f  c o p p e r ,  t h i s  argument  does no t  seem t o  
be p l a u s i b l e  because i t  o v e r l o o k s  a t  l e a s t  two i s s u e s .
F i r s t ,  i t  o v e r l o o k s  t h e  deep d i v i s i o n s  e x i s t i n g  between 
t he  p r o d u c e r s  and consumers o f  c o p p e r .  As s t a t e d  above,  
most  consumer  c o u n t r i e s  are r e l u c t a n t  t o  e n t e r  i n t o  a 
s t a b i l i z i n g  a r ran ge me nt  f o r  copper  because t h e y  b e l i e v e  
t h e  p r e s e n t  m ar k e t  s t r u c t u r e  i s  adequate  t o  s a f e g u a r d  t he  
i n t e r e s t s  o f  bo th  p r o d u c e r s  and consumers .  The p r o d u c e r  
c o u n t r i e s  b e l i e v e  t h a t  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  
a r ran ge me nt  i s  e s s e n t i a l  i f  t he  p r i c e s  o f  c opper  have t o  
be s t a b i l i z e d .  In such a s i t u a t i o n ,  i t  wou l d seem no 
amount o f  f i n a n c i a l  i n c e n t i v e  f rom t h e  Common Fund may 
i n  i t s  own persuade  t h e s e  consumer n a t i o n s  t o  e n t e r  i n t o  
an ag r eement .
The second p o i n t  t h a t  appears t o  be o v e r l o o k e d  r e l a t e s  
t o  t h e  medium w i t h i n  t h e  Common Fund,  t o  be used t o  s u p p o r t
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a c opper  b u f f e r  s t o c k  were an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  copper  a g r e e ­
ment t o  be c o n c l u d e d .  The agreement  c r e a t i n g  t he  Common 
Fund makes i t  c l e a r  t h a t  b u f f e r  s t o c k s  c r e a t e d  by 
a s s o c i a t e d  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  commodi ty  agreements  would  be 
s u p p o r t e d  f r om  f un d s  i n  t h e  f i r s t  window or  f i r s t  a c c o u n t .  
But  i t  i s  c l e a r  f r om  A r t i c l e  17 o f  t h e  agreement  c r e a t i n g  
t he  Common Fund t h a t  t h e  main r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t he  
f i n a n c i n g  o f  t h e  f i r s t  w indow,  l i e s  w i t h  t h e  a s s o c i a t e d  
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Commodi ty O r g a n i z a t i o n s .  The A r t i c l e  c l e a r l y  
r e q u i r e s  t h e  r e s o u r c e s  o f  t h e  f i r s t  window t o  c o n s i s t  o f  
s u b s c r i p t i o n s  o f  member c o u n t r i e s ;  cash d e p o s i t s  made by 
a s s o c i a t e d  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Commodi ty O r g a n i z a t i o n s ;  g u a r a n t ee  
c a p i t a l ,  cash i n  l i e u  o f  g u a r a n t e e  c a p i t a l  and g u a ra n te e s  
p r o v i d e d  by p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  a s s o c i a t e d  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  com­
m o d i t y  o r g a n i z a t i o n s ;  v o l u n t a r y  c o n t r i b u t i o n s ;  e a r n i n g s  
wh i ch  may a cc r ue  f r o m o p e r a t i o n s  o f  t he  f i r s t  a c c o u n t ;  
s p e c i a l  r e s e r v e s ;  and s t o c k  w a r r a n t s  f r o m  a s s o c i a t e d  i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  commodi t y  o r g a n i z a t i o n s .
The heavy r e l i a n c e  by t h e  f i r s t  a cc o un t  on f i n a n c e s  
p r o v i d e d  by t h e  a s s o c i a t e d  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Commodi ty  O r g a n i z a ­
t i o n s  i s  e x e m p l i f i e d  by A r t i c l e  14 o f  t h e  agreement  
c r e a t i n g  t he  Fund.  A c c o r d i n g  t o  t h i s  A r t i c l e  each 
a s s o c i a t e d  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  commodi ty o r g a n i z a t i o n  i s  r e q u i r e d  
t o  e s t i m a t e  i t s  maximum f i n a n c i a l  r e q u i r e m e n t  (MFR) which 
i s  t he  amount needed i n  o r d e r  t o  r e g u l a t e  t h e  mar ke t  o f  
i n t e r e s t  t o  t h a t  o r g a n i z a t i o n  i n  acco r dance  w i t h  t he  p o l i c y  
g u i d e l i n e s  p r o v i d e d  by t h e  Fund. O n e - t h i r d  o f  t h e  MFR 
i s  t hen  r e q u i r e d  t o  be d e p o s i t e d  w i t h  t h e  Common Fund and 
t h e  r e m a i n i n g  t w o - t h i r d s  must be p r o v i d e d  i n  t h e  f o r m o f
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c a p i t a l  guar ant ee s.  The deposi ts  made by a l l  the associ ated  
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Commodity O r g a n i z a t i o n s  are then pooled 
t o g et h e r  in the f i r s t  account and t o g e t h e r  wi th  ot her  funds 
a v a i l a b l e  in the account ,  used to support  b u f f e r  s tocks.
A l t h o u g h  t h e  p o o l i n g  o f  r e s o u r c e s  f ro m a number o f  
commodi ty  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  may r e s u l t  i n  a l a r g e r  amount o f  
money a v a i l a b l e  t o  say a copper  b u f f e r  s t o c k ,  t h i s  i n  
i t s e l f  may no t  work t o  remove t he  o b s t a c l e  t o  t he  c o n c l u s i o n  
o f  a copper  ag r eement .  In f a c t  t he  r e l i a n c e  on f unds  
p r o v i d e d  by commodi ty  agreements  may work t o  r e i n f o r c e  t he  
argument  o f  t ho s e  consumer c o u n t r i e s  who b e l i e v e  t h a t  t he  
p r e s e n t  mark e t  mechanism as f a r  as copper  i s  concerned  
p r o v i d e s  an adequate  o p t i o n  f o r  t h e  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  o f  
c opper  .pr i ces .
V I I I .  Z a mb ia ' s  a t t i t u d e  t o w a rd s  t he  Common Fund
Si nce  n e g o t i a t i o n s  l e a d i n g  t o  t he  c r e a t i o n  o f  t he  
Common Fund had been co ndu c t ed  on t h e  group system o p e r a t i n g  
w i t h i n  t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  sys tem,  t h e  a t t i t u d e  o f  Zambia 
t owa rds  t h e  Fund can o n l y  be u n d e r s t o o d  by l o o k i n g  a t  t he  
p o s i t i o n  t ake n  by t h e  group o f  77 t o  wh i ch  Zambia b e l o n g s .
The idea of  an I n t e g r a t e d  Programme f o r  Commodit ies  
which was to r e s u l t  in the c r e a t i o n  of  the Common Fund,  
was par t  of  the Mani la  d e c l a r a t i o n  and programme of  a ct ion  
of the group of 77 put forward at the f o u r t h  session of  
UNCTAD in 1976.  The s ect ion  of the Mani la  programme 
of a c t i on  on commodit ies c a l l e d  f o r  the c r e a t i o n  of  a 
Common Fund f o r  f i n a n c i n g  b u f f e r  stocks on a product  by
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p r o d u c t  b a s i s  and t h e  e x t e n s i o n  o f  comp en sa to ry  f i n a n c i n g
3 2f a c i l i t i e s .  S i nce  1976,  Zamb i a ' s  p o s i t i o n  has been 
r e f l e c t e d  i n  t h e  p o s i t i o n  t ak e n  by the  group o f  77
f a v o u r i n g  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  t he  Common Fund.
In a d d i t i o n  t o  e x p r e s s i n g  i t s  v iews t h r o u g h  t he  
group o f  77,  Zambia has s u p p o r t e d  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  t he  
Common Fund t h r o u g h  CIPEC. Even b e f o r e  t h e  I n t e g r a t e d  
Programme f o r  Commod i t i es  was e s t a b l i s h e d ,  Zambia t o g e t h e r  
w i t h  o t h e r  members o f  CIPEC had shown w i l l i n g n e s s  i n  
n e g o t i a t i n g  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  copper  a gr eemen t .  To t h i s  
e f f e c t  and a t  t h e  r e q u e s t  o f  CIPEC, UNCTAD convened a 
c o n s u l t a t i o n  m ee t i ng  on t h e  s u b j e c t  i n  March o f  1976.
The CIPEC p o s i t i o n  a t  t h i s  c o n s u l t a t i v e  m e e t i n g  was c l e a r l y
t h a t  what  was r e q u i r e d  was t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  o f  an i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  agreement  on t h e  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  o f  copper  
p r i c e s  t a k i n g  i n t o  acco un t  t h e  w i d e r  c o n t e x t  o f  t he  i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  economic n e g o t i a t i o n s .  The r e f e r e n c e  t o  t he  
w i d e r  c o n t e x t  o f  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  economic  n e g o t i a t i o n s  
appears  t o  have r e f l e c t e d  CIPEC's p r e f e r e n c e  f o r  such an 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  commodi ty  agreement  t o  be c o n c l u d e d  w i t h i n  
some I n t e g r a t e d  Programme f o r  C om m od i t i es .
Z am b i a ' s  commi tment  t o  t h e  i n t e g r a t e d  programme f o r  
c o m mo d i t i e s  and t h e  Common Fund has been e x pr ess ed  j o i n t l y  
w i t h  o t h e r  members o f  CIPEC in  a number o f  r e s o l u t i o n s  
passed by t h a t  o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s  c o n f e r e n c e  o f  m i n i s t e r s .
32.  For  t h e  t e x t  o f  t h e  s e c t i o n  on c o m m o d i t i e s  see 
15 ILM 421 (1 976) .
33.  CIPEC S e c r e t a r i a t ,  " P r o d u c e r s  and consumers a ch i ev ed  
a s u b s t a n t i a l  l e v e l  o f  agreement  d u r i n g  t h e i r  week 
o f  d i s c u s s i o n  i n  Geneva" ,  CIPEC Q u a r t e r l y  Review,  
J a n u a r y - M ar c h  1976,  pages 7 - 9 .
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For exampl e,  a t  t h e  X H I t h  s e s s i o n  o f  t h e  CIPEC c o n f e r e n c e  
o f  m i n i s t e r s  wh i ch  met i n  Z a i r e  i n  J u l y  1978,  t h e  c o n f e r ­
ence no ted  w i t h  d i s a p p o i n t m e n t  t he  l a c k  o f  p r o g r e s s  on 
n e g o t i a t i o n s  w i t h  consuming c o u n t r i e s  t o w a rd s  t he  c r e a t i o n  
o f  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  commodi ty  agreement  f o r  c opper  which 
had been s t a r t e d  i n  March 1976 on t h e  i n i t i a t i v e  o f  CIPEC 
and p u r s ue d ,  s i n c e  UNCTAD IV i n  N a i r o b i ,  w i t h i n  t h e  f r a m e ­
work o f  r e s o l u t i o n  9 3 ( I V ) o f  UNCTAD wh i ch  had i n s t i t u t e d
34an i n t e g r a t e d  programme f o r  c o m m o d i t i e s .  S i m i l a r l y ,  a t
t he  CIPEC XVI t h  c o n f e r e n c e  o f  m i n i s t e r s  h e l d  i n  Lusaka i n
J u l y  1980,  t h e  CIPEC member c o u n t r i e s  no ted  w i t h  s a t i s f a c t i o n
t he  s e t t i n g  up o f  a Common Fund and exp ress ed  t h e  v iew t h a t
t he  Common Fund would impr ove  t h e  chances o f  a c h i e v i n g  an
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  commodi ty  agreement  f o r  c o p p e r ,  and r e s o l v e d
t h a t  CIPEC s h o u l d  assess on a permanent  b a s i s  t h e  d e v e l o p -
35
ment o f  UNCTAD's i n t e g r a t e d  programme f o r  c o m m o d i t i e s .
In a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  p o s i t i o n  h e l d  by t h e  group o f  77 
and CIPEC r e g a r d i n g  t h e  i n t e g r a t e d  programme f o r  c o m m o d i t i e s ,  
Zamb i a ' s  commi tment  t o  t h e  programme and t h e  Common Fund 
i s  e v i d e n t  f r om  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  i t  i s  one o f  t h e  c o u n t r i e s  
t h a t  has s i gn e d  and r a t i f i e d  t he  agreement  c r e a t i n g  t he  
Common Fund i n  acco r dance  w i t h  A r t i c l e  54 o f  t h e  agreement .
34.  CIPEC S e c r e t a r i a t ,  "Th r ee  m ee t i ng s  i n  UNCTAD and
t he  X l l l t h  C on fe r en ce  o f  CIPEC M i n i s t e r s " ,  CIPEC 
Q u a r t e r l y  R e v i e w , A p r i l - J u n e  1978,  pages 10-11 .
35.  CIPEC S e c r e t a r i a t ,  "XVI C on f er enc e o f  M i n i s t e r s  o f
CIPEC - w i d e n i n g  t h e  area o f  t he  o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s  
a c t i v i t i e s " ,  CIPEC Q u a r t e r l y  R e v i e w , J u 1y - Se p t em be r  
1980,  page 4.
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I X . D e c i s i o n  making i n  t h e  Common Fund
( i ) D i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  v o t e s  i n  t h e  fund
The p r ob l em o f  d e c i s i o n  making p o r t r a y e d  i n  a number 
o f  e x i s t i n g  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  i s  l i k e l y  t o  a f f e c t  
t h e  p roposed Common Fund.  The proposed Fund i s  t o  be a 
u n i v e r s a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n  i n  t he  sense t h a t  i t s  membership 
i s  open t o  a l l  s t a t e s  members o f  t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s ,
U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  s p e c i a l i z e d  a g e n c i e s ,  members o f  t h e  I n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  A tomi c  Energy Agency,  and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  
o f  r e g i o n a l  economic  i n t e g r a t i o n  compet en t  i n  f i e l d s  o f  
a c t i v i t y  o f  t h e  Fund.  C o n s i d e r i n g  t h i s  w ide  e n v i s a g e d  
membersh ip ,  and t h e  economic and s o c i a l  d i v e r s i t y  o f  t h e  
s t a t e s  i n v o l v e d ,  i t  wou ld  seem c o m p l e t e l y  i n a p p r o p r i a t e  
f o r  t h e  Common Fund t o  employ i n  i t s  d e c i s i o n  making p r o c e s s ,  
t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  u n a n i m i t y .  The r e q u i r e m e n t  o f  u n a n i m i t y  
c o u l d  i f  i t  were t o  be employed i n  t h e  Fund,  m e r e l y  d e f e a t  
t h e  s o l i d a r i t y  t h a t  t h e  whole  NIEO programme seeks t o  
f o s t e r .  Even i f  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  were t o  be t a i n t e d  by 
a l l o w i n g  t h e  a b s t a i n i n g  members no t  t o  be bound by t he  
d e c i s i o n s  t a k e n ,  t h e  common i n t e r e s t  o f  t h e  members which 
t he  Fund seeks t o  f o s t e r  wou ld  s e r i o u s l y  be i m p a i r e d .  Th i s  
would r e s u l t  f r o m t h e  f a c t  t h a t  a b s t e n t i o n s  by a few 
i m p o r t a n t  c o n t r i b u t o r s  t o  t h e  r e s o u r c e s  o f  t h e  Fund m igh t  
r e s u l t  i n  a d e c i s i o n  t h a t  c an no t  be e a s i l y  i mp le me n t ed .
To a v o i d  t h i s  p r o b l e m ,  t he  Fund seeks t o  employ t h e  
w e i g h t e d  v o t i n g  system wh i ch  h i t h e r t o  has been employed by
36. See A r t i c l e  4,  Agreement  e s t a b l i s h i n g  t h e  Common Fund,
UN Document I D/ IPC/CONF. /L  . 15, adopted  on June 27, 1 980.
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a number o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f i n a n c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  such as
t h e  IMF, IBRD, IFC and t h e  IDA. The d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  v o te s
i s t b b e b a s e d  on t h e  s i z e  o f  each member's c o n t r i b u t i o n  to
t he  Fund.  Thus each member c o u n t r y  i s  t o  be a s s i g n e d  150
b a s i c  v o t e s  p l u s  t h e  number o f  v o t es  a l l o c a t e d  t o  i t  i n
r e s p e c t  t o  shares  o f  d i r e c t l y  c o n t r i b u t e d  c a p i t a l  as
w e l l  as v o t e s  a l l o c a t e d  t o  i t  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  any g uar a n t ee d
37c a p i t a l  i t  pu ts  f o r w a r d .  T h i s  w e i g h t e d  a l l o c a t e d  o f
v o te s  has r e s u l t e d  as e xpec ted  i n  t h e  e c o n o m i c a l l y  p o w e r f u l
s t a t e s  such as t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  hav ing  an a l l o c a t i o n  o f
11 ,888 v o t e s ,  and t h e  l e a s t  dev el oped  c o u n t r i e s  such as
Zambia h av i ng  505 v o t e s ,  Rwanda h av i ng  351 v o t e s ,  Papua
New Guinea 389,  Mozambique 360 v o t es  and Malawi  351 
3 8v o t e s .  . T h i s  v o t e  a l l o c a t i o n  makes i t  i n e v i t a b l e  t h a t  
t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  d e c i s i o n s  w i l l  t end  t o  r e f l e c t  t he  
i n t e r e s t s  o f  t he  p o w e r f u l  v o t e r s  such as t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  
and t h e  v o t i n g  p ro ces s  t h e r e f o r e  may work t o  undermine 
t h e  s o l i d a r i t y  sough t  i n  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  t h e  Fund. 
F u r t h e r m o r e ,  t h i s  k i n d  o f  v o t i n g  d i s t r i b u t i o n  may r e s u l t  
i n  a s i t u a t i o n  where v o t i n g  power i s  used as a s u b s t i t u t e  
f o r  n e g o t i a t i o n s  and d i p l o m a c y .
( i i ) D e c i s i o n  making
L i k e  a l l  o t h e r  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  e mp lo y in g  t h e  w e i g h t e d  
system o f  v o t i n g ,  most  d e c i s i o n s  i n  t h e  p roposed Fund w i l l
37.  See Schedu l e  D o f  agreement  c r e a t i n g  t h e  Common 
Fund .
38. Annex a t t a c h e d  to  Schedu l e  D o f  t h e  agreement  
c r e a t i n g  t h e  Common Fund p r o v i d e s  a l i s t  o f  t h e  
v o t e  a l l o c a t i o n  f o r  member c o u n t r i e s .
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39be t a k e n  by a s i m p l e  m a j o r i t y  o f  t he  v o t e s  c a s t .  In 
c e r t a i n  i m p o r t a n t  m a t t e r s  however ,  a q u a l i f i e d  m a j o r i t y  
w i l l  be r e q u i r e d .  Such q u a l i f i e d  m a j o r i t i e s  w i l l  be r e q u i r e d  
on i m p o r t a n t  d e c i s i o n s  such as t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  r u l e s  
and r e g u l a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  c o n du c t  o f  t he  b u s i n e s s  o f  t he  
Fund;  d e c i d i n g t h e  t e n u r e  o f  o f f i c e  f o r  t h e  E x e c u t i v e  
D i r e c t o r ;  t h e  a p p o i n t m e n t  o f  t h e  Managing D i r e c t o r  o f  t he  
Fund;  d e c i s i o n s  on t h e  l o c a t i o n  o f  t he  Fund h e a d q u a r t e r s ;  
su sp en s io n  o f  a member; t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  Fund o p e r a t i o n s ;  
s e t t l e m e n t  o f  o b l i g a t i o n s ;  and d e c i s i o n s  p e r t a i n i n g  t o  t he
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  and a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  t he
a. 40 a g r e e m e n t .
D e c i s i o n  making by s i m p l e  m a j o r i t y  o r  q u a l i f i e d  
m a j o r i t y  q u i t e  a p a r t  f r o m t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  v o t i n g  
power ,  has i t s  own s h o r t c o m i n g s  f o r  an o r g a n i z a t i o n  such 
as t he  Common Fund.  The main s h o r t c o m i n g  r e l a t e s  t o  a 
s i t u a t i o n  whereby o n l y  one or  a few s t a t e s  wou l d  o u t  v o t e  
t he  m a j o r i t y  o f  s t a t e s .  For  example ,  t h e  v o t e s  o f  t he  
U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  U n i t e d  Kingdom, Canada, F r a n c e ,  and t he  
Fe de ra l  R e p u b l i c  o f  Germany would be enough t o  o u t v o t e  
a l l  t h e  r e m a i n i n g  c o u n t r i e s  pu t  t o g e t h e r .  In such c i r c u m ­
s t an ce s  t h e  chances o f  t h e  Common Fund b e in g  used by t he  
e c o n o m i c a l l y  p o w e r f u l  s t a t e s  f o r  t h e i r  own e x c l u s i v e  i n t e r e s t  
becomes a s t r o n g  p o s s i b i l i t y .  I t  i s  perhaps f o r  t h i s  reason
39. See A r t i c l e s  21 s e c t i o n  3 and 23 s e c t i o n  3 o f  t he  
agreement  c r e a t i n g  t h e  Common Fund.
40.  See A r t i c l e  20 s e c t i o n  6 ; A r t i c l e  22 s e c t i o n  5 ( b ) ;  
A r t i c l e  24 s e c t i o n  11;  A r t i c l e  27;  A r t i c l e  31 s e c t i o n  
1; A r t i c l e  35 s e c t i o n  1; A r t i c l e  36 s e c t i o n  11; and 
A r t i c l e  52 s e c t i o n  2 o f  t h e  agreement  c r e a t i n g  t he  
Common Fund.
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t h a t  t h e  agreement  c r e a t i n g  t he  Common Fund seeks t o  employ ,  
whenever  p o s s i b l e  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  consensus i n  i t s  
d e c i s i o n  mak ing .  A r t i c l e s  21 s e c t i o n  2 and 23 s e c t i o n  2 
r e q u i r e  d e c i s i o n s  i n  t he  Gover n ing  Board and t h e  E x e c u t i v e  
Board r e s p e c t i v e l y  t o  be t ak en  wher eve r  p o s s i b l e  w i t h o u t  
v o t e .  The p r i n c i p l e  o f  consensus i n  t h e  Fund would  enab l e  
the  a d o p t i o n  o f  d e c i s i o n s  g e n e r a l l y  a ccep t ed  by a l l  members 
w i t h o u t  t he  need f o r  me chan i ca l  v o t i n g .  T h i s  p r i n c i p l e  
has been used i n  a number o f  o t h e r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f i n a n c i a l  
o r g a n i z a t i o n s  such as t h e  ADB. In t h e  r u l e s  o f  p r oc ed ur e  
o f  t h e  ADB f o r  example ,  t he  cha i rman o f  t h e  Board o f  
Governors  and t h e  cha i rman o f  t he  Board o f  D i r e c t o r s  are 
empowered t o  a s c e r t a i n  t h e  sense o f  t h e  m e e t i n g  i n  l i e u  
o f  a vot.e . ^ 1
The a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h i s  p r i n c i p l e  would appear  t o  be 
an a t t e m p t  t o  s a f e g u a r d  t he  s o l i d a r i t y  o f  t h e  Fund members 
by making i t  i m p e r a t i v e  f o r  members t o  work ou t  s o l u t i o n s  
t o  p rob l ems by n e g o t i a t i o n s ,  and t h r o u g h  c o n c e s s i o n s  u n t i l  
s o l u t i o n s  a c c e p t a b l e  t o  a l l  are worked o u t .  T h i s  approach 
i f  used i n  p r a c t i c e  by t h e  proposed Fund may r e s u l t  i n  
wa t e r ed  down s o l u t i o n s  which may no t  have any immed i a te  
p r a c t i c a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e .  But  t a k i n g  t h e  d i v e r s i t y  o f  
i n t e r e s t s  r e p r e s e n t e d  i n  t he  Fund such s o l u t i o n s  though 
wa t e r ed  down by compromi ses ,  may go a l ong way i n  a t  l e a s t
41.  Rule 9 o f  t h e  r u l e s  o f  p r o c ed u r e  o f  t h e  ADB adopted
at  t h e  f i r s t  annual  me et i ng  o f  t he  board o f  g o v e r n o r s  
h e l d  a t  Lagos,  N i g e r i a  between November 4 and 7,
1964.  For  t h e  f u l l  t e x t  see ADB; "The g e n e r a l  b y - l a w s  
o f  t he  ADB", ADB Document ADB/OS/GR"! ,  A b i d j a n ,  1966 
at  pages 9 - 1 5 .
179
f o r m i n g  an agreed s t a r t i n g  p o i n t  f o r  t h e  t a c k l i n g  o f  
f u r t h e r  p r o b l e m s .  T h i s  i n  i t s e l f  i s  no mean a ch i evement  
i n  a w o r l d  f u l l  o f  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  making d e c i s i o n s  which have 
a b s o l u t e l y  no p r a c t i c a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e .  T h i s  d e c i s i o n  making 
p r o c e d u r e  may no t  be t h e  b e s t  or  most e f f e c t i v e  b u t  c o n s i d e r ­
i ng  t h e  e x i s t i n g  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  s e t  up o f  most  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  i t  wou ld  seem t o  r e p r e s e n t  a u s e f u l  s t a r t i n g  
p o i n t  f o r  any f u t u r e  changes.
( i i i )  The p o s s i b l e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  o rgans
o f  t h e  proposed Fund on t h e  d e c i s i o n  making p ro cess
The p roposed Common Fund w i l l  have.when o p e r a t i o n a l ,
two d e c i s i o n  making organs namely t he  G ov e rn i ng  C o un c i l  and
42t he  E x e c u t i v e  Board.  L i k e  i n  most  i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l
o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  t h e  G ov er n i ng  C ou n c i l  is^ t o  be composed o f
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  a l l  member s t a t e s  and i s  t h e  supreme
p o l i c y  making o r g a n .  T h i s  s i t u a t i o n  o b t a i n s  a l s o  i n  such
o r g a n i z a t i o n s  as the IMF, the World Bank Group,  r e g i on al
d eve l opmen t  banks ,  r e g i o n a l  economic g r o u p s ,  and t he
proposed seabed a u t h o r i t y .
In t he  proposed Fund t h i s  organ i s  t o  have powers
t o  make d e c i s i o n s  on a l l  m a t t e r s  b e f o r e  t h e  Fund,  t h a t  i s
43both  m a t t e r s  o f  su bs t an ce  and th o se  i n v o l v i n g  p r o c e d u r e .  
A l t h o u g h  t h i s  organ i s  composed o f  t h e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  
a l l  member c o u n t r i e s ,  t h e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  each member i n  t he  
organ w i l l  depend v e r y  much on t he  number o f  v o t e s  t h e y
42. See A r t i c l e s  20,  22,  24 and 25 o f  t h e  agreement  
c r e a t i n g  t h e  Common Fund.
43.  A r t i c l e  20 o f  t he  agreement  c r e a t i n g  t h e  Common Fund 
s t a t e s  i n  s e c t i o n  1 t h a t ,
" a l l  powers o f  t h e  Fund s h a l l  be v e s t e d  i n  
t he  Go ve rn in g  C o u n c i l . "
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h o l d .  As s t a t e d  above,  t h e  number o f  v o t e s  each r e p r e s e n ­
t a t i v e  w i l l  have a t  h i s  d i s p o s a l  w i l l  depend on h i s  
c o u n t r y ' s  c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  t h e  Fund ' s  f i n a n c i a l  r e s o u r c e s .
D e c i s i o n s  on l e s s  i m p o r t a n t  m a t t e r s  may however  be'  
d e l e g a t e d  by t he  G o v e r n i n g  C o u n c i l  t o  t h e  E x e c u t i v e  B o a r d . ^4 
In a d d i t i o n  t o  t h i s  d e l e g a t e d  power ,  t h e  agreement  c r e a t i n g  
t h e  Fund does g i v e  power t o  t h e  E x e c u t i v e  Board t o  make 
c e r t a i n  i n d e p e n d e n t  d e c i s i o n s .  The E x e c u t i v e  Board i s  t o  
c o n s i s t  o f  28 E x e c u t i v e  D i r e c t o r s  a p p o i n t e d  by t he  Gover n ing  
C o u n c i l  i n  a cco r dance  w i t h  c e r t a i n  l a i d  down p r o c e d u r e s .
The most  i m p o r t a n t  o f  t h e se  p r o c ed u r es  f o r  purposes  o f  our  
d i s c u s s i o n  h e r e ,  i s  t h a t  wh i ch  r e q u i r e s  c a n d i d a t e s  t o  be 
proposed by a member c o u n t r y  and then a b a l l o t  conduc t ed  
upon which  28 members r e c e i v i n g  t h e  h i g h e s t  v o t e s  are 
d e c l a r e d  e l e c t e d .  T h i s  p r o c e d u r e  l eaves  a l o t  t o  be d e s i r e d .
F i r s t ,  s i n c e  t h e  E x e c u t i v e  Board does have powers t o  
make d e c i s i o n s  i n  c e r t a i n  p r o c e d u r a l  and s u b s t a n t i v e  m a t t e r s ,  
t h e  i s s u e  o f  t h e  i ndependence  o f  such an organ assumes 
s i g n i f i c a n t  i m p o r t a n c e .  From a f o r m a l  p o i n t  o f  v i e w ,  i t  i s  
p o s s i b l e  t o  have an E x e c u t i v e  Board s e l e c t e d  by o n l y  one 
group o f  c o u n t r i e s  s h a r i n g  t h e  same i n t e r e s t s .  In such an 
e v e n t u a l i t y ,  t h e  i ndependence  o f  such an organ as f a r  as the  
r e s t  o f  t h e  members are concer ned  i s  bound t o  be s us pec t  
and may i n  t h e  l ong  run undermine the  d e c i s i o n s  i t  t a k e s .
S e c o n d l y ,  i t  i s  w o r t h  remember ing t h a t  t h e  Common 
Fund was c r e a t e d  t o  complement  t he  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l
44.  See A r t i c l e  20 s e c t i o n  3 o f  agreement  c r e a t i n g  the  
Common Fund.
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commodi ty  o r g a n i z a t i o n s .  I t  i s  e n t i r e l y  p o s s i b l e  however ,  
t h e  p r o c e d u r e s  f o r  t h e  s e l e c t i o n  o f  E x e c u t i v e  D i r e c t o r s  may 
r e s u l t  i n  an absurd  s i t u a t i o n  i n  which member s t a t e s  
b e l o n g i n g  t o  one commodi ty  o r g a n i z a t i o n  are n o t  r e p r e s e n t e d  
a t  a l l  i n  t h i s  o r g a n .  Take f o r  example ,  a s i t u a t i o n  i n  
wh i ch  a c a n d i d a t e  p roposed by a copper  p r o d u c i n g  member 
c o u n t r y  i s  no t  one o f  t h e  28 e l e c t e d  c a n d i d a t e s .  I t  i s  
d o u b t f u l  w h e t he r  i n  such a s i t u a t i o n  d e c i s i o n s  on m a t t e r s  
p e r t a i n i n g  t o  t h e  m a r k e t i n g  o f  copper  wou ld  r e c e i v e  p r o p e r  
a t t e n t i o n  and sympathy i n  t h e  same way as would  be t he  case 
i f  one o f  t h e  e l e c t e d ‘ members came f rom a c opper  e x p o r t i n g  
c o u n t r y .
A more a c c e p t a b l e  a r r angement  would  seem t o  be one 
t h a t  r e q u i r e s  some f o r m o f  c o l l e c t i v e  a p p o i n t m e n t  o f  members 
o f  t h i s  o r g a n .  T h i s  c o u l d  be done by a l l o w i n g  member 
c o u n t r i e s  p r o p o s i n g  c a n d i d a t e s  o t h e r  t han  t h e i r  n a t i o n a l s  
such as i s  t h e  case i n  t h e  Andean s u b - r e g i o n a l  economic 
g r o up .  In t h a t  g r o u p i n g ,  t h e  main d e c i s i o n  making organs 
are t h e  Commission and t h e  Board p o p u l a r l y  known as t he  
J u n t a .  ^  Wh i l e  t he  Commission i s  t he  supreme d e c i s i o n  
making organ and i s  composed o f  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  a l l  
member c o u n t r i e s  i n  t h e  s u b r e g i o n ,  t h e  J u n t a  c o n s i s t s  o f  
t h r e e  p e r s o n s ,  i n d e p e n d e n t  f r o m t he  member c o u n t r i e s  and 
may i n  f a c t  be n a t i o n a l s  o f  c o u n t r i e s  o u t s i d e  t h e  s u b r e g i o n .
4 5 . See A r t i c l e  5 o f  t he  agreement  c r e a t i n g  t h e  Andean 
g r o up .  For  t he  f u l l  t e x t ,  see,  M u t h a r i k a ,  P . ,  
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Law o f  D e v e l o p m e n t , volume 4, ( i m ) . 
Oceana p u b l i c a t i o n s ,  Washington DC, p . 2255.
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These pe rsons  are r e q u i r e d  t o  a c t  i n  t h e  i n t e r e s t  o f  t he  
s u b r e g i o n  as a who le  and n o t  i n  t h e  i n t e r e s t  o f  any one o f  
t he  member c o u n t r i e s .
I t  must  be conceded t h a t  t he  a r ran ge me nt  o f  t he  
Andean Qroup-may no t  work w e l l  i n  an o r g a n i z a t i o n  o f  
u n i v e r s a l  membership such as t h e  Common Fund,  b u t  one may 
sugge s t  a s l i g h t l y  m o d i f i e d  a r r a n g e m e n t .  Such an a r r a n g e ­
ment may f o r  example r e q u i r e  t h a t  groups o f  c o u n t r i e s ,  
e x p o r t e r s  o f  s p e c i f i e d  c o mm od i t i e s  s h o u l d  be a s s i g n e d  the  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  s e l e c t i n g  a g i ve n  number o f  t h e  E x e c u t i v e  
D i r e c t o r s .  For  example ,  t he  members o f  each commodi ty  
o r g a n i z a t i o n  c o u l d  be a s s i g n e d  one or  two s e a t s  i n  t h e  Board.  
Th i s  c o u l d  be done f o r  a l l  t h e  e x i s t i n g  commodi t y  o r g a n i z a ­
t i o n s  r e p r e s e n t i n g  t h e  ten  c or e  c o mm od i t i e s  t h a t  have been 
s e l e c t e d  f o r  t he  i n t e g r a t e d  programme f o r  c o m m o d i t i e s .
There are two more o rgans  o f  t he  p r oposed  Common Fund 
t o  wh i ch  o n l y  m i n i ma l  comment i s  c a l l e d  f o r .  These are t he  
c o n s u l t a t i v e  Commi t tee and t he  Managing D i r e c t o r  and h i s  
s t a f f .  The r o l e  o f  t h e  C o n s u l t a t i v e  Commi t tee i n  t h e  
Fu nd 's  d e c i s i o n  making p ro cess  i s  l i m i t e d  t o  a d v i s i n g  t he  
E x e c u t i v e  Board on v a r i o u s  t e c h n i c a l  m a t t e r s .  The compo­
s i t i o n  o f  t h i s  organ i s  t o  be d e t e r m i n e d  by t h e  Gover n ing  
C o un c i l  wh i ch  i s  r e q u i r e d  t o  t a k e  i n t o  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  f a c t o r s  
such as e q u i t a b l e  g e o g r a p h i c a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  i t s  members,  
and i n d i v i d u a l  e x p e r t i s e  i n  commodi ty  d e v e l op men t  i s s u e s .
The r o l e  t o  be p l a ye d  by t h i s  organ i n  i n f l u e n c i n g  the  
d e c i s i o n s  o f  t h e  Fund would seem t o  be v e r y  i n s i g n i f i c a n t  
and c a l l s  f o r  no f u r t h e r  comment.
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The l a s t  o r g a n ,  which  may p l a y  a s i g n i f i c a n t  r o l e  i n  
t h e  d e c i s i o n  making p r ocess  o f  t h e  Fund i s  t o  be composed 
o f  t h e  Managing D i r e c t o r  and h i s  s t a f f .  I t  s h o u l d  be 
p o i n t e d  o u t  t h a t  i n  many i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  the  
r o l e  o f  t h i s  k i n d  o f  s t a f f  has t r a d i t i o n a l l y  been l i m i t e d  
t o  f u n c t i o n s  o f  an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  n a t u r e .  T h i s  would 
appear  t o  be t r u e  o f  t h e  proposed Fund wh i ch  i s  a ss ig ne d  
t h e  r o l e  o f  c o n d u c t i n g  t h e  o r d i n a r y  b u s i n e s s  o f  t he  Fund.
But i n  p r a c t i c e  i t  may assume a more s i g n i f i c a n t  r o l e  i f  
i t  f o l l o w s  t h e  f o o t  s t ep s  o f  o t h e r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f i n a n c i a l  
i n s t i t u t i o n s .  In many o f  t he  e x i s t i n g  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
f i n a n c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  t h i s  t y p e  o f  o f f i c i a l s  do p l a y  a 
more s i g n i f i c a n t  r o l e  t ha n  m e r e l y  a c t i n g  as t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n s '  
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  o f f i c e r s .  These o f f i c e r s  are o f t e n  i n  
a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e i r  normal  d u t i e s  c a l l e d  t o  p r e p a r e  d r a f t  
d e c i s i o n s  f o r  t h e  o t h e r  o r g a n s . ^  In t h i s  sense t h e y  can 
i n f l u e n c e  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  t h e  d e c i s i o n s  o f  t h e  compet en t  
o r g a n s .
In some i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f i n a n c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  t hese  
o f f i c i a l s  i n  p r a c t i c e  d i c t a t e  the  d e c i s i o n s  t h a t  e v e n t u a l l y  
emerge i n  t h e  compet en t  o r g a n s .  T h i s  i s  c l e a r l y  t he  case 
i n  the  IBRD where i n  p r a c t i c e  c r e d i t s  can o n l y  be g r a n t e d  
t o  member s t a t e s  or  o t h e r  i n s t i t u t i o n s  i f  t h e  o p i n i o n  o f  
t he  P r e s i d e n t  o f  t he  Bank f a v o u r s  such a move. The E x e c u t i v e
46. See A r t i c l e  24 o f  t h e  agreement  e s t a b l i s h i n g  t he  Common 
Fund .
4 7 . A c c o r d i n g  t o  an i n t e r v i e w  t h e  a u t h o r  c o nd u c t e d  w i t h  
Mr.  P e t e r  P a r k i n s o n ,  D i r e c t o r  o f  M a r k e t i n g  a t  the  
CIPEC S e c r e t a r i a t  i n  P a r i s  i n  December 1982,  t h i s  
s i t u a t i o n  i s  a l s o  o b t a i n e d  w i t h i n  CIPEC.
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D i r e c t o r s  who are  f o r m e r l y  a ss ig n ed  t he  t a s k  o f  making 
d e c i s i o n s  on such m a t t e r s ,  do i n  p r a c t i c e  r e f u s e  to  
c o n s i d e r  a r e q u e s t  wh ich  has r e c e i v e d  an u n f a v o u r a b l e  o p i n i o n  
f ro m t he  P r e s i d e n t  o f  t h e  Bank.  Should t h e  p roposed Fund 
f o l l o w  t h e  p r a c t i c e  o f  t he s e  o t h e r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f i n a n c i a l  
o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  t he  r o l e  o f  t h e  Managing D i r e c t o r  i n  t he  
d e c i s i o n  making p rocess  may p rove t o  be v e r y  s u b s t a n t i a l .
In t h i s  r e s p e c t  i f  one o f  t h e  g oa l s  o f  t h e  New I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
Economic Order  i s  t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  b a r g a i n i n g  l e v e r a g e  o f  
t he  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  
one would  have exp ec te d  t o  see i n  the  Common Fund agreement  
a p r o v i s i o n  wh i ch  would  ensure  t h a t  t h e  p o s i t i o n  o f  t he  
Managing D i r e c t o r  r o t a t e s  between the  d e ve l op ed  c o u n t r i e s  and
4
t he  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s ,  or  t h e  p o s i t i o n  i s  f i l l e d  by a 
person whose s ym pa th ie s  l i e  w i t h  d i s a d v a n t a g e d  d e v e l o p i n g  
c o u n t r i  e s .
X. Cone !us i  on
One o f  t h e  prob l ems t h a t  has been f r u s t r a t i n g  e f f o r t s  
a t  t he  c o n c l u s i o n  o f  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  copper  agreement  has 
been t h a t  o f  t he  c o s t  o f  e s t a b l i s h i n g  a copper  b u f f e r  s t o c k .  
For  t h e  copper  p r o d u c e r  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  t h e r e f o r e ,  the  
u s e f u l n e s s  o f  t h e  Common Fund w i l l  be j ud ge d  by i t s  a b i l i t y  
t o  f i n a n c e  such a b u f f e r  s t o c k .  The a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  adequate 
f i n a n c i a l  r e s o u r c e s  f ro m t he  Fund may a c t u a l l y  a c t  as a 
s t i m u l a n t  t o  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  a copper  agreement .
I t  s h o u l d  be p o i n t e d  o u t  t h a t  UNCTAD's e s t i m a t e s  
i n d i c a t e  t h a t  an adequate copper  b u f f e r  s t o c k  would  need
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a t  l e a s t  1 , 0 2 9 , 0 0 0  t o n s , ^  which  i t  i s  e s t i m a t e d  would 
c o s t  about  $2 b i l l i o n .  When one c o n s i d e r s  t h a t  t h e  Common 
Fund w i l l  i n i t i a l l y  deal  w i t h  t h e  ten  c or e  c o mm od i t i e s  i n  
t he  i n t e g r a t e d  programme f o r  c o m m o d i t i e s ,  i t  becomes c l e a r  
t h a t  i t  w i l l  r e q u i r e  s u b s t a n t i a l  f i n a n c i a l  r e s o u r c e s  t o  
be a b l e  t o  f i n a n c e  an adequate  copper  b u f f e r  s t o c k .  But 
even i f  t h e  r e s o u r c e s  o f  t h e  Fund f i n a l l y  r a i s e d  amounted 
t o  o n l y  $6 b i l l i o n ,  t h e r e  seems t o  be n o t h i n g  t o  s t op  a 
new c opper  commodi ty  agreement  e s t b a l i s h i n g  say a $2 b i l l i o n  
w or t h  o f  b u f f e r  s t o c k .  T h i s  i s  because t h e  r e s o u r c e s  o f  t he  
Fund are t o  be used as a g u ar a n t e e  f o r  b o r r o w i n g  f rom the  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  money m a r k e t s .  The r o l e  o f  t h e  Common Fund 
i n  s t a b i l i z i n g  copper  p r i c e s  w i l l  t h e r e f o r e  be d e t e r m i n e d  
by i t s  a b i l i t y  t o  m o b i l i z e  f i n a n c i a l  r e s o u r c e s ,  adequate 
t o  s e t  up r e a s o n a b l e  b u f f e r  s t o c k s .
Coupled w i t h  t h e  i s s u e  o f  r e s o u r c e  m o b i l i z a t i o n  i s  t h e  
q u e s t i o n  o f  t h e  b a r g a i n i n g  l e v e r a g e  i n  t h e  d e c i s i o n  making 
p r o c e s s .  The p o l i c y  o f  t h e  Fund r e g a r d i n g  t h e  use o f  i t s  
r e s o u r c e s  w i l l  be d e t e r m i n e d  by t h e  two p o l i c y  making o r ga n s ,  
t he  g o v e r n i n g  c o u n c i l  and t he  e x e c u t i v e  b o a r d .  The d e c i s i o n  
making p r oc ess  i n  t h e  two organs w i l l  be based on the  w e i g h t e d  
system o f  v o t i n g  wh i ch  g i v e s  more v o te s  t o  t ho s e  s t a t e s  who 
c o n t r i b u t e  more t o  t h e  r e s o u r c e s  o f  t he  Fund.  S i nce  t he  
i m p o r t a n t  c o n t r i b u t o r s  are bound t o  be t h e  de ve l op ed  
c o u n t r i e s ,  t h e  p r o d u c e r  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  are l i k e l y  t o  
have l e s s  say i n  t h e  d e c i s i o n s  t h a t  w i l l  emerge.  Th i s  r a i s e s  
t he  q u e s t i o n s  as to  t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  t h e  Fund i n  r e l a t i o n
48.  CIPEC S e c r e t a r i a t ,  " A t  t he  Con f er ence  t a b l e " .  CIPEC 
Q u a r t e r l y  Rev iew,  0 a nuary - Mar ch  1979,  page 13.
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t o  t he  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  o f  commodi t y  p r i c e s  i n  g e ne r a l  and 
copper  i n  p a r t i c u l a r .  I t  s hou l d  be r e c a l l e d  t h a t  one o f  
t he  c r i t i c i s m s  t h a t  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  have been making 
r e g a r d i n g  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  i s  t he  uneven 
d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  v o t e s .  Th i s  has been a c o n s i s t e n t  p a t t e r n  
i n  a l l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  where d e c i s i o n s  c a r r y  any w e i g h t  such 
as i n  t he  IBRD, and t he  IMF. In t hese  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  i t  
i s  p o s s i b l e  f o r  t he  deve l oped  and i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  c o u n t r i e s  
who have b i g  shar es  o f  vo t es  t o  t a k e  d e c i s i o n s  and f o r m u l a t e  
p o l i c i e s  w i t h o u t  t a k i n g  i n t o  accoun t  t he  i n t e r e s t s  o f  t he  
d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s .
A l t h o u g h  t h e  I n t e g r a t e d  Programme f o r  Commod i t i es  
and t he  Common Fund may have been f o r m u l a t e d  t a k i n g  i n t o  
a ccoun t  t he  p r i n c i p l e  o f  s o l i d a r i t y ,  t he  v o t i n g  a r r a n g e ­
ments have no t  d e p a r t e d  v e r y  much f r om t h o se  empl oyed i n  
o t h e r  f i n a n c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  I t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  under  t he  
Common Fund ag r eement ,  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  c o u n t r i e s  may 
not  have as many v o t e s  as t o  d i s r e g a r d  t he  i n t e r e s t s  o f  
t he  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s .  But  t h e y  h o l d  s u f f i c i e n t  vo t es  
t o  be ab l e  t o  make i t  i m p o s s i b l e  f o r  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  
t o  pass c e r t a i n  d e c i s i o n s  s i n c e  many d e c i s i o n s  are r e q u i r e d  
t o  be approved by a h i g h l y  q u a l i f i e d  m a j o r i t y .  Th i s  
m a j o r i t y  r e q u i r e s  a 75% o f  t he  t o t a l  v o t e s  i n  a l l  i m p o r t a n t  
m a t t e r s .  The r e s u l t i n g  e f f e c t  i s  t h a t  t h e  v o t i n g  power i n  
t he  Common Fund m a i n t a i n s  t h e  same system t h a t  has been a 
s u b j e c t  o f  s t r o n g  o b j e c t i o n s  f r om d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s .
Th i s  s i t u a t i o n  makes i t  d o u b t f u l  whe t he r  once t h e  common 
f und  becomes o p e r a t i o n a l  i t  may a c t u a l l y  work t o  t he  
s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  commodi t y  p r o d u c e r s  such as Zambi a.
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For  Zambia wh i ch  depends a l mos t  e n t i r e l y  on copper  
f o r  i t s  e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s  t o  b e n e f i t  f r om t h e  commodi t y  
s t a b i l i z a t i o n  scheme p r o v i d e d  by t h e  Common f und  t h e r e f o r e ,  
a number o f  d i f f i c u l t  i s s u e s  have t o  be overcome.  F i r s t ,  
Zambia and o t h e r  copper  e x p o r t i n g  c o u n t r i e s  on t h e  one 
hand,  and copper  consumi ng c o u n t r i e s  on t he  o t h e r ,  must  
r e d o u b l e  t h e i r  e f f o r t s  i n  n e g o t i a t i n g  a copper  agr eement .
The c o n c l u s i o n  o f  such an agreement  woul d  appear  t o  be t he  
o n l y  way i n  wh i ch  copper  p r i c e  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  may be a t t e mp t e d  
w i t h i n  t h e  f r amewor k  o f  t h e  Common Fund.  Se c o n d l y ,  e f f o r t s  
shou l d  be made w i t h i n  t h e  Common Fund t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  
r e s o u r c e s  t h a t  are a v a i l a b l e  t o  commodi t y  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  
w i s h i n g  t o  m a i n t a i n  a b u f f e r  s t o c k .  I t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  t he  
a g r e e me n t . c r e a t i n g  t he  Common Fund makes i t  p o s s i b l e  f o r  
t h e  f und  t o  bo r r ow f r om i n t e r n a t i o n a l  money m a r k e t s .  But  
t h i s  may no t  a l ways  work smoo t h l y  s i n c e  i t  r e q u i r e s  some 
f o r m o f  w i l l i n g n e s s  on t he  f i n a n c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  t o  s u p p o r t  
t he  e f f o r t s  o f  t h e  f u n d .  Th i s  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  so when one 
c o n s i d e r s  t h a t  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  r e l i e d  on are 
l o c a t e d  i n  t h e  commodi t y  consumi ng n a t i o n s  - t h e  same 
n a t i o n s  t h a t  appear  u n w i l l i n g  t o  f a c i l i t a t e  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  
o f  commodi t y  agr eement s .
D e s p i t e  t h i s  r a t h e r  p e s s i m i s t i c  p i c t u r e  o f  t h e  common 
f un d  however ,  copper  e x p o r t i n g  n a t i o n s  w i l l  do w e l l  t o  
c o n t i n u e  f i g h t i n g  f o r  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  o f  a copper  agreement  
s i n c e  however  mi n i ma l  t h e  e f f e c t  t he  Common Fund may have 
on t he  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  o f  copper  p r i c e s ,  such an e f f e c t  i s  
wo r t h  f i g h t i n g  f o r .  U n t i l  t he  common f u n d  becomes f u l l y
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o p e r a t i o n a l  however ,  p r odu c e r s  o f  copper  woul d do we l l  
by c o n t i n u i n g  t o  search f o r  o t h e r  a l t e r n a t i v e  appr oaches .
One such approach i n v o l v e s  t he  use o f  a p r o d u c e r s 4 
a s s o c i a t i o n  i n  s t a b i l i z i n g  copper  p r i c e s .  Copper  
p r o d u c i n g  c o u n t r i e s  have a t t e mp t e d  u s i n g  t h i s  mach i n e r y  
i n  CIPEC. The nex t  c h a p t e r  d i s c u s s e s  t h i s  o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  
i t s  r o l e  i n  copper  p r i c e  s t a b i l i z a t i o n ,  and t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  




ZAMBIA'S MEMBERSHIP IN 8CIPEC
I . The f a i l u r e  o f  t he  commodi t y  
agreement  approach 
I f  one accep t s  t h a t  p r i ma r y  commodi t y  p r o d u c i n g  c o u n t r i e s ,  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  t hose  i n  t he  d e v e l o p i n g  w o r l d ,  must  be i n  a 
p o s i t i o n  t o  e x e r t  some c o n s i d e r a b l e  i n f l u e n c e  on t h e  market s  
f o r  t h e i r  c o mmo d i t i e s ,  t hen i t  becomes c l e a r  t h a t  f o r  many 
c ommod i t i es  t h e  concep t  o f  " commodi t y  ag r eement s "  has not  
succeeded t o  p r o v i d e  t h i s  i n f l u e n c e .  In f a c t  o n l y  v e r y  
l i m i t e d  success  has been e v i d e n t  under  t h e s e  ag r eement s .
Over  a p e r i o d  c o v e r i n g  ove r  two decades,  o n l y  s i x  such 
agreement s  were c o n c l u d e d .  These were f o r  c o f f e e ,  cocoa,  
sug a r ,  t i n ,  whea t ,  and o l i v e  o i 1 .  ^ More r e c e n t l y ,  o n l y  
one agreement  has been conc l uded  under  t he  U n i t e d  Na t i o ns  
I n t e g r a t e d  Programme f o r  Commodi t i es .  Th i s  i s  t he  i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  Ju t e  agreement  whi ch u n l i k e  t he  e a r l i e r  commodi t y  
ag r eement s ,  does no t  employ any mar ket  c o n t r o l  mechanisms 
such as quot as  or  a b u f f e r  s t o c k .  Th i s  agreement  whi ch was 
adopt ed on t h e  1s t  Oc t ober  1982,  when i t  becomes o p e r a t i o n a l
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w i l l  depend e n t i r e l y  on t h e  second window o f  t h e  Common Fund.
The i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  t h i s  approach are d i f f i c u l t  t o  p r e d i c t ,
1 . A l f r e d  M a i z e l s ,  "A new i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s t r a t e g y  f o r  p r i m a r y  
c o m m o d i t i e s " ,  i n  G.K.  H e l l e i n e r  ( e d . ) ,  A w o r l d  d i v i d e d ,  
t he  l es s  deve l oped  c o u n t r i e s  i n  t he  i n t  e r  n a t  i on a I economy /j 
‘Cambr i dge U n i v e r s i t y  Pr ess ,  p . d  2. ^
2. li-  ? ,f UtfCTftb < International Jute hqteeonent" f  figs)
Tv w mat o f  World Trade Taw , .
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As we have seen i n  Chapt er  V however ,  t h e  Common Fund i s  
y e t  t o  be a c t i v a t e d  because o f  t he  l ac k  o f  t h e  r e q u i r e d  
number o f  r a t i f i c a t i o n s .  S i nce  t h i s  i s  t h e  f i f t h  y e a r  s i n c e  
t h e  s i g n i n g  o f  t h e  agreement  c r e a t i n g  t h e  Common Fund and 
t h e  r e q u i s i t e  number o f  r a t i f i c a t i o n s  i s  y e t  t o  be a t t a i n e d ,  
i t  seems as t hough t he  Common Fund agreement  i s  d e s t i n e d  t o  
end as a dead l e t t e r .
The f a c t  t h a t  t he  Common Fund appears  t o  be a non 
s t a r t e r  coup l ed  w i t h  d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n v o l v e d  i n  n e g o t i a t i n g  
commodi t y  agreement s  c l e a r l y  r e p r e s e n t s  a f a i l u r e  o f  t he  
approach i n  t a c k l i n g  t h e  prob l em o f  copper  p r i c e  f l u c t u a t i o n s .
The f a i l u r e  o f  t h i s  appr oach ,  i n  many ways,  r e f l e c t s  
t he  i n h e r e n t  c o n f l i c t  o f  i n t e r e s t  between p r o d u c e r s  and c on ­
sumers i n  m a t t e r s  o f  commodi t y  m a r k e t i n g .  Th i s  c o n f l i c t  i t  
woul d seem, i s  more pronounced i n  t he  case o f  m i n e r a l s  because 
so f a r  o n l y  one m i n e r a l  p r o d u c t  - t i n ,  has been a s u b j e c t  o f  a 
commodi t y  agr eement .  Copper  whi ch i s  an i m p o r t a n t  e x p o r t  f o r  
a number o f  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s ,  has i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s  been 
a s u b j e c t  o f  p r o l o n g ed  and u n s u c c e s s f u l  n e g o t i a t i o n s  whi ch 
were aimed at  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  o f  a commodi t y  agreement  f o r  
t h e  m e t a l .  For  more t han s i x  y e a r s ,  n e g o t i a t i o n s  between 
p r odu c e r s  and consumers o f  copper  have been conduc t ed  under  
t he  Un i t e d  N a t i o n s  i n t e g r a t e d  programme f o r  commod i t i es  ( IPC)  
i n  an a t t e mp t  t o  conc l u d e  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  copper  agreement .  
These n e g o t i a t i o n s  have proved f r u i t l e s s  and have o n l y  he l ped 
t o  h i g h l i g h t  t he  c o n f l i c t i n g  i n t e r e s t s  o f  copper  e x p o r t i n g  
c o u n t r i e s  on t he  one hand and copper  consumers on t he  o t h e r .  
The f a i l u r e  o f  t he  e x p o r t e r - c o n s u m e r  commodi t y  agreement  
approach i n  t he  case o f  copper  has l e f t  copper  e x p o r t i n g
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c o u n t r i e s  v i r t u a l l y  u n p r o t e c t e d  f r om t he  sudden and somet i mes 
s u b s t a n t i a l  movements i n  t he  copper  p r i c e s  on t he  w o r l d  ma r k e t s .  
I t  i s  t h e  awareness o f  t h i s  s t a t e  o f  a f f a i r s  wh i ch  ac t ed  as a 
c a t a l y s t  t o  copper  e x p o r t i n g  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  t o  a t t e mp t  
an a l t o g e t h e r  new approach i n  an e f f o r t  t o  g a i n  some measure 
o f  c o n t r o l  ove r  commodi t y  ma r k e t s .  Th i s  approach i n v o l v e d  t he  
f o r m a t i o n  o f  a p r o d u c e r s '  group w i t h  t h e  aim o f  s eek i ng  ways 
and means o f  i n f l u e n c i n g  copper  p r i c e s .  The awareness o f  t he  
a c t u a l  and p o t e n t i a l  b e n e f i t s  o f  such a p r o d u c e r s '  group has 
not  o n l y  been c o n f i n e d  t o  copper  p r o d u c e r s  as i s  e v i d e n t  i n  
t h e  number o f  such groups t h a t  have come i n t o  be i ng  i n  r e c e n t  
y e a r s .  To da t e  about  18 p r o d u c e r s '  a s s o c i a t i o n s  do e x i s t  
i n c o r p o r a t i n g  p r o d u c e r s  o f  18 c o mmo d i t i e s .  Such groups e x i s t  
a t  i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l  l e v e l ,  i n  p e t r o l e u m ,  b a u x i t e ,  c op pe r ,  
i r o n  o r e ,  me r c u r y ,  r u b b e r ,  banana,  phospha t e  r o c k ,  cocoa,  
c o f f e e ,  t i m b e r ,  c o c o n u t ,  pepper ,  g r o u n d n u t s ,  t u n g s t e n ,  j u t e ,  
t e a  and o i l  s e e d s .
Th i s  c h a p t e r  a t t e mp t s  t o  examine t he  l e g a l  a spec t s  o f  
one o f  t h e s e  p r o d u c e r s  a s s o c i a t i o n s  - t he  I n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l  
Counc i l  o f  Copper  E x p o r t i n g  C o u n t r i e s  (CI PEC) .  The d i s c u s s i o n  
w i l l  be c e n t r e d  on t he  l e g a l  n a t u r e  o f  such an a s s o c i a t i o n ,  
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  o r g a n i s a t i o n ,  i t s  a c t i v i t i e s  and p r o s p e c t s .  I t  
i s  however  n e cessa r y  a t  t he  b e g i n n i n g  t o  b r i e f l y  d i s c u s s  t he  
o r i g i n s  and l e g a l i t y  o f  t he  gene r a l  co nc ep t  o f  a p r o d u c e r s '  
assoc i  a t i  o n .
1 1 . The co nc ep t  o f  a p r o d u c e r s '  a s s o c i a t i o n
Whi l e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  commodi t y  o r g a n i s a t i o n s ,  such as t he  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t i n  c o u n c i l  e x i s t  t o  a d m i n i s t e r  d e t a i l e d  ag r ee -
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ments between e x p o r t e r s  and consumers,  p r o d u c e r s '  a s s o c i a t i o n s  
are a c r e a t i o n  o f  a more gene r a l  t y pe  o f  agreement  whi ch b r i n g  
t o g e t h e r  o n l y  t he  e x p o r t e r s  o f  v a r i o u s  c o mmo d i t i e s .  The main 
aim o f  any p r o d u c e r s '  a s s o c i a t i o n  t h e r e f o r e  i s  t o  a t t e mp t  t o  
g i v e  c o n t r o l  o f  t h e  commodi t y  market  t o  t he  e x p o r t e r s  w i t h o u t  
equal  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  by t he  consumers.  Commodi ty mar ke t  c o n t r o l  
a c t i o n  by p r o d u c e r s  a l o n e ,  as opposed t o  c o n t r o l  by bot h  p r o ­
ducer s  and consumers have g e n e r a l l y ,  and perhaps  u n f a i r l y ,
3
been c h a r a c t e r i s e d  as c a r t e l s  and t h e r e f o r e  u n d e s i r a b l e .
Such c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  e v i d e n t l y  i g n o r e s  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  p r o du c e r  
a c t i o n s  may be o f  s e v e r a l  t y p e s  and may t h e r e f o r e  no t  a l l  have 
t he  same aims and e f f e c t s .  Thus f o r  exampl e ,  an a s s o c i a t i o n  
o f  p r i v a t e  p r o d u c e r s  aimed at  l i m i t i n g  p r o d u c t i o n  or  a l l o c a t i n g  
mar ke t s  . f o r  purposes  o f  i n c r e a s i n g  p r i c e s  may be c a t e g o r i s e d  
as a ha r mf u l  c a r t e l .  But  an a s s o c i a t i o n  o f  e x p o r t i n g  c o u n t r i e s  
whi ch aims at  a d o p t i n g  s i m i l a r  p o l i c i e s  f o r  i t s  members w i t h  
r e s p e c t  t o  m a r k e t i n g  and p r i c i n g  p r a c t i c e s  may no t  n e c e s s a r i l y  
be a ha r mf u l  c a r t e l .  S i nce  t h e  t erm c a r t e l  has been a s s o c i a t e d  
w i t h  ha r mf u l  and u n d e s i r a b l e  a s s o c i a t i o n s  o f  p r o d u c e r s ,  i t  
woul d be u n f a i r  and i ndeed  u n d e s i r a b l e  t o  use t he  t e r m i n  
r e l a t i o n  t o  a s s o c i a t i o n s  o f  e x p o r t i n g  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  
whi ch i n  most  cases are n e i t h e r  aimed a t  i n c r e a s i n g  t he  market  
p r i c e  nor  are t h e y  aimed at  s u p p l y  management .  For  exampl e,  
when one exami nes t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  B a u x i t e  A s s o c i a t i o n  ( IBA)  
c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  i t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  t he  a s s o c i a t i o n ' s  main goa l s  
t h e  c o o r d i n a t i o n  o f  p r o d u c t i o n ,  p r o c e s s i n g ,  and m a r k e t i n g  o f  
b a u x i t e  among t he  members and not  i n c r e a s i n g  t he  mar ket  p r i c e
3. H. K r o n s t e i n ,  The l aw o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c a r t  e 1 s .(T933) 
C o r n e l l  U n i v e r s i t y  Pr ess ,  I t h a c a ,
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4o f  b a u x i t e .  Ano t he r  exampl e i s  t he  c o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  I n t e r ­
gover nmen t a l  Cou n c i l  o f  Copper  E x p o r t i n g  C o u n t r i e s  (CIPEC) 
wh i ch  c o n c e n t r a t e s  at  t he  c o o r d i n a t i o n  o f  measures aimed at  
r a i s i n g  r e a l  e a r n i n g s  f r om copper  e x p o r t s ,  ha r mon i ze  p r o d u c t i o n
5
and m a r k e t i n g ,  and enhance t he  s o l i d a r i t y  between t he  members.
S t r i c t l y  speak i ng  t h e r e f o r e ,  p r o d u c e r s '  a s s o c i a t i o n s  
c o n t a i n  broad goa l s  and are not  r e s t r i c t e d  t o  t he  goal  o f  
r a i s i n g  p r i c e s  as were t h e  e a r l y  19th c e n t u r y  p r i v a t e  p r o ­
ducer  a s s o c i a t i o n s .  On t h i s  ground a l o n e ,  i t  shou l d  be 
p o s s i b l e  t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  a pure c a r t e l  f r om a p r odu c e r s  
a s s o c i a t i o n .  De s p i t e  " c a r t e l "  c o n n o t a t i o n s  w r o n g l y  be i ng  
l e v e l l e d  on p r o d u c e r s '  a s s o c i a t i o n s ,  t hese  a s s o c i a t i o n s  have 
c o n t i n u e d  t o  p r o v i d e  one o f  t he  most  e f f i c i e n t  means at  t he  
d i sposa l ,  o f  t h e  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  f o r  p r o t e c t i n g  t h e i r  
n a t u r a l  r e s o u r c e s .  By en c o u r a g i n g  c o o p e r a t i o n  between p r o ­
ducer s  and c o o r d i n a t i o n  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  and m a r k e t i n g  p o l i c i e s ,  
t hese  a s s o c i a t i o n s  are h e l p i n g  member c o u n t r i e s  gu a r a n t ee  t he  
f u l l  e x e r c i s e  o f  s o v e r e i g n t y  over  t h e i r  n a t u r a l  r e s o u r c e s .
I I I .  E v o l u t i o n  o f  P r o d u c e r s '  A s s o c i a t i o n s
A l t h o u g h  i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l  a s s o c i a t i o n s  o f  p r o du c e r s  
had e x i s t e d  as f a r  back as 1933 when t he  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Tea 
Commi t t ee ( I TC)  was f o r med ,  p r o d u c e r s '  a s s o c i a t i o n s  i n  t he
4.  A r t i c l e  I I I ,  The I n t e r n a t i o n a l  B a u x i t e  Agreement  ( I B A ) .
For  an o f f i c i a l  t e x t ,  see i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l e g a l  m a t e r i a l s ,  
vo l  .1 3 ( 1 9 7 4 ) ,  p p . 1 245-1 253.
5.  A r t i c l e  1 , The I n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l  C o u n c i l  o f  Copper  E x p o r t ­
i ng  C o u n t r i e s '  Agreement ,  Mimeo,  P a r i s ,  3rd J u l y  1981.
6 . See General  Assembl y r e s o l u t i o n  on permanent  s o v e r e i g n t y  
over  n a t u r a l  r e s o u r c e s .  Un i t e d  Na t i o n s  General  Assembl y 
r e s o l u t i o n  3171/XXV111 .
A l so  George E l i a n ,  The p r i n c i p l e  o f  s o v e r e i g n t y  over  
n a t u r a l  r e s o u r c e s , S i J t h o t T  and N o o r d h a f f  i y / 9 .
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f o r m t h e y  e x i s t  t o d ay  are a r e c e n t  phenomenon.  The p r e s e n t  
p r o d u c e r s '  a s s o c i a t i o n s  have evo l v e d  m a i n l y  t h r o u g h  t he  
p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  t he  n o n - a l i g n e d  movement  and t he  
U n i t e d  Na t i o n s  sys t em.
The f i r s t  ma j o r  push f o r  t he  c o n c l u s i o n  o f  p r o d u c e r s '  
a s s o c i a t i o n s  was made i n  1955 at  t he  A s i a n - A f r i c a n  Con f er ence  
i n  Bandung.  The f i n a l  communique i s sue d  a t  t he  end o f  t h i s  
c o n f e r e n c e  c a l l e d  f o r  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  by p r o d u c e r s  i n  
d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  f o r  purposes  of
" s t a b i l i z i n g  t he  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p r i c e s  o f  and 
demand f o r  p r i m a r y  commod i t i es  t h r o u g h  b i l a t e r a l  
and m u l t i l a t e r a l  a r r a n g e m e n t s . . . .  "7
The Bandung c o n f e r e n c e  l ed  s i x  ye a r s  l a t e r  t o  t h e  c r e a t i o n
o f  t he  n o n - a l i g n e d  movement .  At  t he  f i r s t  c o n f e r e n c e  o f
heads o f  s t a t e  and government s  o f  t he  n o n - a l i g n e d  c o u n t r i e s ,
h e l d  i n  B e l g r a d e ,  Y u g o s l a v i a  i n  1961,  demands were agai n
made f o r
" j u s t  t e r ms  o f  t r a d e  f o r  t he  e c o n o m i c a l l y  l e s s -  
deve l oped  c o u n t r i e s  and i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  c o n ­
s t r u c t i v e  e f f o r t s  t o  e l i m i n a t e  t he  e x c e s s i v e  
f l u c t u a t i o n s  i n  p r i m a r y  commodi t y  t r a d e . . . "8
In 1962 a s p e c i a l  c o n f e r e n c e  on t he  p r ob l ems o f  economi c
deve l opment  was he l d  i n  C a i r o ,  Egyp t ,  and b r o u g h t  t o g e t h e r
many d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s .  In t he  c o n f e r e n c e ' s  f i n a l
d e c l a r a t i o n ,  i t  was agreed t h a t ,
7.  F i n a l  communique,  The A s i a n - A f r i c a n  Con f e r ence  he l d  
i n Bandung between A p r i l  18 and 24,  1955.  For  an 
o f f i c i a l  t e x t ,  see Ode t t e  J a n k o w i t s c h  and Kar l  P.
Sauvan t ,  The w o r l d  w i t h o u t  super power s .  The c o l l e c t i v e  
documents o f  t he  n o n - a l i g n e d  c o u n t r i e s , voIume o ne , _
( 1 978)  Oceana p u b l i c a t i o n s  I n c . ,  New York ,pp,T-w/ ,
8 . F i r s t  c o n f e r e n c e  o f  Heads o f  s t a t e  o r  government s  o f  
n o n - a l i g n e d  c o u n t r i e s '  d e c l a r a t i o n ,  B e l g r a d e ,  September  
1961 para 21.  For  a comp l e t e  t e x t  see J a n k o w i t s c h
and Sauvan t ,  volume one c h a p t e r  one at  page 6 .
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" c l o s e  c o o p e r a t i o n  shou l d  be e s t a b l i s h e d  amongst  
d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  p r o d u c i n g  p r i m a r y  commod i t i es  
w i t h  a v i ew t o  cop i ng  w i t h  ma r k e t i n g  p r o b l e ms ,  
i n c l u d i n g  i mprovement  o f  q u a l i t y ,  as w e l l  as o t h e r  
ma t t e r s  r e l a t i n g  t o  t he  exchange o f  goods and 
s e r v i  c e s . " 9
The t h i r d  c o n f e r e n c e  o f  t he  n o n - a l i g n e d  c o u n t r i e s  met 
i n  Lusaka,  Zambia i n  1970 and amongst  o t h e r  t h i n g s ,  t he 
p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  t h e i r  f i n a l  d e c l a r a t i o n  p l e d g e d ,
" t o  o r g a n i s e  exchange o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  i n  r e g a r d  t o  i n
p r o d u c t s  o f  e x p o r t  i n t e r e s t  t o  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s . "
But  l i k e  i n  t h e  l a s t  two c o n f e r e n c e s ,  no a c t i o n  programme was
s p e l t  ou t  as t o  what  approach t he env i saged  p r o du c e r
c o - o p e r a t i o n  s hou l d  t a k e .  I t  was not  u n t i l  t h e  f o u r t h  non-
a l i g n e d  c o n f e r e n c e  he l d  i n  A l g i e r s ,  A l g e r i a  i n  1973 t h a t  such
an a c t i o n  programme was s p e l t  o u t .  For  t h e  f i r s t  t i m e ,  t h e r e
i s  men t i on  o f  f o r m a t i o n  o f  p r o d u c e r s '  a s s o c i a t i o n s .  In t he
programme o f  a c t i o n  f o r  economi c c o o p e r a t i o n  t h a t  was adopt ed
at  t h i s  c o n f e r e n c e ,  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  are encouraged t o ,
" e s t a b l i s h  and s t r e n g t h e n  p r o d u c e r s '  a s s o c i a t i o n s  
i n  r e s p e c t  o f  ma j o r  commod i t i es  o f  i mp o r t a n c e  t o  
t he  w o r l d  economy i n  o r d e r  t o  h a l t  t he  d e t e r i o r a t i o n  
i n  t h e i r  t e rms o f  t r a d e ,  e l i m i n a t e  u n h e a l t h y  compe­
t i t i o n ,  p r e v e n t  ha r mf u l  a c t i v i t i e s  on t h e  p a r t  o f  
m u l t i n a t i o n a l  c o r p o r a t i o n s  and s t r e n g t h n  t h e i r  
ba r ga i  ni  ng p o we r . " • ^
The c a l l  f o r  f o r m a t i o n  o f  p r o d u c e r s '  a s s o c i a t i o n s  appears
t o  have been n e c e s s i t a t e d  by t h e  s l ow p r o g r e s s  t h a t  had been
made i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t he  c o n c l u s i o n  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  commodi t y
agreements  under  t he  Havana p r i n c i p l e s .  Th i s  was made c l e a r
at  t he  same c o n f e r e n c e  when i t  was s t a t e d  t h a t ,
9.  I b i d . ,  para 26 at  page 73.
10.  The comp l e t e  t e x t  o f  t he  d e c l a r a t i o n  can be f ound i n 
J a n k o w i t s c h  and Sauvan t ,  pages 85 t o  90.
1 1 . "The a c t i o n  programme f o r  economi c c o o p e r a t i o n "  i n  
J a n k o w i t s c h  and Sauvan t ,  volume one,  para X I I  at  
page 228.
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" ( t h e )  p r o g r e s s  made t owar ds  t he  f o r m u l a t i o n  
o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  commodi t y  agreements  has so 
f a r  been e x t r e m e l y  s l ow.  The compet en t  i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  bod i es  s h o u l d  g i v e  p r i o r i t y  t o  t h i s  
wor k .  The p r ob l em o f  commod i t i es  l i k e  t e a  
whi ch  have s u f f e r e d  a c o n t i n u o u s  d e c l i n e  i n  
p r i c e ,  shou l d  be d e a l t  w i t h  e x p e d i t i o u s l y  on 
t h e  b a s i s  o f  g l o b a l  a g r e e me n t s . "  12
At  t he  f i f t h  n o n - a l i g n e d  c o n f e r e n c e  he l d  i n  Colombo,
Sr i  Lanka i n  1976,  a f i r m  c a l l  was made t o  a l l  d e v e l o p i n g  
c o u n t r i  e s ,
" t o  e n t e r ,  as soon as p o s s i b l e  i n t o  n e g o t i a t i o n s  
w i t h  a v i ew t o  e s t a b l i s h i n g  q u a l i t a t i v e  o r g a n i z a ­
t i o n s  f o r  p r o d u c e r s ,  t h a t  i s ,  p r o d u c e r s '  a s s o c i ­
a t i o n ,  whi ch woul d enab l e  them t o  s a f e g u a r d  t h e i r  
r i g h t s  and e x e r c i s e  f u l l  and permanent  s o v e r e i g n t y  
o ve r  t h e i r  n a t u r a l  r e s o u r c e s  and t he  n a t i o n a l  
u t i l i z a t i o n  o f  such r e s o u r c e s  f o r  t h e i r  economi c 
d e v e l o p m e n t . . . " 1 3
The v a r i o u s  d e c l a r a t i o n s  and r e s o l u t i o n s  o f  t h e  non-  
a l i g n e d  movement  c a l l i n g  f o r  t he  c r e a t i o n  o f  p r o d u c e r s '  
a s s o c i a t i o n s  are p o l i t i c a l  pronouncement s  emanat i ng  f r om a 
p o l i t i c a l  o r g a n i s a t i o n .  In t h i s  r e s p e c t  t h e r e f o r e ,  i t  i s  
d i f f i c u l t  f o r  one t o  c l a i m  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a d u t y  upon s t a t e s  
t o  e n t e r  i n t o  t h e s e  a s s o c i a t i o n s  or  i ndeed a d u t y  t o  e s t a b l i s h  
them.  The l e g a l i t y  o f  t hese  a s s o c i a t i o n s  canno t  t h e r e f o r e  
emanate f r om t h e s e  p o l i t i c a l  pronouncement s  o f  t he  n o n - a l i g n e d  
movement  bu t  perhaps i n  l a t e r  r e s o l u t i o n s  o f  t he  Un i t e d  
N a t i o n s .  The r i g h t  t o  e n t e r  i n t o  p r o d u c e r s '  a s s o c i a t i o n s  was 
e m p h a t i c a l l y  a s s e r t e d  i n  t he  Un i t e d  N a t i o n s  d e c l a r a t i o n  
and programme o f  a c t i o n  f o r  t he  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  t h e  new 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  economi c o r d e r  (NIEO) .  The d e c l a r a t i o n , ^  
s p e c i f i e s  t h a t  NIEO shou l d  be f ounded among o t h e r  t h i n g s  on:
12.  I b i d . , p . 233 ,
13. Para 15 o f  r e s o l u t i o n  25 o f  t he  f i f t h  n o n - a l i g n e d  c o n f e r ­
ence.  See comp l e t e  t e x t  i n  J a n k o w i t s c h  and Sauvant ,  The 
w o r l d  w i t h o u t  super power s ,  (1978)  Oceana p u b l i c a t i o n s ,
New Yor k ,  p p . 892- 897 ,  ~
14.  See General  Assembl y  r e s o l u t i o n  3201 ( S - V I )
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" f a c i l i t a t i n g  t he  r o l e  whi ch p r o d u c e r s '  a s s o c i a t i o n s  
may p l a y  w i t h i n  t he  f r amewor k  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o ­
o p e r a t i o n ,  and i n  pur suance  o f  t h e i r  a i ms,  i n t e r  a l i a  
a s s i s t i n g  i n  t he  p r o mo t i o n  o f  s u s t a i n e d  g r owt h  o f  t h e  
w o r l d  economy and a c c e l e r a t i n g  t h e  deve l opmen t  o f  
d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s . "
S i g n i f i c a n t  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  t he  r i g h t  t o  e n t e r  i n t o  such
a s s o c i a t i o n s  was made i n  t h e  c h a r t e r  o f  economi c  r i g h t s  and
d u t i e s  o f  s t a t e s  where i t  i s  s t a t e d  t h a t :
" A l l  s t a t e s  have t h e  r i g h t  to a s s o c i a t e  i n  o r g a n i z a t i o n s
o f  p r i m a r y  commodi t y  p r o du c e r s  i n  o r d e r  t o  d e ve l op  t h e i r  
n a t i o n a l  economi es ,  t o  a ch i eve  s t a b l e  f i n a n c i n g  f o r  
t h e i r  deve l opmen t  and,  i n  pur suance o f  t h e i r  a i ms,  t o  
a s s i s t  i n  t h e  p r o mo t i o n  o f  s u s t a i n e d  g r owt h  o f  t he  w o r l d  
economy,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  a c c e l e r a t i n g  t h e  deve l opment  o f  
d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s .  C o r r e s p o n d i n g l y ,  a l l  s t a t e s  have 
t he  d u t y  t o  r e s p e c t  t h a t  r i g h t  by r e f r a i n i n g  f r om econ­
omic and p o l i t i c a l  measures t h a t  woul d l i m i t  i t . "15
A l t h o u g h  t h i s  r e s o l u t i o n  c l e a r l y  p u r p o r t s  t o  c r e a t e  a r u l e  o f
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l aw,  one q u e s t i o n  s t i l l  r e ma i n s .  I s i t  p o s s i b l e
f o r  a r e s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  General  Assembl y t o  c r e a t e  a l e g a l
r i g h t  and bestow i t  on s t a t e s .  Put  a n o t h e r  way,  t h e  q u e s t i o n
i s ,  o f  what  l e g a l  e f f e c t  are t h e  r e s o l u t i o n s  o f  t he  General
As s e mb l y ?
The General  Assembl y  i s  one o f  t he  p r i n c i p a l  organs  o f  
t he  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s .  A r t i c l e  13 o f  t he  c h a r t e r  o f  t he  U n i t e d  
Na t i o n s  p r o v i d e s  t h a t  t he  assembl y  s h a l l  i n i t i a t e  s t u d i e s  and 
make r ecommendat i ons  i n  o r d e r  t o  p r omot e ,  i n t e r  a l i a ,  i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  c o o p e r a t i o n  i n  t he  economi c ,  s o c i a l ,  c u l t u r a l ,  
e d u c a t i o n a l ,  and h e a l t h  f i e l d s .  In a d d i t i o n  t o  t h i s ,  
a r t i c l e  10 empowers t h e  General  Assembl y t o  d i s c u s s  and make 
r ecommendat i ons  on any q u e s t i o n  or  m a t t e r  w i t h i n  t he  scope 
o f  t he  c h a r t e r .  Si nce  m a t t e r s  o f  economi c deve l opmen t  are 
w i t h i n  t h e  scope o f  t he  c h a r t e r ,  t he  General  Assembl y  i n  
p r o c l a i m i n g  t h e  c h a r t e r  o f  economi c r i g h t s  and d u t i e s  o f
15. General  Assembl y  r e s o l u t i o n  3281 (XXIX)  o f  
12th December 1974.
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s t a t e s ,  was p r o p e r l y  p e r f o r m i n g  i t s  f u n c t i o n s .  The q u e s t i o n
however ,  i s  whe t he r  i n  p e r f o r m i n g  i t s  r i g h t f u l  f u n c t i o n s  under
t h e  c h a r t e r ,  t he  General  Assembly can c r e a t e  new r u l e s  o f
l aw t o  b i n d  s t a t e s .  I t  i s  g e n e r a l l y  accept ed  t h a t  t he
General  Assembl y  has no l e g i s l a t i v e  powers s i m i l a r  t o  t hose
o f  a l e g i s l a t u r e  i n  mu n i c i p a l  l aw,  and i t  can t h e r e f o r e  not  
1 6c r e a t e  l aws .  Th i s  p o s i t i o n  i s  emphasi zed by t he  s t a t u t e  
o f  t he  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o u r t  o f  J u s t i c e  whi ch r e q u i r e s  t he  
c o u r t  t o  ap p l y  as i t s  sources  o f  l aw,  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o n v en ­
t i o n s ,  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  cus t om,  gener a l  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  l aw,  and
1 7d e c i s i o n s  o f  j u d i c i a l  bod i es  and t e a c h i n g s  o f  p u b l i c i s t s .
I t  i s  c l e a r  f r om t h i s  t h a t  r e s o l u t i o n s  o f  organs  o f  i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  o r g a n i s a t i o n s  such as The Un i t e d  Na t i o n s  cannot  
w i t h o u t  doubt  be r egar ded  as capab l e  o f  c r e a t i n g  l e g a l  r i g h t s  
o r  o b l i g a t i o n s .  From t h i s  r e a s o n i n g  i t  i s  t h e r e f o r e  d o u b t f u l  
t h a t  r e s o l u t i o n s  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  Na t i on s  General  Assembl y 
r e g a r d i n g  p r o d u c e r s '  a s s o c i a t i o n  co u l d  have c r e a t e d  a l e g a l l y  
b i n d i n g  o b l i g a t i o n  on s t a t e s  t o  e n t e r  i n t o  such a s s o c i a t i o n s .
Even t hough  t he  e f f e c t  o f  t he  v a r i o u s  r e s o l u t i o n s  
r e g a r d i n g  p r o d u c e r s '  a s s o c i a t i o n s  i s  i n  d o u b t ,  t h e  p r a c t i c e  
o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  such as t h e  U n i t e d  Na t i ons  
i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  c e r t a i n  o f  t h e i r  r e s o l u t i o n s  may have t he 
e f f e c t  o f  chang i ng  t h e  r i g h t s  and o b l i g a t i o n s  o f  s t a t e s  over  
a p e r i o d  o f  t i m e .  Th i s  may not  a c c u r a t e l y  be r e ga r de d  as a 
case o f  l aw maki ng but  n e v e r t h e l e s s  t he  i m p o r t a n t  aspec t  o f  
q u a s i - 1 e g i s 1 a t i v e  power .  I n t h i s  r e g a r d ,  i t  woul d seem t h a t
16.  See f o r  exampl e ,  D.W. Gr e i g ,  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  L a W j f l ^ n G j  - 
S u tte rw o rth f , pages 32 - 24 .
17.  A r t i c l e  36 para 1 o f  t he  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Co u r t  o f  J u s t i c e  
s t a t u t e .
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t he  r i g h t  t o  f o r m p r o d u c e r s '  a s s o c i a t i o n s  c o n t a i n e d  i n  t he
c h a r t e r  o f  economi c r i g h t s  and d u t i e s ,  i s  e v i d e n c e  o f  a
deve l oped  custom or  p r a c t i c e  by s t a t e s .  In t he  Ba r ce l ona  
1 8t r a c t i o n  case,  s t a t e  p r a c t i c e  was he l d  t o  be,
" m a n i f e s t  w i t h i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r g a n i s a t i o n s  and 
c o n f e r e n c e s . "
In t h i s  r e g a r d  Judge Ammoun, p o i n t e d  out  t h a t  i t  c o u l d  not
"be d e n i e d ,  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  t he  r e s o l u t i o n s ,  whi ch 
emerge t h e r e f r o m ,  or  b e t t e r  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  t he  vo t es  
exp r essed  t h e r e i n  i n  t h e  name o f  s t a t e s ,  t h a t  t hese  
amount  t o  p r e c ed e n t s  c o n t r i b u t i n g  t o  t h e  f o r m a t i o n  
o f  c u s t o m . 1
1 9As s t a t e d  i n  t he  Nor t h  Sea C o n t i n e n t a l  S h e l f  case ,
" n o t  o n l y  must  t he  ac t s  concer ned amount  t o  a s e t t l e d  
p r a c t i c e ,  bu t  t h e y  must  a l s o  be such,  o r  be c a r r i e d  
ou t  i n  such a way,  as t o  be ev i d e n c e  o f  a b e l i e f  t h a t  
t h i s  p r a c t i c e  i s  r ende r e d  o b l i g a t o r y  by t h e  e x i s t e n c e  
o f  a r u l e  o f  l aw r e q u i r i n g  i t .  The need f o r  such a 
b e l i e f ,  t h a t  i s ,  t he  e x i s t e n c e  o f  a s u b j e c t i v e  e l e me n t ,  
i s  i m p l i c i t  i n  t h e  v e r y  n o t i o n  o f  t h e  o p i n i o  j u r i s  s i v e  
n e c e s s i t a t i s .  The s t a t e s  concer ned must  t h e r e f o r e  f e e l  
t h a t  t h e y  a r e  c o n f o r m i n g  t o  what  amounts t o  a l e g a l  
o b l i g a t i o n . "
In t he  case o f  p r o d u c e r s '  a s s o c i a t i o n s  t h e r e  i s  l i t t l e  doubt  
t h a t  by pas s i ng  a r e s o l u t i o n  i n  t h e  General  Assembl y  a s s e r t i n g  
t he  r i g h t  t o  f o r m such a s s o c i a t i o n s ,  t he  v a r i o u s  c o u n t r i e s ,  
members o f  t he  U n i t e d  Nat i ons ,  were e n d o r s i n g  an e x i s t i n g  
p r a c t i c e  and b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  such a p r a c t i c e  had been 
t r a n s f o r m e d  i n t o  a l e g a l  o b l i g a t i o n .  I f  t h i s  r e a s o n i n g  i s  
a c c e p t e d ,  t hen  t he  l e g a l  f o u n d a t i o n  f o r  t he  r i g h t  t o  f orm 
p r o d u c e r s '  a s s o c i a t i o n s  l i e s  i n  t he  p r a c t i c e  o f  s t a t e s  
v whi ch has been t r a n s f o r m e d  i n t o 1, an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  x u s t o m .
18. [ m o j  ICJ" te p o A s t 3 0 3  ■
' r
19. [  \°[ M  ]  IC T  k e fo r ts  j  £  a t  p
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I V . Legal  n a t u r e  o f  p r o d u c e r s 1 a s s o c i a t i o n s
The f i r s t  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  any p r o d u c e r  a s s o c i a t i o n ,  
i s  t h a t  i t  i s  c r e a t e d  by an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  agreement  i n v o l v i n g  
two o r  more s t a t e s .  Such an agreement  t hen  becomes t he  
b a s i s  o f  t h e  members'  l e g a l  o b l i g a t i o n s .  Th i s  i s  because 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l aw embodi es a p r i n c i p l e  o f  g r e a t  i mp o r t a n c e  
f ound  i n  t h e  maxim pac t a  sun t  ser vanda as g o v e r n i n g  r e l a t i o n s  
between p a r t i e s  t o  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  agr eement .  The maxim 
r e c o g n i s e s  t h a t  commi t ment s  p u b l i c l y  and v o l u n t a r i l y  made by 
s t a t e s  must  be honour ed.  Th i s  i ndeed i s  a p r i n c i p l e  t h a t  
l i e s  a t  t he  co r e  o f  t he  s u c c e s s f u l  o p e r a t i o n  o f  any agreement  
between s t a t e s .  Th i s  p r i n c i p l e  has now been pu t  beyond any 
doub t  by be i n g  c o d i f i e d  i n t o  t he  Vi enna c o n v e n t i o n  on t he  
Law o f  T r e a t i e s .  That  c o n v e n t i o n  s p e c i f i e s  t h a t ,
" e v e r y  t r e a t y  i n  f o r c e  i s  b i n d i n g  upon t he  p a r t i e s  ?n 
t o  i t  and must  be pe r f o r med  by them i n  good f a i t h . "
The second c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  i n v o l v e s  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f
such an a s s o c i a t i o n s '  c a p a c i t y  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l aw,  t h a t
i s ,  whe t he r  i t  woul d be r e g a r d e d  as a s u b j e c t  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l
l aw.  As i s  g e n e r a l l y  r e c o g n i z e d ,  a s u b j e c t  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l
l aw i s  any e n t i t y  c apab l e  o f  poss es s i n g  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r i g h t s
and d u t i e s  and hav i ng  t he  c a p a c i t y  t o  b r i n g  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
21c l a i m s .  The a t t r i b u t e s  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l e g a l  p e r s o n a l i t y  
are r e g a r d e d  as:  c a p a c i t y  t o  make c l a i ms  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  
breaches  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l aw;  c a p a c i t y  t o  e n t e r  i n t o  t r e a t i e s
20.  A r t i c l e  26 o f  t he  Vi enna Con ven t i o n  on t h e  l aw o f
t r e a t i e s  ( 1 9 6 9 ) .  For  a como l e t e  o f f i c i a l  t e x t  o f  t he
21.  R e p a r a t i o n  f o r  i n j u r i e s  s u f f e r e d  i n  t he  s e r v i c e  o f  
t h e  U n i t e d  Na t i o n s  Case , | IC3*
Con v e n t i o n  
Ma t e r i  a l s
see ( / W O  8
a t  page 679 
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or  agreement s  whi ch are v a l i d  under  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l aw;  and 
c a p a c i t y  t o  e n j o y  p r i v i l e g e s  and i m m u n i t i e s  f r om n a t i o n a l  
j u r i s d i c t i o n s .  S t a t e s  by t h e i r  v e r y  n a t u r e ,  do have a l l  t he  
t h r e e  a t t r i b u t e s  and are t h e r e f o r e  c l e a r l y  s u b j e c t s  o f  i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  l aw.  A p a r t  f r om s t a t e s  however ,  some i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
o r g a n i z a t i o n s  may have t h e s e  a t t r i b u t e s .  The q u e s t i o n  i s  
however ,  how t o  d e t e r m i n e  t h a t  one o r g a n i s a t i o n  has or  does 
no t  have t he  n e c es s a r y  a t t r i b u t e s  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l e g a l  
p e r s o n a l i t y .  In a system where t h e r e  i s  no c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
r e q u i r e m e n t  f o r  r e g i s t r a t i o n  o f  a s s o c i a t i o n s  as i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
l e g a l  p e r s o n s ,  t h e  t e s t  f o r  d e t e r m i n i n g  t h e  p e r s o n a l i t y  
seems t o  be f u n c t i o n a l .  The f u n c t i o n a l  t e s t  was d i s c u s s e d  
i n  an i m p o r t a n t  case ,  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s .
In the Reparat i on f o r  I n j u r i e s  Suf f e r e d  in the Ser v i ce  of
2 2the Uni ted Nat i ons ,  the I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Cour t  of  
J u s t i c e  in i ssu i ng  i t s  adv i sor y  opi ni on on the c a pa c i t y  of  
the Uni ted Nat i ons as an o r g a n i s a t i o n  to br i ng an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
cl a i m in r espect  of  i n j u r i e s  to i t s  agents,  u t i l i z e d  a 
f u n c t i o n a l  t e s t .  Using t h i s  t e s t ,  the cour t  reached the 
opi ni on t h a t ,  the o r g a n i z a t i o n  was i ntended to enjoy and 
e x e r c i s e ,  and in f a c t  enjoys and e x e r c i s e s ,  f u n c t i o n s  and 
r i g h t s  which can only be exp l a i ned on the basis of  the posses­
sion of  a l a r ge  measure of  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p e r s o n a l i t y  and 
c a pa c i t y  to oper at e  upon an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p l ane .  Accor d i ng l y ,  
the cour t  concluded t h a t  the o r g a n i s a t i o n  had i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
1egal  per sona l i  t y .
22.  I b i d . p . ] 8 D
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A s i m i l a r  reasoni ng may apply to producers '  a ssoc i a t i ons  
i f  they are regarded as i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n s .  Accord­
ing to the I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Law Commission,  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
o r g a n i s a t i o n ,  i s an a s so c i a t i on  of  s t a t e s  e s t a b l i s h e d  by 
t r e a t y ,  possessing a c o n s t i t u t i o n  and common organs,  and 
having a l ega l  p e r s o n a l i t y  d i s t i n c t  from t h a t  of  the member
9 9
s t a t e s .  Pr oducer s  a s s o c i a t i o n s  as c o n s t i t u t e d  a t  t he  moment 
are e x c l u s i v e l y  a s s o c i a t i o n s  o f  s t a t e s .  Th i s  r e q u i r e m e n t  
o f  s t a t e h o o d  i s  c o n s i d e r e d  v e r y  i m p o r t a n t  as f a r  as member­
s h i p  o f  t h es e  a s s o c i a t i o n s  i s  conce r ned .  Th i s  i s  r e f l e c t e d
i n  t he  f a c t  t h a t  a number o f  t hese  a s s o c i a t i o n s  have s p e c i f i c -
24a l l y  p r o v i d e d  t h i s  r e q u i r e m e n t  i n  t h e i r  c o n s t i t u t i o n s .
A p a r t  f r om be i ng  a s s o c i a t i o n s  o f  s t a t e s ,  t h e y  are a l l  c r e a t e d  
by t r e a t y  and have d i s t i n c t  organs  f o r  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
o f  t he  t r e a t i e s .  The l a s t  c r i t e r  ion p r e s e n t e d  by t he  I n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  Law Commi ssi on r e l a t e s  t o  a l e g a l  p e r s o n a l i t y  
d i s t i n c t  f r om t h a t  o f  t he  member s t a t e s .  Ev i dence  o f  t he  
d i s t i n c t  p e r s o n a l i t y  can u s u a l l y  be f ound  i n  t h e  m u l t i l a t e r a l  
agreement  s i gned  by members r e g a r d i n g  t h e  s t a t u s  o f  t he  
o r g a n i z a t i o n .  Such an agreement  was f o r  exampl e s i gned  i n  
Lusaka on 26t h  June 1974 i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  CIPEC. F u r t h e r mo r e ,  
t h e  h e a d q u a r t e r s  agreement s  t h a t  are e n t e r e d  i n t o  between 
p r odu c e r s  a s s o c i a t i o n s  and t he  hos t  c o u n t r i e s  do presuppose
23.  See The Yearbook o f  t he  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Law Commi ssi on 
( 1968)  a t  p . 124.
24.  For  exampl e ,  A r t i c l e s  2 o f  CIPEC agreement  and 1 o f  
t h e  I BA ' s  agr eement .  A s i m i l a r  a r t i c l e  i s  f ound  i n  
t h e  s t a t u t e  o f  t he  L a t i n  Amer i can and Car i bbean  Sugar  
E x p o r t i n g  C o u n t r i e s  (GEPLACEA),  A r t i c l e  2 o f  t h i s  
s t a t u t e  p r o v i d e s  t h a t  members o f  t he  group are t he  
i n d e p e n d e n t  L a t i n  Amer i can and Car i bbean  c o u n t r i e s  
whi ch are t r a d i t i o n a l  sugar  e x p o r t e r s .
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25t h es e  a s s o c i a t i o n s '  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l e g a l  p e r s o n a l i t y .  There 
i s  no doubt  t h e r e f o r e  t h a t  p r o d u c e r s '  a s s o c i a t i o n s  are 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  and may be r e g a r d e d  as po s s es s i n g  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l e g a l  p e r s o n a l i t y .
V. The I n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l  Counc i l  o f  Copper  E x p o r t i n g  
C o u n t r i e s  (CIPEC)
( i ) Background
CIPEC was c r ea t ed in 1967 and became the f i r s t  
producers '  a s s o c i a t i on  grouping t oge t he r  a number of  deve l op­
ing c oun t r i es  and cover i ng a mineral  commodity.  P r i o r  to  
1967,  t he r e  had been in e x i s t ence  a number of  such a s s oc i a t i ons  
grouping raw ma t e r i a l  producers from devel opi ng c ount r i es  but  
none covered a mi neral  product .  Regarding a g r i c u l t u r a l  
commodi t i es,  the Af r i c a n  Groundnut  Counci l  had been formed in 
1 964,  the In  t  er / \ f  r i c an Cof f ee  Or ga n i s a t i on  in 1 960,  the 
ocoa roducers l l i a n c e  in 1962,  the I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Tea  
Committee formed in 1933 and renewed in 1950.  In f u e l ,  the  
or g a n i s a t i o n  of  pet rol eum expor t i ng c o u n t r i e s  (OPEC) was 
e s t a b l i  shed in 1 960.
A number o f  f a c t o r s  p r e v a i l i n g  i n  t h e  e a r l y  1960s 
made t he  c r e a t i o n  o f  a p r o d u c e r s '  a s s o c i a t i o n  i n  copper  
p o s s i b l e .  The most  s i g n i f i c a n t  o f  t h e s e  f a c t o r s  was t he  
g a i n i n g  o f  p o l i t i c a l  i ndependence  by a number o f  copper  
p r o d u c i n g  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s .  P o l i t i c a l  i ndependence  
n e c e s s i t a t e d  economi c  c o n t r o l  by t he new i n d e p e n d e n t  g o v e r n ­
ment s .  The main d e s i r e  o f  t h es e  government s  was t o  be ab l e  t o
2 5 . Hea d q u a r t e r s  agreement s  have been e n t e r e d  i n t o  by many 
p r o d u c e r s  a s s o c i a t i o n s ,  f o r  exampl e,  CIPEC and IBA.
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e x e r t  some i n f l u e n c e  f r om p r o d u c t i o n  t o  m a r k e t i n g  o f  t he  raw 
m a t e r i a l s  upon wh i ch  t h e i r  economi es depended.  The p r o d u c t i o n  
s t age c o u l d  be d e a l t  w i t h  a t  an a p p r o p r i a t e  t i m e  by domes t i c  
measures o f  n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n .  The m a r k e t i n g  asp ec t  however ,  
c o u l d  no t  be e f f e c t i v e l y  d e a l t  w i t h  w i t h i n  t h e  m u n i c i p a l  
spheres  and needed c o n c e r t e d  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  e f f o r t s .  Th i s  i s  
because t he  m a r k e t i n g  prob l ems o f  raw m a t e r i a l s  t end  t o  
t r a n s c e n d  t h e  v a r i o u s  n a t i o n a l  b o u n d a r i e s .  In t h e  1960s 
t h e r e  was an i n c r e a s i n g  awareness by p r o d u c e r s  o f  raw m a t e r i a l s  
t h a t  one approach t o  t a c k l i n g  t he  raw m a t e r i a l  m a r k e t i n g  
p r o b l e ms ,  was t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  p r o d u c e r s '  a s s o c i a t i o n s .
The f i r s t  i n i t i a t i v e  by copper  p r o d u c i n g  c o u n t r i e s  
t owar ds  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  a p r o d u c e r s '  a s s o c i a t i o n ,  was made 
i n  November 1966 d u r i n g  P r e s i d e n t  Kaunda ' s  v i s i t  t o  C h i l e .
At  t he  end o f  t h i s  v i s i t  a j o i n t  d e c l a r a t i o n  was i s s ue d  on 
b e h a l f  o f  t he  P r e s i d e n t s  o f  Zambia and C h i l e .  In t h i s  
d e c l a r a t i o n ,  t h e y  obser ved  t h a t :
"The p r i n c i p a l  economi c l i n k  between C h i l e  and Zambia 
i s  t h e i r  common c o n d i t i o n  as l a r g e - s c a l e  copper  
p r o d u c e r s .  C h i l e  and Zambia have s t r o n g  p o s i t i o n s  
i n  t h e  w o r l d  copper  mar ke t  and a l t h o u g h  t h e y  produce 
o n l y  30% o f  t h e  w o r l d  t o t a l ,  t h e i r  i n f l u e n c e  on t he  
s u p p l y  o f  copper  f o r  t h e  f r e e  w o r l d  ma r ke t  can be 
e s t i m a t e d  at  a p p r o x i m a t e l y  65% t o  70%. I f  t he  
p r o d u c t i o n  o f  Peru and Congo ( Z a i r e )  i s  added t o  
t h o s e  o f  C h i l e  and Zambi a,  i t  appears  t h a t  t hese  
f o u r  c o u n t r i e s  j o i n t l y  s u p p l y  t h r e e - q u a r t e r s  o f  w o r l d  
ne t  copper  e x p o r t s . "26
Th i s  r e a l i z a t i o n  c l e a r l y  made t he  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a c l o s e r
a s s o c i a t i o n  between t he  copper  p r o d u c i n g  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s
a r e a l  p o s s i b i l i t y .  I ndeed t h e  t a l k s  t h a t  f o l l o w e d  t h i s  v i s i t
c u l m i n a t e d  i n  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  CIPEC.
26.  Jean  d 1 H a in a u t f u A W t& f  j l im p s e  o f C lP E C '1. CiPBC h o c .
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( i i ) Members hi  p
(a)  Ful_l_m embers
Membershi p i n  CIPEC, l i k e  t h a t  o f  o t h e r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
o r g a n i z a t i o n s  i s  d i v i d e d  i n t o  two c a t e g o r i e s  - f u l l  members 
and a s s o c i a t e  members.  ^  F u l l  members are f u r t h e r  sub ­
d i v i d e d  i n t o  o r i g i n a l  members and s u b s e q u e n t l y  a d m i t t e d  
members.  As i n  t he  case o f  t he  Un i t e d  N a t i o n s  C h a r t e r  whi ch 
p r o v i d e s  t h a t  t h e  o r i g i n a l  members o f  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  s h a l l  
be s t a t e s  whi ch hav i ng  p a r t i c i p a t e d  at  t he  San F r a n c i s c o  
c o n f e r e n c e ,
" s i g n  t he  p r e s e n t  c h a r t e r  and r a t i f y  i t "  
t h e  CIPEC agreement  r e q u i r e s  f o u n d e r  members t o  be
" . . . t h o s e  c o u n t r i e s  wh i ch  were r e p r e s e n t e d  at  t he  f i r s t  
c o n f e r e n c e  he l d  i n  Lusaka and whi ch  s i g n e d  t h e  o r i g i n a l  
agreement  wh i ch  e s t a b l i s h e d  t he  o r g a n i s a t i o n . "  28
The o r i g i n a l  or  f o u n d e r  membershi p pos^S f ew p r ob l ems ,  i f  
any,  because i t  depends on p a r t i c i p a t i o n  a t  t h e  c o n f e r e n c e  
e s t a b l i s h i n g  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  i n  t h i s  case 
CIPEC, and r a t i f i c a t i o n  o f  t he  agreement .  In t h e  case o f  
CIPEC, f o u r  c o u n t r i e s  f a l l  i n  t h i s  c a t e g o r y  - C h i l e ,  Peru,  
Z a i r e  and Zambi a.
The second c a t e g o r y  o f  f u l l  members i n  CIPEC cove r s  
t h o s e  c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  have s u b s e q u e n t l y  j o i n e d  t he  o r g a n i ­
s a t i o n  as f u l l  members.  In r e l a t i o n  t o  subsequen t  f u l l  
membersh i p ,  p r ob l ems  may a r i s e  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e i r  admi ss i on  
i n t o  t h e  o r g a n i s a t i o n .  The c r i t e r i a  f o r  admi s s i o n  t o  f u l l
27.  A r t i c l e  2 o f  t he  CIPEC agreement .
28.  A r t i c l e  2 ( a )  o f  t h e  CIPEC agr eement .
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membershi p i s  s t a t e d  i n  a r t i c l e  2 ( c )  o f  t h e  CIPEC agr eement .  
Under  t h a t  c r i t e r i a ,
" any p r o d u c e r  c o u n t r y  w i t h  a s u b s t a n t i a l  ne t  e x p o r t  
o f  copper  produced f r om ore o r i g i n a t i n g  i n  t h e  
c o u n t r y  and whi ch has f u n d a m e n t a l l y  s i m i l a r  i n t e r e s t s  
t o  t h o se  o f  member c o u n t r i e s  may become a f u l l  
member o f  t he  o r g a n i z a t i o n  i f  accep t ed  unan i mo us l y  
by t he  f u l l  members. "
There are t h r e e  i m p o r t a n t  aspec t s  t o  t h i s  c r i t e r i a  whi ch i t
wou l d  seem must  be s a t i s f i e d  b e f o r e  a d mi s s i o n .
F i r s t ,  t h e  subsequent  f u l l  membershi p i s  open t o  copper
p r o d u c i n g  and e x p o r t i n g  s t a t e s .  The r e q u i r e m e n t  o f  s t a t e h o o d
i s  e x e m p l i f i e d  by an i n c i d e n t  t h a t  had t o  be d e a l t  w i t h  by
t h e  CIPEC s e c r e t a r i a t  a few ye a r s  ago.  At  t h a t  t i me  a
p r o v i n c e  i n  Canada approached t he  S e c r e t a r i a t  and i n f o r m a l l y
exp r essed  i t s  wi sh t o  j o i n  CIPEC. The S e c r e t a r i a t  r e f u s e d  t o
a ccep t  t h e  p r o p o s i t i o n  because i t  c o n s i d e r e d  t h a t  membershi p
was l i m i t e d  t o  s t a t e s .  29
The second r e q u i r e m e n t  f o r  t h i s  t y p e  o f  membershi p i s
t h a t  t h e  c o u n t r y  concer ned  must  be a s u b s t a n t i a l  net
e x p o r t e r  o f  c o p p e r .  C o n s i d e r i n g  t h i s  c r i t e r i o n  i t  seems
o b v i o us  t h a t  ma j o r  e x p o r t e r s  o f  copper  such as C h i l e  ( o v e r  a
m i l l i o n  t o n s  e x p o r t e d  i n  1981) ,  Peru (312 t housand  t ons  e x p o r t e d
i n  1981 ) ,  Z a i r e  (463 t housand  t ons  i n  1981 ) ,  and Zambia
(556 t housand  t ons  i n  1981)  woul d e a s i l y  q u a l i f y  as f u l l
members even i f  t h e y  had not  been f o u n d e r  members.  But  as i t
i s  t h e y  were a l l  f o u n d e r  members and t h e i r  f u l l  membershi p
s t a t u s  t h e r e f o r e ,  stems f r om t h i s  f a c t .  The q u e s t i o n  however
a r i s e s  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  a n o t h e r  f u l l  member,  I n d o n e s i a .  The
e x p o r t  c a p a c i t y  o f  I n d o n e s i a  was 59 t housand  t on s  i n  1981.
29.  I n t e r v i e w  w i t h  Mr.  P. P a r k i n s o n ,  d i r e c t o r  o f  M a r k e t i n g
P o l i c y  i n  CIPEC, conduc t ed  by t he  w r i t e r  i n  December 1982.
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Th i s  f i g u r e  was l ower  t han  t h a t  f o r  A u s t r a l i a  and Papua
30New Gui nea (124 t housand  and 171 t housand  t o n s  r e s p e c t i v e l y ) .
On t he  b a s i s  o f  t h e se  f i g u r e s ,  Papua New Gui nea and A u s t r a l i a  
shou l d  have been a d m i t t e d  as f u l l  members p r i o r  t o  t he  
admi ss i on  o f  I n d o n e s i a .  I t  i s  however ,  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  
A u s t r a l i a  and Papua New Gui nea d i d  not  s a t i s f y  t h e  t h i r d  
c r i t e r i a  be l ow or  s i m p l y  p r e f e r r e d  a n o t h e r  t y p e  o f  membersh i p.  
Th i s  was c e r t a i n l y  t h e  case w i t h  A u s t r a l i a  wh i ch  r e q u e s t e d  
ad mi s s i o n  as A s s o c i a t e  member and not  a f u l l  member.  The 
advant age o f  t h i s  f o r  A u s t r a l i a  was t h a t  a s s o c i a t e  membershi p 
i n  CIPEC does no t  c a r r y  w i t h  i t  v o t i n g  r i g h t s  and t h e r e f o r e  
such members are no t  bound by t he  d e c i s i o n s  r ea c he d .  Th i s  
p o s i t i o n  seems t o  s u i t  A u s t r a l i a  because i t s  m i n i n g  i n d u s t r y  
i s  l a r g e l y  p r i v a t e l y  c o n t r o l l e d  and woul d have made i t  
d i f f i c u l t  f o r  t h e  government  t o  impose CIPEC d e c i s i o n s  on 
t h e  p r i v a t e  owners .
The f i n a l  r e q u i r e m e n t  i s  t h a t  o f  h av i n g  f u n d a m e n t a l l y  
s i m i l a r  i n t e r e s t s  t o  t h o s e  o f  member c o u n t r i e s  and accept ed  
un an i mous l y  as such.  The CIPEC agreement  does not  s p e c i f i c a l l y  
ment i on  t he  i n t e r e s t s  o f  i t s  members but  one can deduce t hese  
f r om t he  v a r i o u s  aims o f  t he  o r g a n i s a t i o n .  These i n c l u d e  
c o o r d i n a t i o n  o f  p o l i t i c a l  and commerc i a l  p o l i c i e s ,  and copper  
p r i c e  s t a b i l i z a t i o n .  The unani mous a c cep t ance  o f  a c o u n t r y  
as a f u l l  member woul d p r esuppose  t h a t  i t  had s i m i l a r  i n t e r e s t s  
t o  t h o s e  o f  o t h e r  members.
The p r ob l em t h a t  may a r i s e  w i t h  such membershi p r e q u i r e -
30.  CIPEC S e c r e t a r i a t ,  S t a t i s t i c a l  b u l l e t i n ,  1981,  page 7.
208
ments i s  whe t he r  t h e y  can o c c a s i o n a l l y  be i g n o r e d  or  
whe t he r  t h e y  must  be f o l l o w e d  s t r i c t l y  i n  each admi ss i on  
case.  A s i m i l a r  p r ob l em had a r i s e n  a f t e r  t h e  Second Wor l d 
War r e g a r d i n g  membershi p i n  t he  Un i t e d  N a t i o n s .  The I n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  Cou r t  o f  J u s t i c e  ( I CJ )  was r e q u e s t e d  t o  d e l i v e r  an 
a d v i s o r y  o p i n i o n  on t h e  l e g a l i t y  o f  maki ng a d mi s s i on  t o  t he  
U n i t e d  Na t i o n s  s u b j e c t  t o  c o n d i t i o n s  o t h e r  t han  t ho s e  se t  
ou t  i n  t h e  c h a r t e r .  The ICJ was d i v i d e d  on t h e  i s s u e  t he
m a j o r i t y  h o l d i n g  t h a t  a d d i t i o n a l  c o n d i t i o n s  were not  
31l e g i t i m a t e .  S i nce  CIPEC i s  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  
t h e  c o u r t s  r e a s o n i n g  may be s a i d  t o  a p p l y  t o  i t .  A p p l y i n g  
t he  c o u r t s  r e a s o n i n g  t o  CIPEC,  i t  may be s a i d  t h a t  t h e  
c o n d i t i o n s  se t  i n  a r t i c l e  2 o f  CIPEC are t o  be r e ga r de d  as 
s o l e  c o n d i t i o n s  needed t o  be s a t i s f i e d  b e f o r e  an a p p l i c a n t  
s t a t e  i s  a d m i t t e d  as a f u l l  member.
(b)  Ass^o£i_at£ memb^r^hj_p
The a s s o c i a t e  membershi p s t a t u s  has been used i n  a 
number o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r g a n i s a t i o n s  i n  o r d e r  t o  enab l e  some 
s t a t e s  t o  t a k e  advan t age  o f  t h e  o r g a n i s a t i o n s  even t hough 
t h e y  do no t  q u a l i f y  t o  be f u l l  members.  The U n i t e d  Na t i o n s  
c h a r t e r ,  f o r  exampl e ,  does not  p r o v i d e  f o r  t h i s  t y pe  o f  
membershi p bu t  ove r  t h e  y e a r s  t he  General  Assembl y  has 
c r e a t e d  a f o r m o f  such membershi p by g r a n t i n g  o b s e r v e r  s t a t u s  
t o  t h o s e  e n t i t i e s  t h a t  do no t  q u a l i f y  t o  f u l l  membersh i p .
O r i g i n a l l y ,  t h e  CIPEC agreement  d i d  no t  p r o v i d e  f o r  
a s s o c i a t e  membershi p but  o n l y  f u l l  membersh i p .  The d i f f i c u l t y
31 . C o n d i t i o n s  o f  Admi ss i on  t o  membershi p i n  t h e  Un i t e d  
j j a t j o ns., pYq-iTI IC J  R eports , b8  ,
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i n  me e t i ng  t h e  f u l l  membershi p c r i t e r i a ,  meant  t h a t  f o r  t he  
f i r s t  seven y e a r s  o f  t he  o r g a n i s a t i o n ' s  e x i s t e n c e  i t s  
membershi p was c o n f i n e d  t o  t he  f o u r  f o u n d e r  members.  I f  
one b e l i e v e s  t h e  success  o f  any p r o du c e r  a s s o c i a t i o n  as 
dependent  on t he  h a r m o n i z a t i o n  o f  t he  i n t e r e s t s  o f  as many 
p r o d u c e r s  o f  t h e  commodi t y  as p o s s i b l e ,  t h e  l i m i t e d  member­
s h i p  o f  CIPEC mi g h t  have r educed i t s  e f f e c t i v e n e s s .
A d e t e r m i n e d  e f f o r t  bot h  t o  e n l a r g e  t h e  o r g a n i s a t i o n  
and t o  e s t a b l i s h  and s t r e n g t h e n  l i n k s  w i t h  p r o d u c e r s  o u t s i d e  
t he  f o u r  f o u n d e r  members was i n i t i a t e d  a t  CIPEC' s f i f t h  
m i n i s t e r i a l  c o n f e r e n c e  he l d  i n  Lusaka i n  May 1974.  At  t h a t  
c o n f e r e n c e ,  t he  t hen  Zambian Pr i me M i n i s t e r ,  M r X c h o n a  
obser ved  t h a t  i t  was odd t h a t  an o r g a n i z a t i o n  whi ch  began 
w i t h  four ,  members i n  1 967 shou l d  s t i l l  have t he  o r i g i n a l
o 9
numbers i n  1974.  Mr .  Chona c a l l e d  f o r  an i n c r e a s e  i n  t he  
membershi p o f  CIPEC t o  b r i n g  i n  o t h e r  p r o d u c e r s  whose s u p p o r t  
woul d be v i t a l  i n  t he  ye a r s  t h a t  l i e  ahead.  In r esponse  t o  
Mr .  Chona ' s  c a l l ,  t he  c o n f e r e n c e  o f  m i n i s t e r s  amended t he  
i n i t i a l  CIPEC agreement  t o  p r o v i d e ,  i n t e r  a l i a ,  f o r  t he  
a dmi s s i on  as a s s o c i a t e  members t hose  copper  e x p o r t i n g  c o u n t r i e s  
whose economi es do not  depend on copper  t o  t h e  same e x t e n t  
as i n  t h e  case o f  t h e  o r i g i n a l  members.  The amendment 
t h e r e f o r e  opened t he  a s s o c i a t e  membershi p t o  t ho s e  c o u n t r i e s  
who were or  were about  t o  become net  e x p o r t e r s  o f  copper  as
32.  The Times o f  Zambi a,  24 t h  June 1974;  and The F i n a n c i a l  
Times o f  25 t h  June 1974.
33.  CIPEC Q u a r t e r l y  Rev i ew,  10th a n n i v e r s a r y  i s s u e  (1977)  
at  page 13.
See a l s o  t he  F i n a l  communique o f  t he  5 t h  m i n i s t e r i a l  
c o n f e r e n c e  o f  CIPEC.
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opposed t o  s u b s t a n t i a l  ne t  e x p o r t e r s  i n  t h e  f u l l  member-
O A
s h i p  c r i t e r i a .  As a consquence o f  t h i s  amendment ,  t h r e e  
c o u n t r i e s  A u s t r a l i a ,  Papua New Gui nea,  and M a u r i t a n i a  were 
a d m i t t e d  t o  CIPEC as a s s o c i a t e  members i n  1975 and 1976.
U n l i k e  f u l l  membersh i p,  a s s o c i a t e  membershi p does 
not  c a r r y  w i t h  i t  t he  r i g h t  t o  v o t e . ^  Th i s  l a c k  o f  v o t i n g  
r i g h t s  means i n  p r a c t i c e  t h a t  such members are not  bound by 
d e c i s i o n s  r eached i n  t he  v a r i o u s  organs o f  CIPEC. Th i s  
s i t u a t i o n  s u i t s  c o u n t r i e s  l i k e  A u s t r a l i a  where t h e r e  e x i s t s  
a c l e a r  d i s t i n c t i o n  between t h e  mi n i ng  compani es and t he  
gover nmen t .  Th i s  government  woul d not  wi sh  t o  be commi t t ed  
t o  CIPEC d e c i s i o n s ,  such as p r o d u c t i o n  c u t s  when as a 
government  i t  was power l ess  t o  e n f o r c e  i t  i n  i t s  own t e r r i t o r y .  
A1 t h o u g h . t h i s  a r r angement  s u i t s  A u s t r a l i a ,  i t  has c l e a r l y  
c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  CIPEC' s weakness as t he  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  t he  
pas t  few y e a r s  woul d  seem t o  i n d i c a t e .
A l l  ma j o r  d e c i s i o n s  t aken  i n  t he  v a r i o u s  CIPEC organs 
are b i n d i n g  on t h e  f u l l  members and a s s o c i a t e  members are 
no t  o b l i g e d  t o  ab i de  by them.  Th i s  s i t u a t i o n  r a i s e s  t he  
q u e s t i o n  o f  t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  CIPEC' s d e c i s i o n s  i f  
o t h e r  members are at  l i b e r t y  t o  i g n o r e  them.  Thus f o r  
exampl e ,  i n  March 1978,  t h r e e  o f  t he  f u l l  members agreed t o  
a p r o d u c t i o n  cu t  o f  15% i n  an e f f o r t  t o  s t a b i l i z e  t h e  w o r l d  
copper  p r i c e s .  C h i l e ,  wh i ch  i s  a n o t h e r  i m p o r t a n t  f u l l  
member opposed a r e d u c t i o n  o f  o u t p u t  and s i n c e  under  t he  
CIPEC r u l e s  o f  p r oc edu r e  such a d e c i s i o n  r e q u i r e d  a unani mous
34.  A r t i c l e  2 ( d )  o f  t he  CIPEC agreement .
35.  I b i d . ,  A r t i  c l e  2 ( e ) .
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v o t e  no d e f i n i t i v e  d e c i s i o n  c o u l d  be agr eed.  Th i s  l a c k  o f  
u n a n i m i t y  c l e a r l y  h i g h l i g h t e d  t he  o r g a n i s a t i o n s  weakness.  
But  even i f  C h i l e  s i de d  w i t h  t h e  o t h e r  f u l l  members,  i t  
must  be q u e s t i o n a b l e  whe t he r  a mandat or y  cu t  by f u l l  
members o n l y  and a v o l u n t a r y  c u t  by a s s o c i a t e  members woul d 
have been e f f e c t i v e  i n  a c h i e v i n g  t he  d e s i r e d  g o a l s .
A number o f  p r o du c e r s  a s s o c i a t i o n s  have avo i ded  t h i s  
d i f f i c u l t y  by p r o v i d i n g  f o r  o n l y  one t y p e  o f  membersh i p.
For example,  the I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Bauxi te Ass oc i a t i on  has only
O £
one t y p e  o f  membershi p - f u l l  membershi p.  A u n i f o r m  t y p e  
o f  membershi p f o r  a l l  CIPEC members i s  l i k e l y  t o  i n c r e a s e  
t h e  c r e d i b i l i t y  o f  t h e  o r g a n i s a t i o n ,  at  l e a s t  once a g r e e ­
ment  has been r eached a l l  members woul d be o b l i g e d  t o  ab i de  
by t h e  d e c i s i o n s .  I t  m i gh t  be argued t h a t  i n  such a 
s i t u a t i o n  d i f f i c u l t i e s  woul d be e n co u n t e r e d  i n  r e a c h i n g  
u n a n i m i t y .  Th i s  however ,  does not  seem t o  be a s u f f i c i e n t  
r eason f o r  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  t o  p r o v i d e  access t o  c o u n t r i e s  
t h r o u g h  a s s o c i a t e  membershi p w i t h o u t  them i n c u r r i n g  any 
o b l i g a t i o n s  whenever  an i m p o r t a n t  d e c i s i o n  i s  made.
( i i ) CIPEC as an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l e g a l  per son
I t  i s  g e n e r a l l y  accep t ed  t h a t  i n  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l
communi t y  t h e r e  i s  no c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  a u t h o r i t y  t h a t  c o n f e r s
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l e g a l  p e r s o n a l i t y  on an i n s t i t u t i o n  or
3 7a s s o c i a t i o n  such as CIPEC. The l a c k  o f  such an a u t h o r i t y  
however ,  does no t  mean t h a t  such i n s t i t u t i o n s  a u t o m a t i c a l l y
36.  See a r t i c l e  I I  o f  t he  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  B a u x i t e  A s s o c i a t i o n ' s
a g r e e me n t .
3 7.  K n i g h t  and S e a r l e  v Dove D  9 6 4 j  2Q.B.  631.
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l a c k  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l e g a l  p e r s o n a l i t y .  As s t a t e d  e a r l i e r ,  
t he  t e s t  t h a t  has been used i n  d e t e r m i n i n g  t h e  l e g a l  p e r s o n ­
a l i t y  o f  such i n s t i t u t i o n s  has been a f u n c t i o n a l  one.  In 
i t s  a d v i s o r y  o p i n i o n ,  t he  ICJ i n  d e t e r m i n i n g  whe t he r  t he  
U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  as an o r g a n i s a t i o n ,  c o u l d  b r i n g  an i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  c l a i m  i n  r e s p e c t  t o  i n j u r y  caused t o  i t s  agent s  
empl oyed a f u n c t i o n a l  appr oach .  I t  p o i n t e d  ou t  t h a t  f o r  
t he  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  t o  a ch i eve  i t s  d e s i r e d  o b j e c t i v e s ,  and t o  
p r o p e r l y  c a r r y  ou t  i t s  f u n c t i o n s ,  i t  must  n e c e s s a r i l y  be 
endowed w i t h  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l e g a l  p e r s o n a l i t y  and t h e r e f o r e
3 8cap ab l e  o f  p o s s e s s i n g  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r i g h t s  and o b l i g a t i o n s .
The CIPEC agreement  does not  o u t r i g h t l y  r e c o g n i z e  or  
endow t h e  a s s o c i a t i o n  w i t h  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l e g a l  p e r s o n a l i t y .  
But  us i n g  t h e  approach employed by t he  ICJ i n  t h e  Re p a r a t i o n s  
case,  CIPEC appears  t o  pe r f o r m f u n c t i o n s  and e n j o y s  r i g h t s  
whi ch can o n l y  be e x p l a i n e d  t h r o u g h  CIPEC ha v i n g  a measure 
o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l e g a l  p e r s o n a l i t y .  For  exampl e ,  i t  i s  
c a pab l e  o f  e n t e r i n g  i n t o  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  agreement  w i t h  
s t a t e s .  I t  has i n  t h i s  r e g a r d  e n t e r e d  i n t o  a h e a d q u a r t e r s  
agreement  w i t h  t h e  government  o f  F r ance .  Under  t h i s  a g r e e ­
ment ,  CIPEC was accor ded r e c o g n i t i o n  as an i n t e r n a t i o n a l
o r g a n i s a t i o n  e n j o y i n g  a l l  t he  p r i v i l e g e s  and b e n e f i t s  t h a t
39accr ued f r om t h i s  s t a t u s .  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  CIPEC has i n  t he  
t e r r i t o r y  o f  each member c o u n t r y ,  t he  l e g a l  c a p a c i t y  
ne c es s a r y  f o r  t he  e x e r c i s e  o f  i t s  f u n c t i o n s ,  and e n j o y s
38.  R e p a r a t i o n  f o r  I n j u r i e s  case,  supra  no t e  21.
39.  See Repor t  o f  t h e  E x e c u t i v e  d i r e c t o r s  on t h e  a c t i v i t i e s  
o f  CIPEC ( 1 9 7 0 ) ,  CIPEC Document  C 0 . / 9 7 / 7 1  at  page 58.
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p r i v i l e g e s  and i m m u n i t i e s  bestowed on i t  by t h e  agreement  
on i t s  s t a t u s  s i gne d  i n  Lusaka on 26th June 1974.  In 
t e rms o f  s t a t u s  t h e r e f o r e ,  CIPEC i s  an autonomous,  s e l f  
r e g u l a t i n g  i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n  e n j o y i n g  v a r i o u s  
compet ences on t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p l a n e .
( i v ) CIPEC' s aims and o b j e c t i v e s
L i k e  most  p r o d u c e r s '  a s s o c i a t i o n s ,  CIPEC has s ev e r a l  
o b j e c t i v e s  wh i ch  i t  seeks t o  a c h i e v e .  The most  i m p o r t a n t  
o f  t h e se  i n c l u d e :  c o o r d i n a t i o n  o f  commer c i a l  p o l i c i e s  i n  
o r d e r  t o  s t a b i l i z e  copper  p r i c e s  and r a i s e  t h e  r e a l  l e v e l  
o f  e a r n i n g s  by p r o d u c e r s ;  o b t a i n i n g  b e t t e r  and more comp l e t e  
i n f o r m a t i o n  r e g a r d i n g  p r o d u c t i o n  and m a r k e t i n g  o f  copper  f o r  
i t s  members;  and t o  enhance t h e  s o l i d a r i t y  o f  t he  p r o d u c e r s ,
(a)  P r o v i si ons_deaJ_i ng_wi t h £ 0£ r £ i £ a £ i  cm_of
£°£P£r__m arj^e t_i _ng_p£l i_ci£ £
The need f o r  j o i n t  p r o d u c e r  measures as f a r  as p r o ­
d u c t i o n  and m a r k e t i n g  o f  copper  i s  concer ned  was t he  main 
d r i v i n g  f o r c e  f o r  t he  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  CIPEC. At  t he  f i r s t  
m i n i s t e r i a l  c o n f e r e n c e  he l d  i n  Lusaka i n  1967,  t he s e  
s e n t i m e n t s  were summed up by t h e  t hen C h i l e a n  M i n i s t e r  o f  
Mi nes ,  Mr .  A 1 e j a n d r o H a l e s , who urged t he  w o r l d ' s  ma j o r  
copper  e x p o r t e r s  t o  e s t a b l i s h  an i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l  c o u n c i l  
as a permanent  body t o  i mp l ement  j o i n t  measures o f  p r i c e  
s a f e g u a r d i n g  and m a r k e t i n g  i mpr ovement .  He f u r t h e r  exp r essed  
t h e  hope t h a t  t h e  c o u n c i l  woul d work ou t  j o i n t  mechani sms
t o  enab l e  p r o d u c i n g  c o u n t r i e s  t o  t a k e  an a c t i v e  p a r t  i n
40d e c i s i o n s  a f f e c t i n g  t he  copper  ma r k e t s .
40.  F i n a n c i a l  T i mes,  2nd June 1967.
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At  t he  end o f  t h a t  c o n f e r e n c e ,  what  emerged was an
agreement  between p a r t i c i p a t i n g  c o u n t r i e s  t o  e s t a b l i s h
CIPEC as a c o n s u l t a t i v e  body t h r o u g h  whi ch members co u l d
c o o r d i n a t e  j o i n t  measures i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
41copper  ma r k e t s .  The e a r l y  y e a r s  o f  CIPEC were t h e r e f o r e  
devo t ed  t o  s t u d i e s  t h a t  woul d d e t e r m i n e  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  
measure t h a t  woul d  f a c i l i t a t e  t he  c o o r d i n a t i o n  o f  t h e i r  
commer c i a l  p o l i c i e s .  Thus at  i t s  f i r s t  Con f e r ence  o f  
M i n i s t e r s  h e l d  i n  Lima i n  November 1969,  a number o f  
r e s o l u t i o n s  t o  t h i s  e f f e c t  were passed.  One o f  t hese  r e s o ­
l u t i o n s  r e q u e s t e d  t h e  Cou n c i l  t o  s t u d y  t h e  c o s t s  and p r i c i n g
42p o l i c i e s  o f  t h e  ma j o r  copper  e x p o r t i n g  n a t i o n s .
At  i t s  second M i n i s t e r i a l  Con f e r ence  i n  P a r i s  i n
November 1970,  t he  r i g h t  o f  c o p p e r - p r o d u c i n g  c o u n t r i e s  t o  a
r e a s o n a b l e  and j u s t  r e t u r n  on t h e i r  i n v e s t m e n t  i n  t he  i n d u s t r y
was r e a f f i r m e d .  The communique i s sue d  a t  t h e  end o f  t he
mee t i ng  announced t h e  s e t t i n g  up o f  a co mmi t t ee  t o  s t u d y  t he
most  s u i t a b l e  measures t o  h a l t  t h e  d e c l i n e  i n  copper  p r i c e s .
The 1974 M i n i s t e r i a l  Con f e r ence  he l d  i n  Lusaka a l so
c a l l e d  f o r  c o o r d i n a t e d  a c t i o n  by p r o d u c e r s  o f  copper  t o
combat  t h e  ha r mf u l  r o l e  o f  s p e c u l a t o r s  on t h e  London Metal
Exchange.  Openi ng t h i s  me e t i ng  t he  Zambian Pr i me M i n i s t e r ,
Mr.  Mai nza Chona had t he  f o l l o w i n g  t o  say:
"The t i m e  has come f o r  s p e c u l a t o r s  t o  be t o l d  t h a t  
p r o d u c e r s  o f  copper  have had enough.  Eve r yday  f r om 
Monday t o  F r i d a y ,  t he  peop l e  o f  Zambia have t o  w a i t  
f o r  t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  t h e  second r i n g  at  t h e  London
F i n a n c i a l  T i mes,  2nd June 1967.
Times o f  Zambia,  29 t h  November 1974.
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Metal  Exchange t o  know how much t h e i r  copper  i s  
wo r t h  on a p a r t i c u l a r  day.  They have been reduced 
t o  l i t e r a l l y  h e l p l e s s  s p e c t a t o r s  o f  even t s  a t  
t h i s  g i a n t  i n s t i t u t i o n  c a l l e d  t he  London Metal  
Exchange,  where gambl i ng  t akes  p l a c e .  We are 
h e l p l e s s  s p e c t a t o r s  because t he  peop l e  o f  t h i s  
c o u n t r y ,  and i ndeed t hose  o f  o t h e r  copper  p r o ­
d u c i n g  c o u n t r i e s ,  have no d i r e c t  say i n  t h e  l e v e l s  
o f  p r i c e s  f i x e d .  We t h e r e f o r e  f e e l  t h a t  t he  r o l e  
o f  t h e  s p e c u l a t o r  has c o n t i n u e d  t o  u n d u l y  i n f l u e n c e  
t he  t y p e  o f  p r i c e s  we ge t  and t he  degr ee o f  f l u c t u ­
a t i o n s . "  43
The c a l l  here was f o r  t h e  p r o d u c e r  c o u n t r i e s  t o  f o r m a
c o n c e r t e d  approach o f  combat i ng  t he  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  s p e c u l a t o r s
on t he  London Met a l  Exchange.
On a l l  t h e  above c o n f e r e n c e s ,  no c o n c r e t e  measures
were adop t ed ,  and CIPEC ach i eved  o n l y  what  appears  t o  be
i t s  main goal  - a unani mous agreement  t o  t a k e  c o o p e r a t i v e
a c t i o n .  The p r ob l em w i t h  t h i s  approach i s  t h a t  t he
c o o r d i n a t e d  p o l i c y  approach does no t  a l ways  r e s u l t  i n
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  t he  p o l i c y  d e c i s i o n s .  Th i s  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y
so because t h e  CIPEC agreement  i t s e l f  does no t  p r o v i d e  f o r
any i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  mechani sms f o r  i t s  c o o r d i n a t e d  p o l i c i e s .
A number o f  p o l i c y  r e s o l u t i o n s  passed by CIPEC t h e r e f o r e
have gone u n i mp l emen t ed .  For  exampl e ,  at  i t s  f i f t h
m i n i s t e r i a l  c o n f e r e n c e ,  CIPEC member c o u n t r i e s  dec i de d  t o
c o m p l e t e l y  c o - o r d i n a t e  t h e  p o l i c y  t o  be f o l l o w e d  i n  t he
w o r l d  copper '  ma r k e t ,  and t h a t  t h i s  d e c i s i o n  was t o  be
i mp l ement ed  by means o f  mechani sms adapt ed t o  p r e s e n t  
44c i r c u m s t a n c e s .  Thus a l t h o u g h  t he  p o l i c y  was agreed by t h e  
member c o u n t r i e s ,  t h e  d e c i s i o n  r emai ns  un i mp l emen t ed .  I t
4 3 , Times o f  Zambi a,  24th and 25th June 1974;  and 
F i n a n c i a l  Times o f  25t h  June 1974.
44.  See Times o f  Zambi a,  26th June 1974.
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woul d o b v i o u s l y  have ser ved  t he  o r g a n i z a t i o n  b e t t e r  i f  p o l i c y
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  mechani sms were i n c o r p o r a t e d  i n  t h e  CIPEC
c o n s t i t u t i o n .  In t h i s  r e g a r d  t he  agreement  e s t a b l i s h i n g  t he
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  B a u x i t e  A s s o c i a t i o n  i s  a p e r t i n e n t  exampl e .
Th i s  agreement  c l e a r l y  s p e l l s  ou t  t he  v a r i o u s  o b l i g a t i o n s
wh i ch  member s t a t e s  agree t o  o b s e r v e .  These i n c l u d e  an
o b l i g a t i o n  no t  o n l y  t o  c o o r d i n a t e  p o l i c i e s  bu t  t o  harmon i ze
45t h e  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  t he  d e c i s i o n s .  The e f f e c t  o f  t h i s  
k i n d  o f  p r o v i s i o n  i s  t o  make u n c o o p e r a t i v e  a t t i t u d e  by a 
member i n  t h e  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  an agreed p o l i c y ,  a breach 
o f  t h e  o r g a n i s a t i o n ' s  agr eement .  In t he  case o f  CIPEC 
however ,  no such p r o v i s i o n  i s  i n c o r p o r a t e d  i n  i t s  agr eement .  
The r e s u l t  o f  t h i s  s t a t e  o f  a f f a i r s  i s  t h a t  t h e  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  
o f  t he  o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s  p o l i c y  d e c i s i o n s  i s  l e f t  t o  t he  d e t e r ­
m i n a t i o n  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  members.  Th i s  o f t e n  r e s u l t s  i n  
h o l l o w  p o l i c y  d e c i s i o n s  t h a t  are not  i mp l e me n t ed .
(b)  P r o v i si ° n s _ r  e l a t i n g  £  o__s _ha_ri £ g _o f  i _nf£rma£i  on^
c o o r d i n a t i o n ^  £^£d_uc_t i£n_a£d__m£r k_et_i £ g _ o f  £ 0£ pe r  
The g e n e s i s  o f  t h i s  o b j e c t i v e  o f  CIPEC seems t o  be 
t he  r e a l i z a t i o n  by p r o d u c e r  c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  t h e y  are at  a 
d i s a d v a n t a g e  i n  d e a l i n g  w i t h  consumi ng c o u n t r i e s  and t he  
v a r i o u s  m u l t i n a t i o n a l  c o r p o r a t i o n s  t h a t  are i n v o l v e d  i n t he  
p r o d u c t i o n  and m a r k e t i n g  o f  c o ppe r .  Th i s  o b j e c t i v e  t h e r e f o r e  
aims a t  i m p r o v i n g  t he  members b a r g a i n i n g  p o s i t i o n  v i s - a - v i s  
t he  i m p o r t e r s  by g e n e r a t i n g  g r e a t e r  knowl edge o f  t h e i r
A r t i c l e  IV o f  t he  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  B a u x i t e  A s s o c i a t i o n  
agr eement .  For  a f u l l  o f f i c i a l  t e x t  o f  t h e  agreement  
13 I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Legal  M a t e r i a l s ,  
pages 1245- 1253 .
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i n d u s t r i e s '  s t r u c t u r e  and ma r k e t s .  Th i s  o b j e c t i v e  i s  
r e g a r d e d  by many o t h e r  p r o du c e r s  a s s o c i a t i o n s  as v i t a l  
t o  t he  success o f  any such a s s o c i a t i o n .  For  exampl e ,  one 
o f  t h e  f i r s t  i m p o r t a n t  p r o j e c t s  u n de r t aken  by t he  
O r g a n i s a t i o n  o f  Pe t r o l eum E x p o r t i n g  C o u n t r i e s  (OPEC) was 
a compr ehens i ve  s t ud y  o f  t he  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p e t r o l e u m 
mar ket  by an Amer i can c o n s u l t i n g  f i r m  o f  A r t h u r  D. L i t t l e . ^  
The i mp o r t a n c e  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  g a t h e r i n g  l i e s  i n  
t he  f a c t  t h a t  i t  i s  not  p o s s i b l e  f o r  p r o d u c e r  c o u n t r i e s  t o  
e f f e c t i v e l y  b a r g a i n  w i t h  consumer  c o u n t r i e s  and JMuiU - 
n a t i o n a l  c o r p o r a t i o n s  t h a t  c o n t r o l  t he  mar ke t s  o f  copper  
w i t h o u t  t h e i r  t h o r o u g h  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  a l l  asp ec t s  o f  t he  
i n d u s t r y .  Moreover  i t  i s  o n l y  t h r o u g h  such u n d e r s t a n d i n g  
t h a t  p r o d u c e r s  can hope t o  i n t e l l i g e n t l y  i n t e r v e n e  i n  t he  
ma r k e t .  Th i s  e x p l a i n s  t he  i n c l u s i o n  i n  t h e  CIPEC a g r e e ­
ment  t he  o b j e c t i v e  o f  o b t a i n i n g
" f o r  member c o u n t r i e s  b e t t e r  and more co mp l e t e  
i n f o r m a t i o n  and a p p r o p r i a t e  a d v i c e  on t he  p r o d u c t i o n  
and m a r k e t i n g  o f  c o p p e r . "47
In t he  f i r s t  y e a r s  o f  i t s  e x i s t e n c e ,  CIPEC devot ed
much o f  i t s  work on i n f o r m a t i o n  g a t h e r i n g .  The f o c u s  on
i n f o r m a t i o n  g a t h e r i n g  i s  r e f l e c t e d  i n  t h e  documents p u b l i s h e d
by CIPEC between 1968 and 1972.  Of t h e  83 documents
produced by t he  g o v e r n i n g  board d u r i n g  t h i s  p e r i o d  13 were
s t u dy  p r o p o s a l s ,  and o f  t h e  199 e x e c u t i v e  commi t t ee
48documents 50 were s t u d y  p r o p o s a l s .  The s t u d i e s  so f a r
A1 O t a i b a ,  OPEC and t h e  p e t r o l e u m i n d u s t r y ,Pv*r\r\m U n 1 m ^ _ a. _ * I *■'Croom Helm at  page 131.
47.  A r t i c l e  1 ( c ) ,  CIPEC agreement .
48.  M i n g s t ,  " C o o p e r a t i o n  or  i l l u s i o n :  an e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  t he
i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l  Counc i l  o f  copper  p r o d u c i n g  c o u n t r i e s " .  
0*7 7k) 3>0'lr\te?0'Ational Organization ; 3 7 5 .
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u n de r t a k en  i n  CIPEC i n v o l v e  t h e  s t u d y  o f  t h e  copper  ma r k e t s ,  
v a r i o u s  copper  m i n i n g  l e g i s l a t i o n s ,  w o r k i n g  c o n d i t i o n s  i n  
t h e  m i n i n g  i n d u s t r y ,  and i n v e s t me n t  p r o s p e c t s  i n  t he  
copper  m i n i n g  i n d u s t r y .  ^
( c )  Enhanc i ng  me mb e r s ' _ s o l i _ d a r U y
One o f  t h e  most  i m p o r t a n t  go a l s  o f  any p r o d u c e r s '  
a s s o c i a t i o n  i s  t o  t r y  and c o o r d i n a t e  i t s  members’ p o l i t i c a l  
p o l i c i e s .  Th i s  goal  aims at  u n i f y i n g  t h e  a s p i r a t i o n s  o f  
member c o u n t r i e s  so t h a t  t h e y  woul d speak w i t h  one v o i c e  
i n  v a r i o u s  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f o r a .  CIPEC a l s o  p r o v i d e s  f o r  
t h i s  g o a l .  The success o f  t h i s  goal  w i t h i n  CIPEC has been 
r e m a r k a b l e .  For  exampl e ,  t h e i r  s t and w i t h i n  t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  
i n  UNCTAD r e g a r d i n g  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  copper  agr eemen t ,  has 
been more or  l e s s  u n i f i e d  s i n c e  t he  b e g i n n i n g  o f  n e g o t i a t i o n s .  
D i f f e r e n c e s  do o c c u r  i n  m a t t e r s  o f  d e t a i l  bu t  t h e  broad 
p o l i c i e s  are p r e s e n t e d  j o i n t l y  as a j o i n t  CIPEC p o s i t i o n .
One o n l y  hopes t h a t  t h i s  u n i f i e d  approach w i l l  soon be 
ex t ended  t o  o t h e r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f o r a .
{ v ) CIPEC' s i n s t i t u t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e
P r o d u c e r s '  a s s o c i a t i o n s  l i k e  CIPEC, c o n s t i t u t e ,  i n  a 
gene r a l  sense,  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  r esponse  o f  d e v e l o p i n g  
c o u n t r i e s  t o  p r ob l ems o f  commodi t y  p r i c e  s t a b i l i z a t i o n .  A l l  
such a s s o c i a t i o n s  se t  or  c r e a t e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  a r r angement s  
t h r o u g h  whi ch t h e  c o l l e c t i v e  w i l l  o f  t he  a s s o c i a t i o n  woul d 
n o r m a l l y  f i n d  e x p r e s s i o n .  There i s  no u n i f o r m i t y  as t o  t he  
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  a r r angement s  but  i n  p r a c t i c e  some se t  out
4.9. Repor t  o f  t he  E x e c u t i v e  D i r e c t o r s  on t h e  a c t i v i t i e s  
o f  CIPEC, supr a  no t e  40.
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t h r e e  b a s i c  organs  w h i l e  o t h e r s  c r e a t e  o n l y  t wo .  The 
number o f  organs  v a r i e s  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  commodi t y  i n  
q u e s t i o n  and g e n e r a l l y  speak i ng  a s s o c i a t i o n s  o f  a g r i c u l t u r a l  
commodi t y  p r o d u c e r s  t end  t o  c r e a t e  two o r g a n s ,  w h i l e  t hose  
f o r  m i n e r a l s  t end t o  c r e a t e  t h r e e  o r gans .
The CIPEC agreement  makes p r o v i s i o n  f o r  t h r e e  p r i n c i p a l
organs c o n s i s t i n g  of  a supreme pol i cy - mak i ng organ,  an
50e x e c u t i v e  o r g an ,  and a S e c r e t a r i a t ._ Th i s  seems t o  be i n
k e ep i ng  w i t h  a r r angement s  empl oyed by o t h e r  p r o d u c e r s '  
a s s o c i a t i o n s  i n v o l v e d  i n  m i n e r a l s .  For  exampl e t he  I n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  B a u x i t e  A s s o c i a t i o n  ( I  BA) p r o v i d e s  under  a r t i c l e  VI 
o f  i t s  agreement  f o r  t he  c r e a t i o n  o f  t h r e e  o r gans  - t he  
C o u n c i l  o f  M i n i s t e r s ,  t h e  E x e c u t i v e  Boa r d ,  and t he  S e c r e t a r i a t . 
S i m i l a r  organs  are f ound  i n  t h e  a s s o c i a t i o n  o f  i r o n  e x p o r t i n g  
c o u n t r i e s ,  as w e l l  as i n  t h e  0 r g a n i z a t i o n  o f  Pe t r o l eum 
E x p o r t i n g  C o u n t r i e s  (OPEC).
O r i g i n a l l y ,  CIPEC had f our  organs,  the conference of  
m i n i s t e r s ,  the Governing Board,  the E x e c u t i v e  Commi t tee,  
and the s e c r e t a r i a t  - the gover n i ng  E?oard was composed of  
two high rank i ng o f f i c i a l s  from each member count r y ,  and 
was d i r e c t l y  r e spons i b l e  to the Conference of  M i n i s t e r s  f o r  
f o s t e r i n g  t e c h n i c a l  and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  cooper a t i on  among 
members. The E x e c u t i v e  Committee was d i r e c t l y  r espons i b l e  
to the gover ni ng Board.  This arrangement  had cr ea t ed a 
measure of  bureaucracy which did not augment pr op e r l y  wi th  
the need f o r  e f f i c i e n c y  in the o r g a n i s a t i o n .  The board was
5D. A r t i c l e  3,  CIPEC agreement .
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t h e r e f o r e  sc r apped  i n  1972 and i t s  a c t i v i t i e s  e n t r u s t e d  t o  
t he  e x e c u t i v e  c o mmi t t e e .  The p r e s e n t  CIPEC agreement  
e s t a b l i s h e s  t h r e e  o r g an s ,  t he  c o n f e r e n c e  o f  m i n i s t e r s ,  
t he  e x e c u t i v e  c o mmi t t e e ,  and a s e c r e t a r i a t .
(a)  The C_on_fer£nc_e_of Min_i s_ters^
The C o n f e r e n c e  o f  M i n i s t e r s  i s  t he  supreme p o l i c y  
making organ o f  CIPEC. The main r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  on t h i s  
c o n f e r e n c e  are t h e  M i n i s t e r s  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  m i n i n g  i n  
t h e i r  own r e s p e c t i v e  c o u n t r i e s .  L i k e  i s  t h e  p r a c t i c e  i n  
o t h e r  such a s s o c i a t i o n ,  t he  agreement  r e q u i r e s  t he  c o n f e r ­
ence t o  meet  once a n n u a l l y  i n  o r d i n a r y  s e s s i o n s .  These 
annual  s e s s i o n s  r e p r e s e n t  an advant age i n  f o s t e r i n g  t he  
n e c es s a r y  h a b i t  o f  c o n s u l t a t i o n  and c l o s e r  c o o p e r a t i o n .  
Whenever . c i r c u m s t a n c e s  d i c t a t e  however ,  e x t r a o r d i n a r y  s e s s i o n s  
may be he l d  a t  t he  r e q u e s t  o f  no t  l ess  t han  h a l f  o f  t he  
members.
The o r d i n a r y  s e s s i o n s  are he l d  i n  a l t e r n a t e  between 
t h e  CIPEC h e a d q u a r t e r s  and t he  member c o u n t r i e s .  For  exampl e ,  
i n  1982 t h e  Con f e r ence  met i n  Li ma,  Peru.  I n 1983 t he  
Con f e r ence  h e l d  i t s  annual  s e s s i on  i n P a r i s  w h i l e  i n  1984 
t he  Con f e r ence  met i n  C h i l e .  In 1985 t h e  c o n f e r e n c e  i s  
l i k e l y  t o  meet  i n  P a r i s .
The Con f e r en ce  o f  M i n i s t e r s  i s  open t o  o b s e r v e r s ,  and 
r e g u l a r  o b s e r v e r s  i n c l u d e  non-CIPEC copper  e x p o r t e r s ,  and 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r g a n i s a t i o n s  { u s u a l l y  
UNCTAD, UNIDO, OPEC, IBA,  The T i n  C o u n c i l ,  and A s s o c i a t i o n  
o f  i r o n  o r e  p r o d u c e r s  ) . Whenever  t he  mee t i ng  t a k e s  p l ace  
i n  a member c o u n t r y ,  t h e  r e s p o n s i b l e  r e g i o n a l  economi c
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commi ss i on ,  t h a t  i s  t he  Economic Commi ssi on f o r  A f r i c a ,  
Economic Commi ss i on f o r  L a t i n  Amer i ca ,  or  t h e  Economic 
Commi ssi on f o r  As i a  are a l s o  i n v i t e d .  In a d d i t i o n  t o  
t h e s e  o b s e r v e r s ,  a member c o u n t r y  h o s t i n g  t h e  c o n f e r e n c e  
i s  f r e e  t o  i n v i t e  a few more o b s e r v e r s  as i t  chooses .  For  
exampl e ,  a t  t he  f i f t h  M i n i s t e r i a l  Con f e r ence  h e l d  i n  Lusaka 
i n  June 1974,  t h e  Zambian government  i n v i t e d  as o b s e r v e r s  
t he  t h r e e  ma j o r  copper  consumers ,  Japan,  t he  U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  
and t he  U n i t e d  Ki ngdom.  The i n v i t a t i o n  t o  t h e s e  t h r e e  
ma j o r  consumers appears  t o  have been n e c e s s i t a t e d ,  a t  t he  
t i m e ,  by t h e  need t h a t  e x i s t e d  f o r  c l o s e r  d i a l o g u e  w i t h  
consumers i n  v i ew o f  t he  a n t i c i p a t e d  f o u r t h  UNCTAD s e s s i o n  
t h a t  was t o  t a k e  p l a c e  i n  N a i r o b i  i n  1976.  At  t h e  N a i r o b i  
c o n f e r e n c e ,  UNCTAD was t o  p r opose  p r o d u c e r - c o n s u me r  
c o o p e r a t i o n  i n  co mmod i t i e s  l i k e  c o p pe r ,  and by i n v i t i n g  
ma j o r  consumers at  t he  Lusaka c o n f e r e n c e ,  t he  Con f e r ence  
o f  M i n i s t e r s  i n t e n d e d  t o  show t h e i r  w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  work 
t o g e t h e r  w i t h  consumi ng n a t i o n s .  Agai n at  t he  1980 
Con f e r ence  o f  M i n i s t e r s  he l d  i n  Lusaka,  t h e  t h r e e  ma j o r  
consumers were i n v i t e d .  Th i s  i n v i t a t i o n  appears  t o
have been a c a l c u l a t e d  move t o  show t he  keen i n t e r e s t  copper  
p r o d u c e r s  have i n  w o r k i n g  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  consumers i n  an 
a t t e m p t  t o  s t a b i l i z e  t h e  p r i c e s  o f  c o p p e r ,  d e s p i t e  t h e  
breakdown i n  t h e  p r o d u c e r - c o n s u me r  t a l k s  under  t he  Un i t e d  
Na t i o n s  I n t e g r a t e d  programme f o r  Commod i t i es .
The p r o c ed u r e s  f o l l o w e d  i n  i t s  me e t i ng s  are i n  p r a c t i c e  
v e r y  i n f o r m a l  and d e l e g a t e s  r a r e l y  speak f o r  t he  r e c o r d .  In 
f a c t  t he  p r o c e e d i n g s  o f  t h i s  c o n f e r e n c e  are never  r e c o r d e d
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and o n l y  a f o u r  t o  e i g h t  page f i n a l  r e p o r t  i s  i s s u e d . ^  The 
advan t age  o f  t h i s  v e r y  i n f o r m a l  p r a c t i c e  i s  t h a t  i t  makes i t  
v e r y  l i k e l y  f o r  d e l e g a t e s  t o  pur suade each o t h e r  and t h e r e b y  
r each agr eement .
The c h a i r m a n s h i p  o f  t he  C o n f e r e n c e ,  as i s  t h e  p r a c t i c e  
i n  most  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r g a n i s a t i o n s ,  r o t a t e s  among members 
chang i ng  hands once i n  e v e r y  two y e a r s .  The c h a i r ma n s h i p  
i s  u s u a l l y  he l d  by t he  hos t  c o u n t r y  and c o n t i n u e s  t o  be he l d  
by t h a t  c o u n t r y  when t he  C o n f e r e n c e  meets a t  t h e  h e a d q u a r t e r s  
i n  P a r i s ,  and changes hands agai n  when a n o t h e r  member hos t s  
t he  c o n f e r e n c e .
The f u n c t i o n s  o f  t he  Con f e r e n c e  are no t  e x p l i c i t l y  
s t a t e d  i n  any one a r t i c l e  o f  t h e  CIPEC agr eement .  A r t i c l e  5 
h o w e v e r s p e l 1s ou t  t he  broad f u n c t i o n s  o f  t he  c o n f e r e n c e  
as t o  pu t  i n t o  e f f e c t  t h e  d e c i s i o n s  made and c o o r d i n a t i o n  
o f  p o l i c i e s  c o n c e r n i n g  m a t t e r s  f a l l i n g  w i t h i n  CIPEC' s 
compet ence.  These broad f u n c t i o n s  are supp l ement ed  by c e r t a i n
s p e c i f i c  p r o v i s i o n s  such as t o  c o n s i d e r  and appr ove a p p l i -
5 2c a t i o n s  f o r  membershi p o f  t he  a s s o c i a t i o n ;  s u p e r v i s e
a c t i v i t i e s  of  the Execut i ve  Commi t tee;  ^  appoi nt  the
54S e c r e t a r y  Ge n e r a l ;  t o  c o n s i d e r  and d e t e r m i n e  d i s p u t e s
among member c o u n t r i e s  c o n c e r n i n g  t he  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  and
55a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  agr eement ;  and amending or  t e r m i n a t i n g
5 6o f  t h e  agr eement .
51.  I n t e r v i e w  w i t h  Mr.  P. Pa r k i n s o n  o f  t he  CIPEC Se c r e ­
t a r i a t ,  P a r i s ,  December 1982.
52.  A r t i c l e  2 ( f )  o f  t he  CIPEC agr eement .
53 . I b i d . , a r t i  c l e  7.
54.  I b i d . , a r t i c l e  14.
55.  I b i d . , a r t i c l e  31.
56.  I b i d . ,  a r t i c l e  29.
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( b ) The E.x£cu.t_ive C_ommi_ttee^
The E x e c u t i v e  Commi t t ee o f  CIPEC c o n s i s t s  o f  permanent  
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  member c o u n t r i e s .  These permanent  
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  are r e q u i r e d  t o  be n a t i o n a l s  o f  t he  
c o u n t r y  t h e y  r e p r e s e n t  and shou l d  have h e l d  a r e s p o n s i b l e  
p o s i t i o n  i n  t he  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  or  f o r m u l a t i o n  o f  t h e i r  
c o u n t r y ' s  p o l i c i e s  r e g a r d i n g  t h e  copper  i n d u s t r y .  Th i s  
r e q u i r e m e n t  r e f l e c t s  t he  n a t u r e  o f  t h i s  o r g a n ' s  f u n c t i o n s  
whi ch are i n  t h e  main t o  ensur e  or  promot e t e c h n i c a l  and 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  c o o p e r a t i o n  by f o r m u l a t i n g  s p e c i f i c  p r o p o s a l s  
t o  t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  c o u n t r i e s  f o r  t h i s  p u r p o s e .  The s p e c i f i c  
p r o p o s a l s  t h a t  can be made by t he  Commi t t ee r e l a t e  t o  t he  
deve l opment  o f  human r e s o u r c e s  i n  a l l  a reas  r e l a t i n g  t o  t he  
p r o d u c t i o n  o f  c o p p e r ,  h a r m o n i z a t i o n  o f  t h e  members* p o s i t i o n s  
r e g a r d i n g  copper  p r o d u c t i o n  and m a r k e t i n g .
In p r a c t i c e  however ,  each member c o u n t r y  d e t e r m i n e s  on 
i t s  own whe t he r  t o  send a d i p l o m a t  or  t e c h n i c a l  e x p e r t  t o  
t he  Commi t t ee .  Zambia u s u a l l y  sends a t e c h n i c a l  e x p e r t  t o  
t h i s  Commi t t ee.  For  exampl e ,  t he  f i r s t  Zambian r e p r e s e n t a ­
t i v e  on t h e  Commi t t ee  was Mr .  James Mapona,  a t e c h n i c a l  
e x p e r t  who i s  a t  p r e s e n t  t h e  Managing D i r e c t o r  o f  t he  
Zambia I n d u s t r i a l  and Mi n i n g  Company (ZIMCO).  The second 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  was Mr.  Lamaswala who u n t i l  t he  a p p o i n t me n t  
was t h e  managi ng d i r e c t o r  o f  t he  Zambia M e t a l  Ma r k e t i n g  
C o r p o r a t i o n  (MEMACO). He has r e c e n t l y  been a p p o i n t e d  t o  
t h e  Bank o f  Zambi a.
C o u n t r i e s  r e p r e s e n t e d  on t he  Commi t t ee  are d i v i d e d  
i n t o  two g r oups  depend i ng  on t h e i r  membershi p s t a t u s ,  t h a t
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i s  whe t he r  t h e y  are f u l l  members o r  a s s o c i a t e  members.
Wh i l e  bo t h  t y p e s  o f  members are r e p r e s e n t e d  on t h e  commi t t ee  
and a c t i v e l y  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  i t s  d e l i b e r a t i o n s ,  i t  i s  o n l y  
t he  f u l l  members who have t h e  r i g h t  t o  v o t e .
U n l i k e  i n  o t h e r  such a s s o c i a t i o n s ,  t h e  CIPEC a g r e e ­
ment  r e q u i r e s  i t s  E x e c u t i v e  Commi t t ee  t o  meet  a t  l e a s t  
e v e r y  f o r t n i g h t .  In o t h e r  p r o d u c e r s '  a s s o c i a t i o n s  such 
as t he  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  B a u x i t e  A s s o c i a t i o n  ( I BA)  t hese  
mee t i ngs  are v e r y  l i m i t e d .  The IBA e x e c u t i v e  board i s  
r e q u i r e d  t o  meet  o n l y  about  t h r e e  t i mes  i n  a y e a r . ^  In 
p r a c t i c e  however ,  t he  CIPEC E x e c u t i v e  Commi t t ee  has never  
s a t i s f i e d  t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t  and has o n l y  been a b l e  t o  meet  
about  s i x  t i me s  a n n u a l l y .
The c h a i r m a n s h i p  o f  t h e  Commi t t ee  r o t a t e s  among t he  
f u l l  members once a y e a r .  A s s o c i a t e  members are not  e n t i t l e d  
t o  c h a i r  t h e  Commi t t ee .  Th i s  i s  o n l y  l o g i c a l  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
when one c o n s i d e r s  t he  f a c t  t h a t  such members do no t  have 
v o t i n g  r i g h t s  i n  t he  Commi t t ee .  To a l l o w  such members t o  
c h a i r  t he  c ommi t t ee  woul d amount  t o g i v i n g  them power  t o  
i n f l u e n c e  d e c i s i o n s  o f  t h e  Co mmi t t ee  even t hough  t h e  aim 
o f  deny i n g  them vo t es  i s  not  t o  a l l o w  them t o  e x e r c i s e  
such i n f l u e n c e .
U n l i k e  i n  t h e  Con f e r ence  o f  M i n i s t e r s ,  t h e  mee t i ngs  
o f  t h e  Commi t t ee  are f o r ma l  and r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  speak f o r  
t he  r e c o r d .  The reason f o r  t h i s  appears  t o  be i n  t he  
t e c h n i c a l  n a t u r e  o f  t he  s u b j e c t s  d i s c u s s e d  i n  t h e  Commi t t ee .
57.  A r t i c l e  XI o f  t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  B a u x i t e  A s s o c i a t i o n  
( I B A ) ,  and a r t i c l e  8 o f  t he  CIPEC agr eement .
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The formal  nat ur e  of  i t s  proceedings has a ppa r e n t l y  not  
i mpai red dec i s i on  making in t h i s  organ because of  the close  
r appor t  which e x i s t  between the var i ous members of  the  
Gommi t t e e .
Ap a r t  f r om f o r m u l a t i n g  s p e c i f i c  p r o p o s a l s  f o r  member
c o u n t r i e s ,  the Commi t tee has one other  i mpor t ant  power -
t h a t  of  s e t t i n g  up t e c h n i c a l  commit tees to deal  wi t h  c e r t a i n
5 8s p e c i f i c  issues in the copper i n d u s t r y .  Under these  
powers,  the Execut i ve  Commit tee has set  up a number of  
i mpor t ant  commit tees which have come to p l ay  an i mpor t ant  
r o l e  in the s t r u c t u r e  of  CIPEC. The commit tees t h a t  have 
so f a r  been set  a r e ,  the market i ng p o l i c y  commi t tee,  the  
t e c h n i c a l  sub-commi t tee ,  the budget sub-commi t tee ,  and a 
number of.  ad hoc commi t tees.
( c ) Jhji Haj2k£tj_n£ p oJ_i cy_C ommi t t  ee
Th i s  co mmi t t e e  was e s t a b l i s h e d  i n  1974 and was i n i t i a l l y  
c a l l e d  t h e  m a r k e t i n g  and p r o mo t i o n s  c o mmi t t e e .  Because 
o f  t he  i mp o r t a n c e  CIPEC a t t a c h e s  t o  p r ob l ems  o f  copper  mar ­
k e t i n g ,  t h i s  was t h e  o n l y  f u l l  f l e d g e d  commi t t e e  u n t i l  v e r y  
r e c e n t l y  when t h e  t e c h n i c a l  s u b - c o mmi t t ee  was upgraded t o  a 
f u l l  commi t t e e .
The commi t tee is composed of  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  of  both 
f u l l  and as soc i a t e  members and each count ry  decides on i t s  
own to send a di pl omat  or a market i ng e x p e r t .  In the case 
of  Zambia,  t h i s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  has been de l ega t ed  to the 
K e t a l  Mar k e t i n g  Cor por a t i on  (MEMACO) which has always sent
58. A r t i c l e  12 o f  t h e  CIPEC agr eement .
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a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  f r om i t s  London o f f i c e .  In t h e  p as t  few 
y e a r s  MEMACO s e r v i c e s  L i m i t e d  i n  London has a s s i g n e d  t he  
t a s k  o f  r e p r e s e n t i n g  Zambia on t h i s  c ommi t t ee  t o  i t s  r e s e a r c h  
manage r .
The main f u n c t i o n  of  t h i s  commit tee has been to conduct  
st udi es  on mat t er s  r e l a t i n g  to copper market i ng and r e por t  
to the ex ecut i ve  commi t tee.  Oc c a s i ona l l y ,  however,  i t  has 
r ece i ved  d i r e c t  requests from the Conference of  M i n i s t e r s  
to conduct  c e r t a i n  s p e c i f i c  market  s t u d i e s .  In such 
i nst ances the Commi t tee has r epor t ed d i r e c t l y  to the C o n f e r ­
ence.  I n e x e r c i s i n g  these f u n c t i o n s ,  the Commi t tee has 
no powers to make p o l i c y  dec i s i ons  but merely makes recom­
mendat ions to e i t h e r  the Execut i ve  Committee or the  
conference of  m i n i s t e r s ,  which may in t ur n  t r a n s l a t e  t h e i r  
recommendat ions i n t o  p o l i c i e s .
O r d i n a r i l y  t h i s  c ommi t t ee  meets about  f o u r  t o  f i v e  
t i me s  i n  a y e a r  and i t s  c h a i r ma n s h i p  r o t a t e s  among t he  
f u l l  members once e v e r y  y e a r .
( d ) Th_e Te£hri  i£aj_ Comm_i_t£e£
O r i g i n a l l y  t h i s  was e s t a b l i s h e d  as a sub-commi t tee of  
the market i ng p o l i c y  commit tee and was t h e r e f o r e  d i r e c t l y  
r espons i b l e  to t h a t  commi t tee.  Due to the i n c r e a s i ng  
importance of  issues d e a l t  by i t ,  i t  was decided in 1982 
to e l e v a t e  i t  to a f u l l  f l edged commit tee in the o r g a n i s a ­
t i o n ' s  s t r u c t u r e .  As a r e s u l t  of  t h i s  change in s t a t u s ,  
the commi t tee is now d i r e c t l y  r espons i b l e  to the Execut i ve  
Commi t tee,  a l though on l i m i t e d  mat ters p a r t i c u l a r l y  those  
r e l a t i n g  to mar ke t i ng ,  i t  s t i l l  r epor t s  to t h e M. a r k e t i n g  
Po l i  cy Commi t t e e .
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The i s s u e  t h a t  n e c e s s i t a t e d  t he  c r e a t i o n  o f  a t e c h n i c a l  
s u b - c o mmi t t e e  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  i m p o r t a n t  q u e s t i o n  o f  ' copper  
s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  i n  t he  s a l e s  c o n t r a c t s .  These s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  
r e q u i r e d  copper  d e l i v e r e d  t o  consumers t o  con f o r m t o  c e r t a i n  
s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  se t  by t h e  London Metal  Exchange.  Th i s  meant  
t h a t  any o t h e r  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  made by t he  p r o d u c e r s  co u l d  
not  be e a s i l y  t r a d e d  even t hough t h e i r  p r o d u c t i o n  co u l d  
have been more c o n v e n i e n t  and economi ca l  t o  t he  p r o d u c e r s .  
CIPEC member c o u n t r i e s  f e l t  t h a t  t h e y  were c a p ab l e  o f  p r o ­
d u c i ng  h i g h e r  q u a l i t y  grades t h a n  s p e c i f i e d  by t he  London 
Metal  Exchange and whi ch c o u l d  earn them a h i g h e r  p r i c e  bu t  
were i n h i b i t e d  by t he  a l r e a d y  se t  s t a n d a r d s  on t he  exchange.  
The t e c h n i c a l  s u b - c o mmi t t ee  was t h e r e f o r e  s e t  t o  s t u d y  ways 
and means o f  p e r s u a d i n g  t he  exchange t o  i mpr ove  t he  copper  
s p e c i f i c a t i o n  t e r ms .  A f t e r  many y e a r s ,  t h e  s u b - c o mmi t t e e  
managed t o  r each agreement  w i t h  t h e  London Met a l  Exchange 
on i mproved s p e c i f i c a t i o n  a r r angement s  i n  1982.  Wi t h  
t he  i s s u e  o f  copper  grade s p e c i f i c a t i o n  s e t t l e d ,  t h e  sub­
commi t t ee  was ass i gn e d  more f u n c t i o n s  and because o f  t h i s  
i n c r e a s e d  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,  i t  was upgraded t o  a f u l l  c o mmi t t e e .
The c o m m i t t e e ' s  new f u n c t i o n s  r e l a t e  t o  a l l  i s sue s
r e g a r d i n g  t a r i f f  e s c a l a t i o n s  on f a b r i c a t e d  copper  goods,
copper  p r o m o t i o n ,  b e t t e r  t e rms on m a r i t i m e  t r a n s p o r t ,  and
5 9t e c h n i c a l  as p ec t s  o f  c o n c e n t r a t e s  and b l i s t e r  co p pe r .
The l a s t  i s s u e  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  arose a f t e r  I n d o n e s i a  was 
a d m i t t e d  t o  CIPEC as f u l l  member.  Th i s  c o u n t r y  produces
59.  See t h e  r e p o r t  o f  t he  X V I I I t h  Con f e r ence  o f  M i n i s t e r s
f o r  CIPEC he l d  i n  L i ma,  Peru i n  J u l y  1982.
See a l s o  CIPEC Q u a r t e r l y  Revi ew,  J u 1y - Sep t ember  1982.
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o n l y  b l i s t e r  copper  and c o n c e n t r a t e s .  The p r ob l ems 
r e g a r d i n g  b l i s t e r  and c o n c e n t r a t e  copper  had no t  been 
t a c k l e d  by CIPEC b e f o r e  I n d o n e s i a  became a member because 
a l l  t he  o t h e r  f u l l  members produced r e f i n e d  co p pe r .  As 
a r e s u l t  t h e  t e c h n i c a l  s u b - c ommi t t e e  had c o n c e n t r a t e d  on 
s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  o f  r e f i n e d  copper  and not  b l i s t e r  and 
c o n c e n t r a t e s .  I t  shou l d  be not ed t h a t  t h e r e  are no 
c o n t r a c t s  t r a d e d  on t he  London Metal  Exchange r e l a t i n g  
t o  b l i s t e r  copper  and c o n c e n t r a t e s .  Th i s  has t h e r e f o r e  
become t h e  most  i m p o r t a n t  i s s u e  t he  commi t t ee  i s  s t u d y i n g .  
P r e l i m i n a r y  r ecommendat i ons  on t h i s  i s s u e  were p r e s e n t e d  
t o  t he  Con f e r ence  o f  M i n i s t e r s  a t  t h e i r  annual  s e s s i on  
he l d  i n  P a r i s  i n  J u l y  1983.
T h e . i s s u e  o f  t a r i f f  e s c a l a t i o n  on copper  f a b r i c a t e d  
p r o d u c t s  i s  a n o t h e r  i m p o r t a n t  i s s u e  whi ch has been ass i gned  
t o  t h i s  c o mmi t t e e .  The ass i gnmen t  o f  t h i s  i s s u e  t o  t h i s  
c o mmi t t e e ,  s i g n i f i e s  a f u r t h e r  deve l opment  i n  t he  a c t i v i t i e s  
o f  CIPEC. I n  t he  f i r s t  f ew y e a r s  a f t e r  i t s  f o r m a t i o n ,
CIPEC had devo t ed  much o f  i t s  t i me  and r e s o u r c e s  t o  t he  
i s s u e  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  copper  mar ket  s t a b i l i z a t i o n .  I t  
seems t o  have r e a l i z e d  now t h a t  t h e  goal  o f  mar ke t  s t a b i l i z ­
a t i o n  i s  not  i n  i t s e l f  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  ensur e  t h a t  deve l opment  
g o a l s  i n  i t s  member c o u n t r i e s  are f u l f i l l e d  more r a p i d l y .
The c o m m i t t e e ' s  t a s k  o f  s t u d y i n g  t a r i f f  e s c a l a t i o n s ,  i s  
t h e r e f o r e  geared at  f i n d i n g  ways and means f o r  e n c o u r a g i n g  
and e n a b l i n g  r a w - m a t e r i a l  p r o d u c e r s  and e x p o r t e r s  t o  become 
more s i g n i f i c a n t  p r o c e s s o r s  o f  copper  and t h e r e f o r e  more 
s i g n i f i c a n t  e x p o r t e r s  o f  ma n u f ac t u r e d  copper  p r o d u c t s .
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On t he  i s s u e  o f  c o n c e n t r a t e s  and b l i s t e r  c o p pe r ,  an 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  t he  i s s u e s  i n v o l v e d  may be ga i ned  t h r o u g h  an 
e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  some o f  t h e  c l aus e s  c o n t a i n e d  i n  c o n t r a c t s  
e n t e r e d  i n t o  between p r o du c e r s  and consumers o f  t h i s  t ype  
o f  c o p p e r .  U s u a l l y  t he  b l i s t e r  and c o n c e n t r a t e  c o n t r a c t s  
s p e c i f y  t h a t  t he  w e i g h i n g  and samp l i ng  o f  t h e  meta l  be 
pe r f o r med  a t  t he  p o r t  o f  d i s c h a r g e  and i n  accor dance  w i t h  
c e r t a i n  s p e c i f i c  p r o c e d u r e s .  The p r o c ed u r e s  s p e c i f i e d  
u s u a l l y  r e f l e c t  t he  normal  p r a c t i c e  i n  t h e  b u s i n e s s  and as 
m o d i f i e d  by t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  o f  t he  p o r t  o f  d i s c h a r g e  or  
t h e  s m e l t e r .  G e n e r a l l y  s p e a k i n g ,  t he  commer c i a l  s e t t l e m e n t  
f o r  c o n c e n t r a t e s  w i l l  be based upon s e v e r a l  metal  e l ement s  
such as c o p pe r ,  g o l d ,  s i l v e r ,  and s e v e r a l  p e n a l t y  e l e me n t s ,  
such as . a r s e n i c  and mer cu r y .  In r e a c h i n g  t h i s  a n a l y s i s  
t h e  c o n t r a c t  u s u a l l y  p r o v i d e s  f o r  each p a r t y  t o  p e r f o r m i t s  
own a n a l y s i s  on t h e  c o n c e n t r a t e  r e c e i v e d  a t  t he  p o r t  o f  
d i s c h a r g e  or  s m e l t i n g  p l a n t .  In o r d e r  t o  a l l o w  f o r  chemi ca l  
d i f f e r e n c e s  between t he  l a b o r a t o r i e s ,  t h e r e  i s  u s u a l l y  a 
c l a u s e  i n  t h e  c o n t r a c t  accommodat i ng t he s e  e xpec t ed  d i f f e r ­
ences.  For  copper  c o n c e n t r a t e s  t h i s  d i f f e r e n c e  w i l l  u s u a l l y  
be 0 . 25  t o  0.37% and i s  known as t he  s p l i t t i n g  l i m i t .
The p r ob l em w i t h  t h ese  c o n t r a c t  c l au s es  i s  t h a t  t h e y  put  
a l l  t he  burden o f  l o s s e s  i n c u r r e d  t h r o u g h  sh i pmen t  i n  t e rms 
o f  p h y s i c a l  and chemi ca l  change on t he  p r o d u c e r s  even t hough 
t hese  changes may no t  be as a r e s u l t  o f  t h e i r  n e g l i g e n c e .
As a r e s u l t  o f  t h e s e  u n f a v o u r a b l e  c o n t r a c t ,  t e rms whi ch 
r e q u i r e  t he  w e i g h i n g  and sampl i ng  t o  be done a t  t he  p o i n t  
o f  d i s c h a r g e  or  a t  t he  s m e l t e r ,  t he  p r o d u c e r s  o f  c o n c e n t r a t e
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have cont i nued to i ncur  a l o t  of  losses in t h e i r  r eal  
earni ngs due to physi cal  and chemical  changes t h a t  might  t ake  
pl ace in t r a n s i t .  The issue t h e r e f o r e  is one of  t r y i n g  to 
improve the terms of  these c o n t r a c t s .  The task f o r  studying  
the approach to be f o l l owed in t h i s  r espect  has been assigned  
to the Technical  Commi t tee.  At i t s  XVI th Conference of  
M i n i s t e r s  in Jul y 1980,  i t  was resol ved t h a t  t he Te c h n i c a l  
Commi t tee should pursue t h i s  issue v i g o r o u s l y  and i f  
necessary j o i n t l y  wi th o t her  producers out s i de  CIPEC.
By a s s i g n i n g  t he  t a s k  o f  s t u d y i n g  t h es e  i m p o r t a n t  i s s u e s  
t o  one o f  i t s  c o mmi t t e e s ,  CIPEC has shown a change i n  t he  
l i n e  o f  t h r u s t  i f  one compares i t  w i t h  o t h e r  p r o d u c e r s '  
a s s o c i a t i o n s  whi ch  have c o n c e n t r a t e d  on t h e  i s s u e  o f  
b a l a n c i n g  s u p p l y  and demand o f  t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  c o mmo d i t i e s .  
CIPEC i s  now engaged i n  an i n c r e a s i n g l y  s y s t e m a t i c  manner ,  
i n  a c t i v i t i e s  t h a t  w i l l  broaden and enhance t h e  scope o f  
a c t i o n  i t  may t a k e  t o  s t a b i l i z e  t he  copper  ma r k e t .
(e)  Th£ u^commi^ttee
L i k e  a l l  t h e  o t h e r  commi t t ees  i n  CIPEC,  t h i s  sub ­
commi t t ee  i s  composed o f  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  a l l  member 
c o u n t r i e s .  I t s  main f u n c t i o n  i s  t o  d i s c u s s  and deal  w i t h  
a l l  m a t t e r s  r e l a t i n g  t o  t h e  budget  o f  t h e  a s s o c i a t i o n .
I t  ho l ds  i t s  mee t i ng s  t w i c e  eve r y  y e a r ,  t h e  f i r s t  s ess i on  
be i ng  devo t ed  t o  t h e  e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  t he  a s s o c i a t i o n ' s  accoun t s  
and t he  second s e s s i o n  devot ed  t o  t he  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e  f o l l o w ­
i ng  y e a r ' s  b udge t .  From t i me  t o  t i me  t he  s u b - c o mmi t t e e  may 
not  agree w i t h  t h e  accoun t s  and woul d  seek more i n f o r m a t i o n  
or  c l a r i f i c a t i o n  f r om t h e  S e c r e t a r i a t .
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The p r o c e e d i n g s  i n  t h i s  s u b - c ommi t t ee  are v e r y  
i n f o r m a l  and n o t h i n g  i s  r e c o r d e d  about  i t s  p r o c e e d i n g s  
ex c e p t  a s h o r t  f i n a l  r e p o r t  c o n t a i n i n g  i t s  recommendat i ons  
t o  t h e  e x e c u t i v e  c o mmi t t e e .
( f ) Jhe_ Secretar j_a_t
The CIPEC agreement  se t s  out  a cor ps  o f  s t a f f  headed 
by a S e c r e t a r y  General  char ged  g e n e r a l l y  w i t h  t he  r e s p o n s ­
i b i l i t y  o f  s e r v i c i n g  t he  o r g a n i s a t i o n .  These members o f  
s t a f f  at  t h e  S e c r e t a r i a t  are r egar ded  as i n t e r n a t i o q ^ (  
o f f i c i a l s  who are r e q u i r e d  no t  t o  r e c e i v e  any i n s t r u c t i o n s  
f r om t h e i r  g o v e r n me n t s ,**0 Among t he  i m p o r t a n t  f u n c t i o n s  
o f  t he  S e c r e t a r i a t  are t he  p r e p a r a t i o n  o f  documents t o  be 
d i s c u s s e d  by t h e  Con f e r ence  o f  i n i s t e r s  and t h e  E x e c u t i v e  
Commi t t ee ,  and p r e p a r a t i o n  o f  d r a f t  r e s o l u t i o n s  f o r  t he 
Con f e r e n c e  o f  M i n i s t e r s  whi ch are u s u a l l y  adopt ed as 
t h e y  s t and  or  w i t h  s l i g h t  m o d i f i c a t i o n s .
O r i g i n a l l y  t he  S e c r e t a r y  General  o f  CIPEC was not
r e q u i r e d  t o  be a n a t i o n a l  o f  any member c o u n t r y .  I ndeed
t he  f i r s t  S e c r e t a r y  General  was not  a n a t i o n a l  o f  any
member count r y .  This was modi f i ed by the Conf erence of
Ministers in a resolut ion of t he i r  12th ordinary session held
i n  J a r k a t a  i n  1977.  The amendment  t o  t he  CIPEC agreement
e f f e c t e d  as a r e s u l t  o f  t h a t  r e s o l u t i o n ,  now r e q u i r e s  t he
61S e c r e t a r y  General  t o  be a n a t i o n a l  o f  a member c o u n t r y .
Under  t he  same amendment ,  t h e  pos t  i s  t o  be r o t a t e d  among
60.  A r t i c l e  16 o f  t he  CIPEC agreement .
61.  See supr a  no t e  55.
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t he  f u l l  member c o u n t r i e s  i n  a l p h a b e t i c a l  o r d e r  s t a r t i n g  
w i t h  a c a n d i d a t e  f r om C h i l e .  The t e r m o f  o f f i c e  i s  two 
y e a r s  w i t h  a p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  r e a p p o i n t m e n t .
( v i ) V o t i n g  p r o c ed u r e s  i n  CIPEC
U n l i k e  a number o f  o t h e r  p r o d u c e r s '  a s s o c i a t i o n s ,
CIPEC has two c a t e g o r i e s  o f  members - t h e  f u l l  members 
and a s s o c i a t e  members.  The d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  v o t e s  i n  t he 
o r g a n i z a t i o n  i s  based on t he  n a t u r e  o f  membersh i p.  The 
f u l l  members have .equal  v o t i n g  r i g h t s ,  each member hav i ng  
o n l y  one v o t e ,  w h i l e  a s s o c i a t e  members have no such r i g h t s .  
Th i s  i n e q u a l i t y  appears  t o  be based on a f undamen t a l  p r i n c i p l e  
t h a t  r uns  ac r oss  a l l  a spec t s  o f  CIPEC. Th i s  p r i n c i p l e  i s  
t h a t  c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  depend t o  a g r e a t  e x t e n t  on copper  
shou l d  be i n  a p o s i t i o n  t o  d e t e r m i n e  t h e  m a r k e t i n g  aspec t  
o f  c o p p e r ,  w h i l e  t h os e  no t  s e r i o u s l y  dependent  on copper  
e x p o r t s  can t ake  advant age o f  t he  o r g a n i s a t i o n  bu t  w i t h o u t  
d e t e r m i n i n g  t h e  p o l i c i e s .  Th i s  p r i n c i p l e  has n e c e s s i t a t e d  
two t y p e s  o f  membershi p and a t w o - t i e r  c o n t r i b u t i o n  sys t em.
The f u l l  members c o n t r i b u t e  equal  amounts t owar ds  t h e  c o s t  
o f  r u n n i n g  t he  o r g a n i s a t i o n ,  and t he  a s s o c i a t e  members 
pay h a l f  o f  what  a f u l l  member pays.
(a)  De ^ i £ i  c)n_irmkp_nj3
D e c i s i o n s  and r e s o l u t i o n s  o f  t h e  v a r i o u s  CIPEC organs 
are r eached t h r o u g h  a system t h a t  c l a s s i f i e s  d e c i s i o n s  i n t o  
ma j o r  and m i n o r .  Each organ b e f o r e  r e a c h i n g  a d e c i s i o n ,  
must  c l a s s i f y  t he  i s s u e s  i n t o  e i t h e r  ma j o r  i mp o r t a n c e  
c a t e g o r y  or  o f  a mi nor  i mp o r t a n c e .  Th i s  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n ,  i s  
r e q u i r e d  t o  be made by a unanimous vo t e  i n  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  
o r gan .
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A f t e r  t he  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n ,  ma j o r  d e c i s i o n s  are t hen 
r e q u i r e d  t o  be made by a unani mous vo t e  o f  t h e  f u l l  members 
i n  t he  o r g an .  The r e q u i r e m e n t  o f  u n a n i m i t y  c l e a r l y  aims 
a t  r e c e i v i n g  t h e  s u p p o r t  o f  a l l  t he  f u l l  members b e f o r e  
a d e c i s i o n  i s  made.  Th i s  unani mous s u p p o r t  t o  a d e c i s i o n  
makes i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  much e a s i e r  t han  i f  o n l y  a s i mp l e
or  q u a l i f i e d  m a j o r i t y  was o b t a i n e d .  I t  may be argued t h a t  
t he  r e q u i r e m e n t  o f  u n a n i m i t y  mi gh t  make t h e  t a k i n g  o f  c r u c i a l  
d e c i s i o n s  at  c r i t i c a l  t i me s  d i f f i c u l t .  Wh i l e  t h e r e  may be 
some m e r i t  t o  t h i s  a r gument ,  i t  i s  s u b m i t t e d  t h a t  i n  an 
o r g a n i z a t i o n  o f  o n l y  f i v e  f u l l  members i t  i s  i m p o r t a n t  f o r  
pu r poses  o f  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  f o r  each member t o  f e e l  p a r t  and 
p a r c e l  o f  t he  d e c i s i o n s  t a k e n .  An u n f a v o u r a b l e  a t t i t u d e  
by one ma j o r  e x p o r t e r  t o  a d e c i s i o n  c o u l d  e a s i l y  f r u s t r a t e  
t he  c o n t e n t s  o f  t he  d e c i s i o n .
Mi no r  d e c i s i o n s  are r eached on t he  b a s i s  o f  a t wo-  
t h i r d s  m a j o r i t y  v o t e  o f  a l l  f u l l  members.  T w o - t h i r d s  
m a j o r i t y  o f  t h e  p r e s e n t  f i v e  f u l l  members works  ou t  t o  a 
f i g u r e  o f  3 . 3 ,  wh i ch  means t h a t  i n  e f f e c t  mi n o r  d e c i s i o n s  
woul d r e q u i r e  t h e  s u p p o r t  o f  at  l e a s t  f o u r  members b e f o r e  
t h e y  can be passed.
The v o t i n g  system i n  CIPEC c l e a r l y  aims at  f o s t e r i n g  
c l o s e  c o o p e r a t i o n  by members i n  a l l  t h e  d e c i s i o n s .  In 
f a c t  t he  emphasi s  on c l o s e  c o o p e r a t i o n  i s  r e f l e c t e d  i n  
t he p r a c t i c e  o f  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n .  U n t i l  1982 o n l y  t h r e e
mi no r  i s s u e s  were a c t u a l l y  pu t  t o  a v o t e ,  and a l l  ma j o r
, . • , 62 d e c i s i o n s  were passed w i t h o u t  a v o t e .
See supr a  no t e  52.
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Dec i s i on s t aken  i n  t he  o r g a n i s a t i o n  are b i n d i n g  on 
a l l  f u l l  members but  are v o l u n t a r y  on t h e  p a r t  o f  a s s o c i a t e  
members.  Th i s  p r o v i s i o n  i s  i m p o r t a n t  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  
r e l a t i o n  t o  c e r t a i n  a s s o c i a t e  members,  because each member 
i s  r e q u i r e d  t o  d e c i d e  on i t s  own t he i n t e r n a l  a p p l i c a t i o n  
o f  t h e  d e c i s i o n s .  Thus an a s s o c i a t e  member l i k e  A u s t r a l i a  
whose copper  i n d u s t r y  i s  i n  t he  hands o f  p r i v a t e  e n t r e p r e n u e r s , 
woul d  f i n d  i t  d i f f i c u l t  t o  con f or m t o  c e r t a i n  CIPEC d e c i s i o n s  
i f  t h e y  were made b i n d i n g  on i t ,
(b)  P^ower^s_aj id__fj jn£ti_on^ £f_C£P£C_o_rg£n£
L i k e  o t h e r  e l emen t s  o f  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  any i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  o r g a n i s a t i o n ,  t he  r e l e v a n t  p r o v i s i o n s  on powers 
and f u n c t i o n s  have t o  s t and  t h e  t e s t  o f
" t h e  unknown,  t he  u n f o r e s e e n ,  and i ndeed  t he  
u n f o r s e e a b l e . "  63
In CIPEC t h e  un f o r e s e e n  i s  l i k e l y  t o  a r i s e  i n  t he  case o f  
a d mi s s i o n  t o  membersh i p,  d e l i m i t  at  i on  o f  f u n c t i o n s  between 
t he  v a r i o u s  o r g a n s ,  c o mp l i a n c e  w i t h  r u l e s  o f  p r o c e d u r e ,  
and an organ exc e ed i n g  i t s  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  powers .
A r t i c l e  2 ( f )  o f  t he  CIPEC agreement  p r o v i d e s  t h a t  
a dmi ss i on  o f  a new member s h a l l  t a k e  p l a c e  i n  accor dance 
w i t h  t he  t e r ms  o f  t he  agreement  and w i t h  t he  a p p r o v a l  o f  
t he  M i n i s t e r s  o f  t he  member c o u n t r i e s .  The p r ob l em whi ch 
mi gh t  a r i s e  i n  t h i s  r e g a r d  i s  whe t he r  a d mi s s i o n  c o u l d  be 
e f f e c t e d  w i t h o u t  t h e  a p p r o v a l  o f  t he  M i n i s t e r s .  Th i s  
p r ob l em i s  made even more l i k e l y  by t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t he  a g r e e ­
ment  does no t  s p e c i f y  t h e  organ t h a t  i s  t o  e f f e c t  admi ss i on  
bu t  me r e l y  r e q u i r e s  such a dmi ss i on  t o  be e f f e c t e d  o n l y  
a f t e r  t he  a p p r o v a l  o f  t h e  m i n i s t e r s  o f  member c o u n t r i e s  has
63.  See S i r  Percy  R e n d e r ' s s e p a r a t e  o p i n i o n  i n  The
C e r t a i n  Expenses o f  t he  Un i t e d  N a t i o n s .Cage jjc ^ s T l T C T departs 
| S S .  ’
235
been obt a i ned .  I t  i s d i f f i c u l t  to b e l i e v e  t h a t  the agr ee ­
ment l e f t  t h i s  task to the Conference of  M i n i s t e r s  because 
i f  t h i s  is the case then p r i o r  approval  of  the var i ous  
mi n i s t e r s  who compose the Conf er ence  would seem to be 
unnecessary.  I f  on the ot her  hand admission was to be 
e f f e c t e d  by the Execut i ve  Commi t tee then the p r i o r  approval  
of  the M i n i s t e r s  would seem to make sense.  The u n c e r t a i n t y  
might  cause problems in f u t u r e  say in an event  where an 
a p p l i c a n t  count ry  is r e fused admission and cha l l enges  the  
dec i s i on on the ground t h a t  a p a r t i c u l a r  organ di d not have 
the power to e f f e c t  or re fuse  admission.
The p r ob l em o f  d e l i m i t a t i o n  o f  f u n c t i o n s  and powers 
between organs and t he  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  g i v e n ,  i n t h a t  
c o n n e c t i o n ,  t o  exp r ess  p r o v i s i o n s  i n  a c o n s t i t u e n t  i n s t r u m e n t ,  
i s  i l l u s t r a t e d  by two a d v i s o r y  o p i n i o n s  o f  t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
Cour t  o f  J u s t i c e .  One o f  t he  o p i n i o n s  was d e l i v e r e d  i n 1950.  
The i s s u e  b e f o r e  t he  c o u r t  was one c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  
o f  powers between t he  U n i t e d  Na t i o n s  General  Assembl y  and 
t he  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l .  On t he  f a c e  o f  i t  t h e  p r ob l em was 
s i m p l e ;  t h e  c h a r t e r  o f  t h e  Un i t e d  Na t i o ns  p r o v i d e s  f o r  
ad mi ss i on  t o  membershi p t o  be e f f e c t e d  by a d e c i s i o n  o f  t he  
General  Assembl y  upon recommendat i on  o f  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l .  
The q u e s t i o n  t he  c o u r t  was asked t o  answer  was whe t he r  i n  
v i ew o f  t h i s  p r o v i s i o n ,  t he  General  Assembl y  c o u l d  admi t  a 
c o u n t r y  t o  membershi p when t he  S e c u r i t y  Coun c i l  had not  made 
a recommendat i on  by reason o f  a c a n d i d a t e ' s  f a i l u r e  t o  
o b t a i n  t he  r e q u i s i t e  m a j o r i t y  or  o f  t he  n e g a t i v e  v o t e  o f  a
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permanent  member.  The c o u r t  was o f  t h e  v i ew t h a t ,
" t o  h o l d  t h a t  t he  General  Assembl y has power  t o  
admi t  a s t a t e  t o  membershi p i n  t he  absence o f  
a r ecommendat i on  o f  t he  S e c u r i t y  Cou n c i l  woul d 
be t o  d e p r i v e  t h e  S e c u r i t y  Counc i l  o f  an i m p o r t ­
ant  power  whi ch  has been e n t r u s t e d  t o  i t  by 
t he  c h a r t e r . "
Th i s  l i t e r a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  i f  a p p l i e d  t o  CIPEC,  woul d 
seem t o  sugges t  t h a t  no admi ss i on  t o  membershi p can be 
e f f e c t e d  w i t h o u t  t he  app r ova l  o f  t he  M i n i s t e r s  o f  t he  
member c o u n t r i e s .  I f  t h i s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  i s  c o r r e c t ,  i t  
i s  hard t o  e n v i s a g e  t h e  Con f er ence  o f  M i n i s t e r s  a p p r o v i n g  
t h e  admi s s i o n  and at  t he  same t i me  e f f e c t i n g  a d m i s s i o n .
I t  i s  t h e r e f o r e ,  s u b m i t t e d  t h a t  admi ss i on  s h o u l d  be 
e f f e c t e d  by an organ o t h e r  t han  t he  Con f e r ence  o f  M i n i s t e r s .  
The most  l i k e l y  organ t o  do t h i s  i n  t he  CIPEC s t r u c t u r e  i s  
t h e  e x e c u t i v e  c o mmi t t e e .  But  s i n c e  t h e  CIPEC agreement  on 
t h i s  i s s u e  i s  vague,  one has t o  me r e l y  s p e c u l a t e  on what  
m i gh t  happen i n  t he  even t  o f  a d i s p u t e  a r i s i n g  r e g a r d i n g  
compet ence o f  one o f  one o f  CIPEC' s organs  t o  e f f e c t  
admission.
An o t he r  p o t e n t i a l  area o f  c o n f l i c t  i n  any o r g a n i s a t i o n  
such as CIPEC r e l a t e s  t o  s i t u a t i o n s  when an organ i s  a l l e g e d  
t o  have exceeded i t s  powers p r o v i d e d  f o r  i n  i t s  c o n s t i t u t i o n .  
In one case i n  wh i ch  t he  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Cou r t  o f  J u s t i c e  was 
asked t o  g i v e  an a d v i s o r y  o p i n i o n  on wh e t h e r  t h e  General  
Assembl y  o f  t h e  Un i t e d  Na t i o n s  had ac t ed  u l t r a  v i r e s  t he  
c h a r t e r ,  t h e  c o u r t  obser ved  t h a t  when an organ o f  an o r g a n ­
i z a t i o n  t a k e s  a c t i o n  whi ch  w a r r a n t s  t he  a s s e r t i o n  t h a t  i t
64.  Competence o f  t he  General  Assembl y f o r  t h e  Ad mi s s i on  
o f  a S t a t e  t o  t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s , [ R s o j i e j  R epo rts , <1
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was a p p r o p r i a t e  f o r  t h e  f u l f i l l m e n t  o f  one o f  t he  s t a t e d  
pu r po s e s ,  t he  p r e s ump t i o n  ought  t o  be t h a t  such a c t i o n  i s
fi Rno t  u l t r a  v i r e s  t h e  o r g a n i s a t i o n .  Th i s  v i ew was a f f i r m e d  
i n  t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Co u r t  o f  " J u s t i c e ' s  a d v i s o r y  o p i n i o n  
c o n c e r n i n g  t he  l e g a l  consequences f o r  s t a t e s  o f  t he  c o n t i n u e d  
p r esence  o f  South A f r i c a  i n  Nami b i a .  I n t h a t  case ,  t h e  c o u r t  
exp r essed  t h e  v i ew t h a t ,
"a r e s o l u t i o n  o f  a p r o p e r l y  c o n s t i t u t e d  organ o f  
t h e  U n i t e d  Na t i o n s  whi ch  i s  passed i n  acco r dance  w i t h
t h a t  o r g a n ' s  r u l e s  o f  p r o c ed u r e  and i s  d e c l a r e d
by i t s  P r e s i d e n t  t o  have been so passed,  must  be 
presumed t o  have been v a l i d l y  a d o p t e d . " 6 6
Si nce  CIPEC i s  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  i t  seems 
v a l i d  t o  assume t h a t  t he  o b s e r v a t i o n s  made i n  t h e  two cases 
above a p p l y  t o  i t .  I f  t h i s  i s  t he  case ,  t hen  t h e  s t a r t i n g  
p r emi s  i s  t h a t  t h e  r e s o l u t i o n s  o f  CIPEC wh i ch  are v a l i d l y  
passed ough t  t o  be presumed t o  be v a l i d  and no t  u l t r a  v i r e s  
t h e  CIPEC c o n s t i t u t i o n .  Th i s  however ,  i s  no t  t o  say t h a t  
a l l  r e s o l u t i o n s  and d e c i s i o n s  o f  t he  v a r i o u s  o r gans  i n  
CIPEC w i l l  be v a l i d .  L i k e  a l l  o t h e r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r g a n i z a ­
t i o n s ,  i t  possesses  t h e  c a p a c i t y  t o  commi t  u l t r a  v i r e s  a c t s .  
Th i s  v i ew f i n d s  s u p p o r t  i n  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t he  f u n c t i o n s  and
powers o f  t h e  o r gans  o f  an o r g a n i s a t i o n  l i k e  CIPEC,  as w e l l
as t he  p r o c ed u r e s  t o  be a p p l i e d  i n  t he  e x e r c i s e  o f  t hese  
f u n c t i o n s  are u s u a l l y  l a i d  down i n  t he  c o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  t he  
o r g a n i z a t i o n .  I t  i s  t h e r e f o r e  p e r f e c t l y  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  
i n  t he  f u l f i l l m e n t  o f  t h e i r  o b j e c t i v e s ,  an organ may 
a u t h o r i z e  a c t i v i t i e s  whi ch  are not  e x p r e s s l y  o r  i ndeed
65 . C e r t a i n  Expenses o f  t he  Un i t e d  N a t i o n s , Q u a ]  1C J  R eports
6 6 . ,
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i m p l i e d l y  a u t h o r i z e d  i n  t h e i r  c o n s t i t u t i o n s ^ '  In t hese  
c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  a q u e s t i o n  may a r i s e  as t o  whe t he r  c e r t a i n  
d e c i s i o n s  are u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l .
In t h e  case o f  CIPEC, i f  an i s s u e  r e g a r d i n g  t he  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y  o f  t h e  ac t s  o f  one o f  i t s  organs  a r o s e ,  
i t  woul d no t  f i n d  an answer  i n t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  t he  
o r g a n i s a t i o n .  The CIPEC agreement  does not  c o n t a i n  a 
p r o v i s i o n  on t h i s  i s s u e .  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  even i f  a c l e a r  case 
o f  an u l t r a  v i r e s  a c t i o n  by an organ o f  CIPEC was t o  be
e s t a b l i s h e d ,  t h e r e  woul d s t i l l  r emai n  t he  p r ob l em o f  what
remedy c o u l d  be p r o v i d e d .  As j udge  M o r e l l i  obser ved  i n  h i s  
s e p a r a t e  o p i n i o n  i n  t he  c e r t a i n  expenses case,
" i n  t h e  case o f  a c t s  o f ' i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r g a n i s a t i o n s ,  
and i n  p a r t i c u l a r  t h e  Un i t e d  N a t i o n s ,  t h e r e  i s
n o t h i n g  compar ab l e  t o  t he  remed i es  e x i s t i n g  i n
d o me s t i c  l aw i n  c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  a c t s .
The consequence o f  t h i s  i s  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no p o s s i b i l i t y  
o f  a p p l y i n g  t he  concep t  o f  v o i d a b i l i t y  t o  t he  ac t s  
o f  t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s . " 6 8
By i m p l i c a t i o n  t h i s  means t h a t  u l t r a  v i r e s  a c t i v i t i e s  o f
organs  o f  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r g a n i s a t i o n  l i k e  CIPEC canno t
be d e c l a r e d  v o i d .  S i nce  t he  CIPEC agreement  does not
p r o v i d e  a remedy i n  such c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  i t  woul d seem t h a t
t he  p a r t y a ^ g r i e v e d  woul d o n l y  have t o  depend on t he  gener a l
remedy p r o v i d e d  i n  t he  agr eement ,  t h a t  o f  w i t h d r a w a l  f r om
t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n .  T h i s ,  i t  seems i s  an u n s a t i s f a c t o r y
approach t o  t h e  p r ob l em o f  u l t r a  v i r e s  a c t i v i t i e s .  A more
67.  See d i s s e n t i n g  o p i n i o n  o f  S i r  Ge r a l d  F i t z m a u r i c e ,
Consequences f o r  s t a t e s  o f  t he  c o n t i n u e d  pr esence  o f  
South A f r i c a  i n  South West  A f r i c a  ( N a m i b i a ) . j [  9 ? / 11CJ  
Repor t s  ^ ? at  page 280.  —
68.  See supr a  no t e  65.
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s a t i s f a c t o r y  s o l u t i o n  woul d be one i n  wh i ch  a p r o c e d u r e  i s  
se t  ou t  s p e c i f i c a l l y  t o  deal  w i t h  t h i s  p r ob l em.  Such a 
p r o c ed u r e  e x p r e s s l y  be embodi ed i n  t h e  CIPEC agreement .
Non c o mp l i a n c e  w i t h  t he  p r o c e d u r a l  r u l e s  i s  a n o t h e r  
p o t e n t i a l  a rea o f  c o n f l i c t  i n  an o r g a n i z a t i o n  l i k e  CIPEC.
The CIPEC agreement  does p r o v i d e  a number o f  p r o c e d u r a l  
r u l e s  r e g a r d i n g  v a r i o u s  i s s u e s .  For  exampl e,  i t  p r o v i d e s  
t h a t  ma j o r  d e c i s i o n s  o f  i t s  organs  have t o  be made when a 
unani mous v o t e  has been a t t a i n e d .  I f  however ,  an organ o f  
CIPEC adop t s  a d e c i s i o n  on a ma j o r  i s s u e  i n  a manner  not  
c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h i s  p r o c e d u r e ,  a q u e s t i o n  may a r i s e  as t o  
whe t he r  such a d e c i s i o n  i s  i l l e g a l  or  u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l .  
S i m i l a r l y ,  t h e  agreement  empowers t he  v a r i o u s  organs t o  
d e t e r m i n e  t h e i r  own p r o c edu r e s  i n  c e r t a i n  i n s t a n c e s .  I f  
such an organ d e t e r m i n e s  i t s  own p r o c e d u r e ,  and d ec i des  
s u b s e q u e n t l y  not  t o  app l y  t h e  p r o c e d u r e ,  an i s s u e  o f  t he  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y  o f  i t s  ac t  may a r i s e .  I f  such an i s s u e  
a r i s e s  and i t  i s  e s t a b l i s h e d  t h a t  t he ac t  was u l t r a  v i r e s  
t he  CIPEC ag r eemen t ,  t he  i s s u e  woul d be r educed  t o  one o f  
d e t e r m i n i n g  what  r emed i es  are a v a i l a b l e .  Regr e t t ab l y ,  t he  
CIPEC agreement  does no t  p r o v i d e  any ex p r es s  remedy excep t  
perhaps t o  a l l o w  a member a g g r i e v e d  t o  w i t h d r a w .  D r i v i n g  
member c o u n t r i e s  t o  w i t h d r a w a l  does not  seem t o  be t he  bes t  
s o l u t i o n  t o  t h i s  p r o b l e m.  A more a c c e p t a b l e  s o l u t i o n  woul d 
be f o r  t he  CIPEC agreement  p r o v i d i n g  f o r  a mechani sm t h a t  
woul d remedy t h e  u l t r a  v i r e s  a c t .
The d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e s e  probl ems mi gh t  sound s p e c u l a t i v e  
i n  v i ew o f  t h e  w i l l i n g n e s s  o f  CIPEC member c o u n t r i e s  t o  use
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i t s  o r gans  t o  d i s c u s s  and s o l v e  i t s  p r o b l e ms ,  but  t he  l i k e l i ­
hood o f  t h es e  p r ob l ems a r i s i n g  s e r i o u s l y  canno t  c o m p l e t e l y  be 
o v e r l o o k e d .  I t  i s  t o  t a c k l e  t hese  u n f o r e s e e n  c i r c u ms t a n c e s  
t h a t  CIPEC woul d do w e l l  t o  i n t r o d u c e  new p r o v i s i o n s  i n  i t s  
a g r e e me n t .
( v i i ) D i s p u t e  s e t t l e m e n t  i n  CIPEC
D i s p u t e s  most  l i k e l y  t o  occur  i n  CIPEC con f o r m t o  two 
p a t t e r n s  - d i s p u t e s  between member c o u n t r i e s ,  and d i s p u t e s  
between t he  o r g a n i z a t i o n  and t he  members.  In bot h  cases 
t he  d i s p u t e s  are l i k e l y  t o  r e l a t e  t o  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  
t he  o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s  agr eement .
There i s  no doubt  t h a t  t h e  most  i m p o r t a n t  m o t i v a t i o n  
f o r  any c o u n t r y  j o i n i n g  CIPEC i s  t he  i mp o r t a n c e  o f  copper  
t o  such a c o u n t r y ' s  economi c w e l l - b e i n g  and t h e  p e r c e i v e d  
c a p a c i t y  o f  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  t o  enhance t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  
t hese  c o u n t r i e s  as f a r  as copper  p r o d u c t i o n  and m a r e k t i n g  
i s  c o n c e r n e d .  But  s i n c e  t he  i n t e r e s t s  o f  a l l  CIPEC members 
as f a r  as copper  i s  concer ned  canno t  r e a s o n a b l y  be expec t ed  
t o  be t he  same, t h e  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  c o n f l i c t  between t he  members 
o f  t he  o r g a n i z a t i o n  i s  c o n s i d e r a b l e .  The need f o r  adequat e 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r o v i s i o n s  p r o v i d i n g  f o r  c o n f l i c t  r e s o l u t i o n  
p r o c ed u r es  i s  a t  t h e  v e r y  h e a r t  o f  a s u c c e s s f u l  CIPEC.
The s i g n i f i c a n t  f e a t u r e  o f  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r o v i s i o n s
i n  CIPEC, l i k e  t h o s e  i n  many o t h e r  p r o d u c e r s '  a s s o c i a t i o n s
69i s  t he  i n t e r n a l i z e d  p r o c ed u r e s  f o r  d i s p u t e  s e t t l e m e n t .
Onl y two p r o d u c e r s '  a s s o c i a t i o n s  p r o v i d e  f o r  e x t e r n a l i z e d
69.  A r t i c l e  13 ( 2)  of  the Groundnut  Counc i l ,  and A r t i c l e  17 
of  the Tea Promotion As s oc i a t i on .
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d i s p u t e  s e t t l e m e n t  p r o c e d u r e s .  The A f r i c a n  g r o u n d n u t  c o u n c i l  
p r o v i d e s  f o r  d i s p u t e s  t o  be r e f e r r e d  t o  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  o f  
A f r i c a n  u n i t y  c o n c i l i a t i o n  and a r b i t r a t i o n  commi ss i o n , w h i l e  
t h e  t e a  p r o mo t i o n  a s s o c i a t i o n  p r o v i d e s  r e c o u r s e  t o  t h e  i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  c o u r t  o f  j u s t i c e .
A r t i c l e  31 of  the CIPEC agreement deal s wi t h d i sput e  
s e t t l e me n t  and r e qu i r e s  a l l  di sputes concerni ng the i n t e r ­
p r e t a t i o n  or a p p l i c a t i o n  of  the agreement  to be r e f e r r e d  
to the conference of  m i n i s t e r s  f o r  dec i s i on or to be r esol ved by 
the p a r t i e s  to the d i sput e  in a manner agreed between them­
s e l v e s .  This approach has been f o l l owed in a number of  other  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  such as the i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
Bauxi t e  A s s o c i a t i o n ,  the i n t e r n a t i o n a l  Monet ar y  Fund, the
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Finance Corporat i on ( I F C ) ,  and the X n t e r n a t i o n a l
7 0development  A s s o c i a t i o n  ( I D A ) .
The i n t e r n a l i z e d  approach t o  d i s p u t e  s e t t l e m e n t  r e f l e c t s
the nat ur e  of  the most l i k e l y  di sputes to a r i s e  in an
o r g a n i z a t i o n  l i k e  CIPEC. Si nce  CIPEC i s  an o r g a n i s a t i o n  t h a t
aims mai nl y  at  harmoniz i ng the product i on and marekt i ng
p o l i c i e s  of  copper producing c o u n t r i e s ,  the d i sput es  t h a t
are most l i k e l y  to a r i s e  w i l l  i nvo l v e  p o l i c y  i ssues and t h e i r
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n .  P o l i c y  d i s p u t e s  by t h e i r  v e r y  n a t u r e  are
71n o n - j u s t i c i a b l e  . Because o f  t h i s  n o n - j u s t i c i a b l e n a t u r e  
o f  p o l i c y  d e c i s i o n s ,  p o l i c y  makers t end  t o  c o n c e i v e  t hem­
s e l v e s  as b e t t e r  s u i t e d  t o  s e t t l e  t he  d i s p u t e s  t han
70 .  See f o r  exampl e ,  a r t i c l e  V I I I  o f  t h e  IBA agr eement ;  
a r t i c l e  X V I I I  o f  t he  IMF ag r eement ;  a r t i c l e  V I I I  o f  
t he  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  F i nance  C o r p o r a t i o n  ( I F C ) ;  and 
a r t i c l e  X I I I  o f  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  i e v e l o p m e n t  A s s o c i a t i o n  
( I D A ) .
7 1 . Hexner ,  " I n t e r p r e t a t i o n  by p u b l i c  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r g a n ­
i s a t i o n s  o f  t h e i r  b a s i c  d ocumen t s " ,  ( 1 9 7 9 ) ,  73 A . d . I . L .  
341 .
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j u d i c i a l  o f f i c e r s  who are u n l i k e l y  to a p p r e c i a t e  the po l i c y  
i m p l i c a t i o n s  of  t h e i r  de c i s i o ns .
The d i f f i c u l t y  wi th the i n t e r n a l i z e d  di sput e  s e t t l ement  
procedure is t h a t  the p o l i c y  makers may not be in a po s i t i o n  
to a pp r e c i a t e  the r e l e v a n t  l ega l  p r i n c i p l e s  t h a t  might  be 
i n t e r wi ne d  wi t h the p o l i c y  i ssues.  To t a c k l e  t h i s  problem,  
a number of  producers'  assoc i a t i ons  have e s t a b l i s h e d  pr o ­
cedures through which the organ r espons i b l e  f o r  d i sput e  
se t t l e me nt  would seek advise from legal  e x p e r t s .  For example,  
the c o n s t i t u t i o n  of  the Union of  Banana E x por t i n g  C o u n t r i e s  
empowers the Banana Co u n c i l ,  which is the organ r e spons i b l e
f o r  d i s p u t e  s e t t l e m e n t ,  t o  seek t h e  o p i n i o n  o f  an a d v i s o r y
7 ?commi ss i on b e f o r e  r e a c h i n g  d e c i s i o n s .  Th i s  a d v i s o r y  
commi ss i on  i s  e s t a b l i s h e d  w i t h i n  t he  o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  as a 
s u b o r d i n a t e  organ composed o f  l e g a l  e x p e r t s .  By p r o v i d i n g  
such a p r o c e d u r e  an o r g a n i z a t i o n  woul d be s a i d  t o  be mee t i ng  
t he  demands o f  c r i t i c s  o f  t he  i n t e r n a l i z e d  d i s p u t e  s e t t l e m e n t  
p r o c e d u r e s .  There i s  c e r t a i n l y  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  i n  t h i s  r e a s o n ­
i ng  because i f  t h e  d e f i c i e n c y  o f  t he  i n t e r n a l i z e d  system i s  
i t s  l a c k  o f  compet en t  men t o  t a c k l e  t h e  l e g a l  i s s u e s ,  t hen 
p r o v i d i n g  f o r  a c o n s u l t a t i o n  or  a d v i s o r y  p r o c e d u r e  w i t h  a 
s u b o r d i n a t e  l e g a l  o r gan ,  t he  prob l em woul d appear  t o  be 
s o l v e d .
The CIPEC agreement  p r o v i d e s  f o r  t he  i n t e r n a l i z e d  
d i s p u t e  s e t t l e m e n t  p r o c ed u r e  t h r o u g h  i t s  ( C o u n c i l .  The Coun c i l  
be i ng  t he  supreme p o l i c y  maker  i n  t he  o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  woul d 
seem t o  be s u i t e d  t o  deal  w i t h  t h e  d i s p u t e s  wh i ch  are l i k e l y
72.  A r t i c l e  34 o f  t he  C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  t h e  Uni on o f  banana 
e x p o r t i n g  c o u n t r i e s .
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t o  be o f  a p o l i t i c a l  n a t u r e .  But  as has a l r e a d y  been 
conceeded,  t h e  d e c i s i o n s  o f  such a p o l i c y  mak i ng body mi g h t  
need t o  be i n f o r me d  by l e g a l  e x p e r t s  about  c e r t a i n  l e g a l  
p r i n c i p l e s .  U n l i k e  t he  Uni on o f  Banana E x p o r t i n g  C o u n t r i e s ,  
CIPEC does no t  p r o v i d e  f o r  t h i s  a d v i s o r y  organ and p r o c e d u r e .  
The n a t u r a l  r e s u l t  o f  t h i s  d e f i c i e n c y  woul d seem t o  be t h a t  
p a r t i e s  t o  a d i s p u t e  who d ec i de  t o  use t h i s  p r o c e d u r e  woul d 
be e n t r u s t i n g  t h e  s o l u t i o n  o f  t he  p r ob l em t o  a p o l i c y  organ 
and a p o l i c y  s o l u t i o n .  Th i s  mi gh t  r e s u l t  i n  u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  
s e t t l e m e n t  o f  d i s p u t e s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  when t h e  d i s p u t e  
i n v o l v e s  t h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  c e r t a i n  l e g a l  p r i n c i p l e s  i n  
t he  c o n s t i t u t i o n .  I t  s h ou l d  be no t ed  t h a t  t he  organ 
r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  d i s p u t e  s e t t l e m e n t  i n  CIPEC i s  t h e  Con f er ence  
o f  M i n i s t e r s  wh i ch  i s  composed o f  m i n i s t e r s  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  
t h e  m i n i n g  i n d u s t r y  i n  t he  member c o u n t r i e s .  I t  i s  u n l i k e l y  
t h a t  t he se  men woul d be l e g a l  e x p e r t s .
Th i s  d e f i c i e n c y  appears  t o  be compensated by an a l t e r n a t e  
d i s p u t e  s e t t l e m e n t  p r o c e d u r e  p r o v i d e d  f o r  i n  t h e  CIPEC 
agr eement .  Under  t h i s  p r o c e d u r e ,  member c o u n t r i e s ,  p a r t i e s  
t o  a d i s p u t e  may choose t o  s e t t l e  t h e i r  d i s p u t e  i n  a manner  
agreed upon among t h e ms e l v e s .  Th i s  p r o v i s i o n  appears  t o  be 
broad enough t o  a l l o w  f o r  t he  s e t t i n g  o f  an ad hoc a d v i s o r y  
body o f  l e g a l  e x p e r t s  t o  p r o v i d e  e x p e r t i s e  i n  t he  i n t e r ­
p r e t a t i o n  o f  t h e  l e g a l  i s s u e s  i n v o l v e d .
(a)  £ompe t ence_o f  t_h£ £ o n f £ r e n £ e _ o f  Min_i s_t£r£
I n_ d i s PUt e_Se t t l  £rnen£
As me n t i oned  e a r l i e r  on,  t h e  CIPEC agreement  c o n f e r s  
t he  compet ence on d i s p u t e  s e t t l e m e n t ,  t o  t h e  Con f e r ence  o f
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M i n i s t e r s .  The p r o b l e m,  however ,  i s  whe t he r  t h e  c o n f e r e n c e  
can e x e r c i s e  t h i s  compet ence at  any t i m e o r o n l y  when a 
case has been r e f e r r e d  t o  i t .
The d i f f i c u l t i e s  which t h i s  issue may r a i s e  has been 
appr ec i a t ed  by a number of  producers'  as s o c i a t i ons  which 
have i nc l uded express pr ov i s i ons  in t h e i r  c o n s t i t u t i o n s  
r egar d i ng the ma t t e r .  For example,  the c o n s t i t u t i o n  of  
the A f r i c a n  Groundnut  Counci l  provides t h a t ,
"Any d i s p u t e  c o n c e r n i n g  t he  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  or  a p p l i ­
c a t i o n  o f  t h e  agreement  s h a l l ,  a t  t h e  r e q u e s t  o f  any 
c o u n t r y  p a r t y  t o  t he  d i s p u t e ,  be r e f e r r e d  t o  t he  
Co un c i l  f o r  a d e c i s i  o n . "  73
The CIPEC agreement  on t he  o t h e r  hand p r o v i d e s  f o r  a l l
d i s p u t e s  t o  be e i t h e r  r e f e r r e d  t o  t he  Con f e r ence  o f  M i n i s t e r s
or  s e t t l e d  i n  a manner agreed by t he  p a r t i e s .  Th i s
p r o v i s i o n ,  c l e a r l y  does not expr ess l y  s p e c i f y  where the
power  o f  r e f e r e n c e  r e s i d e s .  In o t h e r  wor ds ,  i t  does not
s pe c i f y  who should r e f e r  the d i sput e  to the conf er ence .
Due t o  t h i s  l a c k  o f  s p e c i f i c i t y ,  i t  may be r e a s o n a b l e  t o
assume t h a t  any member count ry  in the o r g a n i z a t i o n  or indeed
any ot her  organ in the o r g a n i z a t i o n  may r e f e r  a d i sput e
between two members t o  t h e  c o n f e r e n c e .  I f  t h i s  i s  a c o r r e c t
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  i t  wou l d  appear  t h a t  t h e  CIPEC agreement
provi des f o r  some sor t  of  a compulsory d i sput e  s e t t l ement
p r o c e d u r e .  Such a p r o c ed u r e  woul d seem t o  be s u i t a b l e  f o r
an a s s o c i a t i o n  whi ch  depends v e r y  much on t he  good r e l a t i o n s
between i t s  members.
73.  See A r t i c l e  13 o f  t he  A f r i c a n  g r o u n d n u t s  c o u n c i l .
245
( b ) Ap£e a_1 _ p r o £ e d u r e £
A number o f  p r o d u c e r s '  a s s o c i a t i o n s  p r o v i d e  f o r  appeal  
p r o c e d u r e s  f r om t he  d e c i s i o n s  o f  t he  p o l i c y  maki ng o r gans .  
Most  o f  t h e s e  p r o v i d e  f o r  compu l so r y  t h i r d  p a r t y  a d j u d i ­
c a t i o n  i n  t h e  even t  o f  t h e  d i s p u t e  s e t t l e m e n t  organ o f  t he 
o r g a n i z a t i o n  f a i l i n g  t o  r e s o l v e  t he  d i s p u t e .  The A f r i c a n  
Gr o u n d  nut  C o u n c i l  p r o v i d e s  f o r  r e f e r e n c e  o f  a d i s p u t e  t o
t he  commi ss i on  o f  m e d i a t i o n ,  conei  11 i a t i o n  and a r b i t r a t i o n
74o f  t h e  O r g a n i s a t i o n  o f  A f r i c a n  U n i t y  (OAU).
The l anguage  i n  a r t i c l e  31 o f  t he  CIPEC agreement  
appears  t o  be s u f f i c i e n t l y  wi de t o  a l l o w  f o r  t h i r d  p a r t y  
a d j u d i c a t i o n  where t he  p a r t i e s  concer ned agree t o  do so.
Where t h i s  appeal  p r oc ed u r e  i s  e x e r c i s e d  i n  r e l a t i o n s  t o  t he  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  and a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t he  i n s t r u m e n t  c o n s t i t u t i n g  
t he  o r g a n i s a t i o n ,  t hen  a number o f  d i f f i c u l t  i s s u e s  may 
a r i s e .  For  exampl e ,  i f  t he  t h i r d  p a r t y  t o  whom t he  i s s u e  
has been r e f e r r e d  r e n d e r s  i t s  d e c i s i o n ,  t he  d e c i s i o n  may 
be based on i n t e r e s t s  not  q u i t e  t he  same w i t h  t ho s e  o f  
o t h e r  members o f  t he  o r g a n i z a t i o n .  In such a s i t u a t i o n  
d i f f i c u l t i e s  may a r i s e  as t o  whe t he r  t he  o t h e r  members o f  
t he  o r g a n i z a t i o n  woul d be o b l i g e d  t o  con f o r m t o  such a 
d e c i s i o n .  S i m i l a r l y ,  t he  t h i r d  p a r t y  r e q u e s t e d  t o  s e t t l e  
t he  d i s p u t e  may have v i ews  no t  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  o r g a n i z a ­
t i o n ' s  o b j e c t i v e s  o r  may s i mp l y  no t  be w e l l  ve r sed  w i t h  such 
o b j e c t i v e s ,  and may t h e r e f o r e  p ronounce d e c i s i o n s  t h a t  may 
p rove i n i m i c a l  t o  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  t he  o r g a n i z a t i o n .
7 4 . I b i  d .  ^ Ar t i cle 14" .
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( c ) Fi  naj_i t_y_°£ t he  _de£i_si£n_of^ t_h£ £ o n f £ r e £ £ e
The c o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  CIPEC i s  s i l e n t  on t h e  i s s u e  o f  
t he  f i n a l i t y  and c o n c l u s i v e n e s s  o f  t he  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  t he  
c o n f e r e n c e  o f  M i n i s t e r s  r e g a r d i n g  a d i s p u t e  between members.
I f  f i n a l i t y  me r e l y  r e f e r s  t o  t he  absence o f  a r i g h t  o f  appeal
7 Rt o  a h i g h e r  a u t h o r i t y  r a t h e r  t han permanence,  i t  woul d
appear  t h a t  where no p r o v i s i o n  i s  made t hen t h e  p r e s ump t i on
woul d be t h a t  a p a r t y  d i s s a t i s f i e d  w i t h  a d e c i s i o n  woul d be
e n t i t l e d  t o  r a i s e  i t  a g a i n .
Th i s  v i ew seems t o  f i n d  a measure o f  s u p p o r t  i n  t he
p r a c t i c e  o f  some i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n s .  For  exampl e,
the I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Bauxi t e  A s s o c i a t i o n  1s c o n s t i t u t i o n  is s i l e n t
on t he  i s s u e  o f  t he  f i n a l i t y  o f  t he  d e c i s i o n s  o f  t he  Counc i l
o f  M i n i s t e r s  wh i ch  i s  t h e  organ charged w i t h  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l -
7  fii t y  o f  d i s p u t e  s e t t l e m e n t .  But  at  i t s  f i r s t  s e s s i o n  i n
1974,  t h e  C o u n c i l  o f  M i n i s t e r s  i n  i n t e r p r e t i n g  a r t i c l e
X I X ( l )  o f  t he  agreement  d e c i de d  t h a t  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  t he
a s s o c i a t i o n ' s  budget  are t o  be c a l c u l a t e d  i n  t h e  c u r r e n c y
o f  t he  hos t  c o u n t r y  ( Jama i ca )  but  pa i d  i n  U n i t e d  S t a t e s
d o l l a r s . ^  A l t h o u g h  t h i s  d e c i s i o n  was accep t ed  by a l l
members,  a t  i t s  f o u r t h  s e s s i o n  a few y e a r s  l a t e r ,  t he  Counc i l
r e v e r s e d  i t s e l f  and d ec i ded  t h a t  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  were now t o  be
7 8c a l c u l a t e d  and p a i d  i n  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  d o l l a r s .
75.  See Go l d ,  I n t e r p r e t a t i o n  by t he f u n d .  IMF pamphl e t s  
s e r i e s  N o . 11,  1968.
76.  A r t i c l e  V I I I  para 2 ( e )  o f  t h e  IBA agr eement .
77.  Repor t  o f  t he  Coun c i l  o f  M i n i s t e r s  on t h e  work of  
i t s  f i r s t  s e s s i o n ,  unnumbered.
78.  Repor t  on t he  Cou nc i l  o f  M i n i s t e r s  on t he  work o f  i t s  
f o u r t h  s e s s i o n .  I BA/COM. / 1 V / 17/7 7.
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The assumpt i on  t h e r e f o r e  i s  t h a t  i f  a member o f  
CIPEC i s  d i s s a t i s f i e d  w i t h  t he  d e c i s i o n  o f  t h e  c o n f e r e n c e  i n  
r e l a t i o n  t o  a d i s p u t e  i t  i s  i n v o l v e d  i n ,  t h e  p a r t y  i s  
e n t i t l e d  t o  r a i s e  t h e  i s s u e  aga i n  and a g a i n .  But  o b v i o u s l y  
t h e r e  i s  a l i m i t  t o  t he  number o f  t i mes  a member can 
r a i s e  t he  same i s s u e .  I f  a f t e r  many t i me s  a member i s  s t i l l  
d i s s a t i s f i e d ,  t hen  i t  woul d seem t h a t  such a member's o n l y  
r e c o u r s e  woul d be t o  w i t h d r a w  f r om t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n .
V I . CIPEC' s a c t i v i t i e s  s i n c e  i t s  c r e a t i o n
The main a c t i v i t i e s  o f  CIPEC s i n c e  i t s  i n c e p t i o n  
has c e n t r e d  on t h e  c o o r d i n a t i o n  o f  members p o l i t i c a l  and 
commerc i a l  p o l i c i e s ,  and t he  i s s ue  o f  copper  mar ke t  s t a b i l i z ­
a t i o n .  The approach f o l l o w e d  by t he  o r g a n i z a t i o n  has been 
t o  t a c k l e  t h e  p r ob l ems i n  a v e r y  g ene r a l  way.  Th i s  perhaps 
r e f l e c t s  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  i t s e l f .  U n l i k e  
commodi t y  organ i z-at i  ons such as t he  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  T i n  
Counc i l  whi ch e x i s t s  t o  a d m i n i s t e r  d e t a i l e d  agr eement s ,
CIPEC i s  an i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n  o f  an a d v i s o r y  
n a t u r e  and w i t h o u t  adequat e powers t o  t a c k l e  f o r  exampl e t he  
i s s u e  o f  p r i c e  f l u c t u a t i o n s .  In v i ew o f  t h i s  i n h e r e n t  
d e f i c i e n c y ,  CIPEC l i k e  a l l  o t h e r  p r o d u c e r s '  a s s o c i a t i o n s ,  
pur sues  t he  p r ob l ems  o f  copper  ma r k e t i n g  t h r o u g h  r e o r g a n i z i n g  
o f  t he  p r o d u c e r s '  p o l i c i e s .
( i ) C o o r d i n a t i o n  o f  p o l i t i c a l  and commer c i a l  p o l i c i e s  
S i nce  i t s  e s t a b l i s h m e n t ,  CIPEC's main concer n  has 
been t h e  c o o r d i n a t i o n  o f  t he  p o l i t i c a l  and commerc i a l
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p o l i c i e s  o f  i t s  members w i t h  a v i ew o f  s t a b i l i z i n g  t h e  p r i c e s  
o f  copper  at  l e v e l s  t h a t  are r e m u n e r a t i v e  i n  r e a l  t e rms 
t o  p r o d u c e r s .  In t h i s  r e g a r d ,  CIPEC has sought  t o  ach i eve  
f i r s t  and f o r e m o s t  t h e  c o o p e r a t i o n  o f  a l l  ma j o r  copper  
e x p o r t i n g  c o u n t r i e s  i n  h a r mo n i z i n g  t he  p r o d u c e r s '  p o s i t i o n .
I t  i s  f o r  t h i s  r eason t h a t  CIPEC has pursued i t s
e f f o r t s  t o  pur suade o t h e r  copper  p r o d u c i n g  c o u n t r i e s  s t i l l
o u t s i d e  t he  o r g a n i s a t i o n  t o  j o i n  i t .  I n d o n e s i a ,  A u s t r a l i a ,
M a u r i t a n i a ,  and Papua New Gui nea have a l r e a d y  j o i n e d  t he
o r g a n i z a t i o n .  Ot her  e x p o r t e r s  such as Mex i co ,  I r a n ,  and
t h e  P h i l i p p i n e s  have been i n v i t e d  t o  j o i n  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n
79and CIPEC me r e l y  a wa i t s  t he  r esponse  f r om them.
Th i s  i s  an i m p o r t a n t  aspec t  o f  CIPEC' s a c t i v i t i e s  
because e x p e r i e n c e  has shown t h a t  o n l y  when ma j o r  e x p o r t e r s  
can har mon i ze  t h e i r  p o l i c i e s  and p r e s e n t  a j o i n t  b a s i s  f o r  
n e g o t i a t i o n  i s  t h e r e  a r e a l  p o s s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  probl ems 
o f  commodi t y  m a r k e t i n g  t o  be s o l v e d .  The key t o  any i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  s o l u t i o n  t o  t h e  prob l ems o f  copper  m a r k e t i n g ,  
t h e r e f o r e ,  l i e s  w i t h  t h e  s o l i d a r i t y  o f  t h e  p r o d u c e r s .
CIPEC has so f a r  managed t o  d e ve l op  a mut ual  u n d e r ­
s t a n d i n g  between members,  and has deve l oped  a p r a c t i c e  o f  
hav i ng  a c o n c e r t e d  approach t o  many i s s u e s  o f  i mp o r t a n c e  
i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  copper  m a r k e t i n g .  I t  i s  i n  t h e  f i e l d  o f  
m a r k e t i n g  p o l i c y  and t e c h n i q u e s  where t h i s  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  
i s  most  d e v e l o p e d .  In t h i s  r e g a r d ,  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  has 
conduc t ed  a number o f  s t u d i e s  whi ch have enab l ed  t h e  v a r i o u s
79.  I n t e r v i e w  w i t h  Mr.  P. Pa r k i ns on  o f  t he  CIPEC S e c r e t a r i a t  
c onduc t ed  by t he  w r i t e r  i n  December 1982.
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m a r k e t i n g  c o r p o r a t i o n s  o f  t h e  member c o u n t r i e s  t o  seek 
common t e r ms  i n  t h e i r  m a r k e t i n g  c o n t r a c t s  and a v o i d  a 
s i t u a t i o n  where t h e y  were p l ayed  a g a i n s t  one a n o t h e r  
by s o p h i s t i c a t e d  consumers .  I t  s hou l d  be no t ed  t h a t  as a 
r e s u l t  o f  t h e se  s t u d i e s ,  CIPEC member c o u n t r i e s  have 
been ab l e  t o  i mprove t h e i r  t e rms i n  t h e i r  s a l e s  c o n t r a c t s  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  by i n s i s t i n g  on premi ums.  These premiums 
i n v o l v e  about  s i x  c e n t s  per  pound and have g r e a t l y  
i n c r e a s e d  t he  e a r n i n g s  o f  CIPEC members.
( i i ) P r i c e  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  t h r o u gh  CIPEC
The main o b j e c t i v e  o f  CIPEC has been copper  p r i c e  and
e a r n i n g s  s t a b i l i z a t i o n .  Member c o u n t r i e s  have ove r  t he
y e a r s  had s e v e r a l  mee t i ngs  aimed at  d e v i s i n g  a s u p p o r t
sys tem f o r  t h e  w o r l d  mar ke t  p r i c e  o f  c o p p e r .  U n l i k e  t he
commodi t y  agreement  appr oach ,  CIPEC has t aken  t he  v i ew
t h a t  c o n c e r t e d  s u p p l y  p o l i c i e s  by t he  p r o d u c e r s  a l one  i s
l i k e l y  t o  i n f l u e n c e  t h e  copper  p r i c e s .  I ndeed s i m u l a t i o n s
worked ou t  by economi s t s  have i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  by w i t h h o l d i n g
at  l e a s t  20% o f  CIPEC members'  p r o d u c t i o n ,  t he  p r odu c e r s
8 0may ac h i e v e  a t h r e e f o l d  Y"ise i n  t he p r i c e s .
I t  i s  i m p o r t a n t  t h e r e f o r e ,  f o r  CIPEC t o  work a
s t r a t e g y  t h a t  wou l d  wi n t h e  sympathy o f  as many p r o d u c e r s '  
as p o s s i b l e  and persuade them t o  c u t  p r o d u c t i o n .  I t  i s
o b v i o u s l y  d i f f i c u l t  f o r  CIPEC t o  e xpec t  sympat hy  f r om some
p r o d u c e r s  o u t s i d e  CIPEC whose i n d u s t r i e s  are p r i v a t e l y
80.  Joseph Wyman, " P e r s p e c t i v e  on Coppe r " ,  R e y n o l d ' s  
Research A s s o c i a t e s ,  Fe b r u a r y  24,  1 975.  Mi meo,
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c o n t r o l l e d  and t h e r e f o r e  any p r o d u c t i o n  c u t s  woul d  not  
a u t o m a t i c a l l y  be expec t ed  t o  be e n f o r c e d .  S i nce  however ,  
t h e  m a j o r i t y  o f  t he  CIPEC c o u n t r i e s  have t h e i r  copper  
i n d u s t r i e s  i n  t he  hands o f  t he  gove r nmen t s ,  a c o n c e r t e d  
p r o d u c t i o n  c u t  p o l i c y  i s  l i k e l y  t o  succeed w i t h i n  t he  
o r g a n i z a t i o n  bu t  i f  o n l y  t he  members are whol e  h e a r t e d l y  
commi t t ed  t o  t he  p o l i c y .
The a c t u a l  s t e p s  t aken  by CIPEC i n  t h i s  r e g a r d  were 
a 10% c u t  i n  e x p o r t s  agreed i n  December 1974,  c o u p l e d  w i t h  
a commi t ment  by members no t  t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e i r  s t o c k s  o f  
r e f i n e d  cop p e r .  A l t h o u g h  t h e  cu t b a c k  proved i n a d e q u a t e  
t o  i n f l u e n c e  t he  ma r k e t ,  CIPEC had made a ma j o r  s c o r e .  I t  
had d e mo n s t r a t e d  i t s  c a p a b i l i t y  t o  u t i l i z e  i t s  agreement  t o  
har mon i ze  t he  members'  p o l i c i e s .  Th i s  more t han  a n y t h i n g  
e l s e  i s  at  t h e  co r e  o f  t h e  CIPEC agr eement .
In 1975,  CIPEC aga i n  d e mons t r a t ed  a c o n c e r t e d  approach 
by a g r e e i n g  on a p r o d u c t i o n  c u t  o f  15%. But  aga i n  t he  
c u t s  p r oved  i n a d e q u a t e  t o  a c h i e v e  t he  d e s i r e d  goal  o f  p r i c e  
s t a b i l i z a t i o n .  But  even i f  t he  p r o d u c t i o n  c u t  agreed had 
been s u b s t a n t i a l ,  a number o f  p r ob l ems c o u l d  have a r i s e n  
due t o  t h e  a d v i s o r y  n a t u r e  o f  t he  o r g a n i z a t i o n  i t s e l f .
Among t he  pr ob l ems  t h a t  i m m e d i a t e l y  come t o  mind i s  t he  
d i f f i c u l t y  o f  e n s u r i n g  c o mp l i a n c e  by a l l  t he  members.  
I n t e r n a l  p r ob l ems  i n  a member c o u n t r y  bo t h  s o c i a l  and 
economi c may f o r c e  a member no t  t o  ab i de  t o  t h e  agreed 
p r o d u c t i o n  c u t s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  where t he  agreement  p r o v i d e s  
no s a n c t i o n s  f o r  non c o mp l i a n c e .  S i m i l a r l y ,  l a c k  o f  
commi t ment  by a member may r e s u l t  i n  t h a t  member t a k i n g
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advant age o f  o t h e r  members by i n c r e a s i n g  p r o d u c t i o n  when 
o t h e r  members are commi t t ed  t o  t he  agreed p r o d u c t i o n  c u t s .  
Th i s  l a t e r  p r ob l em has a c t u a l l y  been e x p e r i e n c e d  i n  r e l a t i o n  
t o  Papua New Gui nea.  The B o u r g a n v i l l e  mine i n  t h i s  c o u n t r y  
has v e r y  r i c h  b y - p r o d u c t s  such as g o l d .  Thus even when 
p r i c e s  o f  copper  are l ow t h i s  mine may compensate i t s  l os s e s  
t h r o u g h  t h e  s a l e s  o f  t h e  b y - p r o d u c t .  And i f  t he  p r i c e s  o f  
g o l d  was h i gh  as i t  was a few y e a r s  ago,  a p o l i c y  o f  p r o d u c ­
t i o n  c u t  i n  CIPEC woul d not  appeal  v e r y  much t o  t h i s  mi ne.
A l t h o u g h  t h e r e f o r e ,  t he  CIPEC agreement  p r o v i d e s  f o r  
means o f  h a r mo n i z i n g  t h e  p o l i c i e s  o f  members r e g a r d i n g  
p r o d u c t i o n  c u t s  and o t h e r  p o l i c i e s  aimed at  copper  p r i c e  
s t a b i l i z a t i o n ,  t h e  agreement  does no t  p r o v i d e  means f o r  
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n .  For  exampl e ,  one ma j o r  h u r d l e  f a c e d  by 
CIPEC i n  s t a b i l i z i n g  p r i c e s  i s  t he  q u e s t i o n  o f  f i n a n c i n g  
t h e  s t o c k  p i l e  i n  t he  even t  o f  t he  agreed p r o d u c t i o n  c u t .
Th i s  p r ob l em i s  made even more a c u t e  because u n l i k e  p r o d u c e r  
c o u n t r i e s  i n  commodi t y  c o u n c i l s  such as t he  T i n  C o u n c i l ,
CIPEC members have no access t o  t he  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Monet ar y  
Fund b u f f e r  s t o c k  f i n a n c i n g  f a c i l i t y .  Th i s  f a c i l i t y  i s  
l i m i t e d  t o  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  o f  consumers and p r o d u c e r s .  The 
f a i l u r e  o f  t he  CIPEC Agr eement  t o  p r o v i d e  f o r  t h i s  p rob l em 
has p r oved ft t y rM t o  t h e  s u r v i v a l  o f  CIPEC.
The above p r ob l ems have bogged down t he  i s s u e  o f  
p r i c e  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  i n  CIPEC and has f o r c e d  t he  o r g a n i z a t i o n  
i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s  t o  c o n c e n t r a t e  i t s  e f f o r t s  on t he  d e v e l o p ­
ment  o f  d i a l o g u e  w i t h  consumers under  t h e  U n i t e d  Na t i o n s  
I n t e g r a t e d  Programme f o r  Commodi t i es .
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An o t he r  se t  back t o  CIPEC' s p r i c e  s t a b i l i s a t i o n  
measures has been t h e  l a c k  o f  agreement  between i t s  members 
on t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  meaures t o  be t a k e n .  As e a r l y  as 1972,  
f o r  exampl e ,  CIPEC members had debat ed on t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  
o f  i n t r o d u c i n g  a minimum p r i c e  f o r  c o p pe r .  At  t h e  
Con f e r ence  o f  M i n i s t e r s  he l d  i n  Lima,  Peru i t  was agreed 
t h a t  a minimum p r i c e  shou l d  be i n t r o d u c e d  under  whi ch 
p r o du c e r s  i n  CIPEC woul d w i t h h o l d  t he  s a l e  o f  c o ppe r .  More 
r e c e n t l y  i t  has been agreed t h a t  t h e r e  be a f l o o r  p r i c e  but  
so f a r  t he  members have been unab l e  t o  agree on i t s  i m p l e ­
m e n t a t i o n .
V I I .  Co n c l u s i  on
L i k e  many commodi t y  p r o d u c e r s ,  copper  p r o d u c i n g  
d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  have l o s t  t h e i r  f a i t h  i n  consumer -  
p r o d u c e r  commodi t y  agreement s  as a t o o l  f o r  p r i c e  s t a b i l i z ­
a t i o n .  Th i s  l os s  o f  f a i t h  has been a r e s u l t  o f  t h e  ve r y  
l i m i t e d  r e s u l t s  t h a t  have been a t t a i n e d  t h r o u g h  t h i s  method.  
I ndeed i n  t h e  case o f  c o p p e r ,  t he  p r o s p e c t s  f o r  a s u c c e s s ­
f u l  c o n c l u s i o n  o f  such an agreement  are no more c l o s e r  
t han t h e y  were i n  1976 when n e g o t i a t i o n s  between p r odu c e r s  
and consumers began.  The p r o s p e c t s  f o r  t h e  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  
o f  t he  copper  mar ke t s  t h r o u g h  t h i s  method appear ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  
t o  be somewhat  l i m i t e d .
A number o f  p r o d u c i n g  c o u n t r i e s  i n  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  
have i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s  come t o  accept  t he  f a c t  t h a t  b e t t e r  
r e s u l t s  may acc r ue  t o  them t h r o u g h  some f o r m o f  c o l l u s i v e  
a c t i o n  by t he  p r o d u c e r s .  Th i s  r e a l i s a t i o n  r e s u l t e d  i n  a
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number o f  p r o d u c e r s '  a s s o c i a t i o n s  be i ng  c r e a t e d ,  and i n  t he  
case o f  c o p p e r ,  CIPEC was c r e a t e d  i n  1967.  The CIPEC a g r e e ­
ment  c r e a t e s  a c o n s u l t a t i v e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  f o r  p r o duc e r s  
o f  c o ppe r .  The membershi p o f  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  appears 
t o  be l i m i t e d  t o  p r o d u c e r s  i n  c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  have t h e i r  
copper  i n d u s t r i e s  c o n t r o l l e d  m a i n l y  by t he  gove r nmen t s .
Th i s  i s  e v i d e n t  f r om t h e  a dmi ss i on  t o  membershi p r e q u i r e m e n t s  
i n  t he  agr eement .  C o u n t r i e s  not  mee t i ng  t h i s  c r i t e r i a  o f  
f u l l  membershi p are a d m i t t e d  as a s s o c i a t e  members.
M a x i m i z a t i o n  o f  e x p o r t  r evenue and s t a b i l i z a t i o n  o f  
copper  mar ke t s  are two o f  t h e  i m p o r t a n t  aims o f  CIPEC. To 
ach i e v e  t he s e  o b j e c t i v e s ,  t h e  CIPEC agreement  does no t  
d i r e c t l y  p r o v i d e  f o r  a mechani sm such as s u p p l y  management  
but  p r o v i d e s  a f o r um under  wh i ch  member c o u n t r i e s  c o u l d  work 
out  t he  n e c es s a r y  measures as need a r i s e s .  Th i s  l a c k  o f  a 
p r e d e t e r m i n e d  mechani sm t o  deal  w i t h  t h e  copper  mar ke t  
i n s t a b i l i t y  has r e s u l t e d  i n  CIPEC f a i l i n g  at  c r u c i a l  
t i me s  t o  r each  d e c i s i o n s  as t o  t he  mechani sm most  s u i t a b l e  
t o  deal  w i t h  t he  p r ob l em.  Th i s  c o n s u l t a t i v e  approach 
t h e r e f o r e ,  me r e l y  enab l es  member c o u n t r i e s  har mon i ze  t h e i r  
m a r k e t i n g  p o l i c i e s  and t e c h n i q e s  but  has p r oved  i na d e q u a t e  
as f a r  as p r i c e  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  i s  c o ncer ned .
For  a s u c c e s s f u l  c o n s u l t a t i v e  appr oach ,  t he  o r g a n i z a t i o n  
so c r e a t e d  must  embrace as many p r o d u c e r s  as p o s s i b l e ,  and 
be a b l e  t o  agree on a c t i o n s  or  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  t e c h n i q u e s  
a t  t he  c r u c i a l  t i m e s .  The CIPEC agreement  seems t o  f a i l  
i n  a l l  t h e s e  two aspec t s  a l t h o u g h  e f f o r t s  have been made 
i n  an a t t e mp t  t o  ex t end  i t s  membershi p t o  as many p r o du c e r s
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as p o s s i b l e .  Th i s  f a i l u r e  r a i s e s  t he  p r ob l em o f  t he  
e f f i c a c y  o f  t he  whol e c o n s u l t a t i v e  approach t a k en  by 
CIPEC. I t  i s  s u b m i t t e d  t h a t  t h i s  approach i s  i n a d e q u a t e  
t o  s o l v e  t h e  p r ob l em o f  t he  copper  p r i c e  i n s t a b i l i t y .  To 
succeed i n  t h i s  g o a l ,  a c o n s u l t a t i v e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  such as 
CIPEC needs a d d i t i o n a l  s u p p o r t i v e  measures .  These a d d i t i o n a l  
measures c o u l d  e i t h e r  be i n  t h e  f o r m o f  compensa t o r y  
f i n a n c i n g  schemes or  t h r o u g h  i n d i v i d u a l  CIPEC members 
be i ng  i n v o l v e d  i n  r e g i o n a l  ma r k e t i n g  g r oup s .  The i dea  o f  
compensa t o r y  f i n a n c i n g  schemes i s  d i s c u s s e d  i n  Chapters  7 and 8,  
and t he  r e g i o n a l  approach t o  t he  ma r k e t i n g  o f  Zambian copper  
i s  d i s c u s s e d  i n  Chap t e r  9.
A l t h o u g h  t he  CIPEC agreement  has f a i l e d  t o p r o v i d e  
an e f f e c t i v e  ma c h i n e r y  f o r  copper  p r i c e  s t a b i l i z a t i o n ,  i t  
has ser ved  as a u s e f u l  sour ce  o f  t he u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  t he  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  copper  ma r k e t s ,  f o r  i t s  members.  I t  has 
a l s o  he l ped  t o  f o s t e r  c l o s e  c o o p e r a t i o n  between p r o du c e r s  
i n  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s .  In t h i s  r e g a r d  CIPEC has not  
been a u s e l e s s  v e n t u r e  bu t  a r e a l  f o r c e  t h a t  me r e l y  needs 
a d d i t i o n a l  measures t o  be ab l e  t o  c o n t r o l  t h e  p r i c e s  o f  
c o p p e r .
255
CHAPTER SEVEN 
COMPENSATORY FINANCING APPROACH: THE IMF SCHEME
I . The aims o f  compensa t o r y  f i n a n c i n g  schemes
Compensat or y  f i n a n c i n g  schemes are no t  d e s i gned  t o  t a c k l e  
t h e  p r ob l ems  o f  p r i c e  f l u c t u a t i o n s  d i r e c t l y  but  t o  approach t he  
p r ob l em i n d i r e c t l y .  They approach t he  p r ob l em by way o f  
t a c k l i n g  t h e  e f f e c t  such f l u c t u a t i o n s  have on t he  e x p o r t  
e a r n i n g s  o f  t h e  p r o d u c e r  c o u n t r y .
As p o i n t e d  ou t  i n  Chap t e r  One, copper  p r i c e  f l u c t u a t i o n s  
on t h e  LME have u s u a l l y  r e s u l t e d  i n  f l u c t u a t i o n s  i n  t he  e x p o r t  
e a r n i n g s  o f  Zambi a.  Compensat ory  f i n a n c i n g  schemes woul d 
t h e r e f o r e  aim at  p r o v i d i n g  Zambia w i t h  f i n a n c i a l  a s s i s t a n c e  
t o  a l l e v i a t e  h a r d s h i p s  r e s u l t i n g  f r om f l u c t u a t i o n s  i n  i t s  
e a r n i n g s  f r om c o p pe r .
These schemes are t h e r e f o r e  a f o r m o f  a i d  and d e l i b e r a t e l y  
seek t o  t r a n s f e r  r e s o u r c e s  f r om t he  deve l oped  c o u n t r i e s  t o  
d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  dependent  on e x p o r t s  o f  co mmod i t i e s  t h a t  
e x p e r i e n c e  p r i c e  i n s t a b i l i t y  on i n t e r n a t i o n a l  ma r k e t s .  I t  
shou l d  be emphas i zed t h a t  such schemes do no t  aim at  s o l v i n g  
t he  p r ob l em at  t he  sour ce  o f  t he  p r i c e  i n s t a b i l i t y .
Th i s  be i ng  t he  case,  t he  schemes can o n l y  be o f  he l p  t o  
a c o u n t r y  l i k e  Zambia o n l y  i n  t he  s h o r t  t e r m .  Th i s  i n d i r e c t  
approach t o  t a c k l i n g  p r ob l ems  o f  p r i c e  f l u c t u a t i o n s  does have 
i t s  advan t ages  t h a t  canno t  t o t a l l y  be i g n o r e d .  One o f  t he  main 
advan t ages  i s  t h a t  t he y  do p r o v i d e  f i n a n c i a l  r e s o u r c e s  t h a t  
woul d he l p  a c o u n t r y  whose e x p o r t  commodi t y  e x p e r i e n c e s  p r i c e  
f l u c t u a t i o n s  t o  meet  i t s  p r o j e c t e d  budget  r e q u i r e m e n t s .
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To be e f f e c t i v e  i n  mee t i ng  t h i s  goal  t h e r e f o r e ,  such 
schemes s h o u l d  have adequat e  f i n a n c i a l  r e s o u r c e s ,  t he  r u l e s  and 
p r o c ed u r e s  f o r  t h e  r e l e a s e  o f  such f unds  sh o u l d  no t  be s t r i n g e n t ,  
and t h e  r epayment  p r o c e d u r e s  shou l d  be f l e x i b l e  and l i b e r a l .
In t he  case o f  Zambian c oppe r ,  t h e r e  are two schemes t h a t  
e x i s t  a t  t h e  moment and t o  whi ch  Zambia may t u r n  ,to i n  t he  
even t  o f  copper  p r i c e s  f l u c t u a t i n g ,  t h a t  o p e r a t i n g  under  t h e  
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Monet ar y  Fund h e r e a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  t o  as t he  IMF 
scheme,  and one o p e r a t i n g  under  t he  Lome C o n v e n t i o n .  Th i s  
c h a p t e r  a t t e m p t s  t o  a n a l y s e  t h e  IMF scheme and i t s  r o l e  i n  
t a c k l i n g  t he  e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s  i n s t a b i l i t y  e x p e r i e n c e d  by Zambia 
i n  t he  l a s t  decade as a r e s u l t  o f  p e r s i s t e n t  copper  p r i c e  
f l u c t u a t i o n s  on t h e  London Metal  Exchange.
1 1 . The use o f  t h e  IMF r e s o u r c e s  by i t s  member c o u n t r i e s
S i nce  i t s  i n c e p t i o n ,  t he  IMF has accep t ed  s h o r t f a l l s  i n  
t he  e x p o r t  r e c e i p t s  o f  commodi t y  p r o d u c i n g  member c o u n t r i e s  
as p a r t  o f  t h e  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  d r awi ng  under  i t s  o r d i n a r y  
f i n a n c i n g  f a c i l i t i e s .  O r d i n a r y  f i n a n c i n g  f a c i l i t i e s  o f  t he  
IMF are made up o f  two e l e me n t s .  The f i r s t  e l emen t  i s  t he  
r e s e r v e  t r a n c h e  whi ch r e p r e s e n t s  25 per  c e n t  o f  each member ' s 
quot a  and s i n c e  t he  e a r l y  1950s has de f a c t o  been a u t o m a t i c a l l y  
a v a i l a b l e  t o  a l l  t he  members.  The second e l emen t  i s  t h e  c r e d i t  
t r a n c h e  wh i ch  i s  d i v i d e d  i n t o  f o u r  equal  s u b - t r a n c h e s , access 
t o  each o f  t h e s e  becomi ng p r o g r e s s i v e l y  l e s s  easy and s u b j e c t  
t o  more r i g i d  c o n d i t i o n s .
The I MF1s^ w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  r e g a r d  s h o r t f a l l s  i n  e x p o r t
1. From t h i s  p o i n t  on t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Monet a r y  Fund 
w i l l  be r e f e r r e d  t o  s i m p l y  as t he  Fund.
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r e c e i p t s  f r om c ommod i t i es  as a j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  a member t o  
draw f r om i t s  r e s o u r c e s  i s  c l e a r l y  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  i t s  d e c l a r e d  
o b j e c t i v e s .  The most  r e l e v a n t  o b j e c t i v e  o f  t h e  Fund i s ,
" t o  g i v e  c o n f i d e n c e  t o  members by mak i ng t h e  Fund ' s  
r e s o u r c e s  a v a i l a b l e  t o  them under  adequat e  s a f e g u a r d s ,  
t hu s  p r o v i d i n g  them w i t h  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  c o r r e c t  ma l ­
a d j u s t m e n t s  i n  t h e i r  ba l ance  o f  payments w i t h o u t  
r e s o r t i n g  t o  measures d e s t r u c t i v e  o f  n a t i o n a l  or  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p r o s p e r i t y . "
and
" i n  acco r dance  w i t h  t he  above t o  s h o r t e n  t h e  d u r a t i o n  
and l e s s e n  t he  degree o f  d i s e q u i l i b r i u m  i n  t h e  i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  ba l ances  o f  payments o f  member s . "2
I t  i s  c l e a r  f r om t hese  o b j e c t i v e s  t h a t  t h e  Fund i s  b a s i c a l l y
i n t e n d e d  t o  be among o t h e r  t h i n g s ,  a s h o r t - t e r m  ba l ance  o f
payments s t a b i l i z a t i o n  i n s t i t u t i o n .  I t  t h e r e f o r e  has t he
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  p r o v i d i n g  at  l e a s t  t e mp o r a r y  a s s i s t a n c e  i n
f i n a n c i n g  t h os e  member c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  e n c o u n t e r  b a l ance  o f
payments p r ob l ems  r e s u l t i n g  f r om c i r c u m s t a n c e s  beyond t h e i r
c o n t r o l  such as f l u c t u a t i o n s  i n  t h e i r  e x p o r t  c o mmo d i t i e s .
Th i s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  A r t i c l e  I o f  t h e  Fund ' s  A r t i c l e s
o f  Agreement  was c o n f i r m e d  by a d e c i s i o n  o f  t h e  E x e c u t i v e
D i r e c t o r s  who exp r essed  t h e  v i ew t h a t  t he  Fu n d ' s  pur pose was
t h a t  o f  g i v i n g  t e mp o r a r y  a s s i s t a n c e  i n  f i n a n c i n g  ba l ance
o f  payments d e f i c i t s  on c u r r e n t  accoun t  f o r  monet a r y
3
s t a b i l i z a t i o n  o p e r a t i o n s .  Th i s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  read 
t o g e t h e r  w i t h  A r t i c l e  V pa r ag r ap h  c o f  t h e  Fu nd ' s  A r t i c l e s  
o f  Agreement  t i e s  any use o f  i t s  r e s o u r c e s  t o  t h e  purpose 
and o b j e c t i v e s  o f  t he  Fund.  A r t i c l e  V ( c )  p r o v i d e s  t h a t :
2.  A r t i c l e  I para V and VI o f  t he I MF' s  a r t i c l e s  o f  
a g r e e me n t .
3.  IMF E x e c u t i v e  D i r e c t o r s  d e c i s i o n  7 1 - 2 ,  i n  t he  
E x e c u t i v e  D i r e c t o r s  d e c i s i o n s ,  t h i r d  i s s u e ,  Wash i ng t on ,  
1965,  a t  p . 54 .
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"A member ' s  use o f  t h e  r e s o u r c e s  o f  t h e  Fund s h a l l  be i n  
acco r dance  w i t h  t he  pur poses  o f  t h e  Fund.  The Fund 
s h a l l  adopt  p o l i c i e s  on t he  use o f  i t s  r e s o u r c e s  t h a t  
w i l l  a s s i s t  members t o  s o l v e  t h e i r  b a l a n c e  o f  payments 
p r ob l ems  i n  a manner  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  pur poses  o f  
t h e  Fund and t h a t  w i l l  e s t a b l i s h  adequa t e  s a f e g u a r d s  
f o r  t h e  t e mp o r a r y  use o f  i t s  r e s o u r c e s . "
I t  woul d seem c l e a r  t h a t  t h i s  A r t i c l e  r e q u i r e s  t h a t  any use 
o f  t he  Fund r e s o u r c e s  must  f i r s t  o f  a l l  be shown t o  be i n  c on ­
f o r m i t y  w i t h  t h e  pur poses  o f  t h e  Fund.  S e c o n d l y ,  i t  must  be 
shown t h a t  such use i s  i n  c o n f o r m i t y  w i t h  t h e  p o l i c y  o f  t he  
Fund whi ch  con f o r ms  t o  i t s  pu r poses .  And f i n a l l y  t h a t  adequat e  
s a f e g u a r d s  are p r o v i d e d  f o r  t h e  use o f  such r e s o u r c e s .
( i ) C o n f o r m i t y  w i t h  t h e F u n d ' s  purposes
The f i r s t  r e q u i r e m e n t  t h a t  has t o  be s a t i s f i e d  b e f o r e  any 
use o f  t h e  Fund ' s  r e s o u r c e s  can be made i s  t h a t  t h e  i n t e n d e d  
use has t o  be shown t o  con f o r m t o  t he  pu r poses  o f  t h e  o r g a n i z a ­
t i o n .  To t h i s  end,  w h i l e  t h e  Fund c o n s i d e r s  i t  i t s  d u t y  t o  
p r o v i d e  f i n a n c i a l  a s s i s t a n c e  t o  members,  i t  has a l ways  i n s i s t e d  
t h a t  f i n a n c i a l  a s s i s t a n c e  woul d  o n l y  be p r o v i d e d  when a member ' s  
ba l a n c e  o f  payments i s  t e m p o r a r i l y  i n  d i s e q u i l i b r i u m . ^  I t  i s  
f o r  t h i s  r eason t h a t  t he  Fund r e q u i r e s  t h a t  a member ' s  r e q u e s t  
t o  use t h e  r e s o u r c e s  be exami ned by t h e  Fund i n  o r d e r  t o  d e t e r ­
mine wh e t h e r  such f u nd s  woul d be used i n  c o n f o r m i t y  w i t h  t he  
g e ne r a l  pur poses  o f  t he  Fund.  To ensur e  t h a t  any use o f  i t s  
r e s o u r c e s  con f o r ms  t o  i t s  pu r po s es ,  t h e  Fund i n  p r a c t i c e  
r e q u i r e s  a member s e e k i n g  t h e  f unds  t o  p r o v i d e  t h e  Fund w i t h  
a s t a t e m e n t  o f  t he  p o l i c i e s  t h a t  i t  woul d empl oy .  I t  i s  f r om
t - . See f o r  exampl e ,  Repo r t  o f  t he  f i r s t  t en  y e a r s  o f  IMF, 
( 1 9 5 6 ) ,  wh i ch  v i ews i n f l a t i o n  and no t  l a c k  o f  c a p i t a l  
as t h e  main i mped i ment  t o  deve l o p men t .
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such s t a t e me n t s  t h a t  t he  Fund can be a b l e  t o  d e t e r m i n e  whe t he r  
Fund r e s o u r c e s  w i l l  be used f o r  purposes  s p e c i f i e d  i n  t he  
a r t i c l e  of .  agr eement .  The Fund ' s  a t t i t u d e  t owar ds  r e q u e s t s  
by members f o r  f i n a n c e  has a l ways t u r n e d  on whe t he r  t he  pr ob l em 
t o  be met i s  o f  a t e mp o r a r y  n a t u r e ,  and whe t h e r  t h e  p o l i c i e s  
t he  member w i l l  pur sue w i l l  be adequat e t o  overcome t h e  p r ob l em 
w i t h i n  such p e r i o d  - t he  p o l i c i e s  above a l l  d e t e r m i n e  t he  
Fund ' s  a t t i t u d e . ^  The members'  p o l i c i e s  i n  t h e  case o f  a 
s t a n d - b y  a r r angement s  f o r  exampl e,  are i n  p r a c t i c e  c o n t a i n e d  
i n  a T e t t e r  o f  I n t e n t  whi ch u s u a l l y  i s  d r a f t e d  j o i n t l y  by 
t he  IMF and t he  member c on c e r  ne?11 The l e t t e r  o f  i n t e n t  se t s  
out  t h e  program o f  gene r a l  and s p e c i f i c  p o l i c i e s  whi ch t he  
government  w i l l  pu t  i n t o  o p e r a t i o n  a f t e r  t he  f unds  have been 
p r o c u r e d  , and i t  i s  t h i s  wh i ch  i s  exami ned by t he  Fund 
whi ch g r a n t s  t he  f unds  o n l y  when i t  i s  s a t i s f i e d  t h a t  t h e  
f unds  wou l d  be used i n  c o n f o r m i t y  w i t h  t h e  pur poses  o f  t h e  Fund.
There i s  one i m p o r t a n t  q u e s t i o n  t h a t  a r i s e s  i n  r e l a t i o n  
t o  such a t e t t e r  o f  I n t e n t .  Does such a l e t t e r  c r e a t e  an 
o b l i g a t i o n  on a member u s i n g  t he  r e s o u r c e s  t o  adhere t o  
t he  p o l i c i e s  i t  has s p e c i f i e d  and upon whi ch  t h e  Fund r e l i e d  
on p r o v i d i n g  r e s o u r c e s ?  The answer  t o  t h i s  q u e s t i o n  w i l l  
depend on whe t he r  t h e  l e t t e r  o f  i n t e n t  can be r egar ded  
as an agreement  between t he  member c o u n t r y  and t h e  Fund.
I f  i t  i s  t o  be r e g a r d e d  as an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  agr eement ,  t hen
l M F r E x e c u t i v e  Board d e c i s i o n  no.  1 0 2 - ( 5 2 / l l )  o f  
F e b r u a r y  1 3 t h ,  1952.
b .  The l e t t e r  o f  i n t e n t  i s  u s u a l l y  s i gne d  by t he  M i n i s t e r  
o f  F i nance  a n d / o r  t h e  Governor  o f  t h e  C e n t r a l  Bank 
i n d i c a t i n g  why t h e  c o u n t r y  seeks t he  f un d s  and o u t ­
l i n e s  t h e  programme i t  proposes  t o  f o l l o w  i n  an 
a t t e m p t  t o  s o l v e  i t s  ba l ance  o f  payments p r ob l em.
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t he  member woul d be o b l i g a t e d  t o  f o l l o w  t h e  p o l i c i e s  d e c l a r e d  
i n  i t s  l e t t e r  o f  I n t e n t .  I n t h i s  case f a i l u r e  o f  t he  member 
t o  f o l l o w  t h e  p o l i c i e s  woul d  t h e r e f o r e  be c o n s t r u e d  as a 
breach o f  i t s  o b l i g a t i o n s .  The p o l i c y  o f  t he  IMF t h a t  
r e q u i r e s  s u spens i on  or  i n t e r r u p t i o n  o f  t he  r i g h t  t o  make 
pu r chases  whenever  a pe r f o r man ce  c r i t e r i a  was no t  o b s e r v e d ,  
does c r e a t e  t h e  i m p r e s s i o n  t h a t  t he  l e t t e r  o f  i n t e n t  does 
c r e a t e  an o b l i g a t i o n  on a member c o u n t r y  t o  adhere t o  t h e  
p o l i c i e s  i t  s t a t e s  i n  t h e  l e t t e r  o f  I n t e n t  - f a i l u r e  t o  do 
so be i ng  met by t he  s a n c t i o n  o f  i n t e r r u p t i o n  o f  r i g h t  t o  
make p u r c h a s e s .  Th i s  i m p r e s s i o n  however ,  seems t o  be 
d i m i n i s h e d  when one t a k e s  i n t o  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o t h e r  r e l e v a n t  
f a c t o r s .  For  exampl e ,  i t  i s  a common u n d e r s t a n d i n g  i n  
l aw t h a t  . the e x i s t e n c e  o f  an agreement  u l t i m a t e l y  depends 
on t h e  i n t e n t i o n  o f  t he  p a r t i e s .  An u n d e r s t a n d i n g  between 
two p a r t i e s  t h e r e f o r e ,  may be exp r essed  i n  l e g a l  
l anguage bu t  i f  a l l  o t h e r  r e l e v a n t  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  i n d i c a t e  
t h a t  t he  p a r t i e s  d i d  no t  i n t e n d  a l e g a l l y  b i n d i n g  agr eement ,  
t hen  such an u n d e r s t a n d i n g  woul d not  r i g h t l y  be c l a s s i f i e d  
as an agr eement .  By t h e  same t o k e n ,  an i n f o r m a l  u n d e r s t a n d ­
i ng  may be an agreement  i f  t h e  i n t e n t i o n  o f  t h e  p a r t i e s  so 
d i c t a t e s .  I f  t h e r e f o r e  t h e  p a r t i e s  have g i v e n  an appearance 
o f  an agreement  t o  t h e i r  u n d e r s t a n d i n g ,  i t  may be presumed 
t h a t  t h e  p a r t i e s  i n t e n d e d  an agreement .
There i s  n o t h i n g  i n  t he  l e t t e r s  o f  i n t e n t  as we l l  as 
o t h e r  documents r e l a t i n g  t o  a member ' s  use o f  t h e  Fund 
r e s o u r c e s  wh i ch  sugges t s  t h a t  t h e y  c o u l d  amount  t o  i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  ag r eemen t s .  A l t h o u g h  a member c o u n t r y  s u b s c r i b e s
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i t s  s i g n a t u r e  t o  documents such as t he  l e t t e r  o f  i n t e n t ,  
t he  Fund does no t  do so and i n  f a c t  exec u t e s  no document .  
F u r t h e r mo r e , -  none o f  t h e  l e t t e r s  o f  i n t e n t  and documents 
r e l a t i n g  t o  t h e  use o f  Fund r e s o u r c e s  has eve r  been 
r e g i s t e r e d  under  A r t i c l e  102 o f  t h e  Un i t e d  N a t i o n s  c h a r t e r  
wh i ch  r e q u i r e s  e v e r y  t r e a t y  and e ve r y  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a g r e e ­
ment  e n t e r e d  i n t o  by any member o f  t he  Un i t e d  N a t i o n s  t o  be 
r e g i s t e r e d  w i t h  t h e  S e c r e t a r i a t  and p u b l i s h e d  by i t . ^  
F u r t h e r m o r e ,  t h e  domes t i c  p r a c t i c e  o f  members i s  c o n s i s t e n t  
w i t h  t h i s  r e a s o n i n g  because members do not  s u b mi t  such 
a r r angement s  t o  domes t i c  l e g i s l a t i v e  p r o c e d u r e s  t h a t  are 
u s u a l l y  f o l l o w e d  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  agreement s  
and t r e a t i e s .
The f a c t  t h a t  a r r angement s  between t he  Fund and i t s  
members r e g a r d i n g  t he  use o f  i t s  r e s o u r c e s  are no t  i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  agreement s  and t h e r e f o r e  do no t  c r e a t e  o b l i g a t i o n s  
on t he  members i n v o l v e d  t o  ab i de  by them,  does not  mean 
t h a t  t h e  Fund r e s o u r c e s  c o u l d  be used i n  a manner  i n c o n s i s t ­
ent  w i t h  t h e  pur poses  o f  t he  Fund.  Th i s  i s  because t he  
Fund ' s  a r t i c l e s  o f  agreement  p r o v i d e  a s a n c t i o n  mechani sm 
whi ch can be used t o  l i m i t  a member ' s f u t u r e  use o f  i t s  
r e s o u r c e s  or  even d e c l a r i n g  such a member i n e l i g i b l e  t o  use 
t h e  r e s o u r c e s  i n  f u t u r e . ^
7. I t  s h o u l d  be not ed t h a t  membershi p i n  t he  IMF i s  
open o n l y  t o  members o f  t he  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s ,  and 
any agreement  between a member and t h e  Fund woul d 
be r e q u i r e d  t o  con f o r m t o  A r t i c l e  102 o f  t h e  UN 
c h a r t e r .
8.  See a r t i c l e  V, s e c t i o n  5 o f  t he  Fund ' s  A r t i c l e s  o f  
A g r e e m e n t .
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{ i i  ) Fund p o l i c i e s  f o r  t h e  use o f  i t s  r e s o u r c e s
There are a number o f  f a c i l i t i e s  under  whi ch  a member 
may draw on t h e  r e s o u r c e s  o f  t he  Fund.  These can be 
d i v i d e d  i n t o  t h r e e  c a t e g o r i e s ,  t he  r e s e r v e  t r a n c h e ,  t h e  
c r e d i t  t r a n c h e s ,  and t h e  s p e c i a l  f a c i l i t i e s .  A l l  t hese  
f a c i l i t i e s  have been se t  up not  d i r e c t l y  by t h e  a r t i c l e s  
o f  agreement  bu t  by t he  p o l i c y  d e c i s i o n s  o f  t h e  p o l i c y  
maki ng organs  o f  t h e  Fund.  The power t o  make p o l i c i e s  
r e l a t i n g  t o  t h e  use o f  t he  r e s o u r c e s  o f  t h e  Fund by t he  
members i s  c o n t a i n e d  i n  a r t i c l e  V s e c t i o n  3 pa r ag r aph  c 
whi ch s t a t e s  t h a t ,
"A member ' s  use o f  t he  r e s o u r c e s  o f  t h e  Fund s h a l l  
be i n  acco r dance  w i t h  t h e  purposes  o f  t h e  Fund.
The Fund s h a l l  adopt  p o l i c i e s  on t he  use o f  i t s  
r e s o u r c e s  t h a t  w i l l  a s s i s t  members t o  s o l v e  t h e i r  
bal .ance o f  payments prob l ems i n  a manner  c o n s i s t e n t  
w i t h  t h e  pu r poses  o f  t h e  Fund and t h a t  w i l l  e s t a b l i s h  
adequat e  s a f e g u a r d s  f o r  t he  t e mp o r a r y  use o f  i t s  
r e s o u r c e s . "
The Fund ' s  power  under  t h e  above a r t i c l e  has one i m p o r t a n t  
d i me n s i o n ,  t h a t  any p o l i c y  made by t he Fund r e g a r d i n g  t he  
use o f i t s  r e s o u r c e s  must  be c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  o v e r a l l  
purposes  o f  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  t he  most  i m p o r t a n t  o f  whi ch 
i s  t o  h e l p  member c o u n t r i e s  i n  t h e i r  s h o r t  t e r m ba l ance  
o f  payments p r o b l e m.
Pu r s uan t  t o  a r t i c l e  V s e c t i o n  3 ( c ) ,  t h e  Fund has over  
t he  y e a r s  made a number o f  p o l i c y  d e c i s i o n s  r e g a r d i n g  t he  
use o f  i t s  r e s o u r c e s  by member c o u n t r i e s .  Two c a t e g o r i e s  
o f  f a c i l i t i e s  have so f a r  been c r e a t e d .  These are t h e  
so c a l l e d  normal  and s p e c i a l  f a c i l i t i e s .  The normal  
f a c i l i t i e s  co mp r i s e  o f  o r d i n a r y  d r awi ngs  under  t he  t r a n c h e  
p o l i c i e s ,  s t a n d - b y  a r r an g e me n t s ,  and t h e  s p e c i a l  d r awi ng
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r i g h t s  f a c i l i t y .  These f a c i l i t i e s  are i n t e n d e d  f o r  use 
by t h o s e  member c o u n t r i e s  f a c i n g  ba l ance  o f  payments 
probl ems r e s u l t i n g  f r om t h e  o v e r a l l  bad p e r f o r man c e  by 
t h e i r  economi es .  The s p e c i a l  f a c i l i t i e s  on t h e  o t h e r  
hand,  were c r e a t e d  f o r  t he  use o f  t h o s e  members f a c i n g  
ba l ance  o f  payments p r ob l ems r e s u l t i n g  f r om s p e c i a l  and 
s p e c i f i c  p r ob l ems .
At present  t he r e  are t hr ee  speci a l  f a c i l i t i e s  in 
o p e r a t i o n ,  the B u f f e r  Stock Fi nanci ng f a c i l i t y  e s t a b l i s he d  
in 1969 to f i n an c e  member c o n t r i b u t i o n s  to e l i g i b l e  i n t e r ­
na t i ona l  commodity b u f f e r  stocks;  the Compensatory  
Fi nanci ng F a c i l i t y  e s t a b l i s h e d  in 1963 to a l l e v i a t e  members'  
balance of  payments problems caused by s h o r t f a l l s  in 
expor t  r e c e i p t s ; ^  and the Extended F a c i l i t y  c r ea t ed by a 
dec i s i on of  the Execut i ve  D i r e c t o r s  in 1974 to provi de  
medium term ass i s t ance  to members wi th imbalances r e l a t e d  
to s t r u c t u r a l  m a l a d j u s t m e n t s . ^  Our a t t e n t i o n  w i l l  l a t e r
on in the c ha pt e r ,  be focused on the Compensatory Fi nanci ng
F a c i l i t y  which is of  cons i der a b l e  i n t e r e s t  to copper  
producing c o u n t r i e s  as wel l  as producers of  o t her  commodi t i es.  
For the t i me being however,  i t  should be ment ioned t h a t  a l l  
the f a c i l i t i e s  so f a r  c r ea t ed by the Fund do conform to 
i t s  general  purposes in the sense t h a t  they are a l l  to be 
used f o r  purposes of  a l l e v i a t i n g  member c o u n t r i e s '  shor t
9. I M F ,  E x e c u t i v e  D i r e c t o r s  d e c i s i o n  no.  1 4 7 7 ( 6 3 / 8 )  as 
amended by E x e c u t i v e  D i r e c t o r s  d e c i s i o n  no.  2192
( 6 6 / 8 1 )  o f  September  20,  1966,
10. See IMF p r ess  r e l e a s e  no.  74 / 43  o f  September  15,  1974.
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t e r m ba l a n c e  o f  payments p r o b l e ms .  D e c i s i o n s  r e g a r d i n g
t h e se  p o l i c i e s  a l l  r e q u i r e  t h a t  a member shows t h a t  i t
has a ba l a n c e  o f  payments p r ob l em b e f o r e  i t  can -b-e—abTe—’
t o  draw on any o f  t h e  f a c i l i t i e s .  Because t h e  r e s o u r c e s
can be made a v a i l a b l e  o n l y  i n  o r d e r  t o  he l p  c o r r e c t  an
i mba l anc e  i n  members'  ba l a n c e  o f  payment s ,  a l l  t he
f a c i l i t i e s  do r e q u i r e  t h a t  t he  use o f  t he  r e s o u r c e s  be o f  a
11t e mp o r a r y  n a t u r e .  The l o g i c a l  r e s u l t  o f  a l l  t h i s  i s  
t h a t  a c o u n t r y ' s  economi c d i f f i c u l t i e s  t h a t  do not  
t r a n s l a t e  t h e ms e l v e s  i n t o  a ba l ance  o f  payments p r ob l em 
canno t  be d e a l t  w i t h  t h r o u g h  t hese  f a c i l i t i e s .  Probl ems 
f a c i n g  copper  on t he  w o r l d  mar ke t s  do e v e n t u a l l y  t r a n s l a t e  
t he ms e l v e s  i n t o  Zamb i a ' s  b a l ance  o f  payments p r ob l ems 
making t h e s e  Fund f a c i l i t i e s  o f  p a r t i c u l a r  i n t e r e s t  t o  
t h a t  c o u n t r y .
( i i i )  C o n d i t i o n a l i t y  i n  t h e  use o f  Fund r e s o u r c e s
One o f  t h e  most  w i d e l y  debat ed  i s s u e s  i n  t h e  IMF
r e l a t e s  t o  c o n d i t i o n s  a t t a c h e d  t o  t he  use o f  i t s  r e s o u r c e s
by member c o u n t r i e s .  Re f e r ence  t o  t h es e  c o n d i t i o n s  i s
made in a r t i c l e  3 section 3 of the Fund's A r t i c l e s  of
Agr eemen t  o f  wh i ch  pa r ag r aph  (a)  s t a t e s  i n t e r  a l i a  t h a t :
"a member s h a l l  be e n t i t l e d  t o  buy t h e  c u r r e n c y  o f  
a n o t h e r  member f r om t h e  Fund i n  exchange f o r  i t s  
own c u r r e n c y  s u b j e c t  t o  t he  f o l l o w i n g  c o n d i t i o n s :
( i )  The member d e s i r i n g  t o  pur chase  t h e  c u r r e n c y  
r e p r e s e n t s  t h a t  i t  i s  p r e s e n t l y  needed f o r  
mak i ng i n  t h a t  c u r r e n c y  payments wh i ch  are 
c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  t h i s  
a g r e e me n t ;
11.  i M M e c i s i o n  n o , 1 0 2 - ( 5 2 / l l )  o f  F e b r u a r y  13,  1952 
l i m i t i n g  t h e  use o f  o r d i n a r y  d r a wi ngs  t o  between 
t h r e e  and f i v e  y e a r s .
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( i i )  The Fund has no t  g i ven  n o t i c e  under  a r t i c l e  
V I I  s e c t i o n  3,  t h a t  i t s  h o l d i n g s  o f  t he  
c u r r e n c y  d e s i r e d  have become s ca r ce
( i i i )  The proposed pur chase  woul d be a g o l d  t r a n c h e  
pu r chase  or  woul d not  cause t h e  Fund ' s  h o l d ­
i ngs  o f  t h e  p u r c h a s i n g  member ' s  c u r r e n c y  t o  
i n c r e a s e  by more t han t w e n t y - f i v e  p e r c e n t
o f  i t s  quo t a  d u r i n g  t h e  p e r i o d  o f  t w e l v e  
months end i ng  on t h e  da t e  o f  t h e  pu r chase  
or  t o  exceed two hundred p e r c e n t  o f  i t s  
q u o t a ;
{ i v ) The Fund has no t  p r e v i o u s l y  d e c l a r e d  under  
s e c t i o n  5 o f  t h i s  a r t i c l e ,  a r t i c l e  IV 
s e c t i o n  6,  a r t i c l e  VI s e c t i o n  1 or  a r t i c l e  XV 
s e c t i o n  2 ( a )  t h a t  t he  member d e s i r i n g  t o  
pu r chase  i s  i n e l i g i b l e  t o  use t h e  r e s o u r c e s  
o f  t he  Fund . "
The a r t i c l e  quo t ed  above i mposes s e v e r a l  c o n d i t i o n s  t h a t
have t o  be obser ved  b e f o r e  a d r awi ng  can be made on any
o f  t he  f a c i l i t i e s .  There are two n o t a b l e  c o n d i t i o n s  t h a t
deser ve  s p e c i a l  t r e a t m e n t ,  and t h e s e  are t h o s e  p l a c i n q
q u a n t i t a t i v e  l i m i t a t i o n s  on t h e  amounts t o  be p u r chased ,
and t h a t  r e q u i r i n g  such pur chases  t o  be c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h
1 2t he  pur poses  o f  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n .
( i v ) Q u a n t i t a t i v e  l i m i t a t i o n  on pur chase
Par agr aph  3 ( i i i ) o f  a r t i c l e  3,  c o n t a i n s  two l i m i t s
on t h e  amounts o f  r e s o u r c e s  a member i s  p e r m i t t e d  t o  u t i l i z e
at  any one t i m e .  The f i r s t  l i m i t a t i o n  i s  t h a t  i n  any one
p e r i o d  o f  t w e l v e  mont hs ,  a member may not  make pur chases
t h a t  woul d i n c r e a s e  t he  Fund ' s  h o l d i n g s  o f  t h a t  member ' s
1 3c u r r e n c y  by more t han  t w e n t y - f i v e  p e r c e n t  o f  i t s  q u o t a .
The second l i m i t a t i o n  i s  t h a t  t he  t o t a l  o u t s t a n d i n g  pur chases  
by any member i n  a l l  t h e  f a c i l i t i e s  s hou l d  no t  i n c r e a s e  t he
12.  See a r t i c l e  3 s e c t i o n  3 paras ( i )  and ( i i i )  o f  t he  
IMF A r t i c l e s  o f  Ag r eement .
13.  I t  s h o u l d  be no t ed  t h a t  a member r e q u i r i n g  f unds  f r om 
t h e  IMF d e p o s i t s  i t s  own c u r r e n c y  w i t h  t h e  Fund i n  
exchange f o r  an e q u i v a l e n t  amount  i n  o t h e r  c u r r e n c i e s .
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Fund ' s  h o l d i n g  o f  t h a t  member ' s  c u r r e n c y  above two hundred
p e r c e n t  o f  i t s  q u o t a .  A l t h o u g h  t h es e  l i m i t a t i o n s  can be
wai ved i n  e x c e p t i o n a l  c i r c u m s t a n c e s , 1^ t h e y  c o n s t i t u t e  a
s e r i o u s  i mped i ment  on c o u n t r i e s  s u f f e r i n g  s e r i o u s  ba l ance
o f  payments p r ob l ems  t he  magn i t ude  o f  wh i ch  may no t  a d e q u a t e l y
be r e s o l v e d  by a mere two hundred p e r c e n t  o f  t h e i r  quot a  i n
t h e  Fund.  I n any case c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  are most  l i k e l y  t o
s u f f e r  a b a l ance  o f  payments p r ob l em are t h o s e  dependent
on e x p o r t s  o f  p r i m a r y  co mmod i t i e s  l i k e  copper  t h a t  s u f f e r
f r om p e r p e t u a l  p r i c e  f l u c t u a t i o n s ,  and i t  i s  t h e s e  same
1 6c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  have smal l  quo t as  i n  t he  o r g a n i z a t i o n .  Th i s  
s i t u a t i o n  c r e a t e s  a c y c l e  i n  whi ch a l e a s t  deve l oped  
c o u n t r y  f o r  exampl e ,  i s  u n d e r s t a n d a b l y  a l l o c a t e d  a smal l  
quo t a  i n  t h e  Fund because i t  i s  poor  and most  l i k e l y  t o 
s u f f e r  f r om economi c prob l ems r e s u l t i n g  f r om p r i c e  f l u c t u ­
a t i o n s  f o r  i t s  c o mmo d i t i e s .  The smal l  quo t a  a u t o m a t i c a l l y  
means t h a t  i t  can o n l y  be ab l e  t o  draw so much f r om t he  
Fund f a c i l i t i e s ,  an amount  t h a t  mi gh t  no t  be adequat e  t o  
meet  i t s  p r ob l em t h e r e b y  n e c e s s i t a t i n g  i t s  c o n t i n u e d  
dependence on f u t u r e  d r a w i n g s .
( v ) C o n s i s t e n c y  w i t h  Fund a r t i c l e s  and p o l i c i e s
An o t he r  i m p o r t a n t  c o n d i t i o n  a t t a c h e d  t o  t h e  use o f  t he  
Fund r e s o u r c e s  i s  t h a t  t h e  Fund has t o  s a t i s f y  i t s e l f  t h a t  
any r e q u e s t  f o r  f unds  i n  a l l  t he  f a c i l i t i e s  ex c e p t  t hose  
made under  t h e  r e s e r v e  t r a n c h e  are c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  i t s  
A r t i c l e s  o f  /Agreement  and p o l i c i e s .  The Fund ' s  power  t o
14.  See a r t i c l e  V section 4 of IMF A r t i c l e s  of Agreement.
1 5 , Quotas i n  t h e  IMF are d e t e r m i n e d  by a c o u n t r y ' s  
economi c p o s i t i o n .
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examine r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  means t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no de f a c t o  
a u t o m a t i c i t y  i n  t he  use o f  i t s  f a c i l i t i e s .  Th i s  has been 
made c l e a r  by t h e  E x e c u t i v e  Board whi ch  exp r essed  t he  v i ew 
t h a t ,
"As a r e s u l t  o f  t h e  a d o p t i o n  o f  a r t i c l e  V s e c t i o n  
3 ( d )  t he  Fund w i l l  no t  have t he  power  t o  c r e a t e  
any new f a c i l i t y  i n  t h e  gener a l  accoun t  f o r  t he  
u n c o n d i t i o n a l  use o f  i t s  r e s o u r c e s .  "16
The main reason f o r  t h e  d e c i s i o n  not  t o  a l l o w  any f u r t h e r
u n c o n d i t i o n a l  f a c i l i t i e s  was t h a t  s i n c e  a new f a c i l i t y  had
been c r e a t e d  i n  t h e  f o r m o f  s p e c i a l  d r awi ng  r i g h t s  (SDRs) ,
any f u t u r e  need f o r  r e s o u r c e s  c o u l d  e a s i l y  be c a t e g o r i s e d
as a need f o r  r e s e r v e  a s s e t s  and woul d t h e r e f o r e  be met
under  t h e  SDR f a c i l i t y  w i t h o u t  n e c e s s a r i l y  ha v i ng  t o  c r e a t e
a n o t h e r  f a c i l i t y .  But  perhaps a more i m p o r t a n t  reason may
be f ound  i n  t he  v o t i n g  p r oc edu r e s  i n  t he  Fund i n  r e l a t i o n  t o
use o f  r e s o u r c e s .  The p o l i c y  o f  t h e  Fund i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t he
c r e a t i o n  o f  u n c o n d i t i o n a l  f a c i l i t i e s  u n t i l  t hen  r e q u i r e d  a
m a j o r i t y  o f  vo t e s  c a s t  i n  t h e  E x e c u t i v e  Boar d.  On t he  o t h e r
hand,  t he  use o f  t he  SDR accoun t  r e q u i r e d  a m a j o r i t y  i n  t he
Board o f  Gover nor s  o f  85 p e r c e n t  o f  t he  t o t a l  v o t e s .  Th i s
s i t u a t i o n  c r e a t e d  a c o n t r a d i c t i o n  i n  t h e  sense t h a t  f a i l u r e
t o  o b t a i n  t h e  r e q u i s i t e  m a j o r i t y  f o r  d r a wi n g  i n  t h e  SDR
accoun t  c o u l d  have been e a s i l y  c i r c u m v e n t e d  by t h e  c r e a t i o n
o f  u n c o n d i t i o n a l  f a c i l i t i e s  whi ch me r e l y  r e q u i r e d  a s i mp l e
1 7m a j o r i t y  i n  t h e  E x e c u t i v e  Board.
16.  See pa r ag r a ph  34 o f  E x e c u t i v e  Board t o  t h e  Board o f
g o v e r n o r s  o f  A p r i l ,  1968,  recommendi ng m o d i f i c a t i o n
o f  t he  a r t i c l e s  o f  agreement .
17.  For  t he  m a j o r i t y  r e q u i r e d  f o r  t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  SDRs,
see A r t i c l e  XXIV s e c t i o n  4.
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A l t h o u g h  t h e r e  mi gh t  be j u s t i f i c a t i o n s  f o r  t he se  
c o n d i t i o n a l i t i e s ,  i t  can e q u a l l y  be argued t h a t  t h e y  do 
p r o v i d e  t i g h t e r  c o n t r o l s  on t he  use o f  t he  r e s o u r c e s  o f  
t h e  Fund and have i n  many ways c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  a l l e g a t i o n s  
o f  t he  I MF' s  i n t e r f e r e n c e  i n  domes t i c  a f f a i r s  o f  member 
c o u n t r i  e s .
I I I .  Compensat ory  F i n a n c i n g  F a c i l i t y  (CFF)
The Compensat ory  F i n a n c i n g  F a c i l i t y  i s  one o f  t he
s p e c i a l  f a c i l i t i e s  o p e r a t i n g  i n  t he  IMF. The f a c i l i t y  was
c r e a t e d  by a p o l i c y  o f  t he  Fund i n  1 9 6 ^  a f t e r  i t  was
r e a l i z e d  t h a t  p r i m a r y  commodi t y  e x p o r t i n g  c o u n t r i e s  were
more i n c l i n e d  t o  s u f f e r  i n  t h e i r  e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s  t han
1 9e x p o r t e r s  o f  i n d u s t r i a l  goods.  I t  s h ou l d  be men t i oned  
t h a t  t h e  CFF was c r e a t e d  b e f o r e  t h e  amendment  t o  a r t i c l e  
V o f  t he  a r t i c l e s  o f  agreement  wh i ch  removed t h e  power o f  
t he  Fund t o  c r e a t e  u n c o n d i t i o n a l  f a c i l i t i e s .  The change i n  
a r t i c l e  V was however ,  made w i t h o u t  p r e j u d i c e  t o  t he  a l r e a d y  
e x i s t i n g  CFF. In f a c t  e xp r ess  men t i on  o f  t h i s  p o l i c y  (CFF) 
i s  made i n  a r t i c l e  XIX ( j )  o f  t he  a r t i c l e s  o f  agreement  
whi ch s t a t e s  t h a t ,
"Gol d t r a n c h e  pu r chase  means a pu r chase  by a member 
o f  t he  c u r r e n c y  o f  a n o t h e r  member i n  exchange f o r  
i t s  own c u r r e n c y  wh i ch  does not  cause t h e  Fund ' s  
h o l d i n g s  o f  t he  member ' s  c u r r e n c y  t o  exceed one hundred 
p e r c e n t  o f  i t s  q u o t a ,  p r o v i d e d  t h a t  f o r  t he  purposes  
o f  t h i s  d e f i n i t i o n  t he  Fund may e x c l u d e  pur chases  and 
h o l d i n g s  under  p o l i c i e s  on t he  use o f  i t s  r e s o u r c e s  
f o r  compensa t o r y  f i n a n c i n g  o f  e x p o r t  f l u c t u a t i o n s . "
18. E x e c u t i v e  Board d e c i s i o n  no.  1 4 7 7 ( 6 3 / 8 ) ,  Fe b r u a r y  27,  1963.
19. See r e p o r t  by t he  Fund t o  t he  UN Commi ssi on on i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  commodi t y  t r a d e  e n t i t l e d  "Fund p o l i c i e s  and 
p r o c ed u r e s  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t he  compensa t o r y  f i n a n c i n g
o f  commodi t y  f l u c t u a t i o n s .  IMF s t a f f  p a pe r s ,  v o l .  V I I I ,  
1960- 1961.
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The r e f e r e n c e  t o  CFF i n  t he  above a r t i c l e  me r e l y  enab l es  t he
Fund t o  f l o a t  t h e  p o l i c y  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  g o l d  t r a n c h e
i n  t h e  sense t h a t  d r a w i n gs  under  t he  p o l i c y  woul d  no t  be 
t aken  i n t o  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  when c a l c u l a t i n g  t h e  one hundred 
p e r c e n t  o f  quo t a  r e q u i r e m e n t  i n  t he  go l d  t r a n c h e .  I t  
does no t  i n  any way sugges t  t h a t  t he  f a c i l i t y  i s  uncon­
d i t i o n a l .  Thus d e s p i t e  t he  f a c i l i t y  h av i ng  been c r e a t e d  at
t h e  t i me  when t h e  Fund had t he  power t o  c r e a t e  u n c o n d i t i o n a l  
f a c i l i t i e s ,  i t  may c o n t a i n  c o n d i t i o n s  whi ch  a p u r c h a s i n g  
member has t o  s a t i s f y  b e f o r e  making t he  p u r c h a s e .
IV . C o n d i t i o n a l i t y  under  t he  CFF
There are two c o n d i t i o n s  t h a t  have t o  be s a t i s f i e d  
by an e l i g i b l e  member b e f o r e  i t  can be a b l e  t o  draw f r om 
t h i s  f a c i l i t y  and t h e s e  are t h a t ,  i t  s a t i s f i e s  t he  Fund 
t h a t  i t  w i l l  c o o p e r a t e  i n  f i n d i n g  s o l u t i o n s  t o  i t s  ba l ance  
o f  payments p r o b l e ms ,  and s e c o n d l y  t o  show t h a t  t he  
b a l an c e  o f  payments s h o r t f a l l  i s  a t t r i b u t a b l e  t o  c i r c u m ­
s t ances  beyond i t s  c o n t r o l .
(a)  The f i r s t  c o n d i t i o n  whi ch  any member w i s h i n g  t o  
pur chase  under  t h i s  f a c i l i t y  has t o  s a t i s f y  i s  t h a t  i t  
c o n v i n c e s  t h e  f u nd  t h a t  i t
" . . .  w i l l  c o o p e r a t e  w i t h  t he  Fund i n  an e f f o r t  
t o  f i n d ,  where r e q u i r e d ,  a p p r o p r i a t e  s o l u t i o n s  
f o r  i t s  b a l a nc e  o f  payments d i f f i c u l t i e s . * 1 20
The u n d e r t a k i n g  r e q u i r e d  t o  be made by a member i s  t o
c o o p e r a t e  i n  an e f f o r t  t o  f i n d  a p p r o p r i a t e  p o l i c i e s  but
20 •Imp The p r ob l em o f  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  o f  p r i c e s  o f  p r i ma r y
' p r o d u c t s :  Repor t  o f  E x e c u t i v e  D i r e c t o r s  and scope f o r  
a c t i o n  by t he  Fund.  IMF ( Wa s h i n g t o n ) ,  1 969,  p p . 14- 15 .
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t h e r e  i s  no i n d i c a t i o n  as t o  what  t h e se  a p p r o p r i a t e  p o l i c i e s
ough t  t o  be.  And a l t h o u g h  t h e r e  i s  no e x p r es s  r e q u i r e m e n t
f o r  a member t o  p r o v i d e  t h e  u n d e r t a k i n g ,  t h e  p o l i c y  o f
t he  Fund i s  t h a t  a r e q u e s t  f o r  a pur chase beyond t he  f i r s t
25% o f  a member ' s  quot a  woul d be met o n l y  when t he  Fund i s
s a t i s f i e d  t h a t  t he  member concer ned has been c o o p e r a t i n g
w i t h  t he  Fund i n  acco r dance  w i t h  i t s  u n d e r t a k i n g .  The
i m p l i c a t i o n  here i s  t h a t  t he  Fund i s  i n  a p o s i t i o n  t o
d i c t a t e  t he  a p p r o p r i a t e  p o l i c i e s  t o  a member and t h a t
member i s  o b l i g e d  t o  c o o p e r a t e .  The r e q u i r e m e n t  t o  c o o p e r a t e
however ,  does no t  mean t h a t  t he  p u r c h a s i n g  member woul d be
i n  v i o l a t i o n  o f  i t s  o b l i g a t i o n s  i f  i t  d e p a r t s  f r om t h e
obser vance  o f  p o l i c i e s  i n  s u p p o r t  o f  whi ch t he  Fund made
i t s  r e s o u r c e s  a v a i l a b l e .  What i t  does mean i s  t h a t  a
member who does no t  c o o p e r a t e  mi gh t  f i n d  i t s e l f  i n e l i g i b l e
f o r  f u t u r e  use o f  t h e  r e s o u r c e s  o f  t h e  Fund because i t
m i g h t  be r e g a r d e d  as u s i ng  t h e  f unds  i n  a manner  c o n t r a r y
? 1t o  t he  pur poses  o f  t he  Fund.  The power  t o  l i m i t  a 
member ' s f u t u r e  use o f  r e s o u r c e s  i s  t h e  a b s o l u t e  d i s c r e t i o n  
o f  t he  Fund whi ch  i n  p r a c t i c e  has shown r e l u c t a n c e  t o  
e x e r c i s e  i t .  I n s t e a d  i t  has i n g e n i o u s l y  d eve l oped  t e c h n i q u e s  
t h a t  a v o i d  t h e  appearance o f  s a n c t i o n s ,  and wh i ch  are t h e r e ­
f o r e  l e s s  i n j u r i o u s  t o  t h e  f e e l i n g s  o f  members.  Such 
t e c h n i q u e s  have i n c l u d e d  p u b l i c i t y ,  i n f o r m a l  commun i ca t i ons  
w i t h  members,  and p o l i t i c a l  p r e s s u r e .
(b)  The second c o n d i t i o n  a t t a c h e d  t o  t he  use o f  t h e  CFF
21.  A r t i c l e  V ( 5 ) ,  IMF a r t i c l e s  o f  ag r eement .
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r e l a t e s  t o  t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t  t h a t  t he  Fund e x e r c i s e  s u b j e c t i v e  
j udgement s  as t o  whe t he r  a member i s  e n c o u n t e r i n g  payments 
d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  t h a t  t he  ba l ance  o f  payments s h o r t f a l l  i s  o f  
a s h o r t  t e r m c h a r a c t e r  and l a r g e l y  a t t r i b u t a b l e  t o  c i r c u m ­
s t ances  beyond i t s  c o n t r o l .  These r e q u i r e m e n t s  do g i v e  
t he  Fund ways o f  s c r u t i n i z i n g  t he economi es o f  t h e  p u r c h a s i n g  
member.  The member p u r c h a s i n g ,  on t he  o t h e r  hand,  i s  
o b l i g e d  t o  make a v a i l a b l e  t he  necessa r y  i n f o r m a t i o n  o t h e r ­
wi se  i t  r i s k s  no t  r e c e i v i n g  t h e  f unds  i t  i s  s e e k i n g .
V . Ot her  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  t he  CCF
( i ) Co u n t r y  cove r age
The CFF i s  open f o r  use by a l l  t he  members o f  t he  IMF, 
a l t h o u g h  i t  i s  expec t ed  t h a t  o n l y  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  w i l l  
make use o f  i t .  Th i s  means t h a t  t he  f a c i l i t y  i s  not  i n  
f a c t  aimed a t  t h e  poor  c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  depend on e x p o r t s  o f  
p r i m a r y  co mmod i t i e s  s i n c e  any c o u n t r y  member o f  t h e  IMF 
may use i t  r e g a r d l e s s  o f  i t s  economi c s t r e n g t h .  Th i s  i s  
made v e r y  c l e a r  by t h e  d e c i s i o n  o f  t h e  E x e c u t i v e  D i r e c t o r s  
s e t t i n g  up t he  f a c i l i t y  i n  Fe b r u a r y  1 963 . ^  The £>i r e c t o r s  
made i t  c l e a r  i n  t h a t  d e c i s i o n ,  t h a t  t h e  f a c i l i t y  was t o  
a p p l y  i n  p r i n c i p l e  t o  a l l  members e n c o u n t e r i n g  payments 
d i f f i c u l t i e s  produced by t e mp o r a r y  e x p o r t  s h o r t f a l l s  d u r i n g  
t h e  l a t e s t  t w e l v e  months f o r  whi ch a r e l i a b l e  e s t i m a t e  o f  
e x p o r t  p r oceeds  can be made.  But  a l t h o u g h  t h e  d e c i s i o n  i s  
d r a f t e d  so t h a t  i t  a p p l i e s  i n  p r i n c i p l e  t o  a l l  members,  and 
i s ,  t h e r e f o r e  not  l i m i t e d  t o  a c l a s s  o f  IMF members,  i t  does
22.  E x e c u t i v e  D i r e c t o r s  D e c i s i o n  n o . 1 4 7 7 ( 6 3 / 8 )  o f  1963,  
as amended.
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ment i on  p r i m a r y  p r o du c e r s  as a s p e c i a l  o b j e c t  o f  c o n c e r n .  
Th i s  men t i on  o f  p r i m a r y  p r o du c e r s  c r e a t e s  t h e  i mp r e s s i o n  
t h a t  t h e  main o b j e c t  o f  concer n  f o r  t h e  f a c i l i t y  i s  
p r odu c e r s  o f  p r i m a r y  c ommod i t i es  who are members o f  t he
Fund.  In p r a c t i c e  however  t h i s  does no t  appear  t o  be t h e
c a s e .
The use o f  t he  f a c i l i t y  has not  been c o n f i n e d  t o
p r o d u c e r s  o f  p r i m a r y  commod i t i es  nor  has i t  shown any s ub ­
s t a n t i a l  b i as  i n  f a v o u r  o f  such c o u n t r i e s .  In f a c t  many 
c o u n t r i e s  have u t i l i z e d  t he  f a c i l i t y  i n  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  not  
q u i t e  connec t ed  t o  t he  prob l ems o f  p r i ma r y  p r o du c e r
c o u n t r i e s .  An exampl e o f  t h i s  i s  t o  be f ound  i n  t h e
23E x e c u t i v e  Board d e c i s i o n  o f  August  2,  1979,  wh i ch  a l l owed  
members t o  pur chase  f r om t he  f a c i l i t y  i n  t h e  e v e n t  o f  them 
s u f f e r i n g  a ba l ance  o f  payments p rob l em r e s u l t i n g  f r om 
s h o r t f a l l s  i n  mer chand i se  e x p o r t s ,  t r a v e l  and wor ke r s  
r e m i t t a n c e s .  For  t h e  f i r s t  t i me  t h e r e f o r e  a member c o u l d  
i n c l u d e  s e r v i c e s  i n  i t s  c a l c u l a t i o n  o f  t he  s h o r t f a l l .  As 
a r e s u l t  o f  t h i s  a number o f  deve l oped  c o u n t r i e s  whose 
economi es depend t o  some e x t e n t  on s e r v i c e s ,  began t o  
u t i l i z e  t he  f a c i l i t y .  One o f  t he  c o u n t r i e s  wh i ch  has 
u t i l i z e d  t h i s  f a c i l i t y  due t o  a s h o r t f a l l  i n  i t s  ba l ance  
o f  payments r e s u l t i n g  f r om a s h o r t f a l l  i n  e x p o r t s  o f  
me r c ha nd i s e ,  t r a v e l  and w o r k e r ' s  r e m i t t a n c e s  i s  Y u g o s l a v i a  
whi ch drew SDR 138.5 m i l l i o n  i n  1979.  Many o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  
t h a t  woul d  t e c h n i c a l l y  be c l a s s i f i e d  as d e v e l o p e d ,  have been
23.  D e c i s i o n  no.  6 2 2 4 - ( 7 9 / 1 3 5 ) .
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c o n t i n u o u s l y  d r a w i n g  f r om  t h e  f a c i l i t y .  Romania,  Korea,  
I c e l a n d ,  I s r a e l ,  New Z e a l a n d ,  A u s t r a l i a ,  and South A f r i c a  
have a l l  drawn f r om t h e  f a c i l i t y .
The p rob l em t h a t  a r i s e s  by a l l o w i n g  d e ve l op ed  members 
t o  use t h i s  f a c i l i t y  r e l a t e s  t o  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  q uo t a  
system i n  t h e  IMF. Member 's  quotas  i n  t h i s  o r g a n i z a t i o n  
are d e t e r m i n e d  by each member 's  l e v e l  o f  economic  d e v e l o p ­
ment .  The h i g h l y  d ev e l o pe d  c o u n t r i e s  make h i g h e r  c o n t r i ­
b u t i o n s  and t h e  l e a s t  d e ve l op ed  c o n t r i b u t e  l e s s .  S i nce  t he  
p o l i c y  o f  t h e  Fund i s  t h a t  a member can draw up t o  100% o f  
i t s  q u o t a ,  t h e  h i g h e r  a c o u n t r y ' s  quot a  i s  t h e  h i g h e r  i s  t h e  
amount i t  can d r a w . 2^ The problem i s ,  t h e r e  i s  a l i m i t  t o  
t h e  amount o f  f un ds  i n  t h e  f a c i l i t y  and d r a w i n g s  by a few 
d ev e l o pe d  c o u n t r i e s  at  once may c r e a t e  a c r i s i s  i n  t he  
f a c i l i t y  i f  n o t  a c t u a l l y  e x h a u s t i n g  i t .  To be o f  s u b s t a n t i a l  
b e n e f i t  t o  t h o s e  c o u n t r i e s  i n  t h e  d e v e l o p i n g  w o r l d  who 
f a c e  d i s r u p t i v e  b a la n ce  o f  payments p r o b l e m s ,  t h e  use o f  
t h e  CFF s h o u l d  be d e l i b e r a t e l y  r e s t r u c t u r e d  and c o n f i n e d  
t o  h e l p i n g  t h e  commodi t y  p r o d u c e r s  f r om  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s .  
T h i s  a f t e r a l l  i s  what  t h e  v a r i o u s  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  r e s o l u t i o n s  
on t h e  new i n t e r n a t i o n a l  economic o r d e r  (NIE0)  have c a l l e d  
f o r  - t h e  t r a n s f e r  o f  r e s o u r c e s  f ro m t h e  d e ve l o p e d  
c o u n t r i e s  t o  t h e  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s .  The CFF wou ld  be 
an i n s t r u m e n t  o f  such a t r a n s f e r  i f  t he  c o u n t r y  co ver age  
i s  s p e c i f i e d  t o  c o v e r  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  dependent  on 
e x p o r t s  o f  p r i m a r y  c o m m o d i t i e s .  Indeed t h i s  had been 
t he  r eason  f o r  t h e  f a c i l i t y ' s  c r e a t i o n .
24. E x e c u t i v e  Board d e c i s i o n ,  No. 6 2 2 4 - (  7 9 /35  ) I b i d .
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( i i ) Trade cove rage
The CFF scheme c ove rs  d e f i c i t s  a r i s i n g  o u t  o f  e x p o r t  
s h o r t f a l l s .  T h i s  p o l i c y  does no t  s p e c i f y  t h e  t y p e  o f  
m er cha nd is e  t h a t  sh ou l d  be ta k en  i n t o  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  when 
c a l c u l a t i n g  t h e  s h o r t f a l l .  Lack o f  t h i s  s p e c i f i c i t y  seems 
t o  sugges t  t h a t  t h e  f a c i l i t y  c ove rs  t h e  t o t a l i t y  o f  a 
members'  e x p o r t  t r a d e  i n  commod i t i e s  and s e r v i c e s .  The 
p r a c t i c e  o f  t h e  IMF s i n c e  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  t h e  f a c i l i t y  
s u p p o r t s  t h i s  v i e w .  To da te  a number o f  c o u n t r i e s  both 
d e v e l o p i n g  and d eve l oped  have u t i l i z e d  t h e  f a c i l i t y  t o  
c o ve r  e x p o r t  s h o r t f a l l s  which have been c a l c u l a t e d  f rom 
t h e  t o t a l i t y  o f  t h e i r  e x p o r t s  e x c l u d i n g  m a n u f a c t u r e r s .  
S h o r t f a l l s  i n  t h e  e x p o r t  o f  p r i m a r y  c o m m o d i t i e s ,  both  
a g r i c u l t u r a l  and m i n e r a l s  as w e l l  as e x p o r t  o f  s e r v i c e s  
have been a cc ep t ed  by t h e  Fund as s u f f i c i e n t  reason f o r  
a c o u n t r y  t o  draw f r om t h e  f a c i l i t y .
{ i i i )  C o n d i t i o n s  f o r  e l i g i b i l i t y
A member i s  e l i g i b l e  t o  draw f rom t h e  f a c i l i t y  i f  i t  
can show t h a t  i t  i s  e n c o u n t e r i n g  b a la nc e  o f  payments 
p r o b l e m s ,  p r o v i d e d  however  t h a t  t he  Fund i s  s a t i s f i e d  t h a t ,
" t h e  s h o r t f a l l  i s  o f  a s h o r t - t e r m  c h a r a c t e r  and 
i s  l a r g e l y  a t t r i b u t a b l e  t o  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  beyond t he  
c o n t r o l  o f  t h e  member, and t he  member w i l l  c o o p e r a t e  
w i t h  t he  Fund in  an e f f o r t  t o  f i n d ,  where r e q u i r e d ,  
a p p r o p r i a t e  s o l u t i o n s  f o r  i t s  b a la n ce  o f  payments 
d i f f i c u l t i e s . "  25
25, See E x e c u t i v e  D e c i s i o n  o f  December 29,  1965 i s su ed  as 
Press r e l e a s e  No. 75/65 o f  December 29,  1975.  For 
t e x t  see IMF S ur ve y ,  Januar y  5, 1976,  p . l .
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The f i r s t  two c o n d i t i o n s  which r e q u i r e  a member s eek i ng  
t he  use o f  t h e  f a c i l i t y  t o  show t h a t  i t  i s  e n c o u n t e r i n g  a 
t e m p o r a r y  b a la nc e  o f  payments p r ob l em,  are c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  
t he  o v e r a l l  pu rposes  o f  t h e  IMF which seek t o  h e lp  members 
i n  t h e i r  s h o r t  t e r m b a la n c e  o f  payments p r o b l e m s .  These 
two c o n d i t i o n s  do n o t  t h e r e f o r e  r a i s e  any d i f f i c u l t  i s s u e .
I t  i s  t h e  o t h e r  two c o n d i t i o n s  which r a i s e  some problems 
i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  member c o u n t r i e s .
The c o n d i t i o n s  t h a t  t h e  IMF s hou l d  be s a t i s f i e d  w i t h  
t h e  s h o r t f a l l  i s  beyond t h e  c o n t r o l  o f  t he  member and t h a t  
t he  member w i l l  c o o p e r a t e  w i t h  t he  Fund i n  s e e k i n g  s o l u t i o n s  
c l e a r l y  g i v e s  t he  Fund a s u b j e c t i v e  power i n  i n f l u e n c i n g  
the  p o l i c i e s  o f  members w i s h i n g  t o  u t i l i s e  t h e  f a c i l i t y .
T h i s  s i t u a t i o n  i n e v i t a b l y  commi ts members t o  p u r s u i n g  
p o l i c i e s  t h a t  are  s a t i s f a c t o r y  t o  t he  Fund b u t  wh i ch  do no t  
n e c e s s a r i l y  c o i n c i d e  w i t h  t h e  a s p i r a t i o n s  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y  
c o nc er ne d .  I t  i s  t h e r e f o r e  t r u e  t h a t  t h e  CFF e l i g i b i l i t y  
c o n d i t i o n s  c o u l d  r e s u l t  In t he  Fund e x e r t i n g  undue p r e s s u r e  
on t h e  i n t e n d i n g  p u r c h a s e r  t o  t he  e x t e n t  o f  f o r c i n g  the  
member t o  adopt  p o l i c i e s  t h a t  are c o n t r a r y  t o  i t s  n a t i o n a l  
a s p i r a t i o n s  or  even d e s t r u c t i v e  o f  i t s  n a t i o n a l  a s p i r a t i o n s .  
Th i s  i n t e r f e r e n c e  w i l l  no doubt  c a s t  some doub t  on t he  
f u t u r e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  t h e  F un d ' s  l e g a l  norms s i n c e  such 
norms depend on t h e  e x t e n t  t o  which t h e y  are r e s p e c t e d  by 
members, and r e s p e c t  f o r  them depends on t he  e x t e n t  t o  which 
members are c o n v i n c e d  t h a t  t h e  norms promote t h e i r  n a t i o n a l  
and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t s .
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( i v ) Base f o r  c ompensa t i on
The f o r m u l a  used t o  c a l c u l a t e  t h e  e x t e n t  o f  t h e  
s h o r t f a l l  i s  e x pr ess ed  i n  t h e  E x e c u t i v e  Board d e c i s i o n  
o f  December 29,  1975^6 which  s t a t e s  i n t e r  a l i a  t h a t :
"The s h o r t f a l l  f o r  t h e  purpose o f  (CFF) s h a l l  be t he  
amount by wh i ch  t h e  member 's e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s  i n  t he  
s h o r t f a l l  y e a r  are l e s s  than  t h e  average o f  t he  
member 's  e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s  f o r  t he  f i v e  y e a r  p e r i o d  
c e n t r e d  on t h e  s h o r t f a l l  y e a r .  In co mp u t i n g  the  
f i v e  y e a r  average e a r n i n g s  i n  t he  two p o s t  s h o r t f a l l  
y e a r s  w i l l  be deemed t o  be equal  t o  e a r n i n g s  i n  t he  
two p r e - s h o r t f a l l  y e a r s  m u l t i p l i e d  by t h e  r a t i o  o f  
t h e  sum o f  e a r n i n g s  i n  t he  most r e c e n t  t h r e e  y e a r s  
t o  t h a t  i n  t h e  t h r e e  p r e c e e d i n g  y e a r s . "
T h i s  f o r m u l a  e n ab le s  t h e  IMF t o  d e t e r m i n e  t h e  s e v e r i t y  o f  
t he  s h o r t f a l l  and t h e r e f o r e  t h e  s i z e  o f  t h e  d r a w i n g  t o  be 
made. The l a r g e r  t h e  s h o r t f a l l  t he  l a r g e r  t h e  amount o f  
t h e  d r a w i n g  i s  l i k e l y  t o  be.  Thus f o r  exampl e ,  c a l c u l a t i o n s  
based on t h i s  f o r m u l a  r e v e a l e d  t h a t  Z am b i a ' s  e x p o r t s  
d e c l i n e d  i n  1975 f r om  an average o f  SDR 1082 m i l l i o n  i n  
t he  two p r e c e e d i n g  y e a r s  t o  SDR 648 m i l l i o n .  T h i s  r e p r e ­
sen ted  a 4.35% s h o r t f a l l ,  and on t he  b a s i s  o f  wh i ch  Zambia
o 7
was a b le  t o  draw SDR 19 m i l l i o n .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand,  i n  
January  1983 c a l c u l a t i o n s  r e v e a l e d  t h a t  Z am b i a ' s  e x p o r t  
s h o r t f a l l  f o r  t h e  y e a r  1982 was 7% below i t s  average  
e a r n i n g s  f o r  t h e  two p r e c e e d i n g  y e a r s .  Because o f  t h i s
s h o r t f a l l ,  Zambia was a l l o w e d  t o  draw t h e  e q u i v a l e n t  
o f  SDR 34 m i l l i o n .
One s i g n i f i c a n t  a s pec t  o f  t h i s  f o r m u l a  i s  t h a t  the 
IMF i s  no t  bound t o  adhere to  i t ,  i f  i t  c o n s i d e r s  t h a t  t he  
r e s u l t s  o f  t he  c o m p u t a t i o n  appear  u n r e a s o n a b l e .  Th i s  
f l e x i b i l i t y  a l l o w s  t h e  Fund c o n s i d e r a b l e  scope f o r  a d j u s t i n g
26. See IMF Press r e l e a s e  no.  75/65 , D e c . 29 , 1 975 para  6 .
27. At  c u r r e n t  exchange r a t e  f o r t h e  SDR.
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t h e  base f o r  c a l c u l a t i o n  i n  accordance  w i t h  i t s  own w i s h e s ,  
and t h e r e f o r e  a f f e c t i n g  t he  amounts an a f f e c t e d  member 
would  be a l l o w e d  t o  draw.
( v ) L i m i t s  on t h e  use o f  CFF
P r e s e n t  l i m i t s  on d r aw i ng s  t h a t  can be made under
t he  CFF were s e t  o u t  under  a d e c i s i o n  o f  t h e  E x e c u t i v e
Board i n  1979,  a d e c i s i o n  wh i ch  had t h e  e f f e c t  o f  s u b -
7 Rs t a n t i a l l y  l i b e r a l i z i n g  t h e  f a c i l i t y .  T h i s  d e c i s i o n  
r a i s e d  t h e  t o t a l  d ra w i n gs  t h a t  c o u l d  r emain  o u t s t a n d i n g  
a t  any one t i m e  t o  100% o f  a member 's q uo ta  i n  t h e  Fund bu t  
p r o v i d e d  t h a t  t h e  d r a w i n gs  do no t  exceed 50% o f  such a
member 's  quo t a  i n  t h e  Fund i n  any p e r i o d  o f  12 months
e xc e p t  i n  cases o f  ma jo r  emergenc ies  and d i s a s t e r s .  In 
such e mergenc ies  and d i s a s t e r s ,  t h e  l i m i t  wou ld  be r a i s e d  
t o  75% o f  a member 's  qu ot a  b u t  o n l y  i f  t h e  Fund i s  s a t i s f i e d  
t h a t  t h e  member i s  c o o p e r a t i n g  w i t h  i t  i n  f i n d i n g  s o l u t i o n s  
t o  i t s  p r o b 1ems.
T ak i n g  t he  above l i m i t a t i o n s  i n t o  mind and a p p l y i n g  
them t o  Zambia,  a c o u n t r y  o f  p a r t i c u l a r  i n t e r e s t  t o  t he  
w r i t e r ,  t he  i n a d e q u a c i e s  o f  t he  f a c i l i t y  t o  s o l v e  t h e  p r o b ­
lems o f  p r i m a r y  commodi ty  e x p o r t i n g  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s
become g l a r i n g l y  o b v i o u s .  Za mb ia ' s  qu ot a  i n  t h e  IMF i s
29SDR 211. 5  m i l l i o n  and assuming t h a t  t h e  c o u n t r y  had no com­
mi t me nt s  under  o t h e r  f a c i l i t i e s  o f  t he  Fund,  t h e  maxi  mum i t  .coul  d
28.  D e c i s i o n  no.  6224 above note  30.
29. IMF S u r v ey ,  March 7, 1983 page 69.
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be a b l e  t o  draw i n  any one p e r i o d  o f  t w e l v e  months would 
be SDR 105.75 m i l l i o n  r e p r e s e n t i n g  50% o f  i t s  q u o t a .  I t  
i s  w o r t h w h i l e  t o  compare t h e s e  f i g u r e s  w i t h  t h e  a c t u a l  s h o r t ­
f a l l s  Zambia has e x p e r i e n c e d  i n  t h e  p a s t  few y e a r s .  In 
1975,  f o r  exampl e,  t h e  v a l u e  o f  Za mb ia ' s  e x p o r t s  d e c l i n e d  
f r om an average o f  SDR 1082 m i l l i o n  t o  SDR 648 m i l l i o n  due 
p r i m a r i l y  t o  l o we r  p r i c e s  o f  c o p p e r .  The a c t u a l  s h o r t f a l l  f o r  
t h a t  y e a r  t h e r e f o r e  was r o u g h l y  SDR 434.  But  s i n c e  50% o f  
Za mb ia ' s  q uo ta  wh i ch  i s  t h e  l i m i t  o f  i t s  d r a w i n g s  f o r  any 
p e r i o d  o f  t w e l v e  months ,  amounts to o n l y  SDR 105.75 m i l l i o n ,  
and even assuming t h a t  i t  had no p r e v i o u s  commi tments t o  
t he  f a c i l i t y  and t h e r e f o r e  c a pa b l e  o f  d r a w i n g  t h e  e n t i r e  
amount ,  i t s  d r a w i n g  o f  SDR 105.75 would o n l y  be a b l e  t o  
c o v e r  a . q u a r t e r  o f  t he  a c t u a l  s h o r t f a l l .  In a c t u a l  f a c t  
Zambia h av in g  had o t h e r  e a r l i e r  commi tments was o n l y  ab l e  
t o  draw SDR 19 m i l l i o n .  S i m i l a r l y ,  i n  J a nua ry  1983,
Zambia was a b l e  t o  draw o n l y  SDR 34 m i l l i o n  d e s p i t e  e x p e r i -
3 0e nc in g  a p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y  h i g h e r  s h o r t f a l l  t ha n  i n  1975.
The l i m i t s  imposed by t he  IMF on t h e  amounts o f  
d r a w i n g s  r e s t r i c t s  t he  p o s s i b l e  b e n e f i t s  t h a t  a commodi ty  
e x p o r t i n g  c o u n t r y  e x p e r i e n c i n g  s h o r t f a l l s  may be a b l e  t o  
o b t a i n  f r om  t h i s  f a c i l i t y .  A f u r t h e r  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  o f  
t h e  l i m i t s  t o  a l l o w  f o r  h i g h e r  d r aw i ng  l i m i t s  would  go a 
l ong  way i n  c om ba t i n g  t h e  b a la n ce  o f  payments p r ob l em f a c i n g  
a number o f  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  dependent  on t h e  e x p o r t  
o f  p r i m a r y  c o m m o d i t i e s .
30 The 1975 s h o r t f a l l  amounted t o  abou t  4% w h i l e  i n  1973 
i t  was more than  7%.
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( v i  ) C o n d i t i o n s  f o r  repayment
L i k e  i n  t h e  case o f  a l l  IMF f a c i l i t i e s ,  t h e  p r o c e d u r e s  
i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  CFF r e q u i r e  t h a t  t he  b o r r o w i n g  member 
d e p o s i t  an e q u i v a l e n t  amount i n  i t s  own c u r r e n c y  w i t h  t he  
Fund wh i ch  must t hen  be r e p u r c h a s e d  w i t h  f o r e i g n  exchange 
t o  c a n c e l  t h e  d e b t .  The repayment  o r  r e p u r c h a s e  p e r i o d  
v a r i e s  between t h r e e  and f i v e  y e a r s  d epend i ng  on v a r i o u s  
c i r c u m s t a n c e s .  In a d d i t i o n  however ,  a p p r o x i m a t e l y  a f t e r  
one o r  two y e a r s ,
" ( t h e  Fund) a f t e r  c o n s u l t a t i o n  w i t h  t he  member may 
recommend t o  t h e  member t h a t ,  i n  v iew  o f  an i m p r o v e ­
ment i n  i t s  b a la n c e  o f  payments and r e s e r v e  p o s i t i o n ,  
i t  s h o u l d  make a r e p u r c h a s e  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  a p a r t  o r  
a l l  o f  t h e  o u t s t a n d i n g  d r a w i n g . "31
One o f  t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  o f  t h i s  p r o c e d u r e  i s  t h a t  i t
does not.  a l l o w  f l e x i b i l i t y  i n  t he  c o n d i t i o n  o f  repayment  
even where t h e  c o u n t r y  r e s p o n s i b l e  does no t  o n l y  c o n t i n u e  
t o  e x p e r i e n c e  b a l a n c e  o f  payment  d i f f i c u l t i e s  b u t  i t s  
p o s i t i o n  wor se ns .  Thus f o r  example ,  Zambia wh i ch  has 
e x p e r i e n c e d  a c o n t i n u o u s  b a la n ce  o f  payments p rob l ems 
r e s u l t i n g  f r om  poor  copper  p r i c e s  s i n c e  1975,  has had t o  
comply w i t h  t h e  repayment  c o n d i t i o n s  v e r y  r i g i d l y .  Th i s  
has o b v i o u s l y  meant t h a t  i t s  p o s i t i o n  has been a g g r a v a t e d  
d u r i n g  t h e  p e r i o d s  when t h e  r epayments  are due.  A more
f l e x i b l e  p r o c e d u r e  i s  c e r t a i n l y  c a l l e d  f o r  i f  such c o u n t r i e s
are t o  be he lp ed  o u t  o f  t h e i r  p r e s e n t  d i l emma.
( v i i )  Rate o f  i n t e r e s t
A s e r v i c e  c ha rge  o f  0.5% i s  n o r m a l l y  l e v i e d  on a l l  
d r a w i n g s  made under  t h e  CFF scheme. In a d d i t i o n  t o  t h i s
31. E x e c u t i v e  Board d e c i s i o n s  no.  1 0 2 ( 5 2 / 1 1 )  o f  F e b . 13, 1952 
no.  2 7 0 - ( 5 3 / 9 5 )  o f  D e c . 23,  1953 and E x e c u t i v e  Board 
D e c i s i o n  o f  D e c . 29,  1953.
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s e r v i c e  c h a r g e ,  a b o r r o w i n g  c o u n t r y  has t o  pay an i n t e r e s t  
on a l l  o u t s t a n d i n g  b a l a n c e s .  The i n t e r e s t  r a t e  i s  c a l ­
c u l a t e d  on t h e  b a s i s  o f  a s l i d i n g  s c a l e  t h a t  r i s e s  f r om 
4.0% per  annum f o r  l oa ns  o u t s t a n d i n g  f o r  l e s s  than  one 
y e a r ,  t o  a maximum o f  6.0% per  annum on t h o s e  b a la n ce s  
o u t s t a n d i n g  i n t o  t h e  f i f t h  y e a r .  The r a t e  o f  i n c r e a s e  i n  
t he  i n t e r e s t  i s  0.5% f o r  e v e r y  y e a r  t h e r e  i s  an o u t s t a n d i n g  
b a l a n c e .
These c ha r ges  have t h e i r  b a s i s  i n  t h e  IMF a r t i c l e s  o f
agreement  wh i ch  a u t h o r i z e  t h e  Fund t o  l e v y  u n i f o r m  charges
f o r  a l l  members on t h e  average b a la n ce s  o f  t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e
l o c a l  c u r r e n c i e s  h e l d  by t he  Fund i n  excess o f  t h e i r
q u o t a s .  The a r t i c l e s  i n  a d d i t i o n ,  p r o v i d e  f o r  t h e  r a t e
o f  c ha r ges  t o  r i s e  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  l e n g t h  o f  t i m e  t h a t
b a l a n ce s  i n  excess o f  qu o t a  remai n o u t s t a n d i n g  and a l s o  i n
3 2r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  amount o u t s t a n d i n g .
There i s  no d oub t  t h a t  such a h ig h  r a t e  o f  i n t e r e s t  
t en ds  t o  d i m i n i s h  t he  e f f e c t  t he  CFF would o t h e r w i s e  have 
on t h e  member c o u n t r i e s  e x p e r i e n c i n g  b a l a n c e  o f  payments 
p r ob l ems  r e s u l t i n g  f r om s h o r t f a l l s  i n  t h e i r  commodi ty  
e x p o r t s .  For  exampl e ,  Zambia drew f r om  t h i s  f a c i l i t y  a 
t o t a l  o f  SDR 34 m i l l i o n  i n  J anuar y  1983.  I f  t h i s  amount 
i s  s u b j e c t e d  t o  a s e r v i c e  cha r ge  o f  0.5%, t h e  r e s u l t i n g  
c ha r ges  t h a t  wou l d  have t o  be l e v i e d  wou ld  amount t o  about  
SDR 0 .17  m i l l i o n .  In a d d i t i o n  an i n t e r e s t  c ha r ge  o f  between 
4% and 6% o f  t h e  o u t s t a n d i n g  b a la n ce s  wou ld  have t o  be p a i d
32.  E x e c u t i v e  D e c i s i o n  o f  S e p t .  1 974.  IMF Survey  Sept .  30, 
1 974 .
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u n t i l  t he  l oa n  i s  f i n a l l y  d i s c h a r g e d .  A l t h o u g h  i t  i s  
d i f f i c u l t  t o  know f o r  sure  what  t he  o u t s t a n d i n g  b a l ances  
would be i n  t h e  f u t u r e ,  i t  seems u n l i k e l y  t h a t  Zambia would 
be a b l e  t o  d i s c h a r g e  i t s  l oan b e f o r e  t h e  end o f  two or  
t h r e e  y e a r s .  On t h i s  a s s u m p t i o n ,  and u s i n g  4% as t h e  r a t e  
o f  i n t e r e s t ,  i t  wou ld  no t  be o v e r s t a t i n g  t h e  f a c t  i f  one 
v e n t u r e s  t o  su gge s t  t h a t  Zambia would have t o  pay an i n t e r e s t  
r a t e  o f  a n y t h i n g  between SDR 2 m i l l i o n  and SDR 4 m i l l i o n .
I f  t he s e  e s t i m a t e s  are c l o s e  t o  t he  t r u t h ,  t he n  i t  becomes 
o bv io u s  t h a t  t he  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  charged by t h e  IMF l i m i t  
s e v e r e l y  t h e  a c t u a l  r e s o u r c e s  t h a t  are f i n a l l y  made a v a i l a b l e  
t o  a member f a c i n g  a s e r i o u s  s h o r t f a l l  i n  i t s  e x p o r t  o f  
c o m m o d i t i e s .  In o t h e r  words ,  t he  r e s o u r c e s  made a v a i l a b l e  
under  t h e  CFF are i n a d e q u a t e  t o  meet t h e  demands o f  
c o u n t r i e s  whose commodi ty  e x p o r t s  f a c e  c o n t i n u o u s  gloomy 
p r o s p e c t s  on i n t e r n a t i o n a l  m a r k e t s .  The h igh  i n t e r e s t  
r a t e s  c o up l ed  w i t h  s e r v i c e  c harges  m e r e l y  d i m i n i s h e s  t he  
r e s o u r c e s  a v a i l a b l e  t o  t he s e  c o u n t r i e s  even f u r t h e r .  A 
change i n  t h e  r a t e  o f  i n t e r e s t  charged or  a c o mp le te  a b o l i t i o n  
o f  t h e s e  r a t e s  would  go a l ong  way in  making more r e s o u r c e s  
a v a i l a b l e  t o  t h e s e  c o u n t r i e s .  I t  m i g h t  be argued t h a t  
t he  Fund needs t o  l e v y  t he s e  r a t e s  t o  meet i t s  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  
c o s t s  as w e l l  as o t h e r  c o s t s .  T h i s  i s  o b v i o u s l y  t r u e  f rom 
a p u r e l y  economic p o i n t  o f  v i e w .  But  i f  t h e  CFF i s  meant t o  
h e l p  c o u n t r i e s  e x p e r i e n c i n g  e x p o r t  s h o r t f a l l s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s ,  t hen  o t h e r  ways and means o f  mee t i ng  
t h e se  c o s t s  c o u l d  be worked o u t  on a g l o b a l  b a s i s  t o  he lp  i n  
p a r t i c u l a r  t ho s e  c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  c anno t  meet t h e  c h a r g e s .
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One o f  t h e  i m p o r t a n t  t e n e n t s  o f  t he  New I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Order  
i s  a c a l l  f o r  t h e  t r a n s f e r  o f  r e s o u r c e s  f r om  t h e  d eve l oped  
w o r l d  t o  t h e  d e v e l o p i n g  w o r l d .  One way o f  h e l p i n g  t h i s  
p ro ces s  wou l d  s u r e l y  be a scheme w i t h i n  t h e  IMF which  
would  o b l i g a t e  t h e  r i c h  c o u n t r i e s  t o  meet t h e  i n t e r e s t  
r a t e s  t h a t  f a l l  due t o  t h e  IMF f r om poor  c o u n t r i e s  u t i l i z i n g  
i t s  v a r i o u s  f a c i l i t i e s .
V I . Zambia*s  e x p e r i e n c e  w i t h  t h e  CFF
No co ppe r  e x p o r t i n g  c o u n t r y  used t h i s  f a c i l i t y  between 
1963 and 1970,  a p e r i o d  t h a t  had been c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by h igh  
copper  p r i c e s  on t h e  w o r l d  m a r k e t s .  The sh ar p  drop i n  t he  
p r i c e s  o f  copper  t h a t  began i n  t h e  e a r l y  1970s,  has r e s u l t e d  
i n  an i n c r e a s e d  use o f  t h i s  f a c i l i t y  by a l l  m a j o r  copper  
e x p o r t i n g  c o u n t r i e s  i n  t h e  d e v e l o p i n g  w o r l d .
The f i r s t  use o f  t h e  f a c i l i t y  by any m a jo r  copper  
e x p o r t i n g  c o u n t r y  was i n  December 1971 when Zambia drew 
SDR 19 m i l l i o n ,  and e ve r  s i n c e  t he  d r a w i n g s  by th e se  
c o u n t r i e s  has f o l l o w e d  c l o s e l y  t he  ups and downs o f  copper  
p r i c e s  on t h e  w o r l d  m a r k e t s .  The f i r s t  downward t r e n d  i n  
t h e  w o r l d  p r i c e s  o f  c opper  was e x p e r i e n c e d  i n  t h e  f i r s t  
h a l f  o f  t h e  1970s.  As a r e s u l t  o f  t h i s  downward t r e n d ,  a l l  
ma j o r  c opper  e x p o r t i n g  c o u n t r i e s  - C h i l e ,  Peru ,  Z a i r e ,  and 
Zambia had by 1975 made s u b s t a n t i a l  p ur chas es  under  t h i s  
f a c i l i t y .  C h i l e  had pu r chased  a t o t a l  o f  SDR 7 9 . 0  m i l l i o n ,  
Peru SDR 30 .75  m i l l i o n ,  Z a i r e  SDR 28.25 m i l l i o n ,  and Zambia 
SDR 57 .0  m i l l i o n . 33
33. Source o f  f i g u r e s  i s  map on page 306 o f  IMF Survey 
13 Oc t .  1975.
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The c l o s e  c o r r e s p o n d e n c e  between t h e  movement o f  
w o r l d  p r i c e s  and t h e  use o f  t h i s  f a c i l i t y  by copper  
e x p o r t i n g  c o u n t r i e s  can be i l l u s t r a t e d  by t h e  case o f  
Zambia wh i ch  made t h r e e  d r aw i ng s  d u r i n g  t h i s  p e r i o d .
The f i r s t  d r a w i n g  by Zambia was i n  December 1971 and 
i n v o l v e d  SDR 19 m i l l i o n .  T h i s  d r aw i ng  f o l l o w e d  a 34% 
s h o r t f a l l  i n  r e c e i p t s  f r om  copper  e x p e r i e n c e d  t h a t  y e a r  as 
a r e s u l t  o f  a c o m b i n a t i o n  o f  two f a c t o r s ,  t h e  M u f u l i r a  
mine d i s a s t e r  o f  September  1970 which had r educed  p r o ­
d u c t i o n  by 11% and t he  d e c l i n e  i n  w o r l d  co pp er  p r i c e s .
A second d r a w i n g  o f  SDR 19 m i l l i o n  was made i n  August  1972 
as a r e s u l t  o f  t h e  new Fund p o l i c y  t h a t  a l l o w e d  members t o  
i n c r e a s e  t h e i r  o u t s t a n d i n g  d ra w i n gs  up t o  50% o f  t h e i r  q u o t a
i n  any one y e a r  i n  cases o f  a s h o r t f a l l  r e s u l t i n g  f rom
34d i s a s t e r s  o r  m a j o r  e m er g e n c i e s .  The t h i r d  d r a w i n g  o f
SDR 19 m i l l i o n  was made i n  December 1975 f o r  purposes  o f
a l l e v i a t i n g  t h a t  c o u n t r y ' s  b a la n ce  o f  payments p rob l ems
r e s u l t i n g  f r om  a s h o r t f a l l  i n  e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s  s u f f e r e d
i n  t h e  t w e l v e  months en d i ng  June 30,  1975.  In  t h i s  s h o r t f a l l
y e a r ,  t h e  v a l u e  o f  Z am b i a ' s  e x p o r t s  f e l l  by 35% be low t he
35p r e v i o u s  y e a r ' s  l e v e l .  T h i s  d e c l i n e  was a c co un ted  f o r  
e n t i r e l y  by a s t ee p  f a l l  i n  t h e  v a l u e  o f  co ppe r  e x p o r t s  
wh ich  c o m pr i s e  more than  90% o f  Z am b i a ' s  t o t a l  e x p o r t s ,  
r e s u l t i n g  f r om  f a l l i n g  w o r l d  p r i c e s .
34.  P r i o r  t o  t h i s  d e c i s i o n ,  t he  o u t s t a n d i n g  d r aw i ng  in 
such cases was o n l y  25% - see 1 9 6 3 / 19 6 6 / 1 9 69  d e c i s i o n s .
35. i mp  Survey  D e c . 15, 1975.
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The slump t h a t  f o l l o w e d  a f t e r  1975 c r e a t e d  s e r i o u s  
b a l an ce  o f  payments p rob lems f o r  copper  e x p o r t i n g  d e v e l o p i n g  
c o u n t r i e s ,  f o r c i n g  them t o  depend even more on d ra wi ngs  
f r om t h e  CFF. Thus i n  t he  two y e a r s  between 1975 and 1977,  
a l l  t h e  f o u r  ma jo r  e x p o r t e r s  drew s u b s t a n t i a l  amounts f rom 
t h e  f a c i l i t y .  C h i l e  drew SDR 79 m i l l i o n  i n  June 1976,
Peru SDR 61 .5  m i l l i o n  i n  May o f  t he  same y e a r ,  Z a i r e  
SDR 56 .5  m i l l i o n  i n  March 1976,  and Zambia SDR 19 m i l l i o n  
i n  June o f  t h e  same y e a r .
P r e ss u re  has c o n t i n u e d  t o  be e x e r t e d  on t h e  ba lance
o f  payments o f  t he s e  c o u n t r i e s  due to  t h e  c o n t i n u e d  slump
i n  t he  w o r l d  co ppe r  p r i c e s .  Between 1978 and t h e  f i r s t
h a l f  o f  1983,  a l l  t h e  f o u r  c o u n t r i e s  have a ga i n  made
s u b s t a n t i a l  pu r chases  f r o m  t h i s  IMF f a c i l i t y .  Zambia f o r
example has d u r i n g  t h i s  p e r i o d  purchased a t o t a l  o f  SDR 93.3  
36
m i l l i o n ,  a l l  as a r e s u l t  o f  s h o r t f a l l s  i n  i t s  e x p o r t  
r e c e i p t s  r e s u l t i n g  a l m os t  e n t i r e l y  f rom low copper  p r i c e s  
on t h e  w o r l d  m a r k e t s .  T h i s  s i t u a t i o n  has c r e a t e d  some k i n d  
o f  dependence on t h e  IMF Compensatory  F a c i l i t y  by t hese  
c o u n t r i e s .  I t  i s  t h i s  dependence which r a i s e s  s e r i o u s  
q u e s t i o n s  about  t h e  u s e f u l n e s s  o f  t h i s  k i n d  o f  f a c i l i t y .
Amongst  t h e s e  q u e s t i o n s  i s  one t h a t  r e l a t e s  t o  t he  e f f e c t i v e ­
ness o f  t he  scheme i n  s o l v i n g  p roblems f a c i n g  member c o u n t r i e s ,  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  d e v e l o p i n g  ones whose economies depend on t he  
e x p o r t  o f  p r i m a r y  c o mm od i t i e s  such as c o p p e r .  I t  would
I t  pu rchased  SDR 59 .3  m i l l i o n  i n  O c t . 26,  1981 and 
SDR 34 .0  m i l l i o n  on J a n . 10, 1983.
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seem t h a t  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  scheme i s  no t  geared at  
s o l v i n g  t h e s e  c o u n t r i e s '  p rob lems once and f o r  a l l  bu t  t o  
deal  w i t h  t h e  p rob l em i n  a p iecemeal  f a s h i o n .  Th i s  a ppr oach ,  
though h e l p f u l  as a t e m p o r a r y  measure,  t en ds  t o  c r e a t e  a 
dependence by t h e  c o u n t r i e s  co ncer ne d .  To b reak  t h i s  
dependence,  more permanent  measures need t o  be employed 
u s in g  o t h e r  f o r a  s i n c e  t h e  IMF by i t s  v e r y  n a t u r e ,  can 
o n l y  p r o v i d e  p iecemeal  s o l u t i o n s  t o  p rob l ems f a c i n g  
e x p o r t e r s  o f  such c o m m o d i t i e s .
V I I .  E v a l u a t i o n  o f  t he  scheme
The p r i n c i p l e s  b eh i nd  t h e  IMF c ompensa to ry  f i n a n c i n g  
scheme emphasize a t e m p o r a r y  t r e a t m e n t  o f  t h e  b a la nc e  o f  
payments, p rob l ems a r i s i n g  o u t  o f  f l u c t u a t i o n s  i n  t he  w o r l d  
p r i c e s  o f  c o m m o d i t i e s .  T h i s  t e m p o r a r y  approach has meant 
t h a t  t h e  IMF t r e a t s  t h e  p rob l em o f  commodi ty  p r i c e  
f l u c t u a t i o n s  as c a pa b l e  o f  be i ng  s o l v e d  by way o f  r e c e i p t  
s t a b i l i z a t i o n  r a t h e r  t han  p r i c e  s t a b i l i z a t i o n .  Th i s  
approach has r e s u l t e d  i n  t h e  IMF l e a v i n g  t h e  i s s u e  o f  
p r i c e  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  on t h e  s i d e ,  and c o n c e n t r a t i n g  on 
s t a b i l i z i n g  the  e x p o r t  r e c e i p t s  o f  commodi t y  e x p o r t i n g  
c o u n t r i e s  by way o f  comp en sa t i ng  s h o r t f a l l s  i n  t ho se  
r e c e i p t s  as t h e y  a r i s e .  T h i s  approach t h e r e f o r e ,  does no t  
aim a t  a t t a c k i n g  t h e  r o o t  cause o f  t he  commodi ty  p rob l em 
bu t  m e r e l y  seeks t o  a m e l i o r a t e  the  d i f f i c u l t i e s  r e s u l t i n g  
f r om commodi ty  p r i c e  f l u c t u a t i o n s .  I t  i s  u n d e r s t a n d a b l e  
t h a t  t h e  IMF has t ak en  t h i s  approach because i t s  a r t i c l e s  
o f  agreement  c l e a r l y  c ha r ges  i t  w i t h  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i 1i t y  of
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h e l p i n g  member c o u n t r i e s  overcome t e m p o r a r y  d i f f i c u l t i e s  
a r i s i n g  f rom s h o r t f a l l s  i n  t h e i r  e x p o r t  r e c e i p t s .  In 
f a c t  i t  must  be conceded here t h a t  t he  IMF approach 
co up l ed  w i t h  a more permanent  s o l u t i o n  t o  t h e  p rob l em o f  
commodi ty  p r i c e  f l u c t u a t i o n s  shou l d  be t h e  d e s i r e d  goal  o f  
a l l  commodi ty  e x p o r t i n g  c o u n t r i e s .  The p r ob l em however  i s  
whe t he r  t he  IMF t h r o u g h  the  CFF has p l a y e d  i t s  p a r t  i n  
s o l v i n g  t he  commodi ty  p rob l em or  w he t he r  i t  can i mprove 
i t s  p e r f o r m an c e  i n  t h i s  r e g a r d .
F i r s t  o f  a l l ,  t h e  IMF scheme i s  no t  commodi ty  o r i e n t e d  
bu t  i s  based on c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  o f  t he  g l o b a l  b a la n ce  o f  
payments and does not  t h e r e f o r e  concern  i t s e l f  w i t h  t he  
e q u a l l y  c r u c i a l  p rob l em o f  b a la nc e  o f  t r a d e  o r  t h e  e x p o r t  
s i t u a t i o n  o f  a g i v e n  commodi ty  or  group o f  c o m m o d i t i e s .  As 
a r e s u l t  d r aw i n gs  f rom t h e  scheme become dependent  on the  
e f f e c t  t h a t  low commodi ty  p r i c e s  would have on t he  b a l ance  
o f  payments o f  any one g i v e n  c o u n t r y .  Thus even where t he  
p r i c e s  o f  a g i v e n  commodi ty  have shown a downward sw i ng ,  
bu t  f o r  one reason or  a n o t h e r  such a slump does not  
a f f e c t  t h a t  c o u n t r y ' s  b a la nc e  o f  payments p o s i t i o n ,  t hen  no 
use can be made o f  t he  f a c i l i t y .  The p rob l ems o f  commodi ty 
p r i c e  f l u c t u a t i o n s  would be t a c k l e d  more e f f e c t i v e l y  w i t h o u t  
r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  i s s u e  o f  ba la nce  o f  payments .
The second s h o r t f a l l  o f  t he  IMF c ompensa to ry  scheme 
even as a supp l ement  t o  o t h e r  e f f o r t s  i s  t he  f a c t  t h a t  i t  
i n v o l v e s  l oa ns  t o  t h o s e  c o u n t r i e s  whose e x p o r t  c ommod i t i es  
e x p e r i e n c e  low p r i c e s  on t h e  w o r l d  m a r k e t s .  These l oans  
bear  an i n t e r e s t  and are l i n k e d  and l i m i t e d  by r e f e r e n c e
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t o  t he  quo t a  system i n  t he  o r g a n i s a t i o n .  T h i s  means t h a t  
t he  a v a i l a b l e  r e s o u r c e s  t o  member c o u n t r i e s  are f i r s t  
and f o r e m o s t  l i m i t e d  t o  t h e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  such members made 
t o  t he  f u n d .  Thus a s ma l l  c o n t r i b u t o r  can o n l y  e x pec t  t o  
draw so much even though t he  low p r i c e s  f o r  i t s  commodi ty 
m i gh t  be s e r i o u s .  In a d d i t i o n  i t  has to  con te nd  w i t h  p ay in g  
the  normal  IMF i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  which i n  e f f e c t  have a 
t en de nc y  o f  d i m i n i s h i n g  even f u r t h e r  t he  so c a l l e d  compen­
s a t i o n  t h a t  i t  would have o t h e r w i s e  r e c e i v e d .  The sum 
t o t a l  o f  a l l  t h i s  i s  t h a t  t h e  f a c i l i t y  does n o t  appear  t o  
p r o v i d e  adequate  r e s o u r c e s  f o r  c o u n t r i e s  such as copper  
e x p o r t e r s  whose co mmod i t i es  s u f f e r  f r e q u e n t  p r i c e  
f l u c t u a t i o n s .
The IMF Compensa to r y  F i n a n c i n g  F a c i l i t y  does no t  as 
a m a t t e r  o f  p r i n c i p l e  make a p r e f e r e n c e  f o r  d e v e l o p i n g  
c o u n t r i e s .  I t  has tended t o  adhere s t r i c t l y  t o  t he  non~ 
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  p r i n c i p l e s  s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  f o un d  i n  t he  
General  Agreement  f o r  T a r i f f s  and Trade (GATT).  S t r i c t  
adherence t o  t h i s  p r i n c i p l e  has meant t h a t  a l l  members o f  
t h e  o r g a n i s a t i o n  are a b l e  t o  draw f rom t h e  f a c i l i t y  
i r r e s p e c t i v e  o f  t h e  i mpac t  low commodi ty p r i c e s  m i gh t  have 
on t h e i r  economi es .  C o u n t r i e s  as d eve l oped  as I c e l a n d ,  
A u s t r a l i a  and New Zea l and have been a b l e  t o  draw s i d e  by 
s i d e  w i t h  l e s s  d eve l oped  c o u n t r i e s  such as Tan za n i a  and 
Zambia.  And s i n c e  the  amount a c o u n t r y  can draw depends 
on i t s  qu o t a  i n  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  t he  de ve l op ed  c o u n t r i e s  
have drawn h i g h e r  amounts because o f  t h e i r  b i g g e r  q u o t a s .
But  i t  i s  no s e c r e t  t h a t  such c o u n t r i e s  are n o t  as s e r i o u s l y
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a f f e c t e d  by low commodi ty  p r i c e s  as t h e  l e s s  d eve l oped  
c o u n t r i e s  who i n  c e r t a i n  cases depend e n t i r e l y  on such 
c o m m o d i t i e s .  Thus d e s p i t e  t h e  s e r i o u s  economic prob lems 
t h a t  Zambia has fa c ed  i n  t h e  l a s t  decade as a r e s u l t  o f  low 
copper  p r i c e s ,  i t  has o n l y  been ab l e  t o  pu rcha se  f rom t he  
IMF f a c i l i t y  SDR 169.3 m i l l i o n  i n  t he  s i x  p u rcha se s  i t  
has made s i n c e  1971.  T h i s  s ho u l d  be c o n t r a s t e d  w i t h  f o r  
example one d r aw i ng  made by Y u g o s l a v i a  i n  F e b r u a r y  1980 
o f  SDR 138.5 m i l l i o n  and SDR 160 m i l l i o n  p ur chased  by 
Korea i n  J u l y  1980.
V I I .  C o n c l u s i  on
The IMF c ompensa to ry  scheme canno t  on i t s  own p r o v i d e  
a s o l u t i o n  t o  t h e  p rob l em o f  commodi ty  p r i c e  f l u c t u a t i o n s  
bu t  can perhaps  m e r e l y  supp l ement  o t h e r  g l o b a l  e f f o r t s .  But  
even i n  i t s  s u p p l e m e n t a r y  r o l e ,  t he  scheme seems t o  have 
s e r i o u s  f l a w s  wh i ch  i f  a l l o w e d  t o  p e r s i s t  m i g h t  o n l y  be t o  
t h e  d i s a d v a n t a g e  o f  commodi ty  p r o d u c i n g  c o u n t r i e s  i n  d e v e l o p i n g  
c o u n t r i e s .  T h i s  i s  because t h e  r e s o u r c e s  a v a i l a b l e  t o  t he se  
c o u n t r i e s  under  t h e  scheme are v e r y  l i m i t e d  and t h e r e f o r e  
no t  adequate  f o r  them t o  a l l e v i a t e  p rob lems caused by low 
commodi ty  p r i c e s .  A l t h o u g h  t h e  r e s o u r c e s  under  t h e  scheme 
are l i m i t e d ,  t h e s e  c o u n t r i e s  w i l l  a lways be tempted  t o  use 
t h e  f a c i l i t y  because at  l e a s t  i t  o f f e r s  a t e m p o r a r y  r e l i e f  
t o  t h e i r  p r o b l e m s .  T h i s  w i l l  i n e v i t a b l y  r e s u l t  i n t o  an 
o v e r de pe nd en ce .  T h i s  overdependence w i l l  l ea d  t h e s e  c o u n t r i e s  
i n t o  a d eb t  p r ob l em wh i ch  w i l l  no t  be easy t o  overcome 
because t h e y  w i l l  have t o  bor row f rom o t h e r  sou rces  i n  
o r d e r  t o  meet t h e i r  o b l i g a t i o n  t o  t he  IMF.
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A r e s t r u c t u r i n g  o f  t he  IMF t o  co n fo r m t o  t he  g en er a l  
p r i n c i p l e s  i n  t h e  New I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Economic o r d e r  (NIEO) 
i n  o r d e r  t o  d e l i b e r a t e l y  f a c i l i t a t e  t h e  t r a n s f e r  o f  r e s o u r c e s  
f r om t h e  r i c h  c o u n t r i e s  t o  t h e  poor  ones wou ld  seem t o  be 
t he  b es t  o p t i o n  f o r  even t h e  advoc at es  o f  t h e  compensa to r y  
system.
The r e s t r u c t u r i n g  o f  t h e  scheme s ho u l d  seek t o  i n c r e a s e  
t h e  l i m i t s  on t h e  amounts a v a i l a b l e  t o  member c o u n t r i e s  
e x p e r i e n c i n g  b a la n ce  o f  payments p rob lems a r i s i n g  ou t  o f  
t h e  d e c l i n e  i n  t h e  p r i c e s  o f  t h e i r  e x p o r t  c o m m o d i t i e s ,  
S e c o n d l y ,  t h e  r e s o u r c e s  a v a i l a b l e  i n  t h e  scheme s hou l d  be 
used e x c l u s i v e l y  t o  co ve r  s h o r t f a l l s  i n  p r i m a r y  c ommod i t i es  
as opposed t o  s h o r t f a l l s  i n  t r a v e l  and w or k e r  r e m i t t a n c e s .  
F i n a l l y , ,  t h e  r e s t r u c t u r i n g  o f  t he  scheme wou ld  need t o  t a c k l e  
t he  p rob l em o f  t he  r a t e  o f  i n t e r e s t  charged  f o r  t h e  use 
o f  t he  f a c i l i t y  wh ich  does impose f u r t h e r  s t r a i n  on t he  
c o u n t r i e s  u t i l i z i n g  t he  f a c i l i t y .  On t h i s  l a s t  p o i n t ,  
exe mpt i ng  a l l  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  h e a v i l y  dependent  on 
one or  a few c o mm od i t i e s  f o r  t h e i r  e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s  f rom 
p ay ing  i n t e r e s t  on t he  l oans  may go a l ong  way i n  i m p r o v i n g  
t h e  u s e f u l n e s s  o f  t h e  f a c i l i t y  i n  as f a r  as t h e s e  c o u n t r i e s  
are c o n c e r n e d .
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CHAPTER EIGHT
EXPORT EARNINGS STABILIZATION ARRANGEMENTS UNDER THE
LOME CONVENTIONS
I . E q u i t a b l e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  g l o b a l  r e s o u r c e s  
i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law
A more r e c e n t  scheme f o r  t he  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  o f  e x p o r t  
e a r n i n g s  t o  wh ich  Zambia may t u r n  t o  i n  t h e  e ve nt  o f  f l u c t u ­
a t i o n s  i n  t h e  e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s  f r om copper  i s  t h a t  o p e r a t i n g
y ' 'under  t he  Lome C o n v e n t i o n .  The Lome Con v en t i o n  b r i n g s  i n t o  
a s s o c i a t i o n  c o u n t r i e s  f o r m i n g  t he  European Economic 
Communi ty on t h e  one hand and a group o f  A f r i c a n ,  Car[& bean 
and P a c i f i c  c o u n t r i e s  on t h e  o t h e r .  The two groups  o f  
c o u n t r i e s  are r e f e r r e d  t o  h e r e a f t e r  as EEC c o u n t r i e s  and 
ACP c o u n t r i e s .
The c o n c l u s i o n  o f  t h e  Lome C o nv e n t i on s  i n  many ways 
r e f l e c t s  t h e  d e s i r e  o f  t h e  EEC c o u n t r i e s  t o  m a i n t a i n  t h e i r  
sour ces  o f  raw m a t e r i a l s  i n  t he  ACP c o u n t r i e s  and t h e  d e s i r e  
o f  ACP c o u n t r i e s  t o  ensure  t he  e q u i t a b l e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e s o u r c e s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  prob lems 
f a c i n g  p r i m a r y  c o m m o d i t i e s .
One q u e s t i o n  t h a t  a r i s e s  i n  t h i s  r e g a r d  i s  as t o  
w he t he r  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a l e g a l  r i g h t  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law 
o f  access t o  raw m a t e r i a l s  and a l e g a l  r i g h t  o b l i g i n g  
deve l oped  c o u n t r i e s  t o  p r o v i d e  f i n a n c i a l  r e s o u r c e s  t o  t he  
d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s .  D e t e r m i n i n g  t h i s  would  h e l p  to  
put  t he  Lome s t a b i l i z a t i o n  schemes i n t o  i t s  r i g h t f u l  
p e r s p e c t i v e .
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G e n e r a l l y  s p e a k i n g ,  t he  deve l oped  and i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  
c o u n t r i e s  do assume t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  a l e g a l  d u t y  on t he  
d ev e l o pe d  c o u n t r i e s  t o  p r o v i d e  them w i t h  access t o  p r i m a r y  
c o m m o d i t i e s .  T h i s  assumpt ion  was c l e a r l y  b r o u g h t  t o  t he  
f o r e  d u r i n g  1975 when o i l  p r i c e s  were i n c r e a s e d  by OPEC 
members. Most  i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  c o u n t r i e s  condemned t he  OPEC 
measures as a c t s  o f  economic c o e r c i o n  and s abot age  and 
which  c o n t r a v e n e d  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l aw.  There 
i s  however ,  no e v i d e n c e  a t  p r e s e n t  t o  s u p p o r t  such a 
p r e s u m p t i o n .  P r o f e s s o r  B r o w n l i e  s t a t e s  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
law p o s i t i o n  as f o l l o w s :
" Fo r  a w h i l e  i t  would seem t h a t  t h e  f o r m a t i o n  o f  a 
d u t y  t o  make r e s o u r c e s  a v a i l a b l e  t o  t h o s e  s t a t e s  
which  need them would be p r e m a t u r e ,  such a d u t y  would 
need t o  be o f  g e n e r a l  a p p l i c a t i o n  and ca nno t  a p p l y  
to. t h e  o i l  r e q u i r e m e n t  o f  deve l oped  s t a t e s  bu t  no t  
f o r  example ,  t o  t h e  g r a i n  r e q u i r e m e n t  o f  o th e r  
s t a t e s . 1
The s u g g e s t i o n  here would seem t o  be t h a t  i f  such a l e g a l  
r i g h t  o f  access t o  raw m a t e r i a l s  by i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  c o u n t r i e s  
e x i s t e d ,  t hen  such a r i g h t  would have t o  a p p l y  t o  d e v e l o p i n g  
c o u n t r i e s  who wou ld  c l a i m  access t o  f i n a n c i a l  r e s o u r c e s  i n  
i n d u s t r a l i z e d  c o u n t r i e s .
Developing c ou n t r i e s  have also assumed the ex i s ten ce  
of a l ega l  r ight  of  access to f i n a n c i a l  and t e ch no l o g i c a l  
a i d .  This assumption seems to run through a l l  the NIEO 
documents which conta in  numerous r e f er e nc e s  to not ions of  
e q u i t y  and e q u i t a b l e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  resources.  
For example,  the preamble to the C h a r t e r  f o r  Economic 
Rights and d u t i e s  of  S t a t es  dec lares  t h a t :
1. B r o w n l i e ,  I . ,  "Loaves and f i s h e s :  Access t o  n a t u r a l  
r e s o u r c e s  and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l a w . "  An i n a u g u r a l  
l e c t u r e  d e l i v e r e d  a t  LSE in  1978.
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" . . .  i t  i s  a f u nd a me n ta l  purpose o f  t h e  p r e s e n t  
c h a r t e r  t o  promote t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  t h e  NIEO, 
based on e q u i t y ,  s o v e r e i g n  e q u a l i t y ,  i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e ,  
common i n t e r e s t  and c o o p e r a t i o n  among a l l  s t a t e s ,
i r r e s p e c t i v e  o f  t h e i r  economic and s o c i a l  s y s t e m s . "2
" E q u i t y "  as used i n  t h e  NIEO documents convey i d ea s  o f
" f a i r n e s s "  "r i ghteousness"  and " j u s t i c e " .  A l l  these not ions
appear  t o  r e p r e s e n t  moral  i de as  r a t h e r  t han  f a s t  l e g a l
p r i n c i p l e s  t h a t  may j u s t i f y  the e x i s ta n ce  of  a l eg a l  r i g h t
on t h e  p a r t  o f  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  t o  c l a i m  a r i g h t  o f
access t o  f i n a n c i a l  r e s o u r c e s  f rom t h e  d e ve l op ed  and
i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  c o u n t r i e s .
Th i s  r e a s o n i n g  f i n d s  s u p p o r t  i n  a number o f  d e c i s i o n s
made by v a r i o u s  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r i b u n a l s .  On a l l  o c c a s i o n s
when such t r i b u n a l s  have had o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  c o n s i d e r  t he
l e g a l  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  t e rms such as e q u i t y ,  t h e  t r i b u n a l s
have n o t  seen f i t  t o  d e f i n e  such terms b u t  have me r e l y
acknowledged t h e  a p p l i c a b i l i t y  o f  such p r i n c i p l e s  i n
r e l a t i o n  t o  c e r t a i n  s p e c i f i c  i s s u e s .  These i s s u e s  have
i n c l u d e d  d e m a r c a t i o n  o f  c o n t i n e n t a l  s h e l v e s  and t e r r i t o r i a l
a p p o r t i o n e m e n t . For  example ,  i n  t he  case c o n c e r n i n g  t he
j&iversion of the Waters of  the R i v e r  Meuse, Judge Hudson
used t h e  te rm " e q u i t y "  i n  a broad sense o f  an equal  and
f a i r  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  l e g a l  norms t o  s p e c i f i c  f a c t u a l  
3
s i t u a t i o n s .  In a more r e c e n t  case,  t h e  B a r c e l o n a  T r a c t i o n  
case ,  where q u e s t i o n s  o f  d i p l o m a t i c  p r o t e c t i o n  were r a i s e d  
t he  t r i b u n a l  was o f  t h e  v i ew t h a t  t he  n o t i o n s  o f  e q u i t y
2. Char ter  of  Economic Rights  and d u t i e s  of  S t a t e s .
3. The d i v e r s i o n  o f  t he  Wa te rs  o f  R i v e r  Meuse ( N e t h e r l a n d s  
v . B e 1 g Turn) l<? 3*1 j p, p/px S e r i e s  A/B No. 70,  pages 76-77 .
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i m p l i e d  t h e  r e a s o n a b l e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  
l a w . ^  S i m i l a r l y ,  t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Cou r t  o f  J u s t i c e  has 
i n v o k e d  n o t i o n s  o f  e q u i t y  i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  d e l i m i t a t i o n  
o f  c o n t i n e n t a l  s h e l v e s .  Thus i n  t he  Nor th  Sea c o n t i n e n t a l  
s h e l f  case ,  t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Cou r t  o f  J u s t i c e  ( I C J )  
r u l e d  t h a t  a r t i c l e  6 o f  t h e  1958 c o n t i n e n t a l  s h e l f  c o n v e n t i o n  
had n o t  c r y s t a l l i z e d  i n t o  c us to ma r y  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law 
t h e r e b y  b i n d i n g  t h e  Fe d er a l  R e p u b l i c  o f  Germany wh i ch  was 
n o t  a c o n t r a c t i n g  p a r t y  t o  t h e  t r e a t y .  S i nc e  t h e r e f o r e ,  
t h e  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  t he  c o n v e n t i o n  d i d  n o t  g over n  t h e  
d e l i m i t a t i o n  o f  t h e  s h e l f  as between t h e  F e d e r a l  R e p u b l i c  on 
th e  one hand and N e t h e r l a n d s  and Denmark on t h e  o t h e r ,  t he  
c o u r t  c a l l e d  f o r  t h e  d i s p u t i n g  p a r t i e s  t o  use n o t i o n s  o f  
e q u i t y  w i t h  a v i ew  t o  r e a c h i n g  d e l i m i t a t i o n  a g ree me nt s .  In 
t h e  W e s t e r n  Approaches / A r b i t r a t i o n  between t h e  U n i t e d  Kingdom 
and F r a n c e ,  t h e  a r b i t r a l  t r i b u n a l  a l s o  i n v o k e d  n o t i o n s  o f  
e q u i t y  i n  i t s  e f f o r t s  t o  d e l i m i t  t h e  s h e l f  i n  t h e  E n g l i s h  
Chan ne l .  In t h i s  c a s e ,  t h e  t r i b u n a l  emphas ized t h a t :
"The c h o i c e  o f  t h e  method o r  methods o f  d e l i m i t a t i o n  
i n  any g i v e n  case w he t h e r  under  t h e  1958 c o n v e n t i o n  
or  c u s t o m a r y  l aw,  has t h e r e f o r e  t o  be d e t e r m i n e d  i n  
t h e  l i g h t  o f  t h o s e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  and o f  t h e  fu nd a me n ta l  
norm t h a t  t h e  d e l i m i t a t i o n  must be i n  a cco rda nce  w i t h  
e q u i t a b l e  p r i n c i p l e s . "6
From t h e  above s u r v e y  o f  t h e  c a se s ,  two p o i n t s  emerge.  F i r s t ,  
t h a t  no t r i b u n a l  has been p r e p a r e d  t o  d e f i n e  n o t i o n s  o f  
e q u i t y  and t o  s ug ge s t  t h e i r  g e n e r a l  a p p l i c a t i o n  i n  i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  economic  l aw.  Se co nd ly  by t a k i n g  t h i s  a pp r oa ch ,  
t h e  c o u r t s  have c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  doub t s  as t o  w h e t h e r  such
4. The Barcelona T r a c t i o n ,  Light  and Power Company case
(Belgium v. S p a i n ) ,  £ m o ]  i c T  Reports, page 3 at  para 36.
5.  D l b q J l C T  R eports  , page 3.
6 - ( w i l )  IS In te rn a tio n a l L et$ed Mates-ta-Ls , page 397 .
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n o t i o n s  are a p p l i c a b l e  or  not  t o  m a t t e r s  o f  access t o  raw 
m a t e r i a l s  or  f i n a n c i a l  r e s o u r c e s .  Thus a l t h o u g h  t he  
t h r u s t  o f  o p i n i o n  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  r e g a r d i n g  t he  
r e f o r m  o f  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  economic o r d e r  i s  based on 
t h e s e  p r i n c i p l e s ,  i t  appears d o u b t f u l  w h e t h e r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
law r e c o g n i z e s  a d u t y  on any c o u n t r y  t o  p r o v i d e  access t o  
i t s  r e s o u r c e s .  T h i s  be ing  t h e  case,  t h e  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  o f  
e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s  a r r angement s  i n  t he  Lome C o n v e n t i o n  must 
be based on a n o t h e r  p r e m i s e *
1 1 . The European Economic Communi ty A s s o c i a t i o n  p o l i c y  
Ideas f o r  an e f f e c t i v e  system f o r  t h e  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  
o f  e a r n i n g s  f r om  p r i m a r y  commodi ty  e x p o r t s  have 
e v o l v e d  i n  d i f f e r e n t  fo rms  i n  t he  c ou r se  o f  t h e  p as t  two 
decades .  The most  r e c e n t  approach i s  t h a t  f o un d  embodied 
i n  t he  Lome C o n v e n t i o n s  b r i n g i n g  i n t o  a s s o c i a t i o n  t he  EEC 
and a number o f  A f r i c a n ,  C a r i b b e a n ,  and P a c i f i c  c o u n t r i e s  
(ACP c o u n t r i e s ) .  The f i r s t  c o n v e n t i o n  was s i g ne d  i n  Lome, 
Togo on F e b r u a r y  28,  1975 between t he  n i n e  EEC c o u n t r i e s  
on t h e  one hand and 45 ACP c o u n t r i e s  on t h e  o t h e r .  I n i t i a l l y  
t h e  c o n v e n t i o n  was t o  o p e r a t e  f o r  a p e r i o d  o f  f i v e  y e a r s  
wh i ch  p e r i o d  e x p i r e d  on March 1, 1980 g i v i n g  way t o  the  
s i g n i n g  o f  t h e  second Lome C o nv e n t i on  wh i ch  i s  due t o  
e x p i r e  i n  1985.  At  t h e  t i m e  o f  s i g n i n g  o f  t h e  f i r s t  a g r e e ­
ment ,  i t  was p r a i s e d  as p r o v i d i n g  an i m p o r t a n c e  advance i n  
economic r e l a t i o n s  between t h e  d eve l oped  and d e v e l o p i n g  
c o u n t r i e s  i n  t h e  d r i v e  to wa r ds  a new i n t e r n a t i o n a l  economic 
o r d e r .  From t h e  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  t he  p a s t  seven y e a r s ,  t h e r e  
i s  reason t o  d oub t  t h a t  assessment .
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The s i g n i n g  o f  t h e  Lome C on ve n t i on  was i n  many ways,  
a d i r e c t  consequence o f  t he  EEC's a s s o c i a t i o n  p o l i c y  
c o n t a i n e d  i n  p a r t  IV o f  t h e  t r e a t y  o f  Rome and p a r t s  o f  
i t s  i m p l e m e n t i n g  c o n v e n t i o n s .  In t h a t  t r e a t y ,  t h e  purpose 
o f  a s s o c a t i o n  i s  s t a t e d  as:
" . . .  t o  promote t h e  economic and s o C i a l  deve l opment  
o f  t h e  c o u n t r i e s  and t e r r i t o r i e s  and t o  e s t a b l i s h  
c l o s e  economic r e l a t i o n s  between them and t he  
communi t y  as a w h o l e . "7
The a s s o c i a t i o n  p o l i c y  o f  t h e  EEC i s  c h a r a c t e r i s e d  by two 
main e l e m e n t s ,  namely ,  (a)  t h e  p r o g r e s s i v e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  
o f  a f r e e  t r a d e  area between t he  EEC and t h e  a s s o c i a t e d  
c o u n t r i e s  and t e r r i t o r i e s ,  by t he  r e c i p r o c a l  r e d u c t i o n  o f  
t a r i f f s  and q u a n t i t a t i v e  r e s t r i c t i o n s 8 and (b)  t h e  e s t a b ­
l i s h m e n t  o f  a European Development  Fund (EDF) f o r  t h e  purpose 
o f  g r a n t i n g  communi ty  f i n a n c i a l  a i d  t o  t he  a s s o c i a t e d  
c o u n t r i e s  and t e r r i t o r i e s  t o  promote t h e i r  s o c i a l  and 
economic d e v e l o pm en t .
T h i s  a s s o c i a t i o n  p o l i c y  was m o t i v a t e d  by t he  d e s i r e  
o f  t h e  EEC c o u n t r i e s  t o  ensure  t h e i r  c o n t i n u e d  access t o  
raw m a t e r i a l s  i n  t h e i r  f o r m e r  c o l o n i e s  as w e l l  as by t h e i r  
d e s i r e  t o  s a f e g u a r d  t h e i r  mar ke t s  i n  t h o s e  areas  t h r o u g h  
t a r i f f  r e d u c t i o n s .  A l t h o u g h  t h e  r e c i p r o c a l  r e d u c t i o n  o f  
t a r i f f s  may f a c i l i t a t e  a f r e e r  f l o w  o f  t r a d e ,  and the  
a s sumpt ion  i s  t h a t  a s s o c i a t e d  s t a t e s  would g a i n  i n  hav ing  
access t o  EEC mar ke t s  and t h e  EEC would g a i n  i n  h av in g  
access t o  t h e  raw m a t e r i a l s ,  i t  i s  o b v i o u s  t h a t  t h e  a r r a n g e -
7. A r t i c l e  131 o f  t h e  T r e a t y  o f  Rome. For  t h e  t e x t  o f  toe
6 .  S ohtf fedA - Bas i c  documents o f  A f r i c a n  Reg i ona l  1
Organi  z a t i  ons . Volume IV ,  ( p, - * '
8.  See t h e  EEC t r e a t y  o f  Rome, p a r t  IV ,  A r t i c l e s  133 and 
134.  A l s o  A r t i c l e s  1-7 o f  t he  i m p l e m e n t i n g  c o n v e n t i o n .
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ment does no t  g u a r a n t e e  t he  a s s o c i a t e d  c o u n t r i e s  a good 
p r i c e  f o r  t h e i r  c o m m o d i t i e s .  I t  i s  perhaps because o f  t h i s  
f l o w ,  t h a t  t he  Communi ty s e t  up t he  European Deve lopment  
Fund (EDF) as a way o f  r e c i p r o c a t i n g  t h e  advan tag es  t he  
Communi ty s to o d  t o  g a i n  i n  t h e  a s s o c i a t i o n s .  The key 
e l em en ts  i n  t h i s  p o l i c y  t h e r e f o r e ,  are t h e  g r a n t i n g  o f  
p r e f e r e n t i a l  t a r i f f s  t o  t h e  a s s o c i a t e d  c o u n t r i e s  by t he  
EEC as a means o f  a s s u r i n g  i t s e l f  o f  a s t e a d y  f l o w  o f  raw 
m a t e r i a l s  f r o m  t h e s e  c o u n t r i e s ,  and p r o v i d i n g  t h e s e  
c o u n t r i e s  f i n a n c i a l  a i d  t o  i n v e s t  i n  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  o f  
such raw m a t e r i a l s .
T h i s  d e s i r e  by t h e  EEC has h e l ped  t o  shape two schemes 
i n  t h e  Lome C o n v e n t i o n s  wh i ch  aim e i t h e r  d i r e c t l y  or  
i n d i r e c t . l y  a t  t h e  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  o f  e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s  o f  t h e  
a s s o c i a t e d  ACP s t a t e s .  The two schemes are  t h e  p r e f e r e n t i a l  
t r e a t m e n t  o f  t h e s e  c o u n t r i e s '  p r i m a r y  commodi t y  e x p o r t s  
and t h e  more d i r e c t  i ncome s t a b i l i z a t i o n  scheme - compen­
s a t o r y  f i n a n c i n g .  The two schemes are d i s c u s s e d  below i n  
r e l a t i o n  t o  Z a m b i a ' s  e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s  f r om c o p p e r .
I I I .  The r e l e v a n c e  o f  p r e f e r e n c e s  t o  t h e  p r ob l em o f  
commodi ty  e a r n i n g s  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  
P r e f e r e n c e s  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e  r e l a t i o n s ,  by 
t h e i r  v e r y  n a t u r e ,  i n v o l v e  p r o v i d i n g  a more f a v o u r a b l e  
t r e a t m e n t  t o  c e r t a i n  t r a d i n g  p a r t n e r s  i n  p r e f e r e n c e  over  
o t h e r  p a r t n e r s .  Such p r e f e r e n c e s  may be i n  t h e  f o r m o f  
t a r i f f  r e d u c t i o n s  by one c o u n t r y  t o  p r o d u c t s  o r i g i n a t i n g  
f rom a n o t h e r  c o u n t r y ,  o r  may t a k e  t he  f o r m o f  p r e f e r e n t i a l  
access o f  p r o d u c t s  o f  one c o u n t r y  i n t o  t h e  ma rke t s  o f
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a n o t h e r .  In  a l l  t h e  two cases however ,  t h e  t a r g e t  i s  t o  
p r o v i d e  a s e t  o f  s p e c i a l  measures t h a t  wou ld  h e l p  boos t  t he  
t r a d e  o f  a d i s a d v a n t a g e d  p a r t n e r .  T a r i f f  r e d u c t i o n s  would 
h e l p  t h e  d i s a d v a n t a g e d  p a r t n e r  i n c r e a s e  i t s  e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s  
by r e c o u p i n g  t h a t  p a r t  o f  t h e  e a r n i n g s  t h a t  wou ld  have 
been o t h e r w i s e  l o s t  t h r o u g h  t a r i f f s .  S i m i l a r l y ,  p r e f e r e n t i a l  
ma rk e t s  c o u l d  e nsur e  a d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r y  a s t e a d y  marke t  
f o r  i t s  p r o d u c t s  and t h e r e b y  assure  i t  a s t e a d y  f l o w  o f  
e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s .
P r e f e r e n c e s  are u s u a l l y  m a i n t a i n e d  i n  b i l a t e r a l  
t r a d e  agreements  or  m u l t i l a t e r a l  agreements  c r e a t i n g  customs 
u n i o ns  o r  f r e e  t r a d e  a r e a s .  S i nce  t h e  b a s i c  t e n e t  o f  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e  p o l i c y  has been based on t h e  p r i n c i p l e  
o f  n o n - d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  which  i n  i t s  g e n e r a l i s e d  l e g a l  f o rm 
i s  embodied i n  A r t i c l e  I o f  t h e  GATT, p r e f e r e n c e s  have 
been a p p l i e d  o n l y  as an e x c e p t i o n  t o  t h i s  r u l e  o f  non­
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n .  I t  sh ou l d  be noted  t h a t  i n h e r e n t  w i t h i n  
t h e  t e r m " p r e f e r e n c e "  i s  a measure o f  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  
between t r a d i n g  p a r t n e r s  wh i ch  o r d i n a r i l y  would  go c o n t r a r y  
t o  A r t i c l e  I o f  t h e  GATT. But  i t  sh o u l d  be no ted  t h a t  t h e  
GATT does p r o v i d e  a d e p a r t u r e  f rom t he  r i g i d  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  
t h e  r u l e  o f  n o n - d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  i n  A r t i c l e  I t h r o u g h  i t s
customs u n i on  e x c e p t i o n  i n  A r t i c l e  XXIV and more r e c e n t l y
9
i n  i t s  e n a b l i n g  c l a u s e .  A p a r t  f r om p r e f e r e n c e s  accorded 
under  t h e  customs u n i on  e x c e p t i o n  o f  t h e  GATT, b i l a t e r a l  
commerc ia l  t r e a t i e s  t h a t  p r o v i d e  f o r  p r e f e r e n c e s  u s u a l l y  
c o n t a i n  an e x p l i c i t  r e s t r i c t i o n  on t he  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  the
9. For  t e x t  o f  t he  c l a u s e  see GATT Doc. L /4903 o f  
December 3,  1979.
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MFN t r e a t m e n t .  I t  f o l l o w s  o f  cou r se  f rom t h e  f reedom o f  
s t a t e s  t h a t  t h e  w a i v e r  o r  e x c e p t i o n  can be worded i n  a 
v a r i e t y  o f  ways.  An example o f  t he  w or d i ng  o f  such an 
e x c e p t i o n  i n  a commerc i a l  t r e a t y  i s  p r o v i d e d  by an 
agreement  between t h e  S o v i e t  Union and S o m a l i a . ^  Th i s  
agreement  s t a t e s  t h a t :
"The p r o v i s i o n s  o f  ( t h e  m o s t - f a v o u r e d - n a t i o n  c l a u s e )  
s h a l l  no t  a p p l y  t o  advantages  which have been or  
wh ich  may h e r e a f t e r  be accorded by e i t h e r  c o n t r a c t i n g  
p a r t y . "
A n o t h e r  p e r t i n e n t  example i s  Lome I I  wh ich  p r o v i d e s  under  
A r t i c l e  9 p ar ag r ap h  2 ( b )  t h a t :
"The m o s t - f a v o u r e d - n a t i o n  t r e a t m e n t  r e f e r r e d  t o  i n  
s u b pa ra gr ap h  (a)  s h a l l  no t  a pp l y  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  
t r a d e  o r  economic r e l a t i o n s  between ACP s t a t e s  
o r  between one or  more ACP s t a t e s  and o t h e r  
d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s . "
The p r ob l em t h a t  a r i s e s  r e g a r d i n g  p r e f e r e n c e s  and which has
a s e r i o u s  b e a r i n g  on t h e  commodi ty  e x p o r t  s t a b i l i z a t i o n
p r ob l em r e l a t e s  t o  w h e t he r  such p r e f e r e n c e s  are g r a n t e d  on
a r e c i p r o c a l  o r  n o n - r e c i p r o c a l  b a s i s .  For  i f  t h e y  are t o
be g r a n t e d  on a n o n - r e c i p r o c a l  b a s i s ,  t he n  t he  d e v e l o p i n g
c o u n t r y  b e n e f i c i a r y  i s  no t  o b l i g e d  t o  g r a n t  s i m i l a r  f a v o u r s
t o  t h e  donor  d e ve l op ed  c o u n t r y .  In such a s i t u a t i o n ,  i t
i s  c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r y  would be g a i n i n g  the
advan t age  o f  i n c r e a s i n g  i t s  e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s  t h r o u g h  the
payment  o f  l e s s  o r  no d u t y  on i t s  e x p o r t s .  On t h e  o t h e r
hand,  i f  t h e  p r e f e r e n c e s  g i v en  to  such a c o u n t r y  are
dependent  on t h e  r e c i p r o c a l  g r a n t i n g  o f  s i m i l a r  p r e f e r e n c e s
t o  p r o d u c t s  o r i g i n a t i n g  f r o m the  donor  d e ve l op ed  c o u n t r i e s ,
10. Trade and payments agreement  between t h e  USSR and 
S o m a l i a ,  s i g n e d  a t  Moscow on June 2, 1961.  UNTS 
volume 493,  N o . 7214,  page 186.
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t he n  i t  becomes o bv i ou s  t h a t  such p r e f e r e n c e s  as i t  m igh t  
r e c e i v e ,  i n  t h e  mar ke t s  o f  donor  c o u n t r i e s  w i l l  be 
d i m i n i s h e d  by t he  r e v e r s e  p r e f e r e n c e s  i t  i s  o b l i g e d  t o  
o f f e r .
Reverse p r e f e r e n c e s  a l s o  a f f e c t  t h e  e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s  
o f  a b e n e f i c i a r y  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r y  t h r o u g h  p o s s i b l e  
r e t a l i a t o r y  measures by o t h e r  deve l oped  c o u n t r i e s  s i n c e  
such r e v e r s e  p r e f e r e n c e s  are g e n e r a l l y  opposed by t he  
de ve l oped  c o u n t r i e s  because o f  t h e i r  d i s c r i m i n a t o r y  e f f e c t  
on such c o u n t r i e s . D e v e l o p e d  c o u n t r i e s ,  and i n  p a r t i c u l a r  
t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  r e a c t  t o  r e v e r s e  p r e f e r e n c e s  by e x p l i c i t l y  
or  i m p l i e d l y  r e f u s i n g  t o  g r a n t  p r e f e r e n t i a l  t r e a t m e n t  t o  
p r o d u c t s  o r i g i n a t i n g  i n  t h o se  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  
p r o v i d e  such p r e f e r e n c e s  t o  o t h e r  deve l oped  c o u n t r i e s .  The 
adverse  e f f e c t s  t he s e  measures have on t h e  e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s  
o f  t h e  j de v e l op i ng  c o u n t r y  concerned  c anno t  be o v e r l o o k e d  
because a t  t he  end o f  t he  day ,  t he  b e n e f i t s  such a c o u n t r y  
r e c e i v e s  f rom p r e f e r e n t i a l  t r e a t m e n t  i n  one d eve l oped  
c o u n t r y  are o f f s e t  by r e s t r i c t i v e  measures imposed by 
o t h e r  d e ve l op ed  c o u n t r i e s  opposed t o  t h e  g r a n t i n g  o f  
r e v e r s e  p r e f e r e n c e s .  In  t h e  f i n a l  a n a l y s i s ,  r e c i p r o c a l  
p r e f e r e n c e s  p r o v i d e  no t a n g i b l e  h e l p  i n  t h e  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  
o f  a d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r y ' s  e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s  and may i n  f a c t  
p rove  t o  be a c o s t l y  l i a b i l i t y .
A n o t h e r  p r ob l em w i t h  p r e f e r e n t i a l  schemes and which 
may have a b e a r i n g  on t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  commodi ty  e a r n i n g s  
s t a b i l i z a t i o n ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  t h e  case o f  m i n e r a l s ,  i s  
t he  i s s u e  o f  r u l e s  o f  o r i g i n .
11. See f o r  exampl e,  General  Assembly R e s o l u t i o n  3362,
UN GOAR Supp. I a t  page 3.
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The purpose beh i nd  t he  " r u l e s  o f  o r i g i n "  i s  t o  ensure 
t h a t  t h e  e x p o r t s  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y  r e c e i v i n g  p r e f e r e n c e s  have 
a minimum l e v e l  o f  l o c a l  c o n t e n t  when t h e y  a r r i v e  i n  the  
donor  c o u n t r y .  T h i s  means t h a t  t he  p r o d u c t s  on which 
p r e f e r e n c e s  are sought  must be shown t o  have o r i g i n a t e d  i n  
t he  c o u n t r y  t h a t  q u a l i f i e s  f o r  such p r e f e r e n c e s .  These 
r u l e s  are meant t o  a v o i d  a s i t u a t i o n  where p r o d u c t s  f rom 
t h i r d  c o u n t r i e s  o r  w i t h  a s u b s t a n t i a l  c o n t e n t  f r om a t h i r d  
c o u n t r y  b e n e f i t  f r om  p r e f e r e n c e s  t o  which t h e y  are not  
e n t i t l e d .  Many c ommod i t i es  produced i n  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  
c l e a r l y  o r i g i n a t e  i n  t ho s e  c o u n t r i e s .  But  i n  c e r t a i n  
i n s t a n c e s ,  such as i n  t he  case o f  m i n e r a l s ,  t he  p r o c e s s i n g  
s ta ge  may r e q u i r e  t h e  u t i l i z a t i o n  o f  a number o f  i m p o r t e d  
i n p u t s .  . In such a s i t u a t i o n  the  p rob l em o f  t h e  " o r i g i n "  
o f  t he  p r o d u c t s  becomes c r u c i a l .  For  i f  t he  r u l e s  o f  o r i g i n  
f o r  such p r o d u c t s  are v e r y  s t r i c t ,  t h e  e x p o r t i n g  c o u n t r i e s  
c onc er n  would be un ab le  t o  b e n e f i t  f r om p r e f e r e n c e s  u n le s s  
o f  c ou r se  t h e y  choose t o  e x p o r t  such p r o d u c t s  i n  a h i g h l y  
unprocessed  s t a t e .  However ,  i t  i s  common knowledge t h a t  
t h e  h i g h e r  t h e  l e v e l  o f  p r o c e s s i n g  a commodi ty  under goes ,  
t h e  more i t  i s  l i k e l y  t o  f e t c h  a b e t t e r  p r i c e .  S t r i n g e n t  
r u l e s  o f  o r i g i n  may work t o  e x c l u d e  h i g h l y  p r oc ess ed  com­
m o d i t i e s  f ro m t h e  b e n e f i t s  o f  a p r e f e r e n t i a l  scheme, and 
t h e r e f o r e  no t  o n l y  a f f e c t  p o s s i b l e  e a r n i n g s  f ro m such a 
p r o d u c t  bu t  a l s o  work t o  r e s t r i c t  access o f  such p r o d u c t s  
i n  t he  ma rk e t s  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y  p r o v i d i n g  such p r e f e r e n c e s .
A l l  " r u l e s  o f  o r i g i n "  c u r r e n t l y  employed under  v a r i o u s  
p r e f e r e n t i a l  schemes i n  f a v o u r  o f  t he  dev e l op ed  c o u n t r i e s ,  
approach t he  p rob l em w i t h  t he  assumpt ion  t h a t  a l l  p r o d u c t s
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must have undergone processes which t r an sfo rm t h e i r  
s p e c i f i c  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  to a s u b s t a n t i a l  degree.  This  
so c a l l e d  " s u b s t a n t i a l  t r an s f o r m a t i o n "  c r i t e r i a  however,  
is  not f r e e  of ambigui ty and does cause i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  
problems.  I t  is  f o r  t h i s  reason t h a t  a l l  goods e n t e r i n g  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r ad e  have been c l a s s i f i e d  f o r  customs 
purposes i n t o  99 chapters under a system known as the  
nomenclature of  the Customs Co- ope ra t i on  Counc i l  (CCCN). 
These chapters are f u r t h e r  d i v i de d i n t o  f o u r - d i g i t  t a r i f f  
headings.  This c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  r e f l e c t s  the d i f f e r e n c e  in 
c h a r a c t e r  of goods as between one group and the o t h e r .
A movement f r om one c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  t o  t h e  o t h e r  has now 
become t h e  s t a n d a r d  way f o r  d e f i n i n g  " s u b s t a n t i a l  
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n " i n  t he  r u l e s  o f  o r i g i n .  There are however 
i n s t a n c e s  where t h i s  c r i t e r i a  has proved i n a d e q u a t e  and i t  
has been n e ce s s a r y  t o  employ o t h e r  c r i t e r i a .  For  example ,
t he  EEC c o u n t r i e s  employ two o t h e r  c r i t e r i a ,  t h e  so c a l l e d
p e r c e n t a g e  c r i t e r i a  and t he  process  c r i t e r i a .
The p rob l em o f  d e f i n i n g  the  o r i g i n  o f  goods e n t e r i n g  
a p r e f e r e n t i a l  area i s  t h e r e f o r e  a r e a l  one and has a d i r e c t  
b e a r i n g  on t he  i s s u e  o f  e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s  s t a b i l i z a t i o n .
T h i s  i s s u e  w i l l  be d i s c u s s e d  f u l l y  l a t e r  on i n  t he  c h a p t e r .
I V . Background t o  t h e  Lome P r e f e r e n t i a l  scheme
{ i ) P r e f e r e n c e s  under  GATT
The h i s t o r i c a l  background t o  t h e  p r e f e r e n t i a l  scheme 
i n  t h e  Lome C o n ve n t i on  may be t r a c e d  t o  t h e  s i g n i n g  o f  
t he  General  Agreement  on T a r i f f s  and Trade (GATT).
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One o f  t h e  most i m p o r t a n t  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  t h e  GATT i s
t he  so c a l l e d  Mos t -Fa vo ur ed  N a t i o n  C l ause .  Th i s  c l a u s e  as
i t  a p p l i e s  t o  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e  had b e f o r e  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n
o f  GATT, been used i n  e a r l i e r  t r e a t i e s  o f  f r i e n d s h i p ,
commerce,  and n a v i g a t i o n  and had as i t s  main aim p r o v i d i n g
p a r t i e s  t o  such agreements  t r e a t m e n t  no l e s s  f a v o u r a b l e
than t h a t  accorded  by them t o  t h i r d  p a r t y  t r a d i n g  p a r t n e r s .
Wi th  t h e  s i g n i n g  o f  t he  GATT, t h i s  p r i n c i p l e  was g i v en
l e g a l  s a n c t i t y  i n  A r t i c l e  1 o f  t h e  agreement .  The gene ra l
e f f e c t  o f  t h i s  A r t i c l e  i s  w e l l  summed up by t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l
Cou r t  o f  J u s t i c e ,  wh ich  d e s c r i b e d  i t  as r e q u i r i n g ,
" t h e  ma in t en an ce  a t  a l l  t i m e s  o f  f u n da me n ta l  e q u a l i t y  
w i t h o u t  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  among a l l  t h e  c o u n t r i e s  
c o n c e r n e d . " 1 2
The MFN s t a n d a r d  does however ,  have an i n h e r e n t
c o n t r a d i c t i o n  i n  p r e s e n t  day i n t e r n a t i o n a l  economic se t  
✓
up. As Raul P r e b i s c h  p o i n t e d  ou t  a t  t h e  f i r s t  UNCTAD
1 3me et i ng  i n  1964, no m a t t e r  how v a l i d  t h i s  p r i n c i p l e  may 
be i n  t r a d e  r e l a t i o n s  among e q u a l s ,  i t  i s  n e i t h e r  an 
a c c e p t a b l e  nor  adequate  co nc ep t  f o r  g o v e r n i n g  t r a d e  
between c o u n t r i e s  w i t h  unequal  economic power .
I t  i s  f o r  t h i s  reason t h a t  one o f  t h e  c h a l l e n g e s  
posed by t he  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  r e s o l u t i o n s  c a l l i n g  f o r  a 
New I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Economic O r de r ,  has been t h e  r e p l a c e me n t  
o f  t he  n o n - d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  norm i n h e r e n t  i n  t h e  M os t - F a v o u r e d -  
N a t i o n  s t a n d a r d  w i t h  one t h a t  r e c o g n i z e s  t he  n e c e s s i t y  f o r  
p r e f e r e n t i a l  and d i s c r i m i n a t o r y  r e l a t i o n s  between i n
12. R i g h t s  o f  US N a t i o n a l s  i n  Morocco,  ( 1 9 5 2 ) ,  ICJ R e p o r t s ,  
176 a t  192.
13. UNCTAD I d e b a t e ,  1964.
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p a r t i c u l a r ,  d e ve l op ed  c o u n t r i e s  on t h e  one hand and 
d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  on t h e  o t h e r .
I t  s ho u l d  be p o i n t e d  o u t  here t h a t  a l t h o u g h  GATT
had f o r  many y e a r s  p e r m i t t e d  e x c e p t i o n s  t o  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n
o f  t h e  MFN p r i n c i p l e ,  many o f  t he s e  e x c e p t i o n s  were o f  no
p r a c t i c a l  consequence t o  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  dependent
on the  e x p o r t s  o f  p r i m a r y  c o m m o d i t i e s .  T h i s  p o i n t  i s
i l l u s t r a t e d  by two o f  t h e  e x c e p t i o n s .  These e x c e p t i o n s
are p r o v i d e d  by A r t i c l e  X V I I I  wh ich  p e r m i t s  t h e  c r e a t i o n
o f  t a r i f f  s h e l t e r s  w i t h i n  wh i ch  i n f a n t  i n d u s t r i e s  would 
1 4grow,  and A r t i c l e  XXIV wh i ch  p e r m i t s  members o f  a customs 
un ion  o r  f r e e  t r a d e  area t o  g r a n t  c e r t a i n  t a r i f f  p r e f e r e n c e s  
among t he m s e l v e s  t o  t h e  e x c l u s i o n  o f  t h i r d  p a r t i e s .
A l t h o u g h  t h e s e  e x c e p t i o n s  may be o f  i n t e r e s t  t o  c o u n t r i e s  
dependent  on t h e  e x p o r t  o f  p r i m a r y  c o m m o d i t i e s ,  t he  
b e n e f i t s  a c c r u i n g  t o  them t h r o u g h  t h e  e x c e p t i o n s  are l i m i t e d .  
In b o th  c a se s ,  b e n e f i t s  would acc rue  t o  t h e s e  c o u n t r i e s  
i f  t h e i r  m ar k e t s  were b i g  enough t o  absorb  w h a t e v e r  t h e i r  
i n d u s t r i e s  wou l d  p r o du c e .  But  as i t  i s ,  t h e  d e v e l o p i n g  
c o u n t r i e s '  i n d i v i d u a l  ma rke t s  are too  sma l l  t o  s u p p o r t  
any g i v e n  i n d u s t r y  o f  a s u b s t a n t i a l  s i z e .  Even i f  g roups  
o f  c o u n t r i e s  were t o  p u l l  t h e i r  mar ke t s  t o g e t h e r  t h e r e  are 
a number o f  c o n s t r a i n t s  t h a t  would a c t  t o  r educe  the
14. A r t i c l e  I o f  GATT s t a t e s  t h a t
" . . .  any a d v an t a ge ,  f a v o u r ,  p r i v i l e g e  or  
i m m u n i t y  g r a n t e d  by any c o n t r a c t i n g  p a r t y  
t o  any p r o d u c t  o r i g i n a t i n g  i n  or  d e s t i n e d  
f o r  any o t h e r  c o u n t r y  s h a l l  be accor ded  
i mmed ia te  and u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y  t o  a l l  t h e  
l i k e  p r o d u c t s  o r i g i n a t i n g  i n  o r  d e s t i n e d  
f o r  t h e  t e r r i t o r i e s  o f  a l l  o t h e r  c o n t r a c t ­
i n g  p a r t i e s . "
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b e n e f i t s  o f  such a move. Thus f o r  t h e  moment a t  l e a s t ,  
what  t h e s e  c o u n t r i e s  need and are  s e e k i n g  are p r o t e c t e d  and 
p r e f e r e n t i a l  ma rk e t s  f o r  t h e i r  p r o d u c t s .
To s a t i s f y  t h i s  need,  a t t e m p t s  were made t o  seek t he  
amendment o f  A r t i c l e  I o f  t h e  GATT so as t o  a l l o w  t he  g r a n t ­
i n g  o f  p r e f e r e n c e s  f o r  purposes  o f  b o o s t i n g  t h e  deve l opment
1 5p r ocess  i n  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s .  T h i s  a t t e m p t  f ace d  
v i g o r o u s  o p p o s i t i o n  f ro m some d ev e l oped  c o u n t r i e s  and t he  
amendment t h e r e f o r e  f a i l e d  t o  m a t e r i a l i z e .
The f a i l u r e  t o  amend A r t i c l e  I o f  t h e  GATT was f o l l o w e d  
i n  1966 by a more p o s i t i v e  a pproach .  In t h a t  y e a r ,  p a r t  IV 
was added t o  t h e  GATT. T h i s  a d d i t i o n  s t a t e s  i n  p a r t  t h a t ,
" c o n s i d e r i n g  t h a t  e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s  o f  t h e  l e s s  deve l oped  
c o n t r a c t i n g  p a r t i e s  can p l a y  a v i t a l  p a r t  i n  t h e i r  
economic d eve l opmen t  and t h a t  t h e  e x t e n t  o f  t h i s  
c o n t r i b u t i o n  depends on t h e  p r i c e s  p a id  by t h e  l e s s -  
d ev e l o pe d  c o n t r a c t i n g  p a r t i e s  f o r  e s s e n t i a l  i m p o r t s ,  
t h e  volume o f  t h e i r  e x p o r t s ,  and t h e  p r i c e s  r e c e i v e d  
f o r  t h e s e  e x p o r t s ,  . . . "
The GATT members agree t o  t h e  f u l l e s t  e x t e n t  p o s s i b l e  t o
" Ac co rd  h ig h  p r i o r i t y  t o  t h e  r e d u c t i o n  and e l i m i n a t i o n  
o f  b a r r i e r s  t o  p r o d u c t s  c u r r e n t l y  or  p o t e n t i a l l y  o f  
p a r t i c u l a r  e x p o r t  i n t e r e s t  t o  l e s s - d e v e l o p e d  
c o n t r a c t i n g  p a r t i e s  . . .  and i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  r e f r a i n  
f r o m i n t r o d u c i n g ,  o r  i n c r e a s i n g ,  t h e  i n c i d e n c e  o f  
customs d u t i e s  or  n o n - t a r i f f  b a r r i e r s  on such 
p r o d u c t s  and r e f r a i n  f r om new f i s c a l  measures ,  and 
seek t o  e l i m i n a t e  t h o s e  i n  f o r c e  wh i ch  would  
hamper . . .  t h e  g rowth  o f  consumpt i on  o f  p r i m a r y  
p r o d u c t s  i n  raw or  p roc ess ed  f o r m ,  w h o l l y  o r  m a i n l y  
p roduced  i n  t h e  t e r r i t o r i e s  o f  l e s s  d e ve l op ed  
c o n t r a c t i n g  p a r t i e s .  "16
15. See p r o p o s a l s  o f  C h i l e ,  I n d i a ,  B r a z i l  and t h e  U n i t e d  
Arab R e p u b l i c  i n  t h e  Commi t tee on l e g a l  and i n s t i ­
t u t i o n a l  f ramewor k  o f  GATT. GATT Doc. L /2147  o f
24 F e b r u a r y  1964.
16. A r t i c l e  XXXVI para  1 (b )  o f  GATT.
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I n t e r p r e t i n g  A r t i c l e  I o f  t he  GATT i n  t h e  l i g h t  o f  (
t he  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  i t s  p a r t  IV r e s u l t s  i n  a s i t u a t i o n  i n
w hi ch  p r e f e r e n c e s  f o r  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  appear  t o  be
an a c c e p t a b l e  f a c t  w i t h i n  t h e  GATT. The i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
o f  A r t i c l e  I i n  t he  l i g h t  o f  p a r t  IV i s  a l e g a l l y  sound
p r o p o s i t i o n  s i n c e  any r u l e  a c q u i r e s  i t s  f u l l  meaning o n l y
w i t h i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  t h e  o t h e r  p r o v i s i o n s  i n  t h e  c o n v e n t i o n
t h a t  c o n t a i n s  i t .  The ICJ has on many o c c a s i o n s  emphasized
t h i s  approach whenever  i t  was c a l l e d  t o  i n t e r p r e t  t r e a t y  
17p r o v i s i o n s .
The j u s t i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  use o f  p r e f e r e n c e s  t h r o u g h
t h i s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  i s  now r e i n f o r c e d  by an e n a b l i n g  c l a u s e
which  was added t o  t h e  GATT i n  1979.  The main p r o v i s i o n
i n  t h e  c l a u s e  reads  as f o l l o w s :
" N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g  t he  p r o v i  s i on s  of  A r t i c l  e I o f  t he  
Genera l  Agreement ,  c o n t r a c t i n g  p a r t i e s  may accord  
d i f f e r e n t i a l  and more f a v o u r a b l e  t r e a t m e n t  t o  o t h e r  
c o n t r a c t i n g  p a r t i e s . "18
Th i s  p r o v i s i o n  o f  t he  c l a u s e  r e p r e s e n t s  an o f f i c i a l  i n t e r ­
p r e t a t i o n  o f  t h e  a c c e p t a b i l i t y  o f  p r e f e r e n c e s  w i t h i n  t he  
GATT sys tem.  In t h i s  r e s p e c t ,  p r e f e r e n t i a l  schemes in  
f a v o u r  o f  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  members o f  GATT i n s t i t u t e d  
by GATT members i n  t h e  d eve l oped  c o u n t r i e s  may be assumed
17. In PCIJ (1922)  s e r i e s  B numbers 2 - 3 ,  page 23 the  
permanent  c o u r t  s a i d  t h a t :
" I n  c o n s i d e r i n g  t he  q u e s t i o n  b r o u g h t  b e f o r e  
t h e  c o u r t  on t h e  terms o f  t h e  t r e a t y  i t  i s  
e v i d e n t  t h a t  t h i s  shou l d  be examined as a 
who l e  and t h a t  i t s  meaning s h o u l d  n o t  be 
d e t e r m i n e d  o n l y  i n  te rms o f  c e r t a i n  phrases 
wh i ch  ou t  o f  c o n t e x t  can be i n t e r p r e t e d  i n  
more t han  one s e n s e . "
18. For  t h e  t e x t  o f  t h e  d e c i s i o n  see,  GATT Doc. L /4903 
o f  December 3, 1979.
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t o  be c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  GATT p r o v i d e d  t h a t  t h e y  con fo rm 
t o  a number o f  c o n d i t i o n s  s t a t e d  e l se wh er e  i n  t h e  e n a b l i n g  
c l a u s e .
The p r o v i s i o n s  o f  t h e  Lome" C on v e n t i o n s  d e a l i n g  w i t h  
p r e f e r e n c e s  f o r  ACP c o u n t r i e s  must  be u n d e r s t o o d  i n  the  
l i g h t  o f  t he s e  p e r m i s s i v e  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  t h e  GATT. The 
Rome t r e a t y  c r e a t i n g  the  EEC and by v i r t u e  o f  wh i ch  the  
Lome c o n v e n t i o n s  were made p o s s i b l e  c o n t a i n s  p r o v i s i o n s  
which  c l e a r l y  r e f l e c t  t he  GATT approach t o  p r e f e r e n c e s .
( i i ) P r e f e r e n c e s  under  t h e  Yaounde c o n v e n t i o n s
The i mmed i a te  background t o  t h e  p r e f e r e n t i a l  scheme
i n  t he  Lome C on v e n t i o n s  i s  t o  be found i n  t h e  Yaounde
agreements  wh i ch  r e p r e s e n t  t he  f i r s t  a t t e m p t  a t  t h e  EEC
a s s o c i a t i o n  w i t h  a number o f  A f r i c a n  c o u n t r i e s .  The f i r s t
Yaounde agreement  b r o u g h t  i n t o  a s s o c i a t i o n  t h e  o r i g i n a l
s i x  EEC c o u n t r i e s  on t he  one hand and sev en t een  A f r i c a n
s t a t e s  and Madagascar ,  and i t  was co nc lu d ed  on J u l y  20,
1 91963. T h i s  agreement  was renewed f o r  a f u r t h e r  p e r i o d  
o f  f i v e  y e a r s  i n  1969.
One o f  t h e  key e lemen ts  o f  t he  two Yaounde c o n v e n t i o n s  
was t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  a f r e e  t r a d e  area between t he  EEC 
and t h e  a s s o c i a t e d  s t a t e s  t h r o u g h  t he  r e c i p r o c a l  r e d u c t i o n  
o f  t a r i f f s  f o r  i n d u s t r i a l  p r o d u c t s  and a few t r o p i c a l  
p r o d u c t s .  In t h i s  r e s p e c t  t h e  f i r s t  Yaounde c o n v e n t i o n  
p r o v i d e d  t h a t :
19, For  t he  t e x t  o f  t he  Yaounde c o n v e n t i o n ,  see Lou i s  B. 
Sohn { e d . ) ,  Bas i c  Documents o f  A f r i c a n  Reg i ona l  
Organ i z a t  i on”  vo 1 ume I V ,(|Cj-T^ J p.l 53 2 .
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"Goods o r i g i n a t i n g  i n  A s s o c i a t e d  S t a t e s  ( AASM) 
s h a l l ,  when i m p o r t e d  i n t o  member s t a t e s  (EEC),  
b e n e f i t  f rom t he  p r o g r e s s i v e  a b o l i t i o n  o f  
customs d u t i e s  and charges  hav ing  an e f f e c t  
e q u i v a l e n t  t o  such d u t i e s  . . . "
The agreement  p r o v i d e d  f u r t h e r  t h a t ,
" I n  each a s s o c i a t e d  s t a t e ,  goods o r i g i n a t i n g  i n  
member s t a t e s  s h a l l  b e n e f i t  under  t h e  te rms se t  ou t  
i n  p r o t o c o l  no.  1 annexed t o  t h i s  c o n v e n t i o n ,  
f r o m t h e  p r o g r e s s i v e  a b o l i t i o n  o f  customs d u t i e s  
and charges  h av i ng  an e f f e c t  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  such 
d u t i e s  wh i ch  t h a t  a s s o c i a t e d  s t a t e  a p p l i e d  t o  
i m p o r t s  o f  t he se  goods i n t o  i t s  t e r r i t o r y . " 20
Under t he s e  p r o v i s i o n s  i t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  a l l  f a v o u r s
g r a n t e d  by t h e  EEC c o u n t r i e s  t o  t h e  AASM c o u n t r i e s  i n
terms o f  t a r i f f  r e d u c t i o n s  were t o  be r e c i p r o c a t e d  by
s i m i l a r  r e d u c t i o n s  on goods e n t e r i n g  t h e  A s s o c i a t e d
c o u n t r i e s  f r om t h e  EEC e x ce p t  where d eve l opmen t  needs or
r e q u i r e m e n t s  o f  i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n  i n  t h o s e  s t a t e s
n e c e s s i t a t e d  t h e  r e t e n t i o n , i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  customs d u t i e s
21or  s i m i l a r  c h a r g e s .  R e c i p r o c i t y  was t h e r e f o r e  a key 
e lemen t  o f  t he  Yaounde p r e f e r e n t i a l  scheme.
( i i i ) R e c i p r o c i t y  under  t h e  Yaounde c o n v e n t i o n s
The c o n c e p t  o f  r e c i p r o c i t y  as i t  was a p p l i e d  under  
t he  Yaounde c o n v e n t i o n s  worked t o  d i m i n i s h  t h e  v a l u e  o f  
p r e f e r e n c e s  g r a n t e d  t o  t h e  AASM c o u n t r i e s .  The d i m i n i s h i n g  
o f  t h e  v a l u e  o f  p r e f e r e n c e s  g r a n t e d  to  t h e  AASM c o u n t r i e s  
a rose  s i m p l y  because w h a t e v e r  b e n e f i t s  a cc r ued  t o  them as 
a r e s u l t  o f  them were w r i t t e n  o f f  by way o f  p r e f e r e n c e s  
t h e s e  c o u n t r i e s  had t o  acco r d  t he  p r o d u c t s  e n t e r i n g  t h e i r  
c o u n t r i e s  f r om  t he  EEC.
20. See A r t i c l e s  2 (1 )  and (2)  o f  t h e  f i r s t  Yaounde c o n v e n t i o n .
21. I b i d . ,  A r t i c l e s  3 ( 2 )  and 7 ( 2 ) .
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T h i s  u n f o r t u n a t e  s i t u a t i o n  had a r i s e n  under  the  
Yaounde c o n v e n t i o n s  d e s p i t e  t he  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  n o t i o n  o f  
r e c i p r o c i t y  had been a s u b j e c t  o f  severe  c r i t i c i s m  e l s e ­
where i n  t h e  1960s.  The c r i t i c s  o f  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  had 
p o i n t e d  o u t  t h a t  no j u s t i f i c a t i o n  c o u l d  e x i s t  f o r  t he  
deve l op ed  c o u n t r i e s  se ek in g  c o n c es s i on s  i n  t h e  name o f  
r e c i p r o c i t y  each t i m e  t h e y  o f f e r e d  p r e f e r e n c e s  t o  d e v e l o p i n g  
c o u n t r i e s .  In f a c t  i t  was because o f  such c r i t i c i s m s  t h a t  
membersof  t he  GATT r e p l a c e d  t he  p r i n c i p l e  o f  r e c i p r o c i t y  
w i t h  t h e  o p p o s i t e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  non r e c i p r o c i t y  i n  1963.
The d e c i s i o n  t o  r e p l a c e  t he  p r i n c i p l e  o f  r e c i p r o c i t y  i n  
t h e  GATT was made i n  an i n t e r p r e t a t i v e  no te  wh i ch  was 
added t o  A r t i c l e  XXXV, p ar ag r ap h  3 o f  t h e  GATT which  s t a t e s  
t h a t :
"The d eve l oped  c o n t r a c t i n g  p a r t i e s  do no t  e x pe c t  
r e c i p r o c i t y  f o r  commi tment  made by them i n  
t r a d e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  t o  reduce or  remove t a r i f f s  
and o t h e r  b a r r i e r s  t o  t he  t r a d e  o f  l e s s - d e v e l o p e d  
c o n t r a c t i n g  p a r t i e s . "
Wi th  t h i s  d e c i s i o n  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  r e c i p r o c i t y  was t o
a p p l y  o n l y  t o  r e l a t i o n s  between t h e  d eve l oped  c o u n t r i e s .
In v i ew o f  t he  GATT's abandonment o f  t he  p r i n c i p l e
o f  r e c i p r o c i t y ,  t h e r e  seems t o  be no good r eason why the
y
Yaounde c o n v e n t i o n s  sh ou l d  have i n s i s t e d  on t he  a p p l i c a t i o n  
o f  t he  p r i n c i p l e .  The o n l y  reason which t h e  w r i t e r  can 
see,  i s  p r o b a b l y  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  n e g o t i a t i o n s  f o r  t he  
c o n c l u s i o n  o f  t h e  c o n v e n t i o n s  had been w e l l  advanced at  
t he  t i m e  t h a t  t h e  GATT reached  the  c o n c l u s i o n  t o  abandon 
t h e  use o f  r e c i p r o c i t y  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t a r i f f  n e g o t i a t i o n s  
w i t h  t he  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  t he  d e c i s i o n  
has had a g r e a t  i m pa c t  on t he  new scheme found  i n  t h e  
Lome c o n v e n t i o n s .
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( i v ) Reverse p r e f e r e n c e s  under  t he  Yaounde agreements
Connected t o  t h e  i s s u e  o f  r e c i p r o c i t y  i s  t h e  i s s u e  
o f  r e v e r s e  p r e f e r e n c e s .  Trade a r rangement s  under  t h e  two 
Yaounde agreements  were i n  t h e  fo rm o f  a s e r i e s  o f  
i n d i v i d u a l  f r e e  t r a d e  zones between t he  EEC and the  
A s s o c i a t e d  S t a t e s .  T h i s  a r rangement  i n v a r i a b l y  meant 
t h a t  i n  r e t u r n  f o r  d u t y  f r e e  access f o r  t h e i r  p r o d u c t s  
i n  t h e  EEC m a r k e t s ,  t he  A s s o c i a t e d  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  
had to  p r o v i d e  p r e f e r e n t i a l  t r e a t m e n t  t o  i m p o r t s  f r om the  
EEC. The p r o v i s i o n  o f  p r e f e r e n c e s  by t h e  A s s o c i a t e d  
c o u n t r i e s  t o  p r o d u c t s  i m p o r t e d  f rom t he  EEC had t h e  e f f e c t  
o f  c r e a t i n g  r e v e r s e  p r e f e r e n c e s .  Many o f  t h e  AASM 
c o u n t r i e s  co ve red  by t he  Yaounde a r r angement s  were f o r m e r  
c o l o n i e s ' o f  some members o f  t he  EEC, and had a l l  a long  
been p r o v i d i n g  such p r e f e r e n c e s  i n  t h e i r  c o l o n i a l  a r r a n g e ­
ments .  The Yaounde a r r angement s  me r e l y  m a i n t a i n e d  t he  
s t a t u s  quo.  The AASM s t a t e s  had accept ed  t h e  r e v e r s e  
p r e f e r e n c e s  i n  t h e  Yaounde agreements p u r e l y f o ^  p o l i t i c a l  
r easons - t h e y  d i d  no t  w ish  t o  damage t h e i r  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h
t h e i r  f o r m e r  c o l o n i a l  p a r t n e r s  so soon a f t e r  t h e y  ga ined  
2 2i ndependence .
There were two b a s i c  problems t h a t  t h e  Yaounde " r e v e r s e  
p r e f e r e n c e s "  posed.  F i r s t  o f  a l l  t he  r e v e r s e  p r e f e r e n c e s  
worked t o  p r e v e n t  t h e  AASM b uy i ng  f r om t he  ch e ap e s t  sources  
because t h e y  were under  an o b l i g a t i o n  to  g r a n t  p r e f e r e n c e
22. See d i s c u s s i o n  on t h i s  p o i n t  i n  J.  P i n d e r ,  "The
Communi ty and t he  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s :  A s s o c i a t e s  
and o u t s i  ders  1 ,(l^3 jJW nai o f  Common Ma rke t  S t u d i e s ,  
No . I , page 53.
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t o  t he  p r o d u c t s  o f  t h e  EEC c o u n t r i e s .  T h i s  p rob l em i s
o n l y  r e m o t e l y  c onnec ted  t o  t h e  prob lem o f  e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s
s t a b i l i z a t i o n  and we s h a l l  t h e r e f o r e  not  d we l l  on i t .
The second p r ob le m,  however ,  was s i g n i f i c a n t  t o  t he
i s s u e  o f  e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s  o f  t he  a s s o c i a t e d  s t a t e s .  Developed
s t a t e s  o u t s i d e  t h e  EEC o b j e c t e d  t o  t he  g r a n t i n g  o f  r e v e r s e
p r e f e r e n c e s  because by t h e i r  v e r y  n a t u r e ,  t h e y  are d i s c r i m -
against
i n a t o r y  and t h e y  tended t o  d i s c r i m i n a t e  o t h e r  deve l oped  
c o u n t r i e s  i n  f a v o u r  o f  t he  EEC. The r e a c t i o n  o f  t he s e  o t h e r  
d eve l oped  c o u n t r i e s  t o  what  t h e y  r e ga rd e d  as d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  
i s  what  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  t o  t he  i s s u e  o f  t h e  a s s o c i a t e d  s t a t e s  
e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s .  The U n i t e d  S t a t e s  f o r  exampl e ,  passed the  
Trade Reform Act  i n  1974- to  c o u n t e r  t he  e f f e c t s  o f  r e v e r s e  
p r e f e r e n c e s  such as t h o s e  which  were g r a n t e d  t o  t h e  EEC 
by t he  AASM s t a t e s  under  t he  Yaounde ag r eemen ts .  Under 
t h a t  A c t ,  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  d e c i de d  t h a t :
" g e n e r a l i z e d  t a r i f f  p r e f e r e n c e s  w i l l  no t  be g r a n t e d  t o  
any d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r y  wh i ch  accords  p r e f e r e n t i a l  
t r e a t m e n t  t o  t h e  p r o d u c t s  o f  a de ve l op ed  c o u n t r y  
o t h e r  t han  t he  U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  u n l e s s  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  
has r e c e i v e d  a ssu r ances  s a t i s f a c t o r y  t o  him t h a t  
such p r e f e r e n t i a l  t r e a t m e n t  w i l l  be e l i m i n a t e d  
b e f o r e  J anuar y  1, 1976.23
T h i s  k i n d  o f  r e t a l i a t o r y  measure a f f e c t e d  t h e  t r a d e  o f  t he
AASM s t a t e s  t o  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  i n  t h e  sense t h a t  t h e y
were no l o n g e r  a b l e  t o  e x p o r t  t h e i r  p r o d u c t s  t o  t h e  USA
under  p r e f e r e n t i a l  t e r m s ,  u n l e s s  t h e y  abandoned t h e i r
commi tments under  t h e  Yaounde agreements .  The consequences
o f  t h i s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  t o  t ho s e  AASM c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  e x p o r t e d
23. A r t i c l e  6 0 4( 6 )  o f  t he  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  Trade Reform Act  
o f  1973.
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s u b s t a n t i a l  income f rom t h e i r  e x p o r t s  t h r o u g h  h i g h e r  
t a r i f f s .  Had t h i s  approach been f o l l o w e d  by o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  
o u t s i d e  t he  EEC, t he  e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s  o f  t h e  AASM c o u l d  have 
been s e r i o u s l y  a f f e c t e d .
V. P r e f e r e n c e s  under  t h e  Lome Con v en t i o ns
A t r e a t y  embodying wide r a n g i n g  measures o f  economic 
c o - o p e r a t i o n  between t h e  EEC and 46 d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  i n  
A f r i c a ,  t h e  Car ib bea n  and t h e  P a c i f i c  (ACP c o u n t r i e s )  was 
c o nc l ud e d  on F e b r u a r y  28, 1975.  The ACP c o u n t r i e s  i n c l u d e d  
i n  t he  agreement  were the  17 A s s o c i a t e s  i n  t h e  Yaounde a g r e e ­
ments ;  21 commonweal th c o u n t r i e s  i n  A f r i c a ,  t h e  C ar i b b e a n ,  
P a c i f i c ,  and seven o t h e r  A f r i c a n  c o u n t r i e s .  T h i s  Con ve n t i on  
r e p l a c e d  the  Yaounde agreement  and t h e  Arusha agreement  wh i ch  
governed a l i m i t e d  fo r m o f  a s s o c i a t i o n  between t h e  s i x  EEC 
c o u n t r i e s  on t h e  one hand,  and T a n z a n i a ,  Kenya,  and Uganda 
on t h e  o t h e r .  The f i r s t  Lome Con v en t i o n  e x p i r e d  on 1s t  March 
1980 and was r e p l a c e d  by t h e  second Lome C on v e n t i o n  due 
t o  e x p i r e  on F e b r u a r y  28, 1985.  C u r r e n t l y  t h e  c o n v e n t i o n  
i n c l u d e s  over  60 ACP c o u n t r i e s .
Trade p r e f e r e n c e s  accorded  t o  an i n d i v i d u a l  d e v e l o p i n g  
c o u n t r y  or  a g roup  o f  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  by one or  a 
group o f  dev e l op ed  c o u n t r i e s ,  as i s  t he  case i n  t h e  Lome 
C o n v e n t i o n ,  e s s e n t i a l l y  p r o v i d e  advantageous t r e a t m e n t  
q u i t e  d i s t i n c t  f r o m what  t h e  p o s i t i o n  m i g h t  have been i n  
t h e  absence o f  such a p r e f e r e n t i a l  scheme. A p r e f e r e n t i a l  
scheme such as i s  c o n t a i n e d  i n  t he  Lome C on v e n t i o n  t h e r e f o r e ,  
may p r o v i d e  advan tages  t o  a d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r y  i n  the  
sense o f  p r o v i d i n g  such a c o u n t r y  w i t h  some f o rm  o f
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s te a dy  access t o  t h e  m ar k e t s  o f  t h e  deve l oped  c o u n t r i e s  
a t  a low t a r i f f  r a t e .  In t h i s  way p r e f e r e n c e s  do h e l p  the  
d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  r e a l i z e  a s te ad y  and r e a s o n a b l e  e a r n i n g s  
f rom t h e i r  c o m m o d i t i e s .  I f  t h e r e f o r e ,  t r a d e  p r e f e r e n c e s  
worked as d e s i r e d  t h e y  would go a l ong way t o w ar ds  s t a b i l i z i n g  
t he  e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s  o f  p r i m a r y  co mmod i t i es  t h e y  e x p o r t .
The q u e s t i o n  i n  t h i s  r e s p e c t  i s  t h e r e f o r e  w h e t he r  t h e  
p r e f e r e n t i a l  scheme under  t h e  Lome c o n v e n t i o n  has worked 
t owa rds  s t a b i l i z i n g  e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s  f o r  a c o u n t r y  l i k e  
Zambia wh i ch  e x p o r t s  c o p p e r .
P r e f e r e n c e s  are p r o v i d e d  f o r  under  t i t l e  I ,  c h a p t e r  I
o f  t he  c u r r e n t  Lome c o n v e n t i o n ,  which c o n t a i n s  s i x t e e n
a r t i c l e s .  These s i x t e e n  a r t i c l e s  were t h e  most  d i f f i c u l t
a r t i c l e s  f o r  t h e  d e l e g a t e s  t o  agree upon d u r i n g  t h e  l ong
n e g o t i a t i o n s  l e a d i n g  t o  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  o f  t he  c o n v e n t i o n .
One o f  t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  concerned  the
n a t u r e  o f  t h e  p r e f e r e n t i a l  scheme t o  be i n c l u d e d  i n  t he
c o n v e n t i o n .  T h i s  p rob l em was a r e s u l t  o f  t h e  d i v e r s i t y  o f
c o u n t r i e s  i n v o l v e d  as w e l l  as t h e  number o f  e x p o r t  p r o d u c t s
24t h a t  were t o  be c ov ered  by t h e  scheme.
The most i m p o r t a n t  i s s u e s  c overed  by Lome I I  i n  
r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  p r e f e r e n t i a l  scheme a r e ,  access f o r  t he  
ACP goods i n  t he  EEC m a r k e t s ;  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  n o n - r e c i p r o c i t y ;  
access f o r  communi ty  p r o d u c t s  t o  t he  ACP m a r k e t s ;  and the  
r u l e s  o f  o r i g i n .  In t h i s  r e s p e c t  A r t i c l e  2 p ar ag r ap h  1 o f  
t he  c o n v e n t i o n  p r o v i d e s  t h a t :
24.  The C o u r i e r ,  No. 58,  s p e c i a l  i s s u e ,  November 1979, 
page 26.  A l s o  t h e  C o u r i e r ,  No. 31,  s p e c i a l  i s s u e ,  
March 1975,  page 23.
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" P r o d u c t s  o r i g i n a t i n g  i n  t h e  ACP s t a t e s  s h a l l  be 
i m p o r t e d  i n t o  t he  Communi ty f r e e  o f  customs d u t i e s  
and c harges  h av i ng  e q u i v a l e n t  e f f e c t . "25
T h i s  p r o v i s i o n  makes i t  c l e a r  t h a t  a l l  p r o d u c t s  o r i g i n a t i n g  
f r om ACP c o u n t r i e s  are g e n e r a l l y  t o  be exempt f r om  customs 
d u t i e s  and e q u i v a l e n t  c h a r g e s .  Paragraph 2 o f  A r t i c l e  2 
however ,  e x c e p t s  c e r t a i n  a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r o d u c t s  f r om e n j o y i n g  
u n l i m i t e d  d u t y  f r e e  access .  The a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r o d u c t s  
concer ned  are t ho s e  t h a t  come under  t he  EEC common a g r i ­
c u l t u r a l  p o l i c y  wh i ch  seeks t o  ensure  s u f f i c i e n t  income f o r  
f a r m e r s  i n s i d e  t h e  EEC and t o  m a i n t a i n  a b a l a n c e  between 
s u p p l y  and demand o f  t he s e  p r o d u c t s  f o r  t he  consumers i n  
t h e  Communi ty.  These exc ep t ed  a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r o d u c t s  do 
however ,  e n j o y  a more f a v o u r a b l e  t r e a t m e n t  t han  t h e  m os t ­
f a v o u r e d - n a t i o n  t r e a t m e n t  a p p l y i n g  t o  s i m i l a r  p r o d u c t s  f rom 
t h i r d  c o u n t r i e s .
C o n s i d e r i n g  t h e  g e n e r a l i z e d  f r e e  access p r o v i s i o n s  i n  
A r t i c l e  2, i t  wou ld  appear  t h a t  Zambian copper  e n j o y s  f r e e  
access i n t o  t h e  EEC m a r k e t s .  Th i s  f r e e  access however ,  
does n o t  c o v e r  a l l  t h e  copper  e x p o r t s  f r om Zambia because 
o n l y  a c e r t a i n  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  i t s  e x p o r t s  o f  copper  end 
up i n  t he  EEC m a r k e t s .  For  example ,  i n  1979,  Zambia e x p o r t e d  
copper  w o r t h  about  900.7  m i l l i o n  Kwacha, 345,125 o f  which 
e n t e r e d  t he  EEC m a r k e t s .  The copper  t h a t  e n t e r e d  the  EEC 
marke t s  t h e r e f o r e  r e p r e s e n t e d  about  one t h i r d  o f  i t s  t o t a l  
e x p o r t s  f o r  t h a t  y e a r .  The Lome p r e f e r e n t i a l  scheme c ov er s
25. For  t h e  t e x t  o f  t h e  second Lome c o v n e n t i o n  see,  t he
C o u r i e r ,  No. 58,  s p e c i a l  i s s u e ,  1979.
26. The R e p u b l i c  o f  Zambia,  m o n t h l y  d i g e s t  o f  s t a t i s t i c s ,
v o l .  XVI ,  Nos. 1 0 -12 ,  Oc t ober /December  1980 page 23, 
t a b l e s  24 and 2 5 ( a ) .
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o n l y  t h e  t h i r d  o f  Z a mb ia ' s  t o t a l  copper  e x p o r t s ,  and the  
f r e e  access p r o v i s i o n s  t h e r e f o r e  b e n e f i t  Zambia o n l y  i n  
r e l a t i o n  t o  t h i s  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  i t s  e x p o r t s .  For  Zambia 
t o  reap t h e  maximum b e n e f i t  f r om  p r e f e r e n c e s ,  a g l o b a l  
system t h a t  wou ld  c ov e r  a l l  i t s  e x p o r t s  i s  c a l l e d  f o r .
A l i m i t e d  scheme such as t h a t  f ound i n  t h e  Lome c o n v e n t i o n  
i s  u n l i k e l y  t o  s t e a d y  t he  e x p o r t  income o f  t h a t  c o u n t r y  
because t he  b e n e f i t s  i t  g e ts  f r o m the  scheme are  a lmo s t  
c e r t a i n l y  e roded by t h e  u n f a v o u r a b l e  e n t r y  r e q u i r e m e n t s  f o r  
t h e  r e s t  o f  i t s  copper  i n  t h o s e  c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  do no t  run 
p r e f e r e n t i a l  schemes.
( i ) The p r i n c i p l e  o f  n o n - r e c i p r o c i t y
One o f  t he  d i f f i c u l t i e s  t h a t  had a r i s e n  under  t h e  Yaounde 
agreements had been t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t  t h a t  t h e  p r e f e r e n c e s  
accorded by t h e  EEC t o  t he  a s s o c i a t e d  s t a t e s  had t o  be 
r e c i p r o c a t e d  by s i m i l a r  p r e f e r e n c e s  b e i ng  acco r ded  t o  p r o d u c t s  
o f  t h e  EEC c o u n t r i e s  by t he  a s s o c i a t e d  s t a t e s .  On t he  b a s i s  
o f  t h i s  p r i n c i p l e ,  t h e  a s s o c i a t e d  s t a t e s  had t o  remove t h e i r  
t r a d e  b a r r i e r s  f o r  p r o d u c t s  o r i g i n a t i n g  i n  t h e  European 
Communi ty and t o  g r a n t  t o  s o - c a l l e d  r e v e r s e  p r e f e r e n c e s .
Reverse p r e f e r e n c e s  had t h e  e f f e c t  o f  d i m i n i s h i n g  t h e  v a l u e  
o f  p r e f e r e n c e s  g r a n t e d  t o  t h e s e  c o u n t r i e s  by t he  Communi ty,  
and i n v i t e d  r e t a r i a t o r y  measures f rom o t h e r  d e ve l op ed  
c o u n t r i e s  wh i ch  eroded t h e  b e n e f i t s  f rom t h e  scheme even 
f u r t h e r .
I t  i s  t h e r e f o r e  s i g n i f i c a n t  t h a t  t he  Lome c o n v e n t i o n  
p r o v i d e s  under  A r t i c l e  9 pa r ag ra ph  I t h a t :
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" I n  v iew o f  t h e i r  p r e s e n t  deve l opment  needs,  t he  
ACP s t a t e s  s h a l l  no t  be r e q u i r e d  f o r  t h e  d u r a t i o n  
o f  t h i s  c o n v e n t i o n  toassume i n  r e s p e c t  o f  i m p o r t s  
o r  p r o d u c t s  o r i g i n a t i n g  i n  t h e  Communi ty ,  o b l i g a ­
t i o n s  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  t o  t h e  commi tments e n t e r e d  
i n t o  by t h e  Communi ty i n  r e s p e c t  o f  i m p o r t s  o f  
t h e  p r o d u c t s  o r i g i n a t i n g  i n  t h e  ACP s t a t e s ,  under  
t h i s  c h a p t e r " .
T h i s  p a r ag ra ph  makes i t  c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  Lome" c o n v e n t i o n  has 
abandoned t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  r e c i p r o c i t y  i n  f a v o u r  o f  non­
r e c i p r o c i t y .  ACP c o u n t r i e s  l i k e  Zambia are t h e r e f o r e  no t  
o b l i g e d  t o  g r a n t  r e c i p r o c a l  f r e e  access t o  i m p o r t s  f rom 
t h e  EEC i n  r e t u r n  f o r  t h e  f a v o u r a b l e  t r e a t m e n t  t h a t  t h e i r  
p r o d u c t s  r e c e i v e  i n  t h e  EEC m a r k e t s .  The r e s u l t  o f  t h i s  
change i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  copper  i s  t h a t  Zambia no l o n g e r  runs 
f o u l  o f  r e t a l i a t o r y  measures such as t ho s e  c o n t a i n e d  i n  
t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  Trade A c t .  T h i s  means t h a t  e a r n i n g s  
f rom t h e  r e m a i n d e r  o f  i t s  copper  e x p o r t s  t o  o t h e r  d ev e l oped  
c o u n t r i e s  are u n l i k e l y  t o  be a d v e r s e l y  a f f e c t e d  by r e s t r i c ­
t i o n s  t h a t  c o u l d  o t h e r w i s e  have been imposed t o  c o u n t e r  
r e v e r s e  p r e f e r e n c e s  i t  c o u l d  have been o b l i g e d  t o  g i v e  t o  
t h e  EEC. T h i s  o f  c o u r se  does no t  mean t h a t  Zambia i s  assured  
o f  a good p r i c e  f o r  i t s  copper  e x p o r t s ,  b u t  m e r e l y  t h a t  
i t s  access t o  a l l  ma rk e t s  w i l l  t o  a c e r t a i n  e x t e n t  be a s su r ed .  
The s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  i s  t h a t  i t s  e a r n i n g s  
f r om co ppe r  e x p o r t s  t o  c o u n t r i e s  o u t s i d e  t h e  European 
Communi ty w i l l  no t  u n d u l y  be d i m i n i s h e d  by r e s t r i c t i v e  
measures .  In t h i s  r e s p e c t  i t  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  t h a t  t h e  o n l y  
o b l i g a t i o n  on Zambia under  t h e  C o nv e n t i o n  i s  t o  accord  
p r o d u c t s  f r om t he  EEC no l e s s  f a v o u r a b l e  t r e a t m e n t  than t h a t  
wh ich  i t  acco rds  t o  p r o d u c t s  o f  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  i n  t he  
i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  c o u n t r i e s .  ^
27. A r t i c l e  9 para  2 ( a )  o f  Lome I I .
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( i i ) Rules o f  O r i g i n  i n  t h e  Lome Con v en t i o n  v i s - a - v i s  
Zambian copper  e x p o r t s  t o  t he  EEC 
The main o b j e c t i v e  o f  t he  Lome c o n v e n t i o n  i s  t o  
promote “ t r a d e  between t he  ACP s t a t e s  and t he  Communi ty,  
t a k i n g  a cco un t  o f  t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  l e v e l s  o f  d e v e l o p me n t ,
o o
and a l s o  between t h e  ACP s t a t e s  t h e m s e l v e s . "  To a t t a i n  
t h i s  o b j e c t i v e ,  “ p r o d u c t s  o r i g i n a t i n g  i n  t h e  ACP s t a t e s  
s ho u l d  be i m p o r t e d  i n t o  t h e  Communi ty f r e e  o f  customs 
d u t i e s  and c ha r ges  h av i ng  e q u i v a l e n t  e f f e c t . " ^  In o r d e r  
t o  p r e v e n t  t h i r d  c o u n t r i e s  d e f l e c t i n g  e x p o r t s  t o  t he  EEC 
v i a  ACP s t a t e s  and b e n e f i t t i n g  f r om l ow er  t a r i f f s  t han  
the  EEC would  ge t  i n  t ho s e  c o u n t r i e s ,  i t  i s  i m p o r t a n t  t h a t  
r u l e s  e x i s t  t o  d e t e r m i n e  t h e  o r i g i n  o f  t h e  goods b e f o r e  
p r e f e r e n t i a l  t r e a t m e n t  can be g r a n t e d .  The i m p o r t a n c e  o f  
such r u l e s  stem f ro m t h e  f a c t  t h a t  such a d e f l e c t i o n  would 
undermine t h e  EEC's e x t e r n a l  t a r i f f  and c o n s e q u e n t l y  
a f f e c t  t h e  t a r i f f  p r e f e r e n c e s  t he  ACP s t a t e s  r e c e i v e  under  
t he  c o n v e n t i o n .  I t  i s  t h e r e f o r e  i m p o r t a n t  f o r  bo th  t he  
EEC and t h e  ACP s t a t e s  t o  o bser ve  t h e  r u l e s  o f  o r i g i n .
There i s  no doub t  t h a t  an ACP c o u n t r y  l i k e  Zambia 
g a i ns  f r om t h e  p r e f e r e n c e s  i t  i s  accorded under  t h e  Lome 
c o n v e n t i o n  i n  t h e  sense t h a t  i t  earns  more f r om  i t s  e x p o r t s  
t o  t he  EEC t ha n  i t  would have done in  t he  absence o f  such 
p r e f e r e n c e s .  But  i t  i s  a l s o  t r u e  t h a t  Zambia may wish  t o  
i n c r e a s e  i t s  e a r n i n g s  even more by p r o c e s s i n g  i t s  copper
28. A r t i c l e  I ,  T i t l e  I o f  Lome I I .
29.  I b i d . ,  A r t i  c l e  2 { I ) .
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i n t o  p r o d u c t s  t h a t  may f e t c h  a b e t t e r  p r i c e  i n  t ho s e  m a r k e t s .  
In o r d e r  t o  do t h i s ,  i t  may r e q u i r e  t o  use i m p o r t e d  i n p u t s  
f r om t h i r d  c o u n t r i e s .  I t  sh o u l d  be p o i n t e d  ou t  t h a t  even 
t h e  p r o c e s s i n g  o f  a p r i m a r y  commodi ty l i k e  copper  t o  a 
l e v e l  where i t  can e n t e r  w o r l d  markets  may r e q u i r e  t h e  use 
o f  i m p o r t e d  m a t e r i a l .  I t  i s  i n  t h i s  r e s p e c t  t h a t  r u l e s  o f  
o r i g i n  become i m p o r t a n t  i n  e n s u r i n g  t h a t  a minimum o f  l o c a l  
c o n t e n t  i n  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  e x p o r t s  i s  m a i n t a i n e d .  In t h i s  
s e c t i o n  o f  t he  c h a p t e r  we examine t h e  Lome c o n v e n t i o n  r u l e s  
o f  o r i g i n  as t h e y  a f f e c t  Zamb i a ' s  e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s  i n  the  
EEC m a r k e t s .
About  40 per  c e n t  o f  copper  e x p o r t e d  by Zambia e ve ry  
y e a r  e n t e r s  t h e  EEC m a r k e t s ,  and s i n c e  Zambia depends on 
copper  f o r  up t o  95 per  c e n t  o f  i t s  e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s ,  t h i s  
marke t  fo rms a s u b s t a n t i a l  source  o f  i t s  e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s .
The p r e f e r e n t i a l  t a r i f f s  Zambia i s  accorded under  t h e  Lome 
c o n v e n t i o n  t h e r e f o r e ,  f o r m a s i g n i f i c a n t  sou r ce  o f  e x t r a  
e a r n i n g s  which  c o u l d  have been l o s t  i n  t h e  absence o f  t he  
p r e f e r e n c e s .  But  e q u a l l y  t h e r e  i s  no doubt  t h a t  t h r o u g h  
a d d i t i o n a l  p r o c e s s i n g  o f  i t s  c.opper,  Zambia c o u l d  be ab le  
t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e s e  e a r n i n g s  even f u r t h e r .  But  s i n c e  such 
p r o c e s s i n g  i n e v i t a b l y  r e q u i r e s  t h e  use o f  i m p o r t e d  i n p u t s ,
t he  Lome r u l e s  o f  o r i g i n  assume a c r i t i c a l  r o l e .  S t r i n g e n t
©
r u l e s  o f  o r i g i n  may make i t  i m p o s s i b l e  f o r  h i g h l y  p rocessed  
copper  or  copper  p r o d u c t s  b e n e f i t t i n g  f ro m t h e  p r e f e r e n c e s  
i n  t h e  c o n v e n t i o n .  T h i s  may r e s u l t  i n  reduced e a r n i n g s  f o r  
Zambia even t hough  i t s  p r o d u c t s  may have been r e f i n e d  t o  a 
h i gh  l e v e l .  I t  i s  i n  t h i s  c o n n e c t i o n  t h a t  t he  Lome r u l e s  
o f  o r i g i n  w i l l  be d i s c u s s e d  h er e .
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"Ru l es  o f  o r i g i n "  under  t he  Lome c o n v e n t i o n  are s e t  out  
i n  p r o t o c o l  No. I ,  t i t l e  1^0 and are aimed at  e n s u r i n g  t h a t  
p r e f e r e n c e s  g r a n t e d  under  t h e  c o n v e n t i o n  b e n e f i t  e x c l u s i v e l y  
t h e  p r o d u c t s  o r i g i n a t i n g  i n  t he  ACP c o u n t r i e s  cove red  by 
the  c o n v e n t i o n .  I t  s ho u l d  be r e c a l l e d  t h a t  f r e e  access 
g r a n t e d  i n  A r t i c l e  2 pa rag ra ph  1 o f  t he  c o n v e n t i o n  r e l a t e s  
t o  p r o d u c t s  o r i g i n a t i n g  i n  t he  ACP s t a t e s .  P ro d u c t s  r e c o g ­
n i z ed  by t he  c o n v e n t i o n  as o r i g i n a t i n g  i n  t he  ACP s t a t e s  
are s p e l t  ou t  i n  A r t i c l e  1 p ar ag r aph  1 o f  t i t l e  I o f  
p r o t o c o l  N o . I .  T h i s  pa r ag ra ph  reads as f o l l o w s :
" Fo r  purposes  o f  i m p l e m e n t i n g  the  c o n v e n t i o n  and 
w i t h o u t  p r e j u d i c e  t o  paras  3 and 4,  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
p r o d u c t s  s h a l l  be c o n s i d e r e d  as p r o d u c t s  o r i g i n a t ­
i ng  i n  an ACP s t a t e ,  under  t he  c o n d i t i o n  t h a t  t he y  
were t r a n s p o r t e d  d i r e c t l y ,  w i t h i n  t h e  meaning o f  
A r t i c l e  5
{a)  p r o d u c t s  w h o l l y  o b t a i n e d  i n  one o r  more ACP 
s t a t e s
(b)  p r o d u c t s  o b t a i n e d  i n  one or  more ACP s t a t e s
i n  t h e  m a n u f a c t u r e  o f  which p r o d u c t s  o t h e r  than  
t ho s e  r e f e r r e d  t o  i n  (a)  are used,  p r o v i d e d  
t h a t  t h e  s a i d  p r o d u c t s  have undergone 
s u f f i c i e n t  w o r k i n g  or  p r o c e s s i n g  w i t h i n  
t h e  meaning o f  A r t i c l e  3 . "
Among t he  p r o d u c t s  t h a t  t h e  p r o t o c o l  c o n s i d e r s  w h o l l y
o b t a i n e d  i n  c o u n t r i e s  o f  t he  ACP which produce them are
" m i n e r a l  p r o d u c t s  e x t r a c t e d  f rom t h e i r  s o i l  o r  
f r om t h e i r  s e abe d . "  31
I t  i s  c l e a r  f r o m t h i s  p r o v i s i o n  t h a t  copper  p roduced in
Zambia i s  c o n s i d e r e d  as o r i g i n a t i n g  i n  t h a t  c o u n t r y  f o r
purposes o f  t he  r u l e s  o f  o r i g i n .  Th i s  p o s i t i o n  i s  not
a l t e r e d  even t hough  t he  copper  m i gh t  have undergone r e f i n i n g
or  s m e l t i n g  i n  a n o t h e r  ACP s t a t e .  ^2
30 . I b i d . , n o t e  28.
3 1 , A r t i c l e  2 ( a )  o f  p r o t o c o l  N o. I  o f  t h e  second Lome c o n v e n t i o n .
32.  I b i d . ,  A r t i c l e  I pa ra  3.
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Problems a r i s e  however ,  when Zambia w ishes  t o  p rocess  
i t s  copper  u s i n g  i m p o r t e d  m a t e r i a l s  i n  an a t t e m p t  t o  boos t  
i t s  e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s .  For  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  p r o d u c t s  t o  b e n e f i t  
f rom t h e  p r e f e r e n c e s  i n  t he  c o n v e n t i o n ,  a f u r t h e r  c r i t e r i o n  
has t o  be s a t i s f i e d .  T h i s  c r i t e r i o n  r e q u i r e s  t h a t  t he  
p r o c e s s i n g  be shown n o t  t o  have s u b s t a n t i a l l y  t r a n s f o r m e d  
t he  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  t h e  o r i g i n a l  p r o d u c t .  The b a s i c  
p rob l em t h a t  a r i s e s  i n  t h i s  r e g a r d  i s  one o f  d e f i n i n g  
" s u b s t a n t i a l  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n " .  For  t h i s  purpose a l l  p r o d u c t s  
e n t e r i n g  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e  have been c l a s s i f i e d  under  the  
n o m en c l a t u r e  o f  t he  Customs C o - o p e r a t i o n  Counci  1 (CCCN).
Th i s  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  d i v i d e s  p r o d u c t s  i n t o  a number o f  
c a t e g o r i e s  and a movement o f  a p r o d u c t  f r om one c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  
t o  t he  o t h e r  i s  r e g a r d e d  as p r o o f  o f  " s u b s t a n t i a l  t r a n s f o r m a ­
t i o n " .  But  i t  has on o c c a s i o n s  been argued t h a t  a p r o d u c t  
wou ld  change c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  w i t h o u t  n e c e s s a r i l y  h a v i n g  been 
s u b s t a n t i a l l y  t r a n s f o r m e d .  I t  i s  due t o  such p rob l ems t h a t  
t he  Lome c o n v e n t i o n  has supp l emented  t h e  CCN c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  
w i t h  i t s  own so c a l l e d  l i s t  A which c ov e rs  cases o f  p r o d u c t s  
chang i ng  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  w i t h o u t  s u b s t a n t i a l  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n ,  
and l i s t  B wh i ch  c ove rs  p r o d u c t s  which s ho u l d  be c o n s i d e r e d  
s u b s t a n t i a l l y  t r a n s f o r m e d  when t h e y  move f r om one CCCN 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  t o  a n o t h e r .  ^3 The p r o d u c t s  i n  l i s t  A, though 
c hang i ng  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n ,  are  c o n s i d e r e d  no t  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  
t r a n s f o r m e d  f o r  purposes  o f  t h e  r u l e s  o f  o r i g i n ,  w h i l e  l i s t  B 
c ov er s  t ho s e  p r o d u c t s  though  no t  h av i ng  changed c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  
are t o  be r e g a r d e d  as s u b s t a n t i a l l y  t r a n s f o r m e d  f o r  purposes 
o f  t he  c o n v e n t i o n .
33.  See Annex I I  o f  Lome I I  f o r  l i s t  A, and Annex I I I  f o r  
l i s t  B .
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In t h e  case o f  l i s t  A, t h i s  i s  supp l ement ed  by p roc ess es  
wh i ch  are c o n s i d e r e d  no t  t o  c o n f e r  o r i g i n a t i n g  s t a t u s  and t ho se  
t h a t  do.  L i s t  B on t h e  o t h e r  hand i s  supp l ement ed  o n l y  
w i t h  th o se  p r ocess es  t h a t  are t o  be r e ga rd e d  as c o n f e r r i n g  
o r i g i n a t i n g  s t a t u s .  The consequence o f  t h i s  a d d i t i o n a l  
c r i t e r i o n  under  t he  Lome c o n v e n t i o n  i s  t h a t  c e r t a i n  p r o d u c t s  
though h av i ng  changed c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  under  t he  CCN a r r an g em e nt ,  
would no t  q u a l i f y  as o r i g i n a t i n g  i n  ACP c o u n t r i e s  f o r  purposes 
o f  t a r i f f  p r e f e r e n c e s  because t h e y  would no t  be r e g a r d e d  as 
s u b s t a n t i a l l y  t r a n s f o r m e d .
In t he  case o f  c o p p e r ,  l i s t  B s p e l l s  o u t  t h e  p rocesses
and w o r k i n g s  u t i l i z i n g  i m p o r t e d  m a t e r i a l s  t h a t  wou ld  be
c o n s i d e r e d  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  change t h e  c h a r a c t e r  o f  t h e  r e s u l t i n g
p r o d u c t s  a.nd t h e r e f o r e  d eny in g  them o r i g i n a t i n g  s t a t u s  f o r
purposes o f  p r e f e r e n t i a l  t r e a t m e n t .  The p r o ces se s  i n v o l v e d
are s m e l t i n g  o f  copper  m a t t e ;  f i r e  r e f i n i n g ;  e l e c t r o l y t i c
r e f i n i n g  o f  u n r e f i n e d  c o p p e r ;  f u s i o n  and t h e r m a l  t r e a t m e n t
3 4o f  r e f i n e d  c o p p e r .  I t  i s  o bv i ou s  t h a t  t h e  o r i g i n a t i n g  s t a t u s  
. g i v e n  t o  copper  i n  t h e s e  fo rms i s  aimed a t  e n s u r i n g  
t h a t  t h e  copper  p roduced by c o u n t r i e s  l i k e  Zambia i s  e x p o r t e d  
t o  t he  EEC i n  i t s  raw fo r m or  p rocessed  o n l y  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  
n e c es s a r y  f o r  i t s  smooth and easy t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  t o  t he se  
m a r k e t s .  The Lome r u l e s  o f  o r i g i n  t h e r e f o r e  appear  t o  
f a c i l i t a t e  easy access t o  raw m a t e r i a l s  i n  t he  ACP c o u n t r i e s  
by t he  EEC at  cheap p r i c e s  because i t  i s  o b v i o u s  t h a t  r e f i n e d  
copper  f o r  example ,  would f e t c h  l ow er  p r i c e s  than  say copper  
w i r e s  o r  copper  t ubes  and p i p e s .
34. L i s t  B, t a r i f f  head i ng  no. ex 7 4 . 01 .
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The r e s t r i c t i v e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  Lome c o n v e n t i o n  r u l e s  o f  
o r i g i n  i n  as f a r  as copper  p r o d u c t s  are c o n c e r n e d ,  i s  made 
c e r t a i n  by a n o t h e r  c r i t e r i o n .  Under t h i s  second c r i t e r i o n ,  
p r o c e s s i n g  o f  copper  i n t o  w rough t  p l a t e s ,  b a r s ,  w i r e s ,  
powders ,  f l a k e s ,  w i r e  c a b l e s ,  p i p e s ,  and o t h e r  s i m i l a r  
p r o d u c t s ,  ^  a re  t o  be r e ga rd e d  as q u a l i f y i n g  f o r  o r i g i n a t i n g  
s t a t u s  o n l y  i f  t h e  i m p o r t e d  i n g r e d i e n t s  used i n  t h e i r  manu­
f a c t u r e  do n o t  exceed 50 per  c e n t  o f  t he  v a l u e  o f  t h e  f i n i s h e d  
p r o d u c t .
Th i s  v a l u e  added c r i t e r i a  has s e r i o u s  r e s t r i c t i v e  
e f f e c t s  on e f f o r t s  by a copper  p r o d u c i n g  ACP c o u n t r y  l i k e  
Zambia which  m i g h t  seek t o  i n c r e a s e  i t  s e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s  
f rom copper  t h r o u g h  t he  e x p o r t  o f  f i n i s h e d  p r o d u c t s .  Even 
assuming t h a t  l a b o u r  c o s t s  i n  a c o u n t r y  l i k e  Zambia,  are 
l ow,  p r o c e s s i n g  o f  copper  i s  a s e r i o u s  b u s i n e s s  which 
i n v o l v e s  q u i t e  l a r g e  economies o f  s c a l e .  T h i s  i n e v i t a b l y  
w i l l  r e q u i r e  l a r g e  i n p u t s  f r om abroad w e l l  beyond t he  50 
per  c en t  l i m i t  p r o v i d e d  under  t h e  c o n v e n t i o n .  T h i s  can be 
i l l u s t r a t e d  by a s t u d y  c onduc ted  by UNCTAD i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  
t e x t i l e  f a b r i c s .  UNCTAD e s t i m a t e d  i n  t h a t  s t u d y  t h a t  t he  
i m p l i c i t  v a l u e  added,  u s i n g t h e  c o s t  s t r u c t u r e  and t e c h n i q u e s  
o f  p r o d u c t i o n  i n  deve l op ed  c o u n t r i e s ,  was 86% o f  t h e  v a l u e  
o f  t h e  f i n i s h  p r o d u c t .  Yet  t h e  copper  p r o c e s s i n g  i n d u s t r y  
c o u l d  be s a i d  t o  be more s o p h i s t i c a t e d  than  t h e  t e x t i l e  
i n d u s t r y .  ^  i f  t h i s  s t u d y  i s  a n y t h i n g  t o  go by,  i t  i s
35.  L i s t  A, t a r i f f  h ead i ng  nos.  74.03 t o  7 4 . 1 9 .
36.  P r o p o s a l s  f o r  i mprovement  and h a r m o n i z a t i o n  o f  the  r u l e s  
o f  o r i g i n  under  t he  G e n e r a l i z e d  system o f  p r e f e r e n c e s ,  
UNCTAD, Geneva, 1973,  Doc. TD/B/ CS/ WG/ IV) .
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d i f f i c u l t  t o  c o n c e i v e  how a c o u n t r y  l i k e  Zambia c o u l d  p o s s i b l y  
meet t h e  50% r e q u i r e m e n t  i n  t he  c o n v e n t i o n .  I t  would seem 
u n l i k e l y  t h e r e f o r e  t h a t  Zambian processed  copper  p r o d u c t s  
c o u l d  e ve r  b e n e f i t  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  f rom the  p r e f e r e n c e s  i n  
t h e  c o n v e n t i o n .  In t he  f i n a l  a n a l y s i s  i t  i s  s u b m i t t e d  
here t h a t  t h e  r u l e s  o f  o r i g i n  i n  t he  Lome c o n v e n t i o n  would 
appear  t o  be more r e s t r i c t i v e  than  i s  n ec es sa r y  t o  avo id  
t r a d e  d e f l e c t i o n  by t h i r d  c o u n t r i e s ,  and c l e a r l y  work t o  
l i m i t  t he  e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s  o f  a c o u n t r y  l i k e  Zambia.
V I . Compensatory Financing under the
Lome C on ve n t i o n
One o f  t h e  i m p o r t a n t  i n n o v a t i o n s  i n  t h e  Lome c o n v e n t i o n  
i s  t h e  e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  scheme which  aims at  
a l l e v i a t i n g  t he  e f f e c t s  o f  e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s  i n s t a b i l i t y  on 
the  economies o f  t he  ACP c o u n t r i e s .  The s t a b i l i z a t i o n  o f  
e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s  i s  an e x t r e m e l y  i m p o r t a n t  m a t t e r  f o r  the  
ACP s t a t e s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  t ho se  t h a t  depend on a s i n g l e  
e x p o r t  p r o d u c t  and t hus  whose b a l an ce  o f  payments e n t i r e l y  
depends on t he  income f ro m such p r o d u c t s .  The s t a b i l i z a t i o n  
o f  e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s  scheme i n  t he  Lome c o n v e n t i o n  i s  no t  an 
e n t i r e l y  new scheme s i n c e  a s i m i l a r  scheme has been in  
o p e r a t i o n  under  t he  I n t e r n a t i o n l  Monetary  Fund ( IMF)  s i n c e  
1963. Though t h e  c on c ep t  i s  no t  new, i t s  a p p l i c a t i o n  i n  
r e l a t i o n s  between i n d u s t r i a l  and d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  i s  new.
The Lome c o n v e n t i o n  b a s i c a l l y  accords  t h e  ACP c o u n t r i e s  
t h e  " r i g h t "  t o  compensa t i on  whenever  t h e y  e x p e r i e n c e  a sudden 
f a l l  i n  t h e i r  e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s  t h r o u g h  f a c t o r s  such as u n s t a b l e
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p r i c e s  on t h e  w o r l d  marke t s  o r  p r o d u c t i o n  s e t  backs .  Th i s  
p r i n c i p l e  was f i r s t  agreed upon between t h e  EEC on the  one 
hand and t he  ACP s t a t e s  on t h e  o t h e r  a t  t he  K i n g s t o n  
c o n f e r e n c e  O-f ACP and EEC m i n i s t e r s  i n  J u l y  1 974.  The 
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  t h i s  p r i n c i p l e  r e s u l t e d  i n  t h e  i n c l u s i o n  
o f  a scheme commonly known as STABEX i n  t he  f i r s t  Lome 
c o n v e n t i o n .  The second Lome" c o n v e n t i o n  has no t  o n l y  
m a i n t a i n e d  t he  scheme bu t  has i n c l u d e d  an i n n o v a t i o n  des igned  
t o  t a c k l e  the  prob lem o f  e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  
e x p e r i e n c e d  by m i n e r a l  e x p o r t i n g  ACP s t a t e s .  T h i s  i n n o v a t i o n  
i s  code named MINEX or  SYSMIN.
Of a l l  t he  areas t a c k l e d  by t h e  c o n v e n t i o n s  STABEX and 
MINEX have s p e c i a l  r e l e v a n c e  t o  the  problems o f  commodi ty  
p r i c e  f l u c t u a t i o n s  and e a r n i n g s  s t a b i l i z a t i o n .  MINEX c ove rs  
a number o f  m i n e r a l  p r o d u c t s  which i n c l u d e  c o p p e r .  A l th o u g h  
STABEX c ov e rs  m a i n l y  a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r o d u c t s ,  i t s  d i s c u s s i o n  
w i l l  f o rm a u s e f u l  b a s i s  f o r  t he  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  t h e  MINEX 
scheme and i t s  e f f e c t s  on t h e  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  o f  Zamb i a ' s  
e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s .  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  s i n c e  Zambia has r e c e n t l y  
embarked on a programme o f  d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  o f  i t s  economy 
f rom one w h o l l y  dependent  on t h e  e x p o r t  o f  c o p p e r ,  t o  one 
t h a t  w i l l  a l s o  depend on a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r o d u c t s ,  t h e  STABEX 
p r i n c i p l e s  are bound t o  assume i n c r e a s i n g  i m p o r t a n c e  to  
Za mb ia ' s  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  t he  EEC under  f u t u r e  c o n v e n t i o n s . ^
37. " S h o r t  t e rm  c r i s i s  l ong te r m p r o s p e c t s " ,  an i n t e r v i e w  
w i t h  P r e s i d e n t  K. Kaunda, The C o u r i e r ,  n o . 55, May-June 
1979 a t  page 8. P r e s i d e n t  Kaunda emphasized t he  need 
f o r  Zambia t o  u t i l i z e  l and t o
"p r od uc e  our  b a s i c  f o o d s t u f f s  wh i ch  would  enab l e  
us t o  d e ve l op  agro i n d u s t r i e s  and a t  a l a t e r  
s tage  e x p o r t  both  the  a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r o d u c t s  
as w e l l  as p roc ess ed  o n e s . "
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( i  ) STABEX Scheme
L i k e  t h e  IMF c ompensa to ry  f i n a n c i n g  scheme, STABEX's 
main aim i s  t o  h e l p  a l l e v i a t e  t h e  ha rmf u l  e f f e c t s  o f  u n s t a b l e  
e a r n i n g s  f r om commodi ty  e x p o r t s  e x p e r i e n c e d  by t h e  d e v e l o p i n g  
ACP s t a t e s .  U n l i k e  however ,  t h e  IMF scheme wh i ch  co ve r s  t he  
t o t a l i t y  o f  t h e  e x p o r t  p r o d u c t s  Qf a c o u n t r y  e x p e r i e n c i n g  
such d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  STABEX i s  l i m i t e d  i n  i t s  a p p l i c a t i o n  t o  
a s p e c i f i e d  number o f  p r o d u c t s .
STABEX i s  i n  many ways a p r o d u c t  o f  t h e  c o l o n i a l  t r a d e  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  t h a t  e x i s t e d  between f o r m e r  c o l o n i a l  powers i n  
t h e  EEC and f o r m e r  c o l o n i e s  i n  t h e  ACP s t a t e s .  P r i o r  t o  t he  
c r e a t i o n  o f  t h e  EEC, f o r m e r  French c o l o n i e s  i n  A f r i c a  e n jo ye d  
a g u a r a n t e e d  p r i c e  f o r  t h e i r  p r i m a r y  c om mo d i t i e s  i n  the  
French m a r k e t s .  The Rome t r e a t y  c r e a t i n g  t h e  EEC a b o l i s h e d  
t h e se  g u a r a n t e e s  because t h e y  were c o n s i d e r e d  t o  be a v i o l a ­
t i o n  o f  t h e  f r e e  t r a d e  p r i n c i p l e s  embodied i n  t h e  GATT and 
upon which  t h e  EEC was t o  be based.  But  t o  m a i n t a i n  t he  
French l i n k s  w i t h  i t s  f o r m e r  c o l o n i e s ,  t he  EEC made p r o v i s i o n  
f o r  p r o d u c t i o n  and d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  a id  t o  be a cco r ded  t o  
t he se  c o u n t r i e s  as a t r a n s i t i o n a l  measure u n t i l  such a t i m e  
as new measures were worked o u t .  S i m i l a r l y ,  f o r m e r  B r i t i s h  
c o l o n i e s  had p r i o r  t o  B r i t a i n  j o i n i n g  t h e  EEC, e n jo y ed  
p r i v i l e g e d  access t o  t h e  ma rke t s  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  Kingdom. In 
t h i s  r e s p e c t  a number o f  p r e f e r e n c e s  were i n c l u d e d  i n  b i l a t e r a l  
t r e a t i e s  c o n c l u d e d  between t h e s e  Commonweal th c o u n t r i e s  and
325
3 8B r i t a i n .  When j o i n i n g  t h e  EEC, B r i t a i n  l i k e  t h e  French 
demanded s a f e g u a r d  measures t o  p r e s e r v e  t h i s  r e l a t i o n s h i p .
In a c c e p t i n g  t he  French and B r i t i s h  demands,  t he  EEC 
i n c l u d e d  i n  i t s  p r o t o c o l  N o . 22 an ambiguous s t a t e m e n t  i n  
which i t  e xp res sed  w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  s a fe g u a r d  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  
o f  a l l  t ho s e  ACP c o u n t r i e s  whose economies depend t o  a l a r g e  
e x t e n t  on t h e  e x p o r t s  o f  p r i m a r y  p r o d u c t s .  I t  was on t h e  
b a s i s  o f  t h i s  p r o v i s i o n  o f  t he  p r o t o c o l  t h a t  t h e  i s s u e  o f  
e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  arose d u r i n g  t he  n e g o t i a t i o n s  
l e a d i n g  t o  Lome I .  Dur i ng  t he  n e g o t i a t i o n s  t h a t  f o l l o w e d ,  
two i s s u e s  emerged.  The f i r s t  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t he  
s t a b i l i z a t i o n  scheme t o  be i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  scheme, and the
to
second r e l a t e d At he  t y p e  o f  p r o d u c t s  t h a t  were t o  be covered  
by t h e  scheme.
As r e g a r d s  t h e  f i r s t  i s s u e ,  t he  ACP c o u n t r i e s  i n v o l v e d  
i n  the  n e g o t i a t i o n s  c a l l e d  f o r  a s t a b i l i z a t i o n  scheme t h a t  
would c o n t a i n  an i n d e x a t i o n  o f  p r i m a r y  p r o d u c t s  t o  t he  
p r i c e s  o f  i n d u s t r i a l  p r o d u c t s  i n  whose m a n u f a c t u r e  t h e i r  
p r o d u c t s  fo rmed an i m p o r t a n t  i n g r e d i e n t .  In t h i s  way i t  
was hoped t h a t  t h e  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  scheme c o u l d  g u a r a n t e e  t o  
t h e i r  main p r o d u c t s  s t a b l e ,  e q u i t a b l e  and r e m u n e r a t i v e  
p r i c e s  i n  t h e  EEC m a r k e t s .  I f  t h i s  p ro po s a l  had succeeded,  
t he  r e s u l t i n g  scheme would no t  o n l y  have been i n s t r u m e n t a l  
i n  i n c r e a s i n g  t h e  e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s  o f  t h e  ACP c o u n t r i e s  but  
c o u ld  a l s o  have p la ye d  a s i g n i f i c a n t  r o l e  i n  c o u n t e r a c t i n g
3 8 .HMSO^Report o f  t he  i m p e r i a l  economic c o n f e r e n c e  (Ot tawa)  
1932,  Cmd. 4174;  and t h e  r e p o r t  o f  t h e  Commonweal th 
t r a d e  and economic c o n f e r e n c e  ( M o n t r e a l )  1958,
Cmd. 539.
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any g l o b a l  d e t e r i o r a t i o n  i n  t h e  terms o f  t r a d e  o f  p r i m a r y  
p r o d u c t s .  The EEC however ,  r e j e c t e d  t h i s  p r o p o s a l  perhaps 
due t o  i t s  d e s i r e  t o  m a i n t a i n  t he s e  c o u n t r i e s  as a cheap 
source  f o r  i t s  i n d u s t r i a l  raw m a t e r i a l s .
The second ma j or  i s s u e  i n  t he  n e g o t i a t i o n s  f o r  a
commodi ty  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  scheme under  t he  Lome’* c o n v e n t i o n
r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  p r o d u c t s  t o  be i n c l u d e d  i n  t he  scheme,
s i n c e  t h e  EEC had made i t  c l e a r  t h a t  i t  was f i r m l y  opposed
3 Qt o  t h e  i n c l u s i o n  o f  m i n e r a l s  i n t o  t he  scheme. M i n e r a l s  
are r e g a r d e d  by t h e  EEC as s e n s i t i v e  p r o d u c t s  due t o  t h e i r  
i n d u s t r i e s '  heavy dependence on them.  The Communi ty 
t h e r e f o r e  b e l i e v e s  t h a t  any measures aimed a t  t h e  s t a b i l i z a ­
t i o n  o f  e a r n i n g s  f rom th e se  p r o d u c t s  must  be approached on 
a g l o b a l  b.asis.  But  even i n  t he  case o f  a g r i c u l t u r a l  
p r o d u c t s  which  t h e  communi ty  agreed i n  p r i n c i p l e  t h a t  t h e y  
s hou l d  be co ve red  by t he  scheme, f o u r  c r i t e r i a  were agreed 
uponwKich i n  f a c t  worked t o  e x c lu d e  some a g r i c u l t u r a l  
p r o d u c t s  f ro m t h e  scheme. The f o u r  c r i t e r i a  agreed upon 
r e q u i r e d  t h a t  f o r  any a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r o d u c t s  o f  t h e  ACP 
s t a t e s  t o  q u a l i f y  f o r  t he  scheme, t h e y  must  be shown f i r s t ,  
t o  be o f  s i g n i f i c a n t  i m p o r t a n c e  t o  the  employment  prob lems 
o f  t he  c o u n t r y  p r o d u c i n g  i t ;  s e c o n d l y ,  t h a t  such a p r o d u c t  
must  be r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  t he  d e t e r i o r i a t i o n  o f  t h a t  c o u n t r y ' s  
te rms o f  t r a d e ;  t h i r d l y ,  t h a t  t h e  r e c e i p t s  f ro m such a 
p r o d u c t  must  be shown t o  be t r a d i t i o n a l l y  u n s t a b l e  owing t o  
f l u c t u a t i o n s  i n  p r i c e s  a n d / o r  q u a n t i t i e s ;  and f i n a l l y  t he  
l e v e l  o f  dependence on t h e  p r o d u c t  by t h e  ACP s t a t e  concern
39. T h i s  o p p o s i t i o n  has been r e co r d e d  i n  a d e c l a r a t i o n  o f  
t h e  Communi ty annexed t o  t he  m i nu t es  o f  t h e  n e g o t i ­
a t i o n s  l e a d i n g  t o  Lome I I .
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must  be h i g h .  40
Wi th  t h e  r e j e c t i o n  o f  t he  i s s u e  o f  i n d e x a t i o n ,  the  
c r i t e r i a  f o r  t h e  s e l e c t i o n  o f  p r o d u c t s  t o  be c o ve red  by 
th e  scheme became o f  c r u c i a l  i m p o r t a n c e  t o  a l l  ACP s t a t e s .  
These c r i t e r i a  were v e r y  i m p o r t a n t  because t h e y  d e t e r m i n e d  
what  p r o d u c t s  were t o  b e n e f i t  f rom the  scheme and c o n s e ­
q u e n t l y  which  ACP c o u n t r i e s  were t o  b e n e f i t .  Us ing t h i s  
c r i t e r i a ,  a l i s t  o f  t w e l v e  p r o d u c t s  - a l l  o f  wh ich  w i t h  
t h e  e x c e p t i o n  o f  i r o n  o r e ,  were a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r o d u c t s ,  was 
c o m p i l e d .  Under t h e  second Lome c o n v e n t i o n  however ,  the  
scope o f  t h e  STABEX scheme has been ex tended t o  c o v e r  
a d d i t i o n a l  p r o d u c t s ,  and the  l i s t  now exceeds 44 p r o d u c t s  
a l t h o u g h  i r o n  ore  remai ns  the  o n l y  m i n e r a l  co ve red  by 
STABEX. 41 .
{ a ) Pr£d^c_t £ 0V£r.age
STABEX under  t he  c u r r e n t  Lome c o n v e n t i o n  c ov e rs  o n l y  
t hose  p r o d u c t s  s p e c i f i e d  i n  A r t i c l e  17, and wh i ch  p r o d u c t s  
were s e l e c t e d  u s i n g  t h e  c r i t e r i a  d i s c u s s e d  above.  The 
p r o d u c t s  co ve red  are d i v i d e d  i n t o  t w e l v e  c a t e g o r i e s  namely ,  
g r o u n d n u t  p r o d u c t s ,  cocoa p r o d u c t s ,  c o f f e e  p r o d u c t s ,  coconu t  
p r o d u c t s ,  palm nu t  and k e r n e l  p r o d u c t s ,  raw h i d e s  and s k i n s ,  
wood p r o d u c t s ,  f r e s h  bananas,  t e a ,  raw s i s a l ,  and i r o n  o r e .  
None o f  t he  p r o d u c t s  c ove red  i n  t h i s  s h o r t  l i s t  o f  any 
r e l e v a n c e  t o  Zambia which  e x p o r t s  m a i n l y  c o p pe r .
40.  For  a f u r t h e r  d i s c u s s i o n  on t he se  c r i t e r i a ,  see 
"ACP-EEC M i n i s t e r i a l  c o n fe r en c e?  The C o u r i e r ,  No.
3,  s p e c i a l  i s s u e ,  March 1975.
41.  I b i d .  no te  28.
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The e x c l u s i o n  o f  m i n e r a l s  f rom STABEX r e f l e c t s  the
Communi ty ' s  concern  w i t h  t he  s e c u r i t y  o f  m i n e r a l  s u p p l i e s
f rom t h e  ACP s t a t e s .  Th i s  concern  had become a p pa re n t
b e g i n n i n g  i n  t h e  1960s when t h e r e  was a marked d e c l i n e  i n
European i n v e s t m e n t  i n  m i n i n g  v e n t u r e s  i n  t he  d e v e l o p i n g  
42c o u n t r i e s .  T h i s  same concern  e x p l a i n s  t he  i n n o v a t i o n  i n  
t he  second Lome c o n v e n t i o n  - t h e  so c a l l e d  MINEX ( o r  SYSMIN) 
which i s  d i r e c t e d  towa rds  m a i n t a i n i n g  t he  p r o d u c t i o n  o f  
m i n e r a l s  i n  t h e  ACP s t a t e s  f o r  t he  European mar ke t s  r a t h e r  
t han  t h e  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  o f  t he  e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s  o f  t ho se  
c o u n t r i e s  who depend on t h e  e x p o r t  o f  t he  m i n e r a l s .  MINEX 
w i l l  be d i s c u s s e d  l a t e r  on i n  t he  c h a p t e r .
The e x c l u s i o n  o f  a number o f  p r o d u c t s  upon which 
c e r t a i n  c o u n t r i e s '  economies depend t o  a l a r g e  e x t e n t  
does i n  f a c t  e x c l u d e  such c o u n t r i e s  f r om t he  b e n e f i t s  o f  
t he  scheme. The p o s i t i o n  o f  t he  ACP c o u n t r i e s  ex c l ud ed  
f rom t h e  STABEX scheme i s  summed up w e l l  by t h e  P r e s i d e n t  
o f  Zambia Dr .  Kaunda,  when asked t o  g i v e  h i s  c o u n t r y ' s  
v iews o f  STABEX. In h i s  r e p l y  he s t a t e d  t h a t :
" . . .  i n  t e rms o f  t he  new n e g o t i a t i o n s ,  we are v e r y  
much i n t e r e s t e d  i n  t he  STABEX scheme. We would 
l i k e  c o u n t r i e s  l i k e  Zambia,  who produce m i n e r a l s  
l i k e  copper  and so on,  t o  be c o n s i d e r e d  i n  t h e  
same way as t ho se  who produce a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r o d u c t s .  
A f t e r  a l l  we are a l s o  d e v e l o p i n g  and f o r  m i n e r a l s  
we somet imes Kcive p r i c e s  which  f a l l ,  as i s  t h e  
case now, so we need a s s i s t a n c e . "  43
Thus a l t h o u g h  STABEX i s  aimed a t  e n s u r i n g  s t a b i l i t y  o f  t he
ACP c o u n t r i e s '  e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s  f rom co mmod i t i es  upon which
t h e i r  economies depend,  t h e  e x c l u s i o n  o f  m i n e r a l s  r a i s e s
42. For a d e t a i l e d  d i s c u s s i o n  on t he  d e c l i n e  see A l a i n  
Dangeard,  "European m i n i n g  i n v e s t m e n t  i n  t h e  d e v e l o p i n g  
c o u n t r i e s " ,  The C o u r i e r ,  n o . 49,  May-June 1978 a t  p . 59.
43.  See above,  no te  40.
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doubt s  on t h e  v a l u e  o f  such a scheme v i s - a - v i s  m i n e r a l  
e x p o r t  dependent  c o u n t r i e s  l i k e  Zambia.
P r o v i s i o n  i s  made under  t h e  c u r r e n t  c o n v e n t i o n  f o r  
t h e  i n c l u s i o n  o f  more p r o d u c t s  i n t o  t h e  scheme i f  a r e q u e s t  
was made by one or  more ACP s t a t e s . ^  But  t h i s  p r o v i s i o n  
does no t  seem t o  be e a s i l y  imp l ement ed  because t h e  f i n a l  
d e c i s i o n  t o  i n c l u d e  or  e x c l u d e  a p r o d u c t  v e s t s  i n  t he  
EEC c o u n c i l  o f  M i n i s t e r s .  The d i f f i c u l t y  o f  i m p l e m e n t i n g  
t h i s  p r o v i s i o n ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  m i n e r a l s  
became a p p a r e n t  i n  t h e  f i r s t  y e a r  o f  t h e  l i f e  o f  t h e  f i r s t  
Lome c o n v e n t i o n .  The C o u n c i l  o f  M i n i s t e r s  o f  t h e  ACP 
c o u n t r i e s  me e t i n g  i n  F i j i ,  d e c id e d  t o  i n v o k e  t h e  p r o v i s i o n  
and seek t h e  i n c l u s i o n  i n t o  STABEX o f  among o t h e r  p r o d u c t s ,
A C
ph ospha tes  and c o p p e r .  0 In r esponse  t o  t h i s  r e q u e s t ,  t h e  
EEC C o u n c i l  o f  M i n i s t e r s  a d v i s e d  a g a i n s t  t h e  e x t e n s i o n  o f  
t h e  l i s t  o f  p r o d u c t s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  w i t h  m i n e r a l s  because 
i t  c l a i m e d  t h a t  such an e x t e n s i o n  m i g h t  go f a r  beyond t h e  
p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f f e r e d  by t h e  c o n v e n t i o n .  T h i s  c l e a r l y  
i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  STABEX i s  no t  meant t o  c a t e r  f o r  m i n e r a l  
e x p o r t i n g  ACP c o u n t r i e s ,  and hence t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  a 
new scheme i n  t h e  second Lome c o n v e n t i o n .
For  t h o s e  c o u n t r i e s  whose p r o d u c t s  are c o v e r ed  under  
t he  scheme, a n o t h e r  h u r d l e  has t o  be c l e a r e d  b e f o r e  f i n a n c i a l  
s u p p o r t  can be made a v a i l a b l e  t o  them.  L i k e  i n  t h e  case o f  
t h e  IMF comp en sa to ry  f i n a n c i n g  scheme d i s c u s s e d  i n  c h a p t e r  
f i v e ,  f i n a n c e s  under  t h e  STABEX scheme are n o t  a u t o m a t i c a l l y
44.  A r t i c l e  26 o f  Lome I I  and A r t i c l e  1 7 ( 3)  o f  Lome I .
45.  Annual  R ep o r t  o f  t h e  ACP-EEC C o un c i l  o f  M i n i s t e r s ,
A p r i l  1, 1976 - March 31,  1977,  p . 31.
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made a v a i l a b l e  t o  a c o u n t r y  s u f f e r i n g  e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s  
i n s t a b i l i t y .  A number o f  c o n d i t i o n s  have t o  be s a t i s f i e d  
b e f o r e  f i n a n c e s  can be made a v a i l a b l e .
{ b ) A n o n - a u t o m a t i c  a.pprc^ac_hj_
STABEX_pro^/ i£i  o_r\s_ j_n_L()me I_I
The Lome c o n v e n t i o n ,  l i k e  any o t h e r  t r e a t y  i s  a 
r e s u l t  o f  a c o n t r a c t u a l  a c t .  Th i s  means t h a t  t h e  c o u n t r i e s  
whose p r o d u c t s  are cove red  under  STABEX are assu r ed  o f  
f i n a n c i a l  a i d  i n  t i m e s  when t h e i r  e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s  s u f f e r  
due t o  s p e c i f i e d  prob lems and under  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  s e t  i n  
t h e  c o n v e n t i o n .  These c o n d i t i o n s  are no t  s u b j e c t  t o  
r e v o c a t i o n  or  m o d i f i c a t i o n  f o r  t he  d u r a t i o n  o f  t h e  conven­
t i o n  u n l e s s  o f  co ur se  the  whole c o n v e n t i o n  i s  denounced 
by e i t h e r  t h e  Communi ty i n  r e s p e c t  o f  a l l  ACP s t a t e s  o r  by 
i n d i v i d u a l  ACP s t a t e s . ^
The p r o v i s i o n s  o f  t he  c u r r e n t  Lome c o n v e n t i o n  d e a l i n g  
w i t h  STABEX p r e s c r i b e  a number o f  c o n d i t i o n s  upon which an 
ACP c o u n t r y  whose e x p o r t  commodi ty  q u a l i f i e s  under  t he  
scheme, can c l a i m  c o m p en s a t i o n .  Among t h e  i m p o r t a n t  c o n ­
d i t i o n s  are t h e  so c a l l e d  " o r i g i n a t i n g  and d e s t i n a t i o n "  
c o n d i t i o n ,  " t h e  dependency t h r e s h o l d " ,  and " t h e  t r i g g e r  
or  f l u c t u a t i o n  t h r e s h o l d . "
( c ) Orj_gj_na.tj_n£ £ n_d _des_ti_n_atj_o_n re^ui_rernen_t
P r o d u c t s  which q u a l i f y  under  t he  scheme and upon 
which an ACP c o u n t r y  may seek compensa t i on  must  f i r s t  o f  
a l l  be shown t o  o r i g i n a t e  i n  t h a t  c o u n t r y  and t h a t  i t s  f i n a l
46.  Lome I I ,  A r t i c l e  189.
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d e s t i n a t i o n  would  be t h e  EEC m a r k e t ,  e i t h e r  f o r  purposes  o f  
home c o nsum pt io n  t h e r e  or  b r o u g h t  i n  t he  EEC under  i nwar d  
p r o c e s s i n g  a r r a n g e m e n t s . ^ 7 The e f f e c t  o f  t h i s  c o n d i t i o n  
i s  t o  l i m i t  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  scheme t o  o n l y  t h a t  
p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  l i s t e d  p r o d u c t s  which i s  t r a d e d  between t he  
ACP c o u n t r y  c on cer ne d  and the  EEC. Thus f o r  c omp en sa t i on  
t o  be e f f e c t e d  t h e  i n s t a b i l i t y  i n  t he  e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s  must 
be shown t o  be a r e s u l t  o f  t he  i n s t a b i l i t y  i n  t h a t  p o r t i o n  
o f  t h e  p r o d u c t  t h a t  e n t e r s  t h e  EEC m a r k e t s .  The d e t e r i o r a ­
t i o n  i n  te rms o f  t r a d e  a r i s i n g  as a r e s u l t  o f  t r a d e  between 
t he  ACP c o u n t r y  s e e k i n g  c ompens at i on  and t h i r d  c o u n t r i e s ,  
i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t he  l i s t e d  p r o d u c t s ,  does no t  c o u n t  f o r  
purposes  o f  c o m p e n s a t i o n .  I t  sh ou l d  be p o i n t e d  ou t  t h a t  
t h i s  r e q u i r e m e n t  i s  o n l y  f a i r  t o  t h e  Communi ty because 
t h e r e  can be no reason t o  j u s t i f y  u s in g  t h e  EEC t o  compensate 
f o r  t h e  d e t e r i o r a t i o n  o f  an ACP's e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s  r e s u l t i n g  
f rom such a c o u n t r y ' s  t r a d e  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  
o u t s i d e  t h e  f ramewor k  o f  t h e  c o n v e n t i o n .
( d ) 2 e£ end en £e_ t  h^r£sho^d
The l e v e l  o f  dependence o f  t h e  ACP s t a t e s '  economies 
on t h e  l i s t e d  p r o d u c t s  i s  r e q u i r e d  by the  c o n v e n t i o n  t o  be 
ex pr ess ed  by f i x i n g  what  i s  known as a "dependence t h r e s h o l d " .  
For  a g i v e n  p r o d u c t  t o  q u a l i f y  f o r  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  f unds  i n  
any g i v e n  y e a r ,  e a r n i n g s  f r om  t h a t  p r o d u c t  t o  a l l  d e s t i n a t i o n s
must have r e p r e s e n t e d  a t  l e a s t  6 .5  per  c e n t  o f  t o t a l  e x p o r t s
4 Ro f  t h a t  c o u n t r y  i n  t h e  p r e c e d i n g  y e a r .  T h i s  dependence
47. I b i d . , A r t i c l e  3 0 ( 1 ) .
48.  A r t i c l e  46 pa r a  3 a l l o w s  f o r  a w a i v e r  f r om  t h e  d e s t i n a t i o n  
r e q u i r e m e n t  f o r  l a n d l o c k e d ,  l e a s t  d e v e l o p ed  and i s l a n d  
c o u n t r i e s .
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t h r e s h o l d  i s  reduced i n  r e l a t i o n  to  one p r o d u c t ,  s i s a l ,  t o  
5 per  c e n t  and i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  l e a s t  d e ve l op ed  c o u n t r i e s ,
n a
l a n d l o c k e d  and i s l a n d  s t a t e s  t o  2 per  c e n t .  T h i s
c o n s t i t u t e s  an improvement  on Lome I wh i ch  had s e t  t he
dependence t h r e s h o l d  at  l e a s t  7 .5  per  c e n t  o f  t o t a l  e x p o r t s ,
5 per  c e n t  f o r  s i s a l  and 2 .5  per  c en t  f o r  t h e  l e a s t  deve l oped
l a n d l o c k e d  and i s l a n d  c o u n t r i e s .
S i nce  t h e s e  dependence t h r e s h o l d s  are r e c a l c u l a t e d  each
y e a r  t h e y  t en d  t o  r e f l e c t  as c l o s e l y  as p o s s i b l e  t h e  economic
r e a l i t i e s  i n  t h e  ACP c o u n t r i e s  c o nc er ne d .  In f a c t  t h e  EEC
c o n s i d e r s  such an annual  r e c a l c u l a t i o n  as p r o v i d i n g
"a p h o t o g r a ph  o f  t h e  t r e n d  o f  t he  economy o f  
t h e  p r o d u c t  concerned  i n  t he  g ene ra l  economic 
t r e n d  o f  each c o u n t r y . " 50
I f  .copper  was i n c l u d e d  i n  the  l i s t  o f  p r o d u c t s  covered
by STABEX, Zambia c o u l d  amost c e r t a i n l y  have q u a l i f i e d  f o r
s t a b i l i z a t i o n  f un d s  because i t s  dependence t h r e s h o l d  i s
a lways w e l l  o ve r  90 per  c e n t .  In t h e  case o f  Z a i r e  which
i s  t he  o n l y  o t h e r  m a jo r  ACP e x p o r t e r  o f  c opper  t o  t h e  EEC,
i t s  dependence on copper  e x p o r t s  has over  t h e  y e a r s  been
51w e l l  o ve r  50 per  c e n t  o f  i t s  t o t a l  e x p o r t s .  T h i s  f a c t  
co up l ed  w i t h  t he  t r a d i t i o n a l  f l u c t u a t i o n s  o f  copper  p r i c e s  
on the  w o r l d  ma rke t s  would  appear  t o  have e x e r t e d  a l o t  o f  
i n f l u e n c e  on t h e  d e c i s i o n  o f  t he  EEC t o  e x c l u d e  i t  f r om t he  
scope o f  STABEX. T h i s  heavy dependence on t h e  e x p o r t s  o f  
copper  by t h e  two c o u n t r i e s ,  and f r e q u e n t  f l u c t u a t i o n  o f
49.  Lome I I ,  a r t i c l e  29.
50.  EC Commiss ion,  i n f o r m a t i o n  d i r e c t o r a t e - g e n e r a l ,  "The 
Lome c o n v e n t i o n - s t a b i 1i z a t i o n  o f  e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s " ,
Doc. 9 4 / 7 5 - 2 0 2 / X / 7 5 - E ,  page 10.
51. Data e x t r a c t e d  f r om IBRD, Commodi ty t r a d e  and p r i c e  
t r e n d s  , 1 9 75,  ttyashirujtcn.
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copper  p r i c e s  on t h e  w o r l d  mar ke t s  would have meant t h a t  
t h e  two c o u n t r i e s  c o u l d  have been e n t i t l e d  t o  draw f un ds  
w e l l  beyond what  has been earmarked f o r  t h e  e n t i r e  STABEX 
scheme. ^2
(e)  l o g g e r  £r_fJ_u£tu^a^t i .0n_th_r^sh_o][d
The l a s t  c o n d i t i o n  t h a t  has t o  be s a t i s f i e d  b e f o r e  
fu n ds  can be made a v a i l a b l e  r e q u i r e s  t h a t  t h e  a c t u a l  r e c e i p t s  
i n  a g i v e n  y e a r  s ho u l d  no t  o n l y  be above t h e  dependence 
t h r e s h o l d ,  bu t  t h a t  t h e  e a r n i n g s  r e f e r e n c e  l e v e l  based on 
a f o u r  y e a r  moving average must be c a l c u l a t e d .  For  t he  
scheme t o  be a c t i v a t e d  t h e r e f o r e ,  e a r n i n g s  f r om  a l i s t e d  
p r o d u c t  i n  t he  y e a r  o f  r e q u e s t  must  be shown t o  be a t  
l e a s t  6 .5  per  c e n t  below t h e  r e f e r e n c e  l e v e l . ^  For  t he  
l a n d l o c k e d  and i s l a n d  c o u n t r i e s  t he  t r i g g e r  t h r e s h o l d  i s  
r e q u i r e d  t o  be a t  l e a s t  2 per  c e n t .
Aga in  t h i s  r e q u i r e m e n t  would  seem t o  e x p l a i n  the  
e x c l u s i o n  o f  m i n e r a l s  l i k e  copper  f rom t h i s  scheme. The 
main e x p o r t e r s  o f  copper  t o  the  EEC f o r  e xampl e ,  are 
Zambia and Z a i r e  bo th  o f  wh ich  are l a n d l o c k e d .  Linder 
A r t i c l e  47 o f  t h e  c o n v e n t i o n  t h e  t r i g g e r  t h r e s h o l d  f o r  
t h e se  c o u n t r i e s  i s  f i x e d  a t  2 per  c e n t .  Tha t  i s  t o  say,  
i f  t h e i r  e a r n i n g s  f ro m copper  e x p o r t s  t o  a l l  d e s t i n a t i o n s  
i n  any g i v e n  y e a r  were t o  show a d e c l i n e  o f  a t  l e a s t  2 per  
c e n t  be low t h e  f o u r  y e a r  average ( t h e  r e f e r e n c e  l e v e l ) ,  
t he  scheme would be a c t i v a t e d  and t h e y  would  be e n t i t l e d
52.  The second Lome c o n v e n t i o n  a l l o c a t e s  o n l y  550 m i l l i o n  
European U n i t s  o f  Account  t o  c o v e r  a l l  commi tments 
under  STABEX f o r  t h e  d u r a t i o n  o f  t h e  c o n v e n t i o n .
53.  A r t i c l e  36 o f  Lome I I .  In c e r t a i n  c o n d i t i o n s  a 
t h r e e  y e a r  moving average i s  uded ( a r t i c l e  36 para 3 ) .
54. A r t i c l e  37,  Lome I I .
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t o  r e q u e s t  f o r  c o m p e n s a t i o n .  Due t o  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  ma rk e t s  f o r  c o p p e r ,  t h e  e a r n i n g s  o f  t h e s e  c o u n t r i e s  
f l u c t u a t e  v e r y  r a p i d l y  as t h e i r  e x p e r i e n c e  i n  t h e  p as t  few 
y e a r s  have shown. In each o f  t he  y e a r s  s i n c e  1975 t he  
l e v e l  o f  t h e i r  e a r n i n g s  has d e c l i n e d  w e l l  be low t h e  average 
o f  t he  p r e v i o u s  f o u r  y e a r s .  In t h i s  r e s p e c t  t h e s e  c o u n t r i e s  
c o u l d  have been e n t i t l e d  t o  seek c omp en sa t i on  a l mo s t  e v e r y  
y e a r .  But  t h e  scheme does no t  seem t o  have been d e s i gn ed  
t o  p r o v i d e  c omp en sa t i on  so f r e q u e n t l y  r a t h e r  i t  was d es igned  
t o  h e l p  ACP c o u n t r i e s  i n  d i f f i c u l t i e s  due t o  e x c e p t i o n a l  
c i r c u m s t a n c e s .  The f l u c t u a t i o n  i n  copper  p r i c e s  does not  
appear  t o  be an e x c e p t i o n a l  c i r c u m s t a n c e  due t o  i t s  f r e q u e n c y .
( i i ) Fin.a1 remarks  on STABEX
A l t h o u g h  STABEX i s  c o n s i d e r e d  by many t o  r e f l e c t  t h e  
c u r r e n t  t h i n k i n g  about  t h e  w o r l d  commodi ty  p r o b l e m s ,  some 
o f  i t s  p r o v i s i o n s  c an no t  escape c r i t i c i s m .
The p r o d u c t  c ov er age  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  t h e  scheme e x c l u d e  
many p r o d u c t s  c o m p r i s i n g  a l a r g e  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  t h e  ACP 
s t a t e s  e x p o r t  m e r c h a n d i s e .  Very n o t a b l e  among t h e  e x c l ud e d  
p r o d u c t s  are m i n e r a l s  l i k e  copper  upon wh i ch  a t  l e a s t  two 
ACP c o u n t r i e s  depend a l mo s t  e n t i r e l y  f o r  t h e i r  e x p o r t  
e a r n i n g s .  The c o n v e n t i o n  a l l o w s  an e xp an s io n  o f  t h e  p r o d u c t  
c o v e r a g e ,  b u t  t h e  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  t he se  p r o v i s i o n s  i s  
hampered by t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  t h i n k i n g  between t h e  EEC and
t h e  ACP s t a t e s .  W h i l e  t h e  ACP s t a t e s  m i g h t  w ish  t o  see a
5 5more g e n e r a l  scheme on t h e  l i n e  o f  t h e  IMF scheme, t he
55. , The C o u r i e r ,  n o . 33,  S e p t . - O c t o b .  1975,  page 18.
335
EEC appears  t o  f a v o u r  a more l i m i t e d  appr oa ch .  ^
STABEX a p p l i e s  t o  t h e  s e l e c t e d  p r i m a r y  c ommod i t i es  
r e l e a s e d  f o r  home use i n  t h e  EEC or  b r o u g h t  under  t h e  i nwar d  
p r o c e s s i n g  a r rangement s  i n  t h e  EEC i n  o r d e r  t o  be p r o ce ss e d .  
Had a p r o d u c t  l i k e  copper  been i n c l u d e d ,  t h e  scheme would 
have p r o v i d e d  an i n c e n t i v e  f o r  c o u n t r i e s  l i k e  Zambia to  
c o n c e n t r a t e  on t he  e x p o r t  o f  raw copper  a t  t h e  expense 
o f  d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  i n t o  copper  p r o c e s s i n g  i n d u s t r i e s .  In 
t h i s  way STABEX appears t o  be a d e v i c e  aimed a t  p e r p e t u a t i n g  
t h e  raw m a t e r i a l  s u p p l y i n g  r o l e  o f  t he  ACP s t a t e s .
STABEX u n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  does n o t  t a c k l e  t h e  main 
p rob l em f a c i n g  commodi ty  p r o d u c i n g  c o u n t r i e s ,  t h a t  o f  
r a i s i n g  t h e  p r i c e s  f o r  t he s e  c ommod i t i es  b u t  m e r e l y  o f f e r s  
t o  s t a b i l i z e  e x p o r t  r e c e i p t s  f o r  c e r t a i n  p r o d u c t s .  In 
o f f e r i n g  t o  s t a b i l i z e  e x p o r t  r e c e i p t s ,  t h e  scheme m e r e l y  
o f f e r s  a s h o r t - t e r m  s o l u t i o n  t o  t he  commodi ty  p ro b l e m.
T h i s  a r r angement  does n o t  i n  any way seek t o  i n t e r f e r e  w i t h  
the  f u n c t i o n i n g  o f  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  ma rke t  mechanism 
g o v e r n i n g  t r a d e  i n  t he  v a r i o u s  c ommod i t i es  i t  c o v e r s .
D e s p i t e  th e se  s h o r t c o m i n g s  o f  t he  scheme, i t  appears 
t o  be a u s e f u l  b e g i n n i n g  t owa rds  the  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  t he  
new i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r d e r  f o r  c o m m o d i t i e s .  A s i m i l a r  scheme 
f o r  m i n e r a l s  c o u l d  spread t he  advantages o f  t h e  m i n e r a l  
e x p o r t  o r i e n t e d  c o u n t r i e s .
56. ACP-EEC, I n t e r i m  commi t te e  r e p o r t  1 975 , p p . 1 5- 18 ,  and 
r e p o r t  o f  t h e  f i r s t  ACP-EEC C ou nc i l  o f  M i n i s t e r s  
m e e t i n g ,  B r u s s e l s ,  J u l y  14- 15 ,  1976.
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V I I .  The M i n e r a l  E x p o r t  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  Scheme (MINEX)
under  Lome I I
The main new f e a t u r e  o f  t he  c u r r e n t  Lome c o n v e n t i o n  
and wh i ch  bears  c o n s i d e r a b l e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  t o  t h e  commodi ty  
p r ob l em as i t  a f f e c t s  Zambia,  i s  MINEX. The c r e a t i o n  o f  
MINEX was a r e s u l t  o f  t h e  r e a l i z a t i o n  by bo th  t he  EEC and t he  
ACP c o u n t r i e s ,  t h a t  t he  v e r y  e x i s t e n c e  o f  m i n i n g  p r o d u c t i o n  
i n  t h e s e  c o u n t r i e s  c o u l d  be t h r e a t e n e d  by p a r t i c u l a r  un­
f a v o u r a b l e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  such as t ho se  t h a t  have a l r e a d y  
been seen i n  Zambia and Z a i r e .  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  i t  had been 
r e a l i z e d  t h a t  STABEX was i l l - s u i t e d  t o  m i n e r a l  p r o d u c t i o n ,  
t h e  prob lems o f  which are v e r y  d i f f e r e n t  f r om  t h a t  o f  
a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r o d u c t s .  I t  i s  because o f  t h e s e  r easons  
t h a t  the .  second Lome c o n v e n t i o n  c o n t a i n s  a new t i t l e  
( t i t l e  I I I )  i n  wh i ch  an i n t e r v e n t i o n  sys tem f o r  m i n e r a l s  
i s embodi  e d .
The c h a r a c t e r  o f  t h i s  scheme depends on t h e  s p e c i f i c  
way i n  wh i ch  m i n e r a l s  d i f f e r  f  romc>ther commodi t  i es . The 
key e l em en t  is t h e  ma in t en an ce  o f  a c e r t a i n  l e v e l  o f  
p r o d u c t i o n  c a p a c i t y  f o r  m i n e r a l  dependent  ACP c o u n t r i e s  
r a t h e r  t han  t h e  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  o f  e a r n i n g s  f r o m  such 
p r o d u c t s .  The main r eason f o r  t h i s  approach l i e s  i n  the  
c h a r a c t e r  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  m i n e r a l  mark et s  wh i ch  are prone 
t o  c y c l i c a l  v a r i a t i o n s  o f  a c o n s i d e r a b l e  m a g n i t u d e ,  
r e s u l t i n g  f r om t h e  g r e a t  s e n s i t i v i t y  o f  t h i s  s e c t o r  to  
i n d u s t r i a l  change.  By t h i s  t o k e n ,  t he  i d e a  i n  MINEX i s  no t  
t o  m a i n t a i n  volumes o f  p r o d u c t i o n  a t  a l l  c o s t s ,  as t h i s  i s  
o n l y  l i k e l y  t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  i m b a l a n c e  between s u p p l y  and
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demand on t h e  w o r l d  ma rk e t s  and keep p r i c e s  low and t h e r e ­
f o r e  l ow e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s  f o r  p r o d u c e r  c o u n t r i e s .  What 
MINEX aims t o  do on t h e  c o n t r a r y  i s  t o  keep p r o d u c t i o n  o f  
e x p o r t  c a p a c i t y  a t  a r e a l i s t i c  l e v e l ,  so t h a t  t h e  c o u n t r i e s  
c oncer ned  can t a k e  g r e a t e r  advantage o f  a r e c o v e r y  when the  
b a la n ce  o f  t h e  mark e t  i s  r e s t o r e d .  Th i s  r e a l i s t i c  p r o d u c t i o n  
c a p a c i t y  may be a f f e c t e d  by a number o f  e v e n t s  such as 
m i n i n g  a c c i d e n t s ,  i n t e r n a l  and e x t e r n a l  p o l i t i c a l  upheava ls  
and by economic d e p r e s s i o n  i n  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  c o u n t r i e s .  
MINEX aims a t  i n t e r v e n i n g  t o  r e s t o r e  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  
c a p a c i t y  i n  t h e  e ve nt  o f  t h e s e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  t a k i n g  p l a c e .
A L t h  ough t h e  c h a r a c t e r  o f  t he  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  m i n e r a l
marke t s  n e c e s s i t a t e d  a new approach i n  t h e  LomcT c o n v e n t i o n ,
t he  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  scheme appears  f i r s t  and f o r e m o s t  t o  have
been d e s ig n ed  t o  as su r e  t h e  EEC o f  a c o n t i n u o u s  sour ce  o f
i n d u s t r i a l  raw m a t e r i a l s .  The EEC as p o i n t e d  o u t  e a r l i e r
i n  t he  c h a p t e r  has f o r  somet ime been b o t h e r e d  by i t s  degree
o f  dependence on m i n e r a l s  i n  t he  ACP s t a t e s .  Zambia and
Z a i r e  f o r  exampl e ,  p r o v i d e  a t h i r d  o f  t h e  EEC needs i n  
57c o p p e r .  I n s t a b i l i t y  i n  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  o f  copper  i n  
t h ese  two c o u n t r i e s  t h e r e f o r e  c o u l d  have a g r e a t  i mpac t  on 
th e  i n d u s t r i a l  p r o d u c t i o n  i n  t h e  EEC. The EEC a pp re h en s i o n  
has been made worse by t h e  r e a l i z a t i o n  t h a t  i t s  i n v e s t m e n t s  
in  A f r i c a ' s  mines have d e c l i n e d  c o n s i d e r a b l y  s i n c e  t he  
1 9 6 0 s . 58
57.  South magaz i ne ,  J a n u a r y ,  1982,  " B r i n g i n g  m i n e r a l s  i n t o  
Lome" , page I I I .
58.  D i r e c t  i n v e s t m e n t  i n  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  f e l l  f rom 
US 2 .4  b i l l i o n  d o l l a r s  i n  1970 t o  around US 2 b i l l i o n  
d o l 1ars  i n  1977.
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( i ) P r o d u c t  cove r age
MINEX or  SYSMIN as i t  i s  somet imes r e f e r r e d  t o ,  
i d e n t i f i e s  e i g h t  m i n e r a l s  f o r  i n c l u s i o n  i n  t h e  scheme.
These m i n e r a l s  are c o n s i d e r e d  t o  be o f  t he  g r e a t e s t  s i g n i ­
f i c a n c e  t o  t he  economies o f  t h e  ACP m i n e r a l  p r o d u c i n g  
c o u n t r i e s .  M i n e r a l s  i n c l u d e d  i n  t he  scheme are copper  
and c o b a l t  ( p r oduc ed  by Zambia,  Z a i r e  and Papua New G u i n e a ) ,  
phospha tes  (Togo and S e n e g a l ) ,  b a u x i t e  and A l umi na  (Gu i nea ,  
Jama ica ,  Sur inam and Guyana) ,  Manganese (Gabon) ,  t i n
R Q(Rwanda) and i r o n  ore  p e l l e t s  ( M a u r i t a n i a  and L i b e r i a ) .
The c o n v e n t i o n  p r o v i d e s  a mechanism f o r  e x t e n d i n g  t h e  p r o d u c t
cover age  o f  t h e  scheme d u r i n g  t he  l i f e  o f  t h e  c o n v e n t i o n
by a d e c i s i o n  o f  t h e  ACP-EEC Counci l ,  o f  M i n i s t e r s  i f  i t
t u r n s  o u t  t h a t  o t h e r  p r o d u c t s  o f  i m p o r t a n c e  t o  t h e  ACP
fi ns t a t e s 1 economies are b e i ng  s e r i o u s l y  d i s t u r b e d ?  Th i s  
c o n s t i t u t e s  an improvement  on the  p r o v i s i o n  c o n t a i n e d  i n  
t he  STABEX scheme under  Lome I .  In t h a t  c o n v e n t i o n ,  t he  
l i s t  o f  p r o d u c t s  co ve red  c o u l d  be ex tended  by a d e c i s i o n  o f  
t h e  EEC c o u n c i l  o f  m i n i s t e r s  w i t h  no s i g n i f i c a n t  p a r t  be ing  
p la y ed  by t h e  ACP s t a t e s  i n  t h e  f o r m u l a t i o n  o f  t h e  d e c i s i o n .
A l l  t h e  p r o d u c t s  co ve red  under  t h e  scheme c o n s t i t u t e  
a s i g n i f i c a n t  dependence t h r e s h o l d  f o r  t h e  c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  
p roduce them.  Ta k in g  t h e  example o f  t he  m i n e r a l  we are 
c oncer ned  w i t h  i n  t h i s  t h e s i s ,  c o pp e r ,  t he  g e n e r a l  t r e n d  
may be a p p r e c i a t e d .  Three c o u n t r i e s  e x p o r t  c opper  t o  the  
EEC m a r k e t s :  Zambia,  Z a i r e ,  and Papua New Gu i nea .  The
59. See a r t i c l e  50 o f  Lome I I .
6 0 . I bi d.
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dependence t h r e s h o l d  f o r  t he s e  c o u n t r i e s  on copper  i s
91 per  c e n t  f o r  Zambia,  55 f o r  Z a i r e ,  and 51.7
1f o r  New Guinea.  I t  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  t h a t  t h e  scheme 
i n c l u d e s  c opper  because i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
n e g o t i a t i o n s  aimed at  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  o f  copper  p r i c e s  
have n o t  a c h i ev ed  many r e s u l t s  so f a r .  T h i s  scheme 
t h e r e f o r e ,  may be seen as c o n s t i t u t i n g  a f i r s t  s tep  
t owar ds  t he  r e a l i z a t i o n  o f  t h e  a m b i t i o n s  e x pr ess ed  i n  t he  
new i n t e r n a t i o n a l  economic o r d e r  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  p r i m a r y  
commodi t i e s .
( i i ) A n o n - a u t o m a t i c  approach t o  t h e  use o f  f un ds
i n  SYSMIN
The scheme i s  backed by f i n a n c i n g  amount i ng  t o  
280 m i l l i o n  European u n i t s  o f  accoun t  ( a b o u t  372 m i l l i o n  
d o l l a r s )  f o r  t he  e n t i r e  d u r a t i o n  o f  t he  c o n v e n t i o n  I t
s hou l d  be no ted  t h a t  t he s e  f un ds  are l i m i t e d  and are
u n l i k e l y  t o  have a s u b s t a n t i a l  i mpac t  on t h e  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  
o f  t h e  e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s  o f  t he  c o u n t r i e s  c o n c e r n e d .  Th i s  
i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  o b v io u s  when one c o n s i d e r s  t h a t  t h e  amount 
i s  t o  be d i v i d e d  e q u a l l y  f o r  t h e  f i v e  y e a r s  t h e  c o n v e n t i o n  
w i l l  be i n  f o r c e .
C o n s i d e r i n g  t h e  l i m i t e d  f unds  under  t h e  scheme, i t  i s  
i m p o s s i b l e  t o  a p p l y  an a u t o m a t i c  approach i n  t h e  use o f  t he  
f unds  w i t h o u t  r i s k i n g  ove r  c o n c e n t r a t i o n  o f  a i d  t o  one 
p r o d u c t  o r  i ndeed  t o  o n e . c o u n t r y .  F u r t h e r m o r e  s i n c e  m i n e r a l s  
and m i n e r a l  p r o d u c t i o n  tend  t o  i n v o l v e  s o p h i s t i c a t e d  m u l t i -
61. The C o u r i e r ,  n o . 58,  s p e c i a l  i s s u e ,  Nov. 1979,  page 30.
62-  A r t i c l e  51 o f  Lome I I .
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n a t i o n a l  c o r p o r a t i o n s ,  an a u t o m a t i c  approach t o  t he  use o f  
t h e  f un ds  m i g h t  run a f u r t h e r  r i s k  o f  d i v e r t i n g  t he  a id  
i n  f a v o u r  o f  such c o r p o r a t i o n s .  To a v o i d  bo th  t hes e  
p r o b l e m s ,  t h e  scheme has g o t  a number o f  s p e c i a l  d e v i c e s .
As i n  t h e  case o f  STABEX, the  scheme has a dependence 
t h r e s h o l d  which  r e q u i r e s  t h e  Communi ty t o  p r o v i d e  a s s i s t a n c e  
o n l y  when t h e  m i n e r a l  concerned  has accoun t ed  o ve r  t he  
p r e c e d i n g  f o u r  y e a r s  f o r  a t  l e a s t  15 per  c e n t  o f  t he  t o t a l  
e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s  t o  a l l  d e s t i n a t i o n s .  For  t h e  l e a s t  deve l oped  
and l a n d l o c k e d  s t a t e s  t h e  t h r e s h o l d  i s  reduced  t o  10 per  
c e n t .
In a d d i t i o n  t h e  ACP s t a t e  concerned  must  show t h a t  
i t s  p r o d u c t i o n  c a p a c i t y  or  c a p a c i t y  f o r  e x p o r t  t o  t h e  EEC 
o f  t h i s  m i n e r a l  i s  l i a b l e  t o  be reduced s u b s t a n t i a l l y  t o  
an e x t e n t  wh i ch  i s  l i k e l y  t o  s e r i o u s l y  a f f e c t  i t s  own 
deve l opmen t  s t r a t e g y .  A s u b s t a n t i a l  f a l l  i n  p r o d u c t i o n  or  
e x p o r t  c a p a c i t y  i s  t ak en  t o  mean a f a l l  o f  a t  l e a s t  10 per  
c e n t .
The t h i r d  c o n d i t i o n  t o  be met i s  t h a t  t h e  f a l l  i n  
p r o d u c t i o n  c a p a c i t y  or  c a p a c i t y  t o  e x p o r t  must  be shown t o  
be beyond the'  ACP c o u n t r y ' s  c o n t r o l .  Th i s  c o n d i t i o n  
t h e r e f o r e ,  c o v e r s  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  such as p o l i t i c a l  i n s t a b i l i t y  
i n  and o u t s i d e  t h e  c o u n t r y ,  p r i c e  c o l l a p s e  on t h e  i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  m a r k e t ,  and o t h e r  economic m i sha ps .  I t  i s  hard 
t o  e n v i s a g e  any s i t u a t i o n  t h a t  m igh t  a f f e c t  t h e  e x p o r t  
e a r n i n g s  o f  a m i n e r a l  e x p o r t i n g  ACP c o u n t r y  t h a t  would not
63. A r t i c l e  53 o f  Lome I I .
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q u a l i f y  under  t he  c o n d i t i o n .  In t h i s  r e s p e c t  t h e  scheme 
i s  t r i g g e r e d  i n  a lmo s t  a l l  t he  i n s t a n c e s  wh i ch  a d v e r s e l y  
a f f e c t  t h e  e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s  o f  t he se  c o u n t r i e s .
In t h e  case o f  Zambia,  i t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  i t s  dependence 
t h r e s h o l d  i s  w e l l  above t he  10 per  c e n t  r e q u i r e d  o f  a l a n d ­
l o ck e d  c o u n t r y  under  A r t i c l e  53 o f  t he  c o n v e n t i o n .  In 
f a c t  i t s  dependence t h r e s h o l d  has c o n s i s t e n t l y  been above 
90 per  c e n t .  The e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s  i n s t a b i l i t y  i t  has been 
e x p e r i e n c i n g  i s  r e c e n t  y e a r s  has been a r e s u l t  o f  c i r c u m ­
s ta n ce s  w e l l  beyond i t s  c o n t r o l .  These c i r c u m s t a n c e s  have 
i n c l u d e d  t h e  drop  i n  copper  p r i c e s  on t h e  w o r l d  marke ts  
and t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  p roblems which have a f f e c t e d  i t s  p r o ­
d u c t i o n  c a p a c i t y  and i t s  c a p a c i t y  t o  e x p o r t  t h e  m i n e r a l .
From t h e  b e g i n n i n g  t h e r e f o r e  Zambia has q u a l i f i e d  f o r  
a s s i s t a n c e  under  t h e  scheme. The p rob l em wh i ch  has t o  be 
u n d e r l i n e d  however ,  by c o n t r a s t  w i t h  STABEX, t h e  f un ds  i n  
SYSMIN are v e r y  l i m i t e d  and are aimed at  r e s t o r i n g  t h e  
p r o d u c t i o n  c a p a c i t y  and c a p a c i t y  t o  e x p o r t .  The scheme 
does n o t h i n g  t o  s t a b i l i z e  t h e  p r i c e s  o f  co ppe r  wh ich  would 
seem t o  be t h e  main co ncern  o f  a c o u n t r y  l i k e  Zambia.  For  
i f  t he  f un ds  Zambia i s  a b l e  t o  draw now f r o m  t h e  scheme 
f i n a l l y  h e l p  i t  t o  r e s t o r e  i t s  p r o d u c t i o n  c a p a c i t y  and 
c a p a c i t y  t o  e x p o r t ,  t hen  t he  c o u n t r y  w i l l  be a b le  t o  produce 
a t  f u l l  c a p a c i t y .  But  i f  w i t h  f u l l  c a p a c i t y  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  
t h e  e x p o r t  o f  copper  s t i l l  f e t c h  a low p r i c e  o r  f e t c h  an 
even l o we r  p r i c e  t han  now and Zambia f i n d s  i t s e l f  i n  
s e r i o u s  f i n a n c i a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  i t  w i l l  no t  be e n t i t l e d  t o  
any a s s i s t a n c e  under  SYSMIN. I t  i s  t h i s  d i f f i c u l t y  t h a t
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d i s t i n g u i s h e s  t h i s  scheme f ro m STABEX. Wf iak ^jxcnbia 
needs i s a s s i s t a n c e  t o  en ab le  i t  cope w i t h  t h e  economic 
e f f e c t s  o f  f l u c t u a t i o n s  i n  e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s .  I t  i s  su b­
m i t t e d  here t h a t  t h e  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  SYSMIN do no t  meet 
t h i s  need a d e q u a t e l y .  For Zambia,  t he  success 
o f  SYSMIN i n  r e s t o r i n g  p r o d u c t i o n  c a p a c i t y  o f  t he  copper  
m i n i n g  i n d u s t r y  would o n l y  mean an i n c r e a s e d  copper  s u pp ly  
on t h e  w o r l d  mark et s  t h a t  would o n l y  reduce  t h e  p r i c e s  i t  
f e t c h e s .
( i i i ) C o n c l u d i n g  remarks on SYSMIN
The Lome p r o v i s i o n s  on SYSMIN are d es ig n ed  t o  r e h a b i l i ­
t a t e  m i n i n g  i n d u s t r i e s  i n  ACP c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  e n c o u n t e r  
t r o u b l e s  due t o  c e r t a i n  s p e c i a l  r e a s o n s .  The e s s e n t i a l  
c r i t e r i o n  f o r  a s s i s t a n c e  i s  t h a t  p h y s i c a l  c a p a c i t y  t o  
p roduce m i n e r a l s  or  e x p o r t  them to  t he  EEC must  have d e c l i n e d  
s u b s t a n t i a l l y .  The p r o v i s i o n s  do no t  address  th e ms e lv e s  t o  
t he  b a s i c  need o f  t h e s e  c o u n t r i e s ,  wh ich  need a s s i s t a n c e  t o  
cope w i t h  t he  r e s u l t i n g  economic h a r d s h i p s  f r om  reduced 
e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s .  In t h i s  r e g a r d  SYSMIN appears  t o  be a 
scheme t h a t  works t o  t h e  advantage o f  t h e  EEC i n  i t s  a t t e m p t  
t o  sec ure  cheap s u p p l i e s  o f  v a r i o u s  m i n e r a l s  f rom t h e  ACP 
c o u n t r i e s .
I t  i s  s u b m i t t e d  t h a t ,  t he  e n t i r e  scheme needs r e ­
e x a m i n a t i o n  w i t h  a v iew o f  w i d e n i n g  i t s  p r o v i s i o n s  t o  t a k e  
i n t o  acco un t  t h e  economic e f f e c t s  o f  i n s t a b i l i t y  i n  e x p o r t  
e a r n i n g s  f ro m m i n e r a l  p r o d u c t s .  I t  i s  hoped t h a t  i n  the  
n e g o t i a t i o n s  f o r  t he  n ex t  Lome c o n v e n t i o n  t h i s  i s s u e  w i l l
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be c o n s i d e r e d  s e r i o u s l y  and a s o l u t i o n  worked o u t ,  A 
scheme t h a t  g u a r a n t e e s  c e r t a i n  l e v e l s  o f  p r i c e s  f o r  
ACP c o u n t r i e s '  m i n e r a l s  would  be someth ing  t h a t  ought  
t o  be c o n s i d e r e d  i n  any f u t u r e  a r r a n g em e nt s .
In t h e  two o c c a s i o n s  when Zambia u t i l i z e d  t h e  scheme, 
i t  became a p p a r e n t  t h a t  t he  f unds  made a v a i l a b l e  t o  i t  
were t o  be used f o r  a programme aimed a t  t h e  r e h a b i l i t a t i o n  
o f  t he  co ppe r  i n d u s t r y  and n o t  t o  r e j u v i n a t e  a l l  a sp ec t s  
o f  t h e  economy.  The f i r s t  use o f  t he  scheme i n v o l v e d  t he  
sum o f  55 m i l l i o n  European U n i t s  o f  a c c o u n t .  T h i s  amount 
was t o  be used t o  f i n a n c e  p r o j e c t s  aimed at  t h e  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  
o f  c a p a c i t y  and p r o d u c t i o n  by t h e  m i n i n g  i n d u s t r y .  The 
p r o j e c t s  t h a t  were t o  be f i n a n c e d  i n  t h i s  case were the  
r e p l a c e m e n t  o f  o u t d a t e d  m i n i n g  e q u i p m e n t ,  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  
new p r o c e s s i n g  methods and t h e  improvement  o f  e x i s t i n g  ones,  
and t o  impr ove  s a f e t y  s t a n d a r d s .
A l l  t h e  p r o j e c t s  f i n a n c e d  under  t h i s  a r r an ge me nt  were 
t h e r e f o r e  no t  aimed at  a l l e v i a t i n g  g en er a l  economic  p rob lems 
f a c i n g  Zambia as a r e s u l t  o f  u n s t a b l e  copper  p r i c e s  but  t o  
ensure  t h a t  she i s  c a p a b l e  o f  m a i n t a i n i n g  a l e v e l  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  
t h a t  wou ld  s a t i s f y  t h e  i m p o r t  needs o f  t h e  c o u n t r i e s  i n  t he  
European c ommun i ty .
Even i n  t h i s  l i m i t e d  a s p e c t ,  however ,  t h e  SYSMIN 
f a c i l i t y  was i n a d e q u a t e  t o  f i n a n c e  t h e  t h r e e
p r o j e c t s  m en t i on ed  above and t h a t  meant t h a t  t h e  Zambian 
government  had t o  p r o v i d e  t h e  b a l a n c e .  The t o t a l  c o s t  o f  
t he  p r o j e c t s  was e s t i m a t e d  t o  be 8 5 , 3 4 6 , 0 0 0  European U n i t s  
o f  Account  and t h e  f un d s  which  were made a v a i l a b l e  t o  Zambia
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f r om SYSMIN was o n l y  55 m i l l i o n  U n i t s  o f  Account  t o  be 
p a i d  back o ve r  a f o r t y  y e a r  p e r i o d  w i t h  a t e n  y e a r  g race 
p e r i o d ,  and a t  t h e  r a t e  o f  1 p e r c e n t  i n t e r e s t .
S i nce  t h e  c o m p l e t i o n  o f  t h i s  c h a p t e r ,  t h e  t h i r d  Lome 
C o nv e n t i o n  has been s i g n e d .  Th i s  agreement  c o n t i n u e s  t he  
SYSMIN scheme and makes no changes i n  t h e  r u l e s  g o v e r n i n g  
t h e  use o f  t h e  scheme. T h i s  o b v i o u s l y  means t h a t  t he  
prob l ems a r i s i n g  ou t  o f  t he  second Lome* C o n v e n t i o n  may 
c o n t i n u e  t o  be e n c o u n t e r e d  i n  t he  t h i r d  Lome C o n v e n t i o n .
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CHAPTER NINE
SOUTHERN AFRICAN CQ-QPERATIQN IN MINERAL MARKETING: 
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS
In t h e  l a s t  c h a p t e r s  v a r i o u s  measures f o r  t he  
s t a b i l i z a t i o n  o f  copper  p r i c e s  have been d i s c u s s e d .  In 
t he  d i s c u s s i o n s ,  i t  became c l e a r  t h a t  t he s e  measures 
have a t t a i n e d  l i m i t e d  s u c ce s s .  The c omp en sa to ry  f i n a n c i n g  
o f  e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s  schemes i n  the  IMF and under  t h e  Lome 
C o nv e n t i o n  do p r o v i d e  some r e l i e f  t owa rds  a l l e v i a t i n g  
problems a r i s i n g  as a r e s u l t  o f  copper  p r i c e  f l u c t u a t i o n s .
The commodi ty  agreement  approach t o  copper  p r i c e  f l u c t u a t i o n s  
has proved u n s u c c e s s f u l  m a i n l y  due t o  t h e  breakdown i n  t he  
n e g o t i a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  o f  such an agr eement .  The 
p r o d u c e r  a s s o c i a t i o n  approach has been a t t e m p t e d  t h r o u g h  
CIPEC wh i ch  however  has had v e r y  l i m i t e d  success i n  t he  
s t a b i l i z a t i o n  o f  copper  p r i c e s .  I t s  success has been l i m i t e d  
t o  f o s t e r i n g  s o l i d a r i t y  o f  copper  p r o d u c e r s  and c o - o r d i n a t i n g  
o f  m a r k e t i n g  p o l i c i e s  and s h a r i n g  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  r e g a r d i n g  
m a r k e t i n g  o f  c o p p e r .
The l i m i t e d  success  o b t a i n e d  t h r o u g h  t h e s e  v a r i o u s  
approaches t o  p r i c e  and e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  c a l l s  
f o r  a d i f f e r e n t  approach t o  t h e  p r ob l em.
T h i s  c h a p t e r  d i s c u s s e s  a r e g i o n a l  a pp r o ac h .  The 
approach seeks t o  t a c k l e  the  problems t h r o u g h  t he  c r e a t i o n  
o f  r e g i o n a l  m a r k e t i n g  c o r p o r a t i o n s  by d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s .  
Through such c o r p o r a t i o n s  i t  i s  hoped t h a t  copper  p r o d u c i n g
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c o u n t r i e s  may be a b l e  t o  improve  t h e i r  b a r g a i n i n g  p o s i t i o n  
on m a r k e t i n g  i n s t i t u t i o n s  such as the  LME. Through an 
i mproved b a r g a i n i n g  p o s i t i o n  on the  LME t h e  p r o d u c e r s  may 
be i n  a p o s i t i o n  t o  i n f l u e n c e  p r i c e s .  T h i s  c o u p l e d  w i t h  t he  
o t h e r  measures d i s c u s s e d  i n  e a r l i e r  c h a p t e r s  may s u b s t a n t i a l l y  
a l t e r  t h e  i n f l u e n c e  t he s e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  have on t h e  d e t e r m i n ­
a t i o n  o f  commodi t y  p r i c e s .
The d i s c u s s i o n  i n  t h i s  c h a p t e r  c e n t r e s  on t h e  prob l ems 
and p r o s p e c t s  f o r  t he  use o f  t h i s  approach i n  t h e  Sou the r n  
A f r i c a n  sub r e g i o n  and t h e i r  l e g a l  i m p l i c a t i o n s .  For  t h i s  
approach t o  be o f  v a l u e  t o  Zambia which depends on e x p o r t s  
o f  one main m i n e r a l ,  i t  must  i n v o l v e  m i n e r a l s .
I . I s  t h e r e  c o m p a t i b i l i t y  i n  t h e  m i n e r a l  m a r k e t i n g  
a r r an ge me nt s  i n  So uthe r n  A f r i c a ?
One o f  t h e  o b v i o u s  p o i n t s  r e g a r d i n g  m i n e r a l  m a r k e t i n g  
i n  So u t he rn  A f r i c a  i s  t h e  l a c k  o f  a common a ppr o ac h .  Each 
c o u n t r y  appears  t o  approach t h e  i s s u e  o f  t h e  m a r k e t i n g  o f  
m i n e r a l s  f ro m a d i f f e r e n t  a n g l e .  Out o f  t h i s  d u p l i c i t y  o f  
a p p ro a ch es ,  two broad c a t e g o r i e s  o f  m a r k e t i n g  a r r angement s  
can be i d e n t i f i e d .
The f i r s t  c a t e g o r y  i n v o l v e s  t h e  use o f  s t a t e  c o n t r o l l e d  
m a r k e t i n g  c o r p o r a t i o n s  and t h e  second c a t e g o r y  i n v o l v e s  t he  
use o f  m i n i n g  compan i es .  Of t he  n ine  member c o u n t r i e s  i n  t he
i
S ou th er n  A f r i c a n  C o - o r d i n a t i n g  C on f er ence  (SADCC), f i v e  
employ t h e  f i r s t  c a t e g o r y  o f  m a r k e t i n g  a r r a n g e m e n t s .  These
1. SADCC i s  t h e  l a t e s t  a t t e m p t  a t  s u b - r e g i o n a l  economic 
c o - o p e r a t i o n  i n  t he  South A f r i c a n  sub r e g i o n .  SADCC 
i s  d i s c u s s e d  f u l l y  l a t e r  i n  t he  c h a p t e r .
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are Zambia,  Zimbabwe,  T a n z a n i a ,  Mozambique,  and An go l a .
The r e m a i n i n g  f o u r  c o u n t r i e s ,  t h a t  i s ,  L e s o t h o ,  S w a z i l a n d ,  
Malawi  and Botswana employ t h e  second a ppr oach .
The f i r s t  approach i n v o l v e s  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  a n a t i o n a l  
m i n e r a l  m a r k e t i n g  c o r p o r a t i o n  charged w i t h  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
o f  m a r k e t i n g  o f  a l l  m i n e r a l s  produced i n  t h e  r e l e v a n t  
c o u n t r y .  What has d i f f e r e d  f rom c o u n t r y  t o  c o u n t r y  has 
been t he  way such c o r p o r a t i o n s  have been c r e a t e d  and 
o r g a n i z e d .  In some c o u n t r i e s ,  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n s  have been 
c o n s t i t u t e d  t h r o u g h  t he  employment  o f  normal  company law 
s t a t u t e s  e x i s t i n g  i n  t ho s e  c o u n t r i e s  w h i l e  i n  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  
s p e c i f i c  s t a t u t e s  have been enac ted  w i t h  t he  s o l e  i n t e n t i o n  
o f  i n s t i t u t i n g  such c o r p o r a t i o n s .  Zambia employed i t s  
e x i s t i n g  company laws t o  e s t a b l i s h  t he  Meta l  M a r k e t i n g  
C o r p o r a t i o n  o f  Zambia L t d .  How t h i s  was a c h i e ve d  has a l r e a d y  
been d i s c u s s e d  i n  Chap te r  Three o f  t h i s  t h e s i s .  Zimbabwe 
has used a s i m i l a r  approach by s e t t i n g  up a s t a t u t o r y  
m i n e r a l  m a r k e t i n g  c o r p o r a t i o n .  The c o r p o r a t i o n  was c o n s t i ­
t u t e d  by t h e  Minera l .  M a r k e t i n g  C o r p o r a t i o n  o f  Zimbabwe Act  
o f  1982.  The Act  makes t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n  t h e  s o l e  m a r k e t i n g  
and s e l l i n g  agent  f o r  a l l  m i n e r a l s  produced i n  t h a t  c o u n t r y ,
whe the r  produced by p r i v a t e  e n t e r p r i s e s  o r  by s t a t e  owned 
2e n t e r p r i s e s .
The Zimbabwe m i n e r a l  m a r k e t i n g  c o r p o r a t i o n  i s  un ique  
i n  e mp lo y in g  a g r i c u l t u r a l  m a r k e t i n g  s t r a t e g i e s  t o  m i n e r a l s .  
L i k e  t h e  a g r i c u l t u r a l  m a r k e t i n g  boards c r e a t e d  d u r i n g  the
2. S e c t i o n  20 o f  t h e  Zimbabwe M i n e r a l  M a r k e t i n g  
C o r p o r a t i o n  Ac t  o f  1982.
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p e r i o d  o f  t h e  C e n t r a l  A f r i c a n  F e d e r a t i o n ,  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n
has power t o  purchase  m i n e r a l s  f rom i n t e n d i n g  e x p o r t e r s
f o r  i t s  own acco un t  and e x p o r t  them as though t h e y  were
3
produced by t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n  i t s e l f .  Should t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n
no t  wish t o  do t h i s ,  i t  may u n d e r t a k e  t o  n e g o t i a t e  s a le s
c o n t r a c t s  on b e h a l f  o f  t he  e x p o r t e r  i n  r e t u r n  f o r  a f e e  or
commiss ion o r  m e r e l y  a u t h o r i z e  t h e  p r o d u c e r  t o  e x p o r t  t he
m i n e r a l  o r  m i n e r a l s  s u b j e c t  t o  c e r t a i n  c o n d i t i o n s  i t  may s e t . ^
The s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  t h e  Zimbabwe m i n e r a l s  m a r k e t i n g
Act  t h e r e f o r e  i s  t h a t  by t he  use o f  l e g i s l a t i v e  powers ,  t he
government  i n  t h a t  c o u n t r y  c r e a t e d  a s t a t u t o r y  body charged
w i t h  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  m a r k e t i n g  a l l  m i n e r a l s  i n  Zimbabwe.
Governmenta l  c o n t r o l  o f  t h i s  body i s  p o r t r a y e d  i n  t he  m ach in er y
c r e a t e d  under  t h e  Ac t  t o  run t he  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n .
The Ac t  c r e a t e s  a m i n e r a l  m a r k e t i n g  board wh i ch  i s  t o
be t he  s o l e  a u t h o r i t y  t h r o u g h  which  a l l  m i n e r a l s  i n  Zimbabwe
5
are t o  be m a r k e t e d .  The c o n t r o l  o f  t h i s  board l i e s  f i r m l y  
i n  t he  hands o f  t h e  government  which  e x e r c i s e s  i t  i n  t h r e e  
w ay s .
F i r s t ,  t h e  government  i s  empowered under  S e c t i o n  5 
o f  t he  A c t ,  t o  a p p o i n t  t h e  Chai rman o f  t h e  b o a r d .  Under 
t h e  te r ms  o f  t h i s  s e c t i o n ,  t h e  cha i rman o f  t h e  board i s  t o  
be a p p o i n t e d  by t he  M i n i s t e r  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  t h e  m i n i n g  
i n d u s t r y .  Below t he  Cha i rman,  t h e r e  i s  t h e  General  Manager 
r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  t he  day t o  day r u n n i n g  o f  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n
3. I b i d . ,  s e c t i o n  2 0 ( c ) .
4.  I b i d . ,  s e c t i o n s  42 and 43.
5. I b i d . ,  S e c t i o n  4.
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who t h e  Ac t  r e q u i r e s  t o  be nomina ted  by t h e  M i n i s t e r .  The 
power t o  n omi na te  t h e  General  Manager i s  c l e a r l y  aimed at  
g i v i n g  t h e  government  s u b s t a n t i a l  c o n t r o l  n o t  o n l y  i n  t he  
boardroom b u t  o ve r  t he  d a i l y  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o f  t h e  c o r p o r a ­
t i o n .
S e c o n d l y ,  t h e  c o n t r o l  o f  t he  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  t h e  c o r p o r a ­
t i o n  i s  e x e r c i s e d  by t h e  government  t h r o u g h  t h e  power t o  
a p p o i n t  t h e  r e m a i n i n g  seven members o f  t h e  b o a r d .  S e c t i o n  24 
o f  t he  Ac t  r e q u i r e s  two o f  t he  seven members t o  be a p p o i n t e d  
by t h e  M i n i s t e r  a f t e r  c o n s u l t a t i o n  w i t h  t he  chamber o f  
m i nes ,  one a f t e r  c o n s u l t a t i o n  w i t h  t r a d e  u n i o ns  wh i ch  i n  
t h e  o p i n i o n  o f  t h e  M i n i s t e r  r e p r e s e n t  t h e  m a j o r i t y  o f  mine 
w o r k e r s ,  two i n  c o n s u l t a t i o n  w i t h  m i n i s t r i e s  r e l a t e d  t o  
m a r k e t i n g , ,  e x p o r t  or  s a l e  o f  m i n e r a l s ,  and t h e  l a s t  two 
f o r  t h e i r  knowledge and e x p e r i e n c e  i n  f i e l d s  o f  m i n e r a l  
p r o d u c t i o n  o r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  commodi ty  m a r k e t i n g .
F i n a l l y ,  t h e  government  e x e r c i s e s  g e n e r a l  c o n t r o l  ove r  
t h e  a f f a i r s  o f  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n  t h r o u g h  powers a ss ig n ed  t o  t he  
M i n i s t e r  under  s e c t i o n  25.  T h i s  s e c t i o n  empowers t he  
M i n i s t e r  t o  g i v e  d i r e c t i o n s  i n  w r i t i n g ,  o f  a g e n e r a l  c h a r a c t e r  
r e l a t i n g  t o  t h e  e x e r c i s e  by the  c o r p o r a t i o n s  o f  i t s  f u n c t i o n s ,  
d u t i e s  and powers as appears n e ce s s a r y  t o  t h e  M i n i s t e r  
t a k i n g  i n t o  a cc o un t  no t  o n l y  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  Zimbabwe but  
a l s o  t h o s e  o f  o t h e r  m i n e r a l  p r o d u c e r s .  Whenever t h e  M i n i s t e r  
chooses t o  make such d i r e c t i v e s ,  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n  i s  r e q u i r e d
r
t o  comply w i t h o u t  undue d e l a y .
6. I b i d . ,  s e c t i  on 25 .
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These measures o f  c o n t r o l ^ s e e k  t o  ensur e  t h a t  t he
C o r p o r a t i o n  pursues  m a r k e t i n g  p o l i c i e s  t h a t  r e f l e c t  the
o v e r a l l  p o l i c i e s  o f  t h e  Zimbabwean government  and a l s o  to
ensure  t h a t  t he  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  t he  c o r p o r a t i o n  are s u b j e c t e d
7
t o  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a b i l i t y .
One i n t e r e s t i n g  a s pec t  o f  t h e  Zimbabwe m i n e r a l  
m a r k e t i n g  a r r angement s  i s  t h a t  s i n c e  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n  and i t s  
board are f i r m l y  c o n t r o l l e d  by t he  go ve r nme nt ,  one would 
e x pe c t  i t  t o  s a f e g u a r d  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  t h e  Zimbabwe 
m i n i n g  i n d u s t r y  o n l y .  The m i n e r a l  m a r k e t i n g  c o r p o r a t i o n  o f  
Zimbabwe Ac t  however  does r e q u i r e  i n  a d d i t i o n  t h a t  t he  
c o r p o r a t i o n  i n  p e r f o r m i n g  any o f  i t s  a s s i gn ed  d u t i e s  and 
f u n c t i o n s  t o  t a k e  i n t o  acco un t  the common i n t e r e s t s  o f  a l l
o
p r o d u c e r s  o f  m i n e r a l s .  Th i s  r e g a r d  f o r  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  
o t h e r  m i n e r a l  p r o d u c e r s  c e r t a i n l y  c r e a t e s  a c o n d u c i v e  a tmos­
phere f o r  t he  c o - o r d i n a t i o n  o f  m i n e r a l  m a r k e t i n g  s t r a t e g i e s  
on a r e g i  onal  bas i  s .
The second approach t o  t he  m a r k e t i n g  o f  m i n e r a l s  i n  
Sou the r n  A f r i c a  i s  u n d e r t ak e n  t h r o u g h  t h e  use o f  t he  
o r d i n a r y  m i n i n g  l aw s .  Examples o f  c o u n t r i e s  e mp lo y in g  t h i s  
approach are Malawi  and Botswana.
The Malawi  Mines and M i n e r a l s  Act  o f  1981,  r e q u i r e s  
a l l  e x p o r t e r s  o f  m i n e r a l s  i n  t h a t  c o u n t r y  t o  o b t a i n  a 
p e r m i t  f rom t h e  M i n i s t e r  r e s p o n s i b l e .  In t h i s  r e s p e c t  t he  
Act  s t a t e s  t h a t ,
7 . I b i d . ,  s e c t  i on 2 3 ( 3 ) .
8.  I b i d . ,  s e c t i o n  2 2 ( a ) ( i  i i ) .
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" t h e  M i n i s t e r  may g r a n t  t o  any person a p e r m i t  to  
e x p o r t  m i n e r a l s  f r om Malawi  on c o n d i t i o n s  d e t e r ­
mined by t h e  M i n i s t e r  and s p e c i f i e d  i n  t h e  p e r m i t ;  
b u t  t he  g r a n t  o f  such a p e r m i t  does no t  exempt t he  
person concerned  f ro m c o mp ly i ng  w i t h  t he  r e q u i r e ­
ments o f  any law r e l a t i n g  t o  t he  e x p o r t  o f  
m i n e r a l s . "9
Th i s  p r o v i s i o n  o f  t he  Ac t  g i v e s  both l o c a l  and f o r e i g n  
m i n i n g  e n t e r p r i s e s  i n  Malawi  t h e  r i g h t  t o  d i r e c t l y  market  
t he  m i n e r a l s  t h e y  p r oduce as l ong  as t h e y  o b t a i n  a p e r m i t  
t o  do so f r om t he  M i n i s t e r  r e s p o n s i b l e .  The r e q u i r e m e n t  
o f  a p e r m i t  would seem t o  be des igned  a t  a s s u r i n g  g o v e r n ­
menta l  c o n t r o l  o f  t h e  m a r k e t i n g  p o l i c i e s  o f  t h e  m i n i n g  
e n t e r p r i s e s  s i n c e  u n a c c e p t a b l e  m a r k e t i n g  a r rangement s  by 
such e n t e r p r i s e s  c o u l d  l ead  t o  t he  r e f u s a l  o f  a p e r m i t .
A s i m i l a r  approach i s  employed by Botswana.  In 
t h i s  c o u n t r y ,  a m i n i n g  l e as e  i s  n o r m a l l y  g r a n t e d  t o  both 
n a t i o n a l s  and f o r e i g n  m i n i n g  companies t h a t  are i n c o r p o r a t e d  
i n  t h e  c o u n t r y  or  can e s t a b l i s h  a d o m i c i l i u m  c i t a n d i  e t  
e x e c u t a n d i  i n  t he  c o u n t r y . ^  For a g r a n t  o f  a m i n i n g  l e as e  
t o  be c o n s i d e r e d  however ,  t h e  a p p l i c a n t  company or  i n d i v i d u a l  
must  p r o v i d e  t he  g r a n t i n g  a u t h o r i t y  w i t h  r e l e v a n t  i n f o r m a t i o n  
r e g a r d i n g  h i s  or  i t s  m a r k e t i n g  a r rangement s  f o r  t he  m i n e r a l  
which i s  s u b j e c t  o f  t he  l e a s e . ^  I t  can be assumed f rom 
t h i s  r e q u i r e m e n t  t h a t  w i t h o u t  t he  a p p l i c a n t  p r o v i d i n g  
s a t i s f a c t o r y  i n f o r m a t i o n  as t o  t he  m a r k e t i n g  a r r a ng e me n t s ,  
t he  m i n i n g  l e as e  may n o t  be g r a n t e d .  But  even where 
s a t i s f a c t o r y  i n f o r m a t i o n  i s  p r o v i d e d  r e g a r d i n g  t he  m a r k e t i n g  
ar r angement s  and a m i n i n g  l e a s e  i s  g r a n t e d  t he  government
9. The Mines and M i n e r a l s  Ac t  o f  M a l aw i ,  1981,  s e c t i o n  119.
10. Mines and M i n e r a l s  Ac t  o f  Botswana,  Ac t  n o . 30 o f  1976, 
S e c t i  on 5 ( b ) .
11. I b i d . ,  s e c t i o n  32 pa r ag ra ph  j ( v i ) .
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i s  a t  l i b e r t y  t o  i n c l u d e  i n  t he  l ea se  c o n d i t i o n s  r e l a t i n g
t o  t h e  p r o c e s s i n g ,  d i s p o s a l  and the  s a l e  o f  t he  m i n e r a l s
t o  be p roduced .  In e f f e c t  t h e r e f o r e ,  t he  government  at
a l l  t i m e s  has t h e  f i n a l  c o n t r o l  i n  t h e  manner i n  which  such
1 2m i n e r a l s  are ma r ke te d .
The two approaches t o  t h e  m a r k e t i n g  o f  m i n e r a l s  
employed by c o u n t r i e s  i n  Sou thern  A f r i c a  r e v e a l  one 
i m p o r t a n t  i s s u e  which may h e l p  the  c o - o r d i n a t i o n  o f  m i ne r a l  
m a r k e t i n g  a r r angement s  i n  t h e  s u b - r e g i o n .  T h i s  i s s u e  i s  
t he  gove r nme nt a l  c o n t r o l  o f  such a r r an g em e nt s .  Thus 
a l t h o u g h  some c o u n t r i e s  have e s t a b l i s h e d  s t a t u t o r y  bod i es  
t o  u n d e r t a k e  t he  m a r k e t i n g  o f  m i n e r a l s  and o t h e r s  have 
r e l i e d  on t h e  m i n i n g  laws t o  a ch ie ve  t he  same o b j e c t i v e ,  
both approaches g i v e  t he  governments  concerned  t he  u l t i m a t e  
c o n t r o l  over  t h e  i s s u e .  Th i s  be ing  t he  case ,  c o - o r d i n a t i o n  
o f  t he  m i n e r a l  m a r k e t i n g  a r rangement s  can proceed on a 
gover nmenta l  l e v e l .  The p rob l em i s  one o f  how t h i s  g o v e r n ­
menta l  c o - o r d i n a t i o n  o f  t he  m a r k e t i n g  s t r a t e g y  i s  t o  t a k e  
p l a c e .  H i s t o r i c a l l y ,  t h e r e  are  a number o f  approaches 
some o f  t h e  c o u n t r i e s  had t r i e d  t o  employ i n  c o - o r d i n a t i n g  
p o l i c i e s  i n  t he  sub r e g i o n  r e g a r d i n g  a number o f  i s s u e s  which 
may p rove  v a l u a b l e  i n  any a t t e m p t s  at  t he  c o - o r d i n a t i o n  o f  
m a r k e t i n g  a r r an g e m e n t s .  These a t t e m p t s  and t h e  problems 
e n co u n t e r e d  are d i s c u s s e d  be low.  The d i s c u s s i o n  below 
seeks t o  h i g h l i g h t  t he  prob lems e n c ou n t e r e d  i n  t he s e  a t t e m p t s  
and how t h e y  can be overcome.
12. I b i d . ,  s e c t  i on 35 .
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11 . C o - o r d i n a t i o n  o f  economic p o l i c i e s  i n  So uthe r n  A f r i c a :
A h i s t o r i c a l  p e r s p e c t i v e
( i ) The C e n t r a l  A f r i c a n  F e d e r a t i o n
The C e n t r a l  A f r i c a n  F e d e r a t i o n  was c r e a t e d  i n  1953 
and b r o u g h t  t o g e t h e r  t h r e e  c o u n t r i e s  i n  t h e  s u b - r e g i o n ,
1 3t h a t  i s  t o  say ,  p r e s e n t  day M a l aw i ,  Zambia,  and Zimbabwe.
T h i s  f e d e r a t i o n  i n v o l v e d  complex l e g a l  a r r an ge me nt s  aimed
at  f o s t e r i n g  i n t r a - t e r r i t o r i a l  c o - o p e r a t i o n  i n  a number o f
economic and s o c i a l  f i e l d s .
As f a r  as t r a d e  was c o ncer ne d ,  i n t r a - t e r r i t o r i a l
c o - o p e r a t i o n  was t o  be a t t a i n e d  t h r o u g h  t he  c r e a t i o n  o f  a
common ma rke t  w i t h  a common e x t e r n a l  t a r i f f  t o  a p p l y  i n
r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  c o n s t i t u e n t  member t e r r i t o r i e s  on t h e  one
1 4hand and t h e i r  o t h e r  t r a d i n g  p a r t n e r s  on t he  o t h e r .
The second aspec t  o f  t h e  f e d e r a l  a r r angement  i n v o l v e d  
the  r u n n i n g  o f  j o i n t  s e r v i c e s ,  such as r a i l w a y s  and a i r  
t r a n s p o r t a t i o n . Some o f  t h e se  j o i n t  s e r v i c e s  had e x i s t e d  
p r i o r  t o  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  t h e  F e d e r a t i o n  bu t  were run 
p u r e l y  on a c o n s u l t a t i v e  b a s i s  by t he  C e n t r a l  A f r i c a n  C o u n c i l .  
I t  was i n  f a c t  due t o  t h e  e x p e r i e n c e s  o f  t h i s  C o u n c i l  t h a t  
t h e  f e d e r a l  a r r angement s  i n c l u d e d  t he  r u n n i n g  o f  j o i n t  
s e r v i c e s .  In t h e  y e a r s  i n  which  t h i s  C o u n c i l  had run 
j o i n t  s e r v i c e s ,  i t  had come t o  t he  c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  c on ­
s u l t a t i o n  on i t s  own c o u l d  no t  secure  a harmon ious  and 
e f f e c t i v e  programme f o r  t he  t e r r i t o r i a l  c o - o r d i n a t i o n  o f
13. See Order  i n  C o u n c i l ,  S t a t u t o r y  I n s t r u m e n t s  n o . 1199 
o f  1950.
14. See S i r  Roy Wel ensky ,  " F e d e r a t i o n  o f  Rhodes ia  and 
N y a s a l a n d " ,  i n  F.S.  Joel  son ( e d . ) ,  Rhodes ia  and East  
A f r i  c a , 1 958,  pages 1 1- 20 .
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t h e  s e r v i c e s  i n v o l v e d .  The Cou nc i l  fo rmed t h e  o p i n i o n  
t h a t  t h e  i n h a b i t a n t s  o f  t h e  t h r e e  t e r r i t o r i e s  s t oo d  to  
b e n e f i t  more t h r o u g h  t he  c r e a t i o n  o f  c e n t r a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  
which c o u l d  i n d e p e n d e n t l y  make d e c i s i o n s  t h a t  were 
b e n e f i c i a l  t o  t he  i n t e r e s t s  o f  a l l  t he  c o u n t r i e s  i n v o l v e d .
The second asp ec t  o f  t he  f e d e r a l  a r r angement  makes 
i t  c l e a r  t h a t  i t  was no t  c r e a t e d  t o  f o s t e r  a c omp le te  
i n t e g r a t i o n  o f  t h e  t h r e e  t e r r i t o r i e s  b u t  r a t h e r  t o  encourage 
t h e  c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  o f  j o i n t  economic and s o c i a l  i n t e r e s t s .
One o f  t h e  n o t a b l e  spheres  o f  economic i n t e r e s t ,  t o  t he  t h r e e  
c o u n t r i e s  wh i ch  was l e f t  ou t  o f  t h i s  c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  p o l i c y  
was m i n i n g .
In t h i s  r e s p e c t  t h e  l e g a l  scheme f o r  t h e  f e d e r a t i o n  
made p r o v i s i o n  f o r  t h e  s h a r i n g  o f  l e g i s l a t i v e  power between 
t h e  f e d e r a l  l e g i s l a t u r e  and t h e  t e r r i t o r i a l  l e g i s l a t u r e s .  
C e r t a i n  m a t t e r s  were l e f t  t o  t h e  e x c l u s i v e  j u r i s d i c t i o n  o f  
t he  f e d e r a l  l e g i s l a t u r e  w h i l e  o t h e r  m a t t e r s  were l e f t  t o  
t he  e x c l u s i v e  domain o f  t he  t e r r i t o r i a l  l e g i s l a t u r e s .  A l l  
m a t t e r s  r e l a t i n g  t o  m i n i n g  were l e f t  t o  t h e  j u r i s d i c t i o n  
o f  i n d i v i d u a l  t e r r i t o r i a l  l e g i s l a t u r e s .  The s h ap i ng  o f  
m i n i n g  p o l i c i e s  was t h e r e f o r e  an area wh i ch  was o u t s i d e  
t h e  c e n t r a l i z e d  scheme o f  t he  f e d e r a t i o n .  T e r r i t o r i a l  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  however ,  d i d  no t  r u l e  o u t  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  
o f  t h e  t h r e e  t e r r i t o r i e s  c o - o r d i n a t i n g  t h e i r  m i n e r a l  
m a r k e t i n g  p o l i c i e s .  Indeed as e a r l y  as 1939,  t h e  Rhodes ia -  
Nyasa land Royal  Commission had observed  t h a t  t h e  i mprovement
15 .tfM5<jSouthern R hodes i a ,  N o r t h e r n  Rhodes ia ,  Nyasa la nd .
R epor t  by t h e  C on f er ence  on F e d e r a t i o n  h e l d  in
London,  Ja nua ry  1953,  Command 8753.
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o f  t h e  q u a l i t y  o f  v a r i o u s  p r o d u c t s  i n  t he  t h r e e  c o u n t r i e s  
as w e l l  as t he  methods o f  m a r k e t i n g  and c u l t i v a t i o n  o f
1 F\new mark et s  wou ld  b e n e f i t  f r om c l o s e r  c o - o p e r a t i o n .
(a)  £°JL°ILd ina t i_o_n o.'f?„ m£ r j i Gi ' , IL9 „aI].r £ n£ eiIIeIl.'t i .
C o - o r d i n a t i o n  o f  m a r k e t i n g  a r r angement s  i n  t he  
f e d e r a t i o n  were u n d e r t a k e n  t h r o u g h  f e d e r a l  l e g i s l a t i o n  but  
were l i m i t e d  t o  a g r i c u l t u r a l  c o m m o d i t i e s .  T h i s  l i m i t a t i o n  
stemmed f ro m t h e  f a c t  t h a t  m i n e r a l s  were e x c l u d e d  f rom t he  
f e d e r a l  sphere o f  competence.  Regard ing  a g r i c u l t u r a l  
c o m m o d i t i e s ,  t h e  f e d e r a l  l e g i s l a t u r e  c r e a t e d  a number o f  
m a r k e t i n g  a u t h o r i t i e s  which c o n t r o l l e d  t h e  m a r k e t i n g  o f  
such c o m m o d i t i e s .
In 1955 f o r  example ,  t h e  Feder a l  L e g i s l a t i v e  Assembly
1 7passed t he  t ob a c c o  m a r k e t i n g  Act  which p r o v i d e d  f o r  t he
c o n t r o l  o f  t he  e x p o r t  o f  t ob ac co  f rom t he  f e d e r a t i o n .  Th i s
Act  p r o v i d e d  among o t h e r  t h i n g s  t h a t ,
" I f  i n  t he  o p i n i o n  o f  t h e  M i n i s t e r  t h e  q u a n t i t y  o f  
t o b ac c o  produced i n  t h e  Rhodes ias w i l l  be i n  excess 
o f  t h e  a n t i c i p a t e d  r e q u i r e m e n t s  o f  t he  m a r k e t s ,  he 
may, a f t e r  c o n s u l t a t i o n  w i t h  t h e  buyers  a s s o c i a t i o n  
and growers  a s s o c i a t i o n ,  and such o t h e r  t ob ac c o  
o r g a n i z a t i o n s  i n  Gr ea t  B r i t a i n  and o t h e r  ma jo r  
t o b a c c o  p u r c h a s i n g  c o u n t r i e s  as he t h i n k s  f i t  t o  
c o n s u l t , p r e s c r i  be
(a)  t o t a l  w e i g h t  t h a t  may be s o l d  i n  t h e  Rhodesias 
or  e x p o r t e d . "
S i m i l a r l y  i n  1957 t h e  Fe de ra l  L e g i s l a t i v e  Assembly
I O
passed an Ac t  e s t a b l i s h i n g  t h e  g r a i n  m a r k e t i n g  b o ar d .
One o f  t he  i m p o r t a n t  powers ve s te d  i n  t h e  board was the  
power t o  i m p o r t  and e x p o r t  a l l  t y p e s  o f  g r a i n s  as i t
1 9c o n s i d e r e d  n e ce s s a r y  i n  t h e  i n t e r e s t  o f  t he  f e d e r a t i o n .
1 5 . Wo R h o d e s i  a -Nyasa l  and Royal  Commiss ion.
(1939),  page 131, parag r aph  316.
17. F e d e r a t i o n  o f  Rhodes ia  and Nyasa land Ac t  n o . 5 o f  1955.
18. F e d e r a t i o n  o f  Rhodes ia  and Nyasa land Ac t  n o . 23 o f  1 957.
19. I b i d . ,  s e c t i  on 10.
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T h i s  power was l a t e r  ex tended  t o  co ve r  a l l  a g r i c u l t u r a l  
p r o d u c t s . 20
A s i m i l a r  a r rangement  e x i s t e d  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  beef
and o t h e r  meats .  The c o l d  s t o r a g e  commis ion Ac t  o f  1960
e s t a b l i s h e d  a Commission t h a t  was t o  be r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  t he
o p e r a t i o n  o f  a l l  a b a t t o i r s ,  r e f r i g e r a t i o n  o f  meats ,  and t he
c o n t r o l  o f  t he  e x p o r t  o f  c h i l l e d  and f r o z e n  meats f rom t he  
21f e d e r a t i o n .
The s t a t u t o r y  boards c r e a t e d  by t h e  Fe d er a l  L e g i s l a t i v e  
Co un c i l  were a l l  r e q u i r e d  t o  use one t y p e  o f  mechanism t o  
s t a b i l i z e  t he  income o f  t h e  p r od uc e rs  i n  t h e  f e d e r a t i o n .
The mechanism employed was one o f  c r e a t i n g  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  
f unds  f o r  t he  c o mm od i t i e s  i n v o l v e d .  These f un ds  
were t o  be used i n  m i n i m i z i n g  t he  e f f e c t s  o f  p r i c e  f l u c t u ­
a t i o n s  on t he  p r o d u c e r s .  Whenever p r i c e s  were good on t he  
w o r l d  m a r k e t s ,  t h e  s u r p l u s  r e c e i v e d  was pu t  i n t o  a fund 
t h a t  was to  be used t o  b oos t  t h e  p r i c e s  p a id  t o  p r o d u c e r s  
i n  t he  f e d e r a t i o n  i n  t h e  e ve nt  o f  p r i c e s  d e c l i n e  on w o r l d  
m a r k e t s .  For  example s e c t i o n  17 o f  t he  Gr a i n  m a r k e t i n g  
Board A c t ,  p r o v i d e d  t h a t ,
"where t h e r e  i s  i n  t h e  o p i n i o n  o f  t h e  M i n i s t e r  an 
amount o f  money i n  t h e  e q u a l i z a t i o n  fund  s u r p l u s  
t o  t he  amount ne ces sa ry  f o r  t he  purpose o f  t h e  f u n d ,  
he may t a k e  such s u r p l u s  amount i n t o  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  
i n  d e t e r m i n i n g  the  p r i c e  t o  be f i x e d  by him t h e r e a f t e r  
or  may pay d i r e c t l y  h i g h e r  p r i c e s  t o  p r o d u c e r s . "
The c o n t r o l  o f  m a r k e t i n g  a r r angement s  t h r o u g h  common
'in s 4 b u tto n s  may have been p o s s i b l e  i n  t h e  f e d e r a t i o n
20. See F e d e r a t i o n  o f  Rhodes ia and Nyasa land Ac t  n o . 18 
o f  1957.
21. S e c t i o n  37 o f  t h e  F e d e r a t i o n  o f  Rhodes ia  and Nyasaland 
Ac t  n o .9 o f  1960.
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s i m p l y  because o f  t he  e x i s t e n c e  o f  t he  f e d e r a t i o n  which 
employed t h e  same laws f o r  a l l  t he  t h r e e  t e r r i t o r i e s .  The 
use o f  t h i s  approach i n  c o u n t r i e s  whose laws are not  
harmon ized t h r o u g h  a f e d e r a l  system such as i s  t h e  case i n  
Sou the r n  A f r i c a  i s  bound t o  e n c o u n t e r  a number o f  p ro b l ems .
One o f  t h e  ma jo r  p rob lems would i n v o l v e  t h e  c r e a t i o n  
o f  such boards  s i n c e  t h e y  c a n . o n l y  be c r e a t e d  by l e g i s l a t i o n  
and each c o u n t r y  i n  Sou thern  A f r i c a  has i t s  own i nd e pe nd e n t  
l e g i s l a t i v e  m a c h i n e r y .  These l e g i s l a t i v e  m a c h i n e r i e s  may 
no t  be empowered t o  pass laws a f f e c t i n g  m a r k e t i n g  a r rangements  
o f  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  i n  t h e  s u b - r e g i o n .
( b ) Co-ordj_nat j_on t^hrouig_h j_oj_nt, _au£  h£r v t  i_e£
A n o t he r  i n t e r e s t i n g  aspec t  o f  t he  Rhodes ia  and Nyasaland 
f e d e r a t i o n  and which  may p rove  a u s e f u l  e x p e r i e n c e  upon which 
c o u n t r i e s  i n  t h e  Sou thern  A f r i c a n  s u b - r e g i o n  may draw i n  an 
a t t e m p t  a t  c o - o r d i n a t i n g  o f  m i n e r a l  m a r k e t i n g  a r rangement s  
r e l a t e s  t o  t h e  f e d e r a l  a u t h o r i t i e s .
D u r i n g  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  t he  f e d e r a t i o n ,  a number o f  
j o i n t  a u t h o r i t i e s  had been e s t a b l i s h e d .  Examples o f  such 
boards were t h e  f e d e r a l  power board e s t a b l i s h e d  under  
s e c t i o n  19 o f  t he  f e d e r a l  e l e c t r i c i t y  Act  o f  1956;  t he  
C e n t r a l  A f r i c a n  A i rwa ys  c o r p o r a t i o n  e s t a b l i s h e d  under  t he  
C e n t r a l  A f r i c a n  A i r wa y s  C o r p o r a t i o n  Ac t  o f  1960;  and the  
A g r i c u l t u r a l  Research C ou nc i l  o f  Rhodesia and Nyasa land 
e s t a b l i s h e d  under  s e c t i o n  18 o f  t he  f e d e r a l  r e s e a r c h  Cou nc i l  
Act  o f  1959.  A s i m i l a r  a r rangement  e x i s t e d  f o r  t he  r u n n i n g  
o f  t he  Rhodes ia  r a i l w a y s .
These j o i n t  a u t h o r i t i e s  were c r e a t e d  as a r e s u l t  o f
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an a c t  o f  p o l i t i c a l  un ion  between t he  t h r e e  members i n  
t h e  f e d e r a t i o n .  T h i s  p o l i t i c a l  un ion  w i t h i n  t h e  f e d e r a t i o n  
made i t  p o s s i b l e  f o r  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  j o i n t  a u t h o r i t i e s  t o  
s u p e r v i s e  o r  run s e r v i c e s  o f  j o i n t  i n t e r e s t  t o  t h e  t h r e e  
c o u n t r i e s .  W i t h o u t  t h i s  p o l i t i c a l  u n i o n ,  t h e  j o i n t  
a u t h o r i t i e s  i n  t h e  f e d e r a t i o n  may no t  have been p o s s i b l e .
Even i f  t h e y  were t o  e x i s t  t h e y  p r o b a b l y  would  have t ak en  a 
d i f f e r e n t  f o r m .  Thus t he  use o f  t h i s  approach i n  m a r k e t i n g  
o f  m i n e r a l s  i n  Sou thern  A f r i c a  would depend v e r y  much on 
w he the r  some fo rm o f  a p o l i t i c a l  un ion  can be p o s s i b l e  
between t he  c o u n t r i e s .  The p r o s p e c t s  f o r  such an a c t  o f  
p o l i t i c a l  u n i on  do no t  appear  t o  be b r i g h t  or  even d e s i r a b l e .  
T h i s  b e i ng  t h e  case,  t h e  use o f  some fo rm o f  j o i n t  a u t h o r i t y  
f o r  t h e  m a r k e t i n g  o f  m i n e r a l s  i n  t h e  s u b - r e g i o n  may have t o  
t a k e  a d i f f e r e n t  f o rm f ro m t h e  f e d e r a l  j o i n t  a u t h o r i t i e s .  
Indeed a t  t h e  t i m e  when t h e  f e d e r a t i o n  was d i s s o l v e d  i n  
1963 a number o f  d i s c u s s i o n s  t ook  p l a c e  r e g a r d i n g  t h e  p o s s i b l e  
c o n t i n u a t i o n  o f  some o f  t h e  a u t h o r i t i e s .  Some l e a d e r s  i n  
t he  c o u n t r i e s  s t r o n g l y  o b j e c t e d  t o  t h e  c o n t i n u a t i o n  o f  such 
j o i n t  a u t h o r i t i e s  i n  a s i t u a t i o n  where a p o l i t i c a l  un ion  no 
l o n g e r  e x i s t e d .  For  example ,  P r e s i d e n t  Kaunda o f  Zambia 
c o m p l e t e l y  r e j e c t e d  t he  c o n t i n u a t i o n  o f  such j o i n t  a u t h o r i t i e s  
u n l e s s  t h e y  were t o  f u n c t i o n  as p u r e l y  commerc i a l  e n t e r p r i s e s  
r a t h e r  t han  as a r e s u l t  o f  any p o l i t i c a l  u n i o n .  I t  was on 
t h i s  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  t h a t  t h e  F e d e r a t i o n  o f  Rhodes ia and 
Nya sal  and ( D i s s o l u t i o n )  Order  i n  C ou nc i l  made p r o v i s i o n  
f o r  a r r angement s  t o  c o n t i n u e  t he  work o f  t he  power board
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t h a t  had e x i s t e d  under  t h e  f e d e r a t i o n  and renamed the
2 2C e n t r a l  A f r i c a n  power boar d.
T h i s  e x p e r i e n c e  w i t h  t he  f e d e r a t i o n  o f  Rhodes ia and 
Nyasa land j o i n t  a u t h o r i t i e s  r e v e a l s  one i m p o r t a n t  l e sso n  as 
f a r  as t he  d i s c u s s i o n  i n  t h i s  c h a p t e r  i s  c o nc e r n e d .  For 
such an approach t o  be a p p l i c a b l e  t o  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  i n  
p r e s e n t  day S ou the r n  A f r i c a ,  i t  s ho u l d  be preceeded by some 
ac t  o f  a p o l i t i c a l  u n i o n .  I f  such a p o l i t i c a l  un ion  were 
t o  be p o s s i b l e ,  t hen  use o f  t h e  f e d e r a l  o r  u n io n  l e g i s l a t i v e  
power c o u l d  be made i n  c r e a t i n g  j o i n t  a u t h o r i t i e s  i n  t he  
m a r k e t i n g  o f  m i n e r a l s .  S ince  such a un ion  i s  u n l i k e l y  t o  
e x i s t  and perhaps even u n d e s i r a b l e ,  t h i s  approach may not  
seem t o  h o l d  much p r o s p e c t  f o r  c o u n t r i e s  i n  So u t he rn  A f r i c a .  
In t h i s  r e s p e c t  t h e r e  i s  much to  be l e a r n t  f r om t h e  e x p e r i ­
ence o f  t he  t h r e e  East  A f r i c a n  c o u n t r i e s ,  t h a t  i s ,  kenya,  
T a n z a n i a ,  and Uganda. These c o u n t r i e s  had f o r  some y e a r s  
run j o i n t  s e r v i c e s  i n  v a r i o u s  f i e l d s  such as a i r  t r a n s p o r t ,  
r a i l w a y s  and h a r b o u r s .  These j o i n t  s e r v i c e s  were however 
d i s s o l v e d  when t h e  East  A f r i c a n  Communi ty wh i ch  p r o v i d e d  t he  
p o l i t i c a l  nexus c o l l a p s e d .
( i i ) Economic Communi ty o f  Ea s te r n  A f r i c a
A more r e c e n t  e x p er i m e n t  i n  c o - o r d i n a t i o n  o f  economic 
a c t i v i t i e s  i n v o l v i n g  a number o f  s o u t h e r n  A f r i c a n  c o u n t r i e s  
was made i n  t h e  so c a l l e d  Economic Communi ty o f  Ea s t e r n  
A f r i c a .  Th i s  s ho u l d  be d i s t i n g u i s h e d  f rom t h e  East  A f r i c a n
22. D i s s o l u t i o n  Order  i n  C o u n c i l ,  S t a t u t o r y  i n s t r u m e n t  
no.  2085 o f  1963.
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Communi ty c o m p r i s i n g  Kenya,  Uganda and T a n z a n i a .  The
Economic Communi ty o f  E a s te r n  A f r i c a  was a b r a i n  c h i l d  o f
t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  Economic Commission f o r  A f r i c a  (ECA)
and came i n t o  b e i ng  as a r e s u l t  o f  t he  ECA's r e s o l u t i o n
142 { V I I )  wh ich  had recommended the  e s t a b l i s h m e n t ,  at  t he
s u b - r e g i o n a l  l e v e l ,  o f  an i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l  m ac h i n e r y  t o
be r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  t he  h a r m o n i z a t i o n  o f  a l l  economic and 
23s o c i a l  m a t t e r s .  R e s u l t i n g  f ro m t h i s  r e s o l u t i o n ,  a sub­
r e g i o n a l  me et i ng  was h e l d  i n  Lusaka,  Zambia between 
26 th  Oc tober  and 2nd November 1965. In a t t e n d a n c e  were 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  f r om Z a i r e ,  Zamb ia , M a i a w i , Bur und i  ,
E t h i o p i a ,  Kenya,  Rwanda, Ta n z a n i a ,  Uganda, M a u r i t i u s  and
24Rhoses i a  (now Zimbabwe) .  One o f  t he  most  i m p o r t a n t  
recommendat ions  r e s u l t i n g  f rom t h i s  mee t i ng  was t h a t  an 
economic communi ty  o f  Ea s te r n  A f r i c a  be e s t a b l i s h e d  t o  
c o - o r d i n a t e  economic and s o c i a l  deve l opment  i n  t h e  Ea s t e r n  
A f r i c a n  s u b - r e g i o n .
In o r d e r  t o  imp l ement  t h e  above r e s o l u t i o n ,  a mee t i ng  
o f  t he  i n t e r i m  c o u n c i l  o f  M i n i s t e r s  was h e l d  i n  Add is  Ababa 
i n  May 1966 r e s u l t i n g  i n  an agreement  on t h e  " t e r m s  o f  
a s s o c i a t i o n " .  The " t e rm s  o f  a s s o c i a t i o n "  were i n  e f f e c t  
a t r a n s i t i o n a l  agreement  s p e l l i n g  ou t  t h e  means o f  c o ­
o p e r a t i o n  between member s t a t e s  p r i o r  t o  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t
23. Economic Commission f o r  A f r i c a ,  r e s o l u t i o n  1 4 2 ( V I I )  
on economic i n t e g r a t i o n ,  22 F e b r ua r y  1963.  P u b l i s h e d  
i n  UN, ECA Annual  R e p o r t . 3rd March 1964 - 23rd 
F e b r u a r y  1965.  O f f i c a l  r e c o r d s  o f  ECOSOC, 39 th  
s e s s i o n ,  supp l ement  number 1 0 / E / 40 0 4 .
24. ECA; R epor t  o f  t h e  s u b - r e g i o n  m e e t i n g  on economic
c o - o p e r a t i o n  i n  E a s te r n  A f r i c a . Doc. CN.14/LU/EC0.
F/ 1 2 o f  December 1 0 , 1 96"E>. ~
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o f  t h e  commun i ty .  The aims o f  t he  communi ty  were s p e l l e d  out
i n  t h i s  document .  The most r e l e v a n t  aim f o r  purposes  o f
t h i s  d i s c u s s i o n  was c o n t a i n e d  i n  a r t i c l e  1 pa r ag ra ph  { c ) 
which s t a t e s  t h e  aim o f  t he  communi ty as:
" t o  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  t h e  o r d e r l y  exp an s i on  o f  t r a d e
between t he  member s t a t e s  and t h e  r e s t  o f  t he
w o r l d  and,  t o  t h i s  end,  t a k e  measures wh i ch  r e n d e r  
t h e i r  p r o d u c t s  r e l a t i v e l y  c o m p e t i t i v e  w i t h  goods 
i m p o r t e d  f r om o u t s i d e  t he  communi t y ,  and t o  seek 
t o  o b t a i n  more f a v o u r a b l e  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  t h e i r  
p r o d u c t s  i n  t h e  w o r l d  m a r k e t . "25
I t  i s  c l e a r  f rom t h i s  aim t h a t  t h e  communi ty  when c r e a t e d
would have s ough t  among o t h e r  t h i n g s  t o  c o - o r d i n a t e  or
harmon ize  i t s  members'  m a r k e t i n g  p o l i c i e s  so as t o  o b t a i n
more f a v o u r a b l e  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  t h e i r  p r o d u c t s  on the  w o r l d
m a r k e t s .  The te rms o f  a s s o c i a t i o n  however ,  d i d  no t  s p e c i f y
what  l e g a l  methods would be used i n  t h i s  h a r m o n i z a t i o n
p r o c e s s .  Perhaps t h i s  would have been s p e c i f i e d  i n  a
l a t e r  agreement  f o r m a l l y  c r e a t i n g  t he  commun i ty ,  bu t  as
i s  now common knowl edge ,  no such agreement  was ever
c o n c l u d e d .  E f f o r t s  at  c r e a t i n g  such a communi ty  were
s he lv e d  as v a r i o u s  member c o u n t r i e s  were a t t r a c t e d  t o  t he
O C
i l l  f a t e d  East  A f r i c a n  Communi ty.  What f o rm  t h e  c o ­
o r d i n a t i o n  o f  economic a c t i v i t i e s  would have t ak en  t h e r e f o r e ,  
remains  a m a t t e r  o f  s p e c u l a t i o n .
I t  i s  perhaps f a i r  however ,  t o  say t h a t  t h e  Economic 
Communi ty o f  E a s te r n  A f r i c a  would have most l i k e l y  have 
f o l l o w e d  t he  p a t t e r n  t h a t  has been f o l l o w e d  i n  s i m i l a r
25. See UN Document E / C N . 14 / 35 2,  annex V.
26. See Frank C. B a l l a n c e ,  Zambia and t he  East  A f r i c a n
Communi ty . (WTf )  Syracuse , New % r k } p.  j ,
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c i r c u m s t a n c e s  e l s ew h er e  i n  A f r i c a .  In a number o f  o t h e r
p a r t s  o f  A f r i c a ,  s u b - r e g i o n a l  groups have been c r e a t e d
t h r o u g h  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  o f  m u l t i l a t e r a l  agreements  which
have had t he  e f f e c t  o f  c r e a t i n g  a customs u n i on  o r  a f r e e
t r a d e  a r e a .  Examples o f  such customs u n i ons  and f r e e  t r a d e
areas i n c l u d e  t h e  C e n t r a l  A f r i c a n  Customs and Economic
Union (UDEAC); E q u a t o r i a l  Customs Union (UDE);  and the
Economic Communi ty o f  West A f r i c a n  Sta tes  ^ECOlAJ A s )  •
A customs un ion  approach t o  economic c o - o p e r a t i o n ,
i n v o l v e s  by i t s  v e r y  n a t u r e ,  t h e  s u b s t a n t i a l  e l i m i n a t i o n
o f  t r a d e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  among t h e  members i n v o l v e d  and the
27c r e a t i o n  o f  a common e x t e r n a l  t a r i f f  f o r  them.  A f r e e  
t r a d e  area on t h e  o t h e r  hand,  r e q u i r e s  t h e  e l i m i n a t i o n  o f  
t r a d e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  and d u t i e s  on s u b s t a n t i a l l y  a l l  t r a d e
w i t h o u t  n e c e s s a r i l y  e s t a b l i s h i n g  a common e x t e r n a l  t a r i f f
2 8f o r  i t s  members.
T h i s  approach t o  r e g i o n a l  c o - o p e r a t i o n  t h e r e f o r e  seeks 
t o  f a c i l i t a t e  i n t r a - r e g i o n a l  t r a d e  and pays l i t t l e  a t t e n t i o n  
t o  t he  i s s u e  o f  r e g i o n a l  c o - o r d i n a t i o n  o f  m a r k e t i n g  p o l i c i e s .  
Thus even i f  t he  Economic Communi ty o f  E a s t e r n  A f r i c a  had 
s u c c e s s f u l l y  been e s t a b l i s h e d ,  t h e r e  appears  t o  be no reason 
t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  i t  would have been a u s e f u l  i n s t r u m e n t  f o r  
t h e  c o - o r d i n a t i o n  o f  m a r k e t i n g  p o l i c i e s  i n  t h e  member 
c o u n t r i e s  i n  r e l a t i o n  to  consumers i n  t h e  deve l op ed  c o u n t r i e s .
The models o f  i n t e r  s t a t e  c o - o p e r a t i o n  such as were 
employed i n  t h e  f e d e r a t i o n  o f  Rhodes ia and Nyas a l and ,  and
27. See A r t i c l e  XXIV pa rag ra phs  8 (a)  o f  t he  GATT.
28.  A r t i c l e  XXIV p s r a gr a ph  8 ( b ) .
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t ho s e  employed under  t he  GATT r e g i o n a l  a r r a n g e m e n t s ,  t h a t  
i s  t o  say ,  customs u n i on  and f r e e  t r a d e  areas may not  be 
s u i t a b l e  f o r  t h e  c o - o r d i n a t i o n  o f  m i n e r a l  m a r k e t i n g  p o l i c i e s  
i n  So uthe rn  A f r i c a .  The m o d a l i t i e s  o f  t h e  f e d e r a l  a r r a n g e ­
ment d i d  p r o v i d e  t he  m ach in er y  f o r  such c o - o r d i n a t i o n  but  
o n l y  i n  as f a r  as t h e i r  e x i s t e d  some fo r m o f  a p o l i t i c a l  
u n i on  wh i ch  u n f o r t u n a t e l y  does not  e x i s t  i n  So u t he rn  A f r i c a .
The GATT p e r m i t t e d  r e g i o n a l  a r rangement s  on t h e  o t h e r  hand 
are no t  d es i gned  t o  p r o v i d e  a fo rum or  m ac h i n e r y  t h r o u g h  
which member c o u n t r i e s  can c o - o r d i n a t e  t h e i r  m a r k e t i n g  
p o l i c i e s  i n  as f a r  as e x e r t i n g  some j o i n t  i n f l u e n c e  on i n t e r n a t ­
i o n a l  commodi ty  marke t s  i s  c o nc er ne d .  I f  t h e s e  two approaches 
do no t  p r o v i d e  a s u i t a b l e  model  f o r  such c o - o r d i n a t i o n ,  t he  
i s s u e  t o - b e  addressed be low i s  as t o  whe the r  t h e r e  e x i s t s  
an a l t e r n a t i v e  approach t h a t  may h e l p  e s t a b l i s h  t h i s  
c o - o r d i  n a t i  o n .
I I I .  SADCC and t he  c o - o r d i n a t i o n  o f  m i n e r a l
m a r k e t i  ng p o l i  c i  es
The S ou th er n  A f r i c a n  Development  C o - o r d i n a t i n g  Con f er ence  
(SADCC) i s  t h e  most  r e c e n t  a t t e m p t  i n  t he  s u b - r e g i o n  at  t he  
c o - o r d i n a t i o n  o f  economic and deve l opment  a c t i v i t i e s .  The 
o r i g i n s  o f  t h i s  a s s o c i a t i o n  can be t r a c e d  t o  a c t s  o f  p o l i t i c a l  
s o l i d a r i t y  i n  s u p p o r t  o f  l i b e r a t i o n  movements i n  t he  a r ea .
These a c t s  o f  p o l i t i c a l  s o l i d a r i t y  were f i r s t  g i v e n  fo rm i n  
t he  Lusaka m a n i f e s t o  i n  wh i ch  t he  c o u n t r i e s  o f  East  and 
C e n t r a l  A f r i c a  c a l l e d  f o r  p e a c e f u l  change i n  t h e  s t i l l  
u n l i b e r a t e d  t e r r i t o r i e s  i n  Southern  A f r i c a ,  f a i l u r e  t o  which 
t he s e  c o u n t r i e s  p ledged  t o  s u p p o r t  armed s t r u g g l e .  The a c t s
364
o f  p o l i t i c a l  s o l i d a r i t y  were endorsed by t h e  O r g a n i z a t i o n  
o f  A f r i c a n  U n i t y  ( O A U ) . ^
The e x p e r i e n c e  i n  c o - o r d i n a t i n g  p o l i t i c a l  l i b e r a t i o n  
i n  t he  a r e a ,  opened up t he  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  u s i n g  t he  same 
approach t o  economic m a t t e r s .  The immed i a te  i mpet us  f o r  
t he  emergency o f  SADCC came on 1 A p r i l  1980 when n in e  
Sou the r n  A f r i c a n  s t a t e s  s i gned  t he  "Lusaka D e c l a r a t i o n . "
The n in e  c o u n t r i e s  i n v o l v e d  were:  A ng o l a ,  Mozambique,  
Zimbabwe, Botswana,  Zambia,  S w a z i l a n d ,  M a la w i ,  Lesotho  
and T a n z a n i a .  The d e c l a r a t i o n  appears t o  r e f l e c t  a measure 
o f  s c e p t i c i s m  r e g a r d i n g  t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  
GATT p e r m i t t e d  r e g i o n a l  a r r angement s  namely ,  customs un ions  
and p r e f e r e n t i a l  t r a d e  a re as .  I t  s ho u l d  be obser ved  here 
t h a t  a l l  t he  n i n e  members o f  SADCC had had e x p e r i e n c e  o f  
one k i n d  or  a n o t h e r  w i t h  t he  GATT p e r m i t t e d  r e g i o n a l  g r o u p ­
i n g s .  M a l a w i ,  Zambia,  and Zimbabwe had u n t i 1 1963 been 
grouped i n  t he  F e d e r a t i o n  o f  Rhodes ia and N yas a l and ;  
Mozambique and Angol a came under  t he  P or tu gu es e  c o l o n i a l  
economic u n i o n ;  S w a z i l a n d ,  Lesotho  and Botswana have f o r  
o ve r  s e v e n t y  y e a r s  been t i e d  t o  t he  South A f r i c a n  Customs 
Un i on ;  w h i l e  T an za n i a  had t h e  a g o n i z i n g  e x p e r i e n c e  of  
b e l o n g i n g  t o  t he  i l l  f a t e d  East  A f r i c a n  Communi ty.
The e x p e r i e n c e  o f  t he s e  c o u n t r i e s  i n  t he s e  c o l o n i a l  
and c o l o n i a l  o r i e n t e d  r e g i o n a l  economic g r o u p i n g s  c o u l d  
seem t o  have c r e a t e d  a d e s i r e  f o r  an i n n o v a t i v e  r e g i o n a l
29.  The Lusaka m a n i f e s t o  was approved by the  OAU on 
A p r i l  16, 1969 and adopted by the  Assembly o f  
heads o f  s t a t e s  and governments  at  Add is  Ababa, 
6-10 September  1969. For  a f u l l  t e x t  see 
UN Doc. A/7754 ( 7 t h  November 1969) a t  pages 2 -9 .
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a r r a n g e m e n t ,  d e v o i d  o f  l e g a l  c o m p l e x i t i e s  wh ich  had been a 
common f e a t u r e  i n  e a r l i e r  a r r an ge me nt s .  The new approach 
was t o  assume an i n f o r m a l  p o s t u r e .  The i n f o r m a l  n a t u r e  
o f  t h i s  new a r r angement  i s  c l e a r l y  e v i d e n t  i n  t he  e a r l y  
m ee t i ng s  c a l l e d  t o  d i s c u s s  the  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  t he  new 
a r r a ng e me n t .  The f i r s t  mee t i ng  was an i n f o r m a l  g a t h e r i n g  
o f  F o r e i g n  M i n i s t e r s  o f  t h e  f r o n t  l i n e  s t a t e s  who met i n  
Botswana i n  May 1979 t o  d i s c u s s  and d e v i s e  a programme o f
30a c t i o n  f o r  t he  p r o m o t i o n  o f  r e g i o n a l  economic c o - o p e r a t i o n .  
T h i s  was f o l l o w e d  by a n o t h e r  i n f o r m a l  m e e t i n g  g e n e r a l l y  
r e f e r r e d  t o  as SADCC I he l d  at  Arusha ,  T an za n i a  i n  J u l y  
1979 t o  d i s c u s s  t h e  programme o f  a c t i o n ,  and l a t e r  by an 
e q u a l l y  i n f o r m a l  g a t h e r i n g  o f  Heads o f  S t a t e s  and Govern ­
ments in. A p r i l  1 980 i n  Lusaka.  I t  was i n  Lusaka t h a t  the  
g o a l s  o f  SADCC were pronounced and a document  known as t he  
Lusaka d e c l a r a t i o n  was r e l e a s e d  s e t t i n g  ou t  t h e  g o a l s  o f  t he  
new r e g i o n a l  a r r a ng e me n t .  The goa l s  i d e n t i f i e d  i n  the  
d e c l a r a t i o n  a r e :
(a)  t h e  r e d u c t i o n  o f  economic dependence,  p a r t i c u l a r l y ,
bu t  no t  o n l y ,  on t he  R e p u b l i c  o f  South A f r i c a ;
{ b ) t h e  f o r g i n g  o f  l i n k s  t o  c r e a t e  a genu i ne  and
e q u i t a b l e  r e g i o n a l  i n t e g r a t i o n ;
{ c ) t he  m o b i l i z a t i o n  o f  r e s o u r c e s  t o  promote the
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  n a t i o n a l ,  i n t e r s t a t e  and 
r e g i  onal  p o l i c i e s ;
30. P.E.  S l i n n , " T h e  Sou the r n  A f r i c a n  Deve lopment  Co­
o r d i n a t i n g  Conf  e rence  (WS t f '  lA/orld A-ffaiVs
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(d)  c o n c e r t e d  a c t i o n  t o  secure  i n t e r n a t i o n a l
c o - o p e r a t i o n  w i t h i n  the  f ramework  o f  a
31s t r a t e g y  f o r  economic l i b e r a t i o n .
{ i ) The l e g a l  s t a t u s  o f  SADDC
A l t h o u g h  t h e  o r i g i n s  o f  SADCC l i e  i n  i n f o r m a l  ac ts  
o f  p o l i t i c a l  and l a t e r  economic c o - o p e r a t i o n  between t he  
Sou the r n  A f r i c a n  S t a t e s ,  a l e g a l  touch  was g i v e n  t o  the  
ar r angement  a t  i t s  second summit  mee t i ng  h e l d  i n  S a l i s b u r y  
(now H a r a r e ) ,  Zimbabwe on 20 J u l y  1981. At  t h i s  m e e t i n g ,  
the  Heads o f  S t a t e s  and Governments s ign ed  a memorandum 
o f  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  on t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  SADCC. A c c o r d i n g
t o  t h i s  memorandum, SADCC i n s t i t u t i o n s  were t o  p r o v i d e  t he
3 2m ac h in e ry  f o r  r e g i o n a l  c o n s u l t a t i o n  and d e c i s i o n  making.
D e s p i t e  b e i ng  te rmed a "memorandum o f  u n d e r s t a n d i n g " ,  
t he  i n s t r u m e n t  s e ts  o u t  c l e a r l y  t h e  agreement  o f  t he  p a r t i e s  
and c r e a t e s  c e r t a i n  o b l i g a t i o n s  on t h e  member s t a t e s .  T h i s  
sugges t s  t h a t  t he  i n s t r u m e n t  i s  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  agreement  
o r  t r e a t y  as d e f i n e d  by t he  Vienna C o nv e n t i on  on t he  law 
o f  t r e a t i e s .  The Con v en t i o n  d e f i n e s  a t r e a t y  as,
"an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  agreement  co nc lu d ed  between s t a t e s  
i n  w r i t t e n  fo r m and governed by i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law,  
w he the r  embodied i n  a s i n g l e  i n s t r u m e n t  o r  i n  two or  
more r e l a t e d  i n s t r u m e n t s  and w ha t ev e r  i t s  p a r t i c u l a r  
des i g n a t i  o n ; . . . "  33
The SADCC memorandum o f  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  though  no t  as y e t
r e g i s t e r e d  w i t h  t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i on s  i n  a cc ordanc e w i t h
31. For  t h e  t e x t  o f  t he  Lusaka d e c l a r a t i o n ,  see Amon 
N s ek e l a ,  Towards Economic L i b e r a t i o n ,  London,
(1981)  page 2.
32.  See Memorandum o f  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  on t he  i n s t i t u t i o n s  
o f  t h e  SADCC. Record o f  t he  SADCC summi t  m e e t i n g ,  
H a r a r e ,  20 th  J u l y  1981,  pages 32 -36 .
33. A r t i c l e  2 ( a ) ,  The Vienna c o n v e n t i o n  on t h e  law o f  
t r e a t i e s ,  1969.
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a r t i c l e  102 o f  t he  U n i t e d  N a t i on s  C h a r t e r ,  i s  c l e a r l y  an 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r e a t y  i n  so f a r  as i t  i s  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
agreement  e n t e r e d  i n t o  by n i n e  s t a t e s  and governed by 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l aw.  The p r o v i s i o n s  o f  t he  memorandum l ea ve s  
no doub t  t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  agreement  i s  t o  be governed 
by i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l aw.  For  example ,  a r t i c l e  IX g i v e s  
SADCC l e g a l  c a p a c i t y  i n  each member c o u n t r y  n ec es sa r y  f o r  
i t  t o  c a r r y  on i t s  f u n c t i o n s .  The g r a n t i n g  o f  l e g a l  
p e r s o n a l i t y  t o  SADCC i n  member c o u n t r i e s  f o l l o w s  an approach 
used i n  many o t h e r  s i m i l a r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  ar ranger t ients  
governed by i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l aw.  A n o t he r  example i s  
a r t i c l e  XI which seeks t o  ensure  the  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c h a r a c t e r  
o f  SADCC' s S e c r e t a r i a t  by p r o h i b i t i n g  t h e  E x e c u t i v e  
S e c r e t a r y  f r om  se ek in g  or  r e c e i v i n g  i n s t r u c t i o n s  f r om any 
member s t a t e .  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  a r t i c l e  X I I I  d e a l i n g  w i t h  
a d mi ss i on  t o  membership se ts  o u t  v e r y  s i m i l a r  c o n d i t i o n s  
t o  t h o se  employed by many o t h e r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  
governed by i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l aw.
( i i ) Some p r o v i s i o n s  o f  t h e  "memorandum o f  u n d e r s t a n d i n g ”
The t e x t  o f  t h e  "memorandum o f  u n d e r s t a n d i n g "  i n  
a d d i t i o n  t o  r e c i t i n g  t he  o b j e c t i v e s  as s e t  ou t  i n  t he  Lusaka 
d e c l a r a t i o n ,  p r o v i d e s  f o r  t he  c r e a t i o n  o f  f i v e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  
f o r  SADCC. These a r e ;  t h e  Summit ( A r t i c l e  I I ) ;  t he  Cou nc i l  
( A r t i c l e  I I I ) ;  S e c t o r a l  Commissions ( A r t i c l e  I V ) ;  and a 
S e c r e t a r i  a t .
A r t i c l e  I I  makes i t  c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  Summit c o n s i s t i n g  
o f  t he  heads o f  s t a t e s  and gove r nme nt s ,  i s  t o  a c t  as the  
main p o l i c y  making organ r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  mapping ou t  t he
368
g ene ra l  d i r e c t i o n  SADCC s hou l d  t a k e .  The C ou n c i l  on the  
o t h e r  hand,  i s  t h e  e x e c u t i v e  organ o f  SADCC and i s  r e s p o n s i b l e  
f o r  t he  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  t he  p o l i c i e s  o f  t he  o r g a n i z a t i o n .
Of p a r t i c u l a r  i m p o r t a n c e  t o  the  d i s c u s s i o n  i n  t h i s  
c h a p t e r ,  i s  A r t i c l e  IV o f  t he  "memorandum o f  u n d e r s t a n d i n g "  
wh ich  a u t h o r i s e s  t h e  summit  t o  s e t  up s e c t o r a l  commiss ions  
t o  oversee  v a r i o u s  programmes o f  a c t i o n  u n d e r t a k e n  by SADCC. 
Each such s e c t o r a l  commiss ion i s  t o  be governed by a 
c o n v e n t i o n  t o  be adapted by t he  C ou n c i l  and r a t i f i e d  by 
member c o u n t r i e s .  Such c o n v e n t i o n s  i t  wou ld  ap pe ar ,  are t o  
be b i n d i n g  agreements  between t he  member s t a t e s  and r e g i s -  
r a b l e  w i t h  t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  under  a r t i c l e  102 o f  i t s  
c h a r t e r .  T h i s  approach makes i t  c l e a r  t h a t  c o - o r d i n a t i o n  
o f  t he  v .ar i ous economic p o l i c i e s  i n  t h e  s u b - r e g i o n  would 
be u n d e r t a k e n  t h r o u g h  t h e  medium o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o n v e n t i o n s  
co nc lu d ed  between a l l  t h e  member s t a t e s .  So f a r  t h i s  
appears t o  have been f o l l o w e d  in  t he  case o f  t h e  o n l y  
f u l l y  o p e r a t i o n a l  s e c t o r a l  commiss ion t o  d a t e ,  namely ,  the  
Sou ther n  A f r i c a n  T r a n s p o r t  and Communicat ion Commission 
(SATCC) wh i ch  i s  governed  by a c o n v e n t i o n  s i g n e d  by a l l  t he  
member s t a t e s .  The advan t age  o f  t h i s  approach l i e s  i n  t he  
f a c t  t h a t  a b i n d i n g  o p e r a t i o n a l  medium i s  p r o v i d e d  i n  which 
t he  s e c t o r a l  commiss ion a c ts  as a medium t h r o u g h  which 
c o - o r d i n a t i o n ,  p l a n n i n g ,  and f i n a n c i n g  o f  i d e n t i f i e d  p o l i c y  
d e c i s i o n s  c o u l d  be i mpl emented by member s t a t e s  as opposed 
t o  t he  s e t t i n g  up o f  say an i n de p en de n t  m u l t i - n a t i o n a l  
p r o j e c t .
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In t he  p r i o r i t y  f i e l d  o f  t r a n s p o r t  and c o m m un i c a t i o n s ,  
SATCC was c r e a t e d  by t h e  Summit Con fe rence  i n  accordance 
w i t h  a r t i c l e  IV o f  t he  "memorandum o f  u n d e r s t a n d i n g " .
SATCC i s  governed by a c o n v e n t i o n  adopted by t h e  Gaberone 
summit  o f  J u l y  1982 and which  p r o v i d e s  f o r  t he  c r e a t i o n  o f  
t h r e e  organs f o r  SATCC, namely a commi t tee  o f  M i n i s t e r s ,  a 
c o - o r d i n a t i n g  o f f i c i a l  c o mm i t t e e ,  and a t e c h n i c a l  u n i t .  I t  
i s  t h r o u g h  t h i s  SATCC m ac h i ne ry  t h a t  t he  c o - o r d i n a t i o n  o f  
t he  s u b - r e g i o n ' s  t r a n s p o r t  and commun i ca t i on  p o l i c i e s  would 
be worked o u t .
Regard ing  o t h e r  spheres o f  economic l i f e  i n  t he  sub-  
r e g i o n ,  t h e  m o d a l i t i e s  o f  c o - o r d i n a t i o n  o f  a c t i v i t i e s  w i l l  
have t o  be u n d e r ta k en  l i k e  i n  t he  case o f  SATCC by o t h e r  
s e c t o r a l  . commiss i ons  under  a p p r o p r i a t e  s e c t o r a l  c o n v e n t i o n s .  
The success o f  any o f  t he s e  s e c t o r a l  c o n v e n t i o n s  w i l l  t h e r e ­
f o r e  depend to  a l a r g e  e x t e n t  on the  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  s e c t o r a l  
c o n v e n t i o n s  and the  mechanisms p r o v i d e d  i n  t he s e  c o n v e n t i o n s  
f o r  t he  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  agreed p o l i c i e s .
{ i i i ) The r o l e  o f  S e c t o r a l  Commissions
S i nce  SADCC seeks b a s i c a l l y  t o  c o - o r d i n a t e  o r  c o n s o l i ­
da te  and l i n k  deve l opment  e f f o r t s  ac ross  n a t i o n a l  b o un da r i es  
e x i s t i n g  n a t i o n a l  p l a n s ,  p r o j e c t s ,  and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  
s t r u c t u r e s  as w e l l  as f i n a n c i a l  a r rangement s  w i l l  c o n t i n u e  
t o  p l a y  an i m p o r t a n t  r o l e .  In t h i s  r e s p e c t ,  SADCC has 
f i r s t  a ss i gn ed  t o  each c o u n t r y  a r o l e  i n  i n i t i a t i n g  p r o j e c t s  
These r o l e s  i t  wou ld  seem were ass igned  on t he  b a s i s  o f  work 
a l r e a d y  done in  t h a t  area by a p a r t i c u l a r  c o u n t r y  and t h a t
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c o u n t r y ' s  p o t e n t i a l  i n  t h e  a rea .  The r o l e s  a s s i gn e d  so f a r  
a r e :
Angola Energy p o l i c i e s ,  l and  c u l t i v a t i o n ,
Botswana Animal  d is e as e  c o n t r o l ,  and t h e  S e c r e t a r i a t
Leso t  ho Land u t i l i s a t i o n  and s o i l  c o n s e r v a t i o n
Maiawi F i s h e r i e s  and w i l d l i f e
Mozambi que T r a n s p o r t  and commun ica t i on s
Swazi 1 and Manpower deve lopment  and t r a i n i n g  f a c i l i t i e s
Tanzani  a I n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n  programs
Zambi a Development  fund p r o p o s a l s ,  and m i n i n g
Zi  mbabwe Food s e c u r i t y  p l a n ,  and s e c u r i t y  p r i n t i n g  
f a c i 1 i t i  e s .
A second a spec t  o f  SADCC i n v o l v e s  t he  c r e a t i o n  o f  
f u n c t i o n a l l y  o r i e n t e d  commiss ions  t h a t  assume r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
f o r  a t a s k  c o n s t i t u t i n g  t oo  l a r g e  a burden f o r  any s i n g l e  
gover nment .  The o n l y  commiss ion t o  have been e s t a b l i s h e d  so 
f a r  i s  SATCC e s t a b l i s h e d  i n  J u l y  1980 and l a t e r  g i v e n  an 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  and l e g a l  i d e n t i t y  under  a c o n v e n t i o n  r a t i f i e d  
by a l l  t he  SADCC members. L i k e  SATCC which  i s  based i n  Maputo,  
f u t u r e  commiss i ons  w i l l  be p la ce d  i n  t h e  member s t a t e  a ss i gned  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  t a s k  t o  be u n de r t a k e n  by t he  commis­
s i o n .  In r e a l i t y  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h e r e  w i l l  be no s i n g l e  SADCC 
h e a d q u a r t e r s  f o r  each member s t a t e  w i l l  e v e n t u a l l y  be t he  
s ea t  o f  a t  l e a s t  one s e c t o r a l  commiss i on .  E n d o r s i n g  the  
i de a  o f  s e c t o r a l  commiss ions  and o t h e r  i n s t i t u t i o n s  f o r  SADCC, 
the  o f f i c i a l  communique i s s u e d  a f t e r  t h e  1981 summit  me et i ng  
i n  Harare  obser ved  t h a t :
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" ( T he se )  i n s t i t u t i o n s  w i l l  p r o v i d e  SADCC w i t h  an 
e f f e c t i v e  and f l e x i b l e  mechanism f o r  r e g i o n a l  
c o n s u l t a t i o n  and d e c i s i o n  mak ing.  SADCC has 
eschewed t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  a l a r g e  and u n w i e l d l y  
b u r e a u c r a c y  i n  f a v o u r  o f  a system which  p la c e s  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  i t s  
programme on t h e  governments  o f  member s t a t e s . "  ^
The i m p o r t a n c e  o f  SADCC t h e r e f o r e  i s  t h a t  i t  seeks
t o  f o s t e r  a s p i r i t  o f  c o n s u l t a t i o n  and c o - o p e r a t i o n  i n
t a c k l i n g  common problems e x p e r i e n c e d  i n  t he  s u b - r e g i o n  and
hence a v o i d i n g  t he  i n e v i t a b l e  c o n f l i c t  t h a t  i s  b r o u g h t  about
by the  c r e a t i o n  o f  r e g u l a t o r y  t r a d e  reg imes  such as a
customs u n i o n .  The q u e s t i o n  here i s  w he t he r  t h e  SADCC
approach may be u t i l i z e d  t o  t a c k l e  t he  p rob l em o f  commodi ty
p r i c e  f l u c t u a t i o n s  a f f e c t i n g  commod i t i es  o f  i n t e r e s t  t o
t h e s e  c o u n t r i e s .
F i r s t  o f  a l l  i t  must  be p o i n t e d  o u t  t h a t  SADCC's
approach i n v o l v e s  t he  a s s i g n i n g  o f  r o l e s  t o  each member
c o u n t r y .  I t  s ho u l d  be p o i n t e d  ou t  t h a t  as o f  t h e  p r e s e n t
t i m e ,  no c o u n t r y  has been a ss ig ne d  the  r o l e  o f  c o - o r d i n a t i n g
commodi ty  m a r k e t i n g  p o l i c i e s  l e t  a lone  m i n e r a l  m a r k e t i n g
p o l i c i e s .  T h i s  does no t  however  mean t h a t  c o - o r d i n a t i o n
o f  m a r k e t i n g  p o l i c i e s  i s  an area o u t s i d e  t h e  scope o f  SADCC.
The o b j e c t i v e s  and t h e  programme o f  a c t i o n  f o r  SADCC
were f i r s t  s t a t e d  i n  t h e  Lusaka d e c l a r a t i o n  and g i v e n  l e g a l
c o n t e n t  i n  t h e  "memorandum o f  u n d e r s t a n d i n g " .  One o f  the
main o b j e c t i v e s  o f  SADCC s t a t e d  i n  t he  memorandum i s  t o  t a ke
" c o n c e r t e d  a c t i o n  t o  secure  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o - o p e r a t i o n  
w i t h i n  t he  f ramework  o f  a s t r a t e g y  f o r  economic 
l i b e r a t i o n . "  35
3 4 . See t h e  communique i s su ed  by SADCC a f t e r  i t s  summit  
m ee t i ng  i n  Harare  i n  J u l y  1981 ( t y p e s c r i p t ) .
35.  I bi d.
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The w or d i n g  o f  t h i s  o b j e c t i v e  would seem t o  accommodate 
t h e  c a r r y i n g  ou t  o f  c o n c e r t e d  a c t i o n  i n  c o - o r d i n a t i n g  
m a r k e t i n g  p o l i c i e s .  I f  t h i s  be the  case,  one may be tempted 
to  ask why t h i s  i m p o r t a n t  a spec t  o f  economic l i b e r a t i o n  f o r  
t he  s u b - r e g i o n  has so f a r  not  been a ss ig ne d  t o  any p a r t i c u l a r  
s t a t e  i n  acco r dance  w i t h  SADCC's s e c t o r a l  p o l i c y .  The 
reason would seem t o  l i e  no t  so much i n  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t hese  
c o u n t r i e s  do not. c o n s i d e r  c o - o r d i n a t i o n  o f  m a r k e t i n g  p o l i c i e s  
as an i m p o r t a n t  a s pec t  bu t  r a t h e r  on t h e  b u s i n e s s  l i k e  
approach t ak e n  by SADCC i n  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  t he  s e c t o r a l  
commi ss i on s .  Though t he  memorandum o f  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  g i v e s  
t he  Summit power t o  s e t  up s e c t o r a l  commiss i ons  whenever  
i t  sees f i t ,  i n  p r a c t i c e  t h e  Summit has o n l y  t ak en  t h i s  
s tep  when i t  was s a t i s f i e d  t h a t  t h e r e  was a proven need 
f o r  them.  Th i s  a t t i t u d e  has been summed up w e l l  by P r e s i d e n t  
Mas i r e  o f  Botswana when e x p l a i n i n g  the  r o l e  o f  s e c t o r a l  
co mmi ss io ns .  He p o i n t e d  ou t  t h a t :
"such b od ie s  ( co mm is s io ns )  shou l d  be c r e a t e d  o n l y  
when t h e r e  i s  a proven need f o r  them.  T h i s  
d e l i b e r a t e l y  b u s i n e s s - l i k e  a pproach ,  i n  which 
i n s t i t u t i o n s  w i l l  f o l l o w  a ch ie v em en t ,  s u r e l y  
p r omi se s  g r e a t e r  dynamism than  a system i n  
wh ich  member governments  m er e l y  r e a c t  t o  
p r o p o s a l s  put  f o r w a r d  by t e c h n o c r a t s  l odged  
i n  a c e n t r a l i z e d  b u r e a u c r a c y . "  36
There i s  no doubt  t h a t  a l l  t he  c o u n t r i e s  o f  t h e  s u b - r e g i o n
e x p e r i e n c e  t he  e f f e c t s  o f  p r i c e  f l u c t u a t i o n s  on t he  w o r l d
commodi ty  ma rke t s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  t hose  i n v o l v i n g  m i n e r a l s .
A c o - o r d i n a t i o n  o f  t h e i r  m a r k e t i n g  p o l i c i e s  t ak e n  w i t h i n
36. P r e s i d e n t  M a s i r e  o f  Botswana,  "Opening s t a t e m e n t  by
t he  C ha i r m a n " ,  SADCC summit  m e e t i n g ,  H a r a r e ,  J u l y  20, 
1981,  t y p e s c r i p t  page 6 .
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t he  s e c t o r a l  p o l i c y  o f  SADCC may go a l ong  way towards  
c r e a t i n g  a n e n v i r o n m e n t  t h r o u g h  which t h e  c o - o r d i n a t i o n  
o f  t h e s e  c o u n t r i e s  m a r k e t i n g  p o l i c i e s  c o u l d  be u n d e r t a k e n .  
The l e g a l  f r amewor k  f o r  t h e  c o - o r d i n a t i o n  o f  such p o l i c i e s  ■ 
a l r e a d y  e x i s t s  i n  t h e  memorandum o f  u n d e r s t a n d i n g .  What i s  
l a c k i n g  t h e r e f o r e  i s  a d e c i s i o n  by the  summit  p r o c l a i m i n g  
c o - o r d i n a t i o n  o f  m a r k e t i n g  p o l i c i e s  as one o f  SADCC's 
p r i o r i t i e s .  Once t h i s  p r o c l a m a t i o n  i s  made, A r t i c l e  5 o f  
t h e  memorandum o f  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  c o u l d  be employed i n  s e t t i n g  
up a s e c t o r a l  commiss ion w i t h  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  o v e r ­
s ee i ng  t h e  c o - o r d i n a t i o n  o f  m i n e r a l  m a r k e t i n g  p o l i c i e s .
There i s  e v e r y  reason t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  c o - o r d i n a t i o n  
o f  m i n e r a l  m a r k e t i n g  p o l i c i e s  i n  t he  s u b - r e g i o n  may he lp  
t h e  c o u n t r i e s  i n v o l v e d  e x e r t  a u n i f i e d  i n f l u e n c e  on i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  m i n e r a l  m a r k e t i n g  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  T h i s  u n i f i e d  
approach may p rove  t o  be more s u c c e s s f u l  t ha n  t he  c u r r e n t  
approach i n  wh ich  i n d i v i d u a l  c o u n t r i e s  employ d i f f e r e n t  
a r r angement s  f o r  t he  m a r k e t i n g  o f  t h e i r  m i n e r a l s .  Th i s  
approach p r o v i d e s  one advantage which CIPEC does no t  e n j o y .  
The j o i n t  m a r k e t i n g  a r r angement  f o r  So uthe r n  A f r i c a ,  would 
encompass n o t  o n l y  one m i n e r a l  bu t  a s e l e c t i o n  o f  ma jo r  
e x p o r t  m i n e r a l s  o f  a l l  t h e  c o u n t r i e s  i n  t he  s u b - r e g i o n .
By encompass ing a m u l t i p l i c i t y  o f  m i n e r a l s ,  t h e  c o u n t r i e s  
i n  t h e  s u b - r e g i o n  may be a b l e  t o  s t r e n g t h e n  t h e i r  b a r g a i n i n g  
power on w o r l d  copper  mar ke t s  by u s in g  o t h e r  m i n e r a l s  such 
as chrome as a b a r g a i n i n g  t o o l  f o r  b e t t e r  copper  p r i c e s .
In o t h e r  wor ds ,  s i n c e  Zimbabwe f o r  example ,  i s  a ma j o r  
chrome p r o d u c e r  i n  t h e  w o r l d ,  t h i s  p r o d u c t  can be used i n  
a c o - o r d i n a t e d  m a r k e t i n g  a r rangement  t o  b oos t  p r i c e s  o f
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o t h e r  m i n e r a l s .  T h i s  can be done by a c a r e f u l l y  c c u l a t e d  
w i t h h o l d i n g  o f  t he  m i n e r a l  whenever  o t h e r  m i n e r a l s  are 
f a c i n g  low p r i c e s .  Such a w i t h h o l d i n g  may a c t  t o  push 
up t h e  p r i c e s  o f  o t h e r  m i n e r a l s  such as c o p p e r .  In  t h i s  
r e s p e c t  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h i s  s t r a t e g y  may prove a t  l e a s t  
m a r g i n a l l y ,  more s u c c e s s f u l  than  t he  s t r a t e g y  employed by 
CIPEC.
I V . J o i n t  v e n t u r e  approach t o  m in e r a l
m a r k e t i n g  c o - o r d i n a t i o n
An a l t e r n a t i v e  approach t h r o u g h  which Sou the r n  
A f r i c a n  c o u n t r i e s  may a c h i e v e  a c o m m e r c i a l l y  v i a b l e  
c o - o r d i n a t i o n  o f  t h e i r  m a r k e t i n g  p o l i i c e s  i s  t h r o u g h  
t he  c r e a t i o n  o f  a m i n e r a l  m a r k e t i n g  j o i n t  v e n t u r e .  A 
r e g i o n a l  p u b l i c  j o i n t  v e n t u r e  i n  t h i s  sense,  s h o u l d  be 
u n d e r s t o o d  as a c o r p o r a t e  e n t i t y  which i s  commerc i a l  
i n  n a t u r e ,  c r e a t e d  by t r e a t y  and c o n t r o l l e d  by a l l  t he  
t r e a t y  making s t a t e s .
There are abundant  examples o f  such t y p e s  o f  
c o r p o r a t i o n s  o p e r a t i n g  i n  many p a r t s  o f  t h e  w o r l d .  One 
such example i s  A i r  A f r i q u e  fo rmed i n  1961 as a b y - p r o d u c t  
o f  t he  Yaounde t r e a t y  some o f  whose a spec t s  have been 
d i s c u s s e d  in  Cha p t e r  8 o f  t h i s  t h e s i s .  The agreement  
c r e a t i n g  A i r  A f r i q u e  was s i gn ed  by t h e  governments  o f  
e l eve n  West A f r i c a n  n a t i o n s .  The main aim o f  t h i s  agreement  
was t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  a s i n g l e  m u l t i n a t i o n a l  a i r l i n e  .
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w i t h  o w ne r sh i p  e q u a l l y  d i v i d e d  among t he  p a r t i c i p a t i n g  
3 7n a t i o n s .  In a d d i t i o n ,  t he  agreement  p r o v i d e s  f o r  a
u n i t a r y  s t r u c t u r e  f o r  t he  c o r p o r a t i o n  and p r o v i d e s  f o r  a
r e g i s t e r e d  o f f i c e  i n  each o f  t h e  p a r t i c i p a t i n g  c o u n t r i e s
and p r o v i d e s  f u l l  l e g a l  p e r s o n a l i t y  and powers w i t h i n
each o f  t h e  member s t a t e s  as i s  n o r m a l l y  g r a n t e d  t o  such
3 8c o r p o r a t i o n s  i n  each r e s p e c t i v e  c o u n t r y .  O t he r  examples 
are p r o v i d e d  by L a t i n  Amer ican C o r p o r a t i o n s  s e t  up between 
Paraguay and B r a z i l ,  and Paraguay and A r g e n t i n a  t o  
e x p l o i t  common h y d r o e l e c t r i c  r e s o u r c e s ;  and Suaves C e n t r a l e s  
which i s  a c o r p o r a t i o n  c r e a t e d  by Venez ue l a ,  Colombia  and 
C e n t r a l  Amer ican s t a t e s  t o  u n d e r t a k e  j o i n t l y  t h e  m a r k e t i n g  
o f  C e n t r a l  Amer ican c o f f e e .
( i ) Legal  s t a t u s  o f  j o i n t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o r p o r a t i o n s
A l t h o u g h  t h e r e  seems t o  be no b r o a d l y  accep t ed
39d e f i n i t i o n  o f  a j o i n t  v e n t u r e  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l aw,  
such j o i n t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o r p o r a t i o n s  have f r om t i m e  
t o  t i m e  been c r e a t e d  p u r s u a n t  t o  a t r e a t y .  T h i s  has 
been a r e s u l t  o f  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  economic o r d e r  t h a t  
emerged a f t e r  t he  w ar s ,  wh i ch  en v i sa ge d  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  b od i es  c o r p o r a t e ,  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  o f  which 
were t o
" . . .  p romote a c t i v e  b u s i n e s s ,  e x t e n d i n g  some 
s e v e r a l  c o u n t r i e s  t o  c o - o r d i n a t e  and d i r e c t  
n a t i o n a l  economic e n t e r p r i s e s  i n  a p a r t i c u l a r  
sphere  o f  p r o d u c t i o n , commerce and i n d u s t r y  . 1140
38. I b i d . ,  A r t i  c l e  4.
n39.  See UN, I n f o r m a t i o n  no te  on j o i n t  v e n t u r e s .  
Document A / C o n f .  6 2 / C . 1 / L . 1 9 ,  18 May 1977.
40.  C.M. S c h m i t h o f f ,  "The i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o r p o r a t i o n " ,  
{_ 1^4-3 SO Grctlus Society > IbO Cttp- iSO*
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The p r e c i s e  l e g a l  n a t u r e  o f  t hese  e n t i t i e s  however  was 
no t  e v i d e n t l y  c l e a r .  Some s c h o l a r s  saw t h e s e  c o r p o r a t i o n s  
as
" . . .  no t  c o n s t i t u t e d  by t he  e x c l u s i v e  a p p l i c a t i o n  
o f  one n a t i o n a l  l aw ,  whose members and d i r e c t o r s  
r e p r e s e n t  s e v e r a l  n a t i o n a l  s o v e r e i g n t i e s ;  whose 
l e g a l  p e r s o n a l i t y  i s  no t  based o r  a t  any r a t e  
no t  e n t i r e l y ,  on t he  d e c i s i o n s  o f  a n a t i o n a l  
a u t h o r i t y  o r  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  a n a t i o n a l  l aw;  
whose o p e r a t i o n s  f i n a l l y  are gove r ne d ,  a t  l e a s t  
p r a t i c a l l y ,  by r u l e s  t h a t  do not  stem f r om  a 
s i n g l e  o r  even s e v e r a l  n a t i o n a l  l a w s . "41
An o t h e r  group o f  s c h o l a r s  r e p r e s e n t e d  by Mann,
were o f  t h e  v iew t h a t ,  t h e  mere c r e a t i o n  o f  a body
c o r p o r a t e  by t r e a t y  does not  a u t o m a t i c a l l y  c o n f e r  on
i t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s t a t u s .  A n a l y s i n g  t he  example o f
SAARLOR, t he  French-German company f o r  t h e  e x p l o i t a t i o n
o f  coa l  f rom t he  Saar and L o r r a i n e  r e g i o n s  o f  t h e  two
c o u n t r i e s ,  Mann c o n c l u de s  t h a t  such a company i n  f a c t
r e p r e s e n t e d
" two  companies w i t h  d i f f e r e n t  sea ts  and n a t i o n a l ­
i t i e s ,  bu t  w i t h  i d e n t i c a l  A r t i c l e s  t i e s  t o  
each o t h e r  by p r o v i s i o n s  o f  t he  t r e a t y  r e q u i r i n g  
c o m p l e t e  e q u a l i z a t i o n  between t h e m . . . " 4 2
Th i s  he c o nc l ud e d  was a c o n t r a c t u a l  f o r m u l a t i o n  no
d i f f e r e n t  f r om t h a t  e s t a b l i s h i n g  UNILEVER by t h e  U n i t e d
43Kingdom and The N e t h e r l a n d s .
41.  B. Goldman "Less S o c i e t e s  i n t e r n a t i o n a l e s " ,  c i t e d  
i n  P h i l l i p e  Khan, " I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Companies.  A 
s tu d y  o f  companies h av i ng  i n t e r n a t i n a l  l e g a l  
s t a t u s " ,  J o u r n a l  o f  Bus i ness  and Trade l aw,  
volume 3, page 500.
42.  F.A.  Mann, " I n t e r n a t i o n a l  C o r p o r a t i o n s  and n a t i o n a l  
1 a w " , ( j  967) Br i t  i s h Yearbook o f  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  l aw,  
page 145.
43.  I b i d . ,  page 146 .
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A v iew wh i ch  s u p p o r t s  Mann's a n a l y s i s  i s  r e p r e s e n t e d  
by a s i t u a t i o n  i n  which t he  n a t i o n a l  law o f  t h e  s t a t e  i n  
which such a c o r p o r a t i o n  i s  i n c o r p o r a t e d  works i n  such a 
way as t o  have t he  e f f e c t  o f  amending t h e  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  
t he  t r e a t y  i n  t he  e ven t  o f  them be ing  i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  
t he  n a t i o n a l  l aws .
An a l t e r n a t i v e  approach i s  t o  c o n s i d e r  t h e  i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  s t a t u s  o f  j o i n t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o r p o r a t i o n s  as 
a r i s i n g  f ro m t h e  v e r y  i n s t r u m e n t  c r e a t i n g  them.  In 
t h i s  r e s p e c t ,  t h e  t r e a t y  c r e a t i n g  such a c o r p o r a t i o n  may 
a s s e r t  i t s  own i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l e g a l  s t a t u s  by l i m i t i n g  
f o r  example ,  t h e  power o f  t h e  s t a t e  o f  i n c o r p o r a t i o n  
t o  amend the  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  t he  t r e a t y .  A good example 
o f  t h i s  i s  A r t i c l e  I o f  t h e  c o n v e n t i o n  c r e a t i n g  t he  bank 
f o r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s e t t l e m e n t  wh ich  l i m i t s  t he  power o f  
t he  Swiss Assembly
" t o  a b r o g a t e  t h i s  . . .  t o  amend or  add t o  i t  and 
. . .  t o  s a n c t i o n  amendments t o  t he  s t a t u t e  o f  
t h e  Bank . . .  o t h e r w i s e  than  in  agreement  w i t h  
t h e  o t h e r  s i g n a t o r y  g o v e r n m e n t s . "
In r e c e n t  y e a r s ,  a new d imens i on  has been added to
t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t he s e  c o r p o r a t i o n s . Both w i t h i n  t he  EEC
and t he  Andean s u b - r e g i o n ,  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  j o i n t
c o r p o r a t i o n s  may now be c r e a t e d  by way o f  a c o n v e n t i o n
e n t e r e d  i n t o  by p a r t i c i p a t i n g  s t a t e s  and such c o r p o r a t i o n s
are r e q u i r e d  t o  o p e r a t e  under  s t a t u t e  o r  b y - l a w s  under
s p e c i a l  reg imes  bu t  are e q u a l l y  s u b j e c t e d  t o  n a t i o n a l  laws
o f  t he  member c o u n t r i e s .  S u b j e c t i n g  th e se  c o r p o r a t i o n s
t o  t he  laws o f  t h e  n a t i o n  r e q u i r e s  t h a t  such laws must be
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h a rmo n i z ed .  T h i s  e x p l a i n s  t h e  h a r m o n i z a t i o n  o f  company 
laws t a k i n g  p l a c e  w i t h i n  t h e  EEC.
The c a l l  made i n  t h i s  t h e s i s  f o r  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  
a So uthe r n  A f r i c a n  r e g i o n a l  m a r k e t i n g  c o r p o r a t i o n  may 
t h e r e f o r e  proceed l i k e  i n  t he  EEC t h r o u g h  t h e  h a r m o n i z ­
a t i o n  o f  t h e  company laws i n  t he  s u b - r e g i o n  or  may proceed 
t h r o u g h  an ad hoc c r e a t i o n  o f  a c o r p o r a t i o n  f u n c t i o n i n g  
under  a s p e c i a l  r e g im e .  The l a t t e r  approach i s  endorsed 
by t h i s  t h e s  i s .
( i i ) H a r m o n i z a t i o n  o f  company laws i n  
So uthe r n  A f r i c a
Company laws i n  the  Sou ther n  A f r i c a n  s u b - r e g i o n  
d i s c l o s e  an u n t i d y  system o c c as io n ed  .m a i n 1y by t he '  
c o l o n i a l  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  t he s e  c o u n t r i e s .  C o u n t r i e s  i n  t he  
s u b - r e g i o n  t h a t  e x p e r i e n c e d  B r i t i s h  c o l o n i a l  r u l e  such as
T a n z a n i a ,  Zambia,  Malawi  and Zimbabwe have company laws
%
based on t h e  common law sys tem.  Former Po r t ug u es e
c o l o n i e s  o f  Mozambique and Angola  and t h e  f o r m e r  B e l g i a n
c o l o n y  o f  Z a i r e  employ c i v i l  law p r i n c i p l e s  i n  t h e i r
company l aw s .  The system i n  S w a z i l a n d ,  Botswana,  and
Lesotho  r e v e a l s  a h y b r i d  between the  common law and c i v i l
law p r i n c i p l e s .
The prob l ems a r i s i n g  ou t  o f  t h i s  d i s p a r i t y  i n  t he
company laws o f  t he  s u b - r e g i o n  are w e l l  r e c o g n i z e d  but
44
as y e t  have n o t  been t a c k l e d .  What i s  c l e a r  though  i s
44.  See 1960 London C on f er enc e c a l l i n g  f o r  t h e  e l i m i n a t i o n  
o f  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  commerc i a l  laws t owa rds  u n i f o r m  
c o n t i n e n t a l  l aws .  A.N.  A l l o t t  ( e d . ) ,  The F u t u r e  o f  
Law i n  A f r i c a :  Record o f  p r o c ee d i n g s  o f  London 
Conf  e rence  , 1 9 5 9 - 6 0 , London , j j  960J, page 41 .
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t h a t  a h a r m o n i z a t i o n  e x e r c i s e  must f i r s t  o f  a l l  c o n f r o n t  
t he  p rob l em o f  b r i n g i n g  t o g e t h e r  c i v i l  l aw and common law 
c o r p o r a t e  norms.  A l t h o u g h  t h i s  i s  a d i f f i c u l t  t a s k ,  
h a r m o n i z a t i o n  o f  t h e  s u b - r e g i o n ' s  company laws i s  c e r t a i n l y  
a f e a s i b l e  p r o p o s i t i o n .
The f e a s i b i l i t y  o f  t h i s  p r o p o s i t i o n ,  stems f rom t he
f a c t  t h a t  many o f  r e g i o n a l  c o r p o r a t i o n s  l i k e l y  t o  emerge
i n  t he  s u b - r e g i o n  are a lm os t  c e r t a i n l y  t o  be i n  t h e  n a t u r e
o f  j o i n t  v e n t u r e s ,  an a r rangement  i n  which p a r t i e s  are
more p a r t n e r s  than  s h a r e h o l d e r s .  Such a r r angement s  are
more l i k e l y  t o  be d e s c r i b e d  as q u a s i - p a r t n e r s h i p s , a
c on c ep t  which has s i m i l a r  meanings i n  both  t h e  c i v i l  and 
45common law.  T h i s  s i m i l a r i t y  may t a k e  t h e  p ro c es s  o f  
h a r m o n i z a t i o n  o f  company laws t o  f a c i l i t a t e  t h e  c r e a t i o n  
o f  r e g i o n a l  c o r p o r a t i o n s  i n  t he  area p o s s i b l e .
F u r t h e r m o r e ,  t h e  h a r m o n i z a t i o n  p r ocess  m i g h t  be 
he lped  by r e c e n t  dev el opments  i n  c e r t a i n  a s p ec t s  o f  i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  law and r e g i o n a l  law which  have f a c i l i t a t e d  the  
breakdown o f  many b a r r i e r s  between c i v i l  and common law 
as i s  e v id en ce d  by work c a r r i e d  ou t  by t he  EEC. I f  
France and t h e  U n i t e d  Kingdom, t he  a r c h i t e c t u r e s  o f  t he  
two systems can agree t o  harmon ize  t h e i r  systems w i t h i n  
t he  f ramework  o f  t he  EEC, t h e r e  seems t o  be no r eason why 
c o u n t r i e s  i n  t he  Sou thern  A f r i c a n  s u b - r e g i o n  who are r e c e n t  
r e c i p i e n t s  o f  t he  two systems may not  do t he  same.
45.  Re Westbourne G a l l e r i e s  L t d .  (1972)  2 W.L.R.  1289.
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Company law h a r m o n i z a t i o n  i n  the s u b - r e g i o n  however 
w i l l  v e r y  much depend on t h e  p o l i t i c a l  w i l l  o f  member 
c o u n t r i e s  and t h e i r  p r epa re dne ss  t o  r e l i n q u i s h  s t r i c t  
adherence t o  n o t i o n s  o f  s o v e r e i g n t y .  The h i s t o r y  o f  
e a r l i e r  r e g i o n a l  economic g r o u p i n g s  i n  t h e  s u b - r e g i o n  
shows t h a t  t h i s  p o l i t i c a l  w i l l  has so f a r  been l a c k i n g .  
The r e c e n t  c r e a t i o n  o f  SADCC and t he  work i t  has u n d e r ­
t ak en  i n  t h e  p as t  few y e a r s  however ,  i n d i c a t e s  a p re par ed  
ness by t he  c o u n t r i e s  o f  t h e  s u b - r e g i o n  t o  s t i c k  t o  and 
a c h ie v e  t h e  g o a l s  t h e y  have s e t  f o r  t h e m s e l v e s .  Wi th  
t h i s  k i n d  o f  p o l i t i c a l  w i l l ,  h a r m o n i z a t i o n  o f  t he s e  
c o u n t r i e s  laws would seem t o  be a l i k e l y  p o s s i b i l i t y  
a l b e i t  no t  i n  t h e  v e r y  near  f u t u r e .
V. C r e a t i o n  o f  a Sou thern  A f r i c a n  M i n e r a l  M a r k e t i n g  
C o r p o r a t i o n  under  a s p e c i a l  reg ime 
S i nce  f o r  h a r m o n i z a t i o n  o f  t h e  company laws o f  t he  
s u b - r e g i o n  t o  f a c i l i t a t e  t he  c r e a t i o n  o f  a j o i n t  m i n e r a l  
m a r k e t i n g  c o r p o r a t i o n  may i n v o l v e  a t o r t u o u s  pa th  which 
may r e q u i r e  y e a r s  o f  e v o l v i n g  a p p r o p r i a t e  c o r p o r a t e  norms 
and r u l e s ,  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n  under  a 
s p e c i a l  l e g a l  reg ime may be a more p r a c t i c a l  p r o p o s i t i o n .
The i d e a  o f  c r e a t i n g  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o r p o r a t i o n s  
under  s p e c i a l  l e g a l  r eg imes  i s  no t  a new one and many 
examples are e v i d e n t  i n  many p a r t s  o f  t h e  d e v e l o p i n g  
c o u n t r i e s .  Such examples i n c l u d e  t he  CMAO m u l t i n a t i o n a l  
cement p r o j e c t  between Ghana, Togo and t he  I v o r y  Coas t ;  
a j o i n t  I r o n  Ore c o r p o r a t i o n  between A l g e r i a  and T u n i s i a ;
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46a j o i n t  copper  u n d e r t a k i n g  between Egypt  and Zambia;  
and Suave C e n t r a l e s  between Venezue l a,  C o l omb ia ,  and 
C e n t r a l  Amer ican s t a t e s  f o r  t he  m a r k e t i n g  o f  C e n t r a l  
Amer ican c o f f e e .
A So uthe r n  A f r i c a n  m i n e r a l  m a r k e t i n g  c o r p o r a t i o n ,  
i f  c r e a t e d ,  s ho u l d  seek t o  harmonize m i n e r a l  m a r k e t i n g  
p o l i c i e s  o f  t h e  member c o u n t r i e s  v i s - a - v i s  t h e  consumer ,  
and u n d e r t a k e  t he  m a r k e t i n g  o f  a l l  or  s e l e c t e d  m i n e r a l s  
o f  s i g n i f i c a n t  i m p o r t a n c e  t o  t he  s u b - r e g i o n  such as copper  
and d iamonds,  so t h a t  s a l e s  c o n t r a c t s  f o r  example would 
be n e g o t i a t e d  j o i n t l y  t h r o u g h  t he  c o r p o r a t i o n  on b e h a l f  
o f  t h e  p r o d u c e r s .  In t h i s  way i t  would be p o s s i b l e  f o r  
c o u n t r i e s  o f  t he  s u b - r e g i o n  t o  e x e r t  a u n i f i e d  and c o n c e r t e d  
b a r g a i n i n g  p o s i t i o n  when c o n f r o n t i n g  t he  consumers .  Th i s  
p ro ces s  may g r e a t l y  improve  t he s e  c o u n t r i e s '  b a r g a i n i n g  
p o s i t i o n  i n  t he  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  m i n e r a l  m a r k e t s .
A t r e a t y  e s t a b l i s h i n g  such a c o r p o r a t i o n  may be 
n e g o t i a t e d  w i t h i n  t he  f ramework  o f  SADCC and sh o u l d  p r o v i d e  
f o r  t he  i n c o r p o r a t i o n  o f  t h e  e n t e r p r i s e  i n  one o f  t he  
member s t a t e s  as d e t e r m i n e d  by f a c t o r s  such as m i n e r a l  
l o c a t i o n ,  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e ,  commun i ca t i on  f a c i l i t i e s  and 
ba nk in g  f a c i l i t i e s .  The mechanism f o r  a c h i e v i n g  t h i s  
i s  a l r e a d y  a v a i l a b l e  i n  SADCC i n  t he  fo rm o f  t he  s e c t o r a l  
commiss ions  a r r a n g e m e n t s .  L i k e  i n  t he  case o f  SATCC, a 
s e c t o r a l  commiss ion r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  m i n e r a l  m a r k e t i n g
46.  See Economic Commission f o r  A f r i c a :  Rep or t  o f  t he  
t h i r d  c o n f e r e n c e  o f  A f r i c a n  M i n i s t e r s  o f  I n d u s t r y ,  
( Kenya ) 1 975 , page 11 .
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would have t o  be c r e a t e d  and an a p p r o p r i a t e  c o n v e n t i o n  
e n t e r e d  i n t o  f o r m a l l y  c r e a t i n g  t he  m a r k e t i n g  c o r p o r a t i o n  
and p r o v i d i n g  f o r  i t s  powers ,  f u n c t i o n s ,  o b j e c t i v e s ,  
i m m u n i t i e s ,  o p e r a t i o n a l  and f i n a n c i a l  p r o v i s i o n s .  The 
l e g a l  c a p a c i t y  o f  such a c o r p o r a t i o n  would r e s u l t  f rom 
t h i s  i n s t r u m e n t .
One o f  t he  i m p o r t a n t  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  such a t r e a t y
must p r o v i d e  f o r  t h e  i n c o r p o r a t i o n  o f  t he  c o r p o r a t i o n  i n
one o f  t he  member c o u n t r i e s ,  p r e f e r a b l y  i n  t h e  c o u n t r y
h ous i ng  t h e  sea t  o f  t he  m a r k e t i n g  s e c t o r a l  commi ss i on .
P r o v i s i o n  must t hen  be made f o r  t he  c o r p o r a t i o n  t o  be
r e g i s t e r e d  i n  a l l  t he  p a r t i c i p a t i n g  s t a t e s  where r e g i s t e r e d
o f f i c e s  sh ou l d  be c r e a t e d  t o  hand l e  l o c a l  a f f a i r s  o f  the
e n t e r p r i s e .  Such r e g i s t r a t i o n  w i l l  amount t o  t h e  l e g a l
r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n  by t he  laws o f  p a r t i c i p a t i n g  
47s t a t e s .
The i n c l u s i o n  o f  t he  above p r o v i s i o n s  i n  a t r e a t y  
c r e a t i n g  such a c o r p o r a t i o n  would r e s u l t  i n  t h e  l e g a l  
j u r i s d i c t i o n  o f  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n  l y i n g  i n  t he  s t a t e  o f  
i n c o r p o r a t i o n . I t  i s  t h i s  s t a t e  t h a t  may a p p l y  t h e  laws 
e s t a b l i s h i n g  t he  c o r p o r a t i o n ,  t hos e  under  wh ich  i t  o p e r a t e s  
{ b o th  b y - l a w s  and s t a t u t e s ) ,  and laws o f  t h e  p a r t i c i p a t i n g  
s t a t e s  t o  t he  e x t e n t  t h a t  t he s e  are not  i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  
i t s  own l aw s .
A p r i n c i p l e  o f  equal  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  r e f l e c t i n g  t he  
p a r t i c i p a t i n g  s t a t e s '  s h a r e h o l d i n g ,  must g u id e  i n  m a t t e r s
47.  See f o r  example ,  a r t i c l e s  18, 19 and 23 o f  t he  
Andean Commi ss i on ' s  D e c i s i o n  4 6 , ( J CJ'?2.) 11,
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Legal  m a t e r i a l s  page 359.
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such as a p po i n t m e n t  o f  d i r e c t o r s  t o  t he  bo ar d ,  management ,  
members o f  v a r i o u s  c o m m i t t e e s ,  employment ,  t r a i n i n g ,  and 
f o r e m o s t  t he  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  b e n e f i t s .
Mechanisms sh ou l d  be w r i t t e n  i n t o  t he  t r e a t y  
r e f l e c t i n g  t he  m u l t i n a t i o n a l  n a t u r e  o f  t he  c o r p o r a t i o n  
i n  o r d e r  t o  a v o i d  a s i t u a t i o n  i n  which one or  a few 
s t a t e s  seek t o  domina te  the  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  t he  c o r p o r a t i o n .
F i n a l l y ,  ca r e  s hou l d  be t aken  t o  p r o v i d e  an adequate 
d i s p u t e  s e t t l e m e n t  p r oc e d u r e  which  would be used i n  an 
e ve nt  o f  a d i s p u t e .  A d i s p u t e  s e t t l e m e n t  p r o c e d u r e  t h a t  
p r o v i d e s  f o r  a r b i t r a t i o n  t h r o u g h  a r e g i o n a l  a r b i t r a t i o n  
body would seem t o  be a more s u i t a b l e  approach because 
i t  i s  l i k e l y  t o  f a c i l i t a t e  r e c o n c i l i a t i o n  between t he  members 
i n  d i s p u t e  r a t h e r  than a r b i t r a t i o n  co ndu c t ed  by a 




Th is  c h a p t e r  summar izes the  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  t he  
r e s e a r c h  d i s c u s s e d  i n  p r e v i o u s  c h a p t e r s .  Bes i des  p r o v i d i n g  
a summary o f  c o n c l u s i o n s  a r r i v e d  at  i n  t h o s e  c h a p t e r s ,  i t  
a t t e m p t s  t o  p l a c e  t he  c o n c l u s i o n s  i n  a b r o a d e r  p e r s p e c t i v e  
and s u g g e s t i n g  p r a c t i c a l  s te ps  governments  i n  m i n e r a l  
p r o d u c i n g  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  may t a k e  i n  f u r t h e r i n g  
t h e i r  common i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  o f  copper  
pr i c e s .
The r e s e a r c h  has r e v e a l e d  a number o f  i m p o r t a n t  i s s u e s  
r e g a r d i n g  r u l e s  and i n s t i t u t i o n s  c onnec ted  w i t h  t h e  m a r k e t i n g  
o f  Zambian c o p p e r .
The f i r s t  i s s u e  r e l a t e s  t o  the  r o l e  o f  t h e  London 
Meta l  Exchange i n  t h e  s e t t i n g  o f  p r i c e s  f o r  copper  produced 
i n  Zambia.  As i t  emerged f r om the  d i s c u s s i o n  i n  c h a p t e r  
t h r e e ,  a l t h o u g h  Zambia does not  marke t  i t s  copper  t h r o u g h  
the  LME, the  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a r rangement  f o r  t he  m a r k e t i n g  
o f  m i n e r a l s  are such t h a t  t h e  p r i c e s  i t  r e c e i v e s  e ls ewhere  
f o l l o w  c l o s e l y  t h e  d a i l y  p r i c e s  e s t a b l i s h e d  on t h i s  
i n s t i t u t i o n .  D e s p i t e  t he  i m p l i c a t i o n s  a r i s i n g  f r om t h i s  
s e t  up,  t h e  LME i s  f ro m a l e g a l  p o i n t  o f  v i ew a p r i v a t e l y  
owned B r i t i s h  company which  l i k e  any o t h e r  such body 
c o r p o r a t e  i s  a c c o u n t a b l e  m a i n l y  t o  i t s  members and i t s  
u l t i m a t e  power l i e s  i n  t h e  Board o f  D i r e c t o r s  s e l e c t e d  by 
the  s h a r e h o l d e r s .  Th i s  b e i ng  the  case,  t h e  r u l e s  o f  t he
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LME impose no o b l i g a t i o n  on t h e  Board o f  D i r e c t o r s  t o  
i n f o r m  t h e  o u t s i d e  w o r l d  about  t he  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  i t s  members 
i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  how t h e y  a r r i v e  at  t he  p r i c e  f o r  a commodi ty 
l i k e  c o p p e r .  T h i s  means t h a t  t he  Exchange i s  n o t  amenable 
t o  some k i n d  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  ma ch in er y  t h a t  wou ld  impose 
some k i n d  o f  a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  a g a i n s t  u n i n t e n t i o n a l  o v e r ­
commi tment  o r  even f r a u d  i n  t he  s e t t i n g  o f  p r i c e s  f o r  
c o mmod i t i es  such as c o p p e r .
To add t o  t h i s  p r ob le m,  t h e  r u l e s  o f  t h e  LME r e g a r d i n g  
membersh ip,  as has been d e mon s t ra ted  i n  c h a p t e r  t h r e e ,  
are h e a v i l y  b i a s e d  a g a i n s t  p r od u c e r  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s .  
Thus f o r  exampl e ,  r i n g  members are composed e n t i r e l y  o f  
t h e  meta l  p r o d u c i n g  m u l t i n a t i o n a l s  based i n  t h e  deve l oped  
c o u n t r i e s ,  meta l  and commodi ty  t r a d i n g  c o r p o r a t i o n s ,  banks 
and o t h e r  f i n a n c i a l  c o n g l o m e r a t e s ,  as w e l l  as g e ne r a l  i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  t r a d i n g  and i n v e s t m e n t  groups o f  t h e  deve l oped  
c o u n t r i e s .  In i t s  o r g a n i z a t i o n > s t r u c t u r e , o w n e r s h i p ,  
and p l a c e  i n  t h e  mar ke t  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h i s  Exchange i s  f a r  
f r om a sound and unb i as ed  c r e a t o r  o f  copper  p r i c e s  as i t  
would n o r m a l l y  l i k e  t o  c l a i m .
A body w i t h  such a p o w e r f u l  r o l e  t o  p l a y  bu t  e x c l u de s  
t h e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  o f  t h e  ma jo r  p r o d u c i n g  and e x p o r t i n g  
c o u n t r i e s ,  must  a t  t h e  v e r y  l e a s t  be s u b j e c t e d  t o  f u l l  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a c c o u n t a b i l i t y .  I t  i s  t h e r e f o r e  a dangerous 
s o l u t i o n  t o  s ug ge s t  as some w r i t e r s  have done,  t h a t  a new 
s c e n a r i o  s h o u l d  be worked o u t  e n a b l i n g  c opper  m a r k e t i n g  
c o r p o r a t i o n s  s e t  up by copper  p r o d u c i n g  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  
t o  j o i n  t h e  main a c t o r s  on t h e  LME and work i n  c o l l u s i o n
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w i t h  them.  The dangers  o f  t h i s  approach are l i n k e d  t o  t h e  
n a t u r e  o f  t h e  main a c t o r s  on the  Exchange.  A l mos t  a l l  o f  
them are v a s t  m u l t i n a t i o n a l s  w i t h  i n t e r e s t s  n o t  o n l y  i n  
copper  bu t  o t h e r  m i n e r a l s  and w i t h  v a s t  f i n a n c i a l  r e s o u r c e s  
which t h e y  c o u l d  use t o  o u t w i t  copper  m a r k e t i n g  c o r p o r a t i o n s  
o f  t h e  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s .  The c r e a t i o n  o f  a r e a s o n a b l y  
open and c o m p e t i t i v e  sys tem,  w o r k i n g  under  c l e a r  and 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y  agreed r u l e s  appears t o  be t h e  o n l y  approach 
t h a t  would ass ure  a c o u n t r y  l i k e  Zambia a f a i r  p r i c e  f o r  
i t s  copper  and assu r e  i t  o f  i t s  f u l l  s o v e r e i g n t y  over  i t s  
n a t u r a l  r e s o u r c e s .
U n t i l  such an approach i s  worked o u t  and agreed 
upon,  Zambia and indeed  o t h e r  copper  p r o d u c i n g  c o u n t r i e s  
would c o n t i n u e  t o  depend on i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l  measures aimed 
a t  t h e  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  o f  copper  p r i c e s  and t h e  a m e l i o r a t i o n  
o f  t he  e f f e c t s  o f  p r i c e  f l u c t u a t i o n s  on t h e i r  e x p o r t  
e a r n i n g s .  These i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l  measures however ,  have 
s e r i o u s  l i m i t a t i o n s  which need t o  be overcome b e f o r e  t he se  
measures can p r oduce f a v o u r a b l e  r e s u l t s  f o r  p r o d u c e r s  o f  
c o p p e r .
The second m a jo r  i s s u e  t h a t  has emerged i n  t h e  t h e s i s  
r e l a t e s  t o  i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l  measures aimed a t  t he  
s t a b i l i z a t i o n  o f  copper  p r i c e s .  One o f  t h e s e  measures 
i n v o l v e s  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  t he  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  commodi ty  
agreement  f o r  c o p p e r .
An i n t e r n a t i o n a l  commodi ty  agreement  i s  b a s i c a l l y  
a t r e a t y  i n v o l v i n g  both  t he  governments  o f  e x p o r t i n g  
c o u n t r i e s  and consuming n a t i o n s  and i n v o l v e s  as has been 
d i s c u s s e d  i n  c h a p t e r  f o u r ,  t he  u t i l i z a t i o n  o f  v a r i o u s
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mechanisms aimed a t  t h e  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  o f  t he  p r i c e  o f  a 
commodi ty  i n  q u e s t i o n .  For  such an agreement  t o  succeed 
i n  t h i s  o b j e c t i v e  however ,  a number o f  f a c t o r s  must be 
p r e s e n t .  The f i r s t  and perhaps the  most i m p o r t a n t  f a c t o r  
i s  t h a t  t h e r e  has t o  be agreement  between t h e  two groups 
o f  governments  as t o  t he  d e s i r a b i l i t y  o f  such an a r r a n g e ­
ment .  Se c o nd l y ,  t he  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  mechanism must be 
e f f e c t i v e ,  and f i n a l l y  t h a t  t h e r e  s hou l d  be adequate  
f i n a n c i a l  r e s o u r c e s  f o r  s u p p o r t i n g  w ha tev e r  mechanism i s  
e m p l o y e d .
The need f o r  t he  c o n c l u s i o n  o f  a copper  commodi ty 
agreement  has f o r  a l ong t i m e  been acknowl edged.  Th i s  
f a c t  i s  made o b v i o us  by t h e  UN i n t e g r a t e d  programme f o r  
c o mmod i t i e s  which  l i s t s  copper  as one o f  t h e  ma jo r  
c a n d i d a t e s  f o r  wh i ch  t he  commodi ty  agreement  approach 
may p rove  u s e f u l  i n  t he  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  o f  i t s  p r i c e s .  
N e g o t i a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  o f  such an agreement  have 
been co ndu c t ed  on s e v e r a l  o c ca s io n s  s i n c e  1976 bu t  t o  da te  
no such agreement  has m a t e r i a l i z e d .  The l a c k  o f  agreement  
may be a t t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  i n h e r e n t  weakness o f  t h i s  approach .  
The approach depends f o r  i t s  success on the  compromise 
o f  the  i n t e r e s t s  o f  t h e  consumer n a t i o n s  and t h o s e  o f  
p r o d u c e r s .  In t he  case o f  copper  p r o du c e r s  and consumers 
t h i s  compromise has no t  been p o s s i b l e .  The main p o i n t  o f  
d i s a g r e e m e n t  between t he  two c o u n t r i e s  r e l a t e s  t o  t he  n a t u r e  
o f  t he  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  ma ch in e ry  t o  be employed by such an 
agreement ,  t h a t  i s  t o  say w he t he r  i t  shou l d  i n v o l v e  o n l y  a 
b u f f e r  s t o c k  or  a b u f f e r  s t o c k  coup l ed  w i t h  p r o d u c t i o n
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management .  A second p o i n t  o f  d isa g re e me n t  i n v o l v e s  the  
p r i c e  range such a ma ch in er y  shou l d  s u p p o r t .
A l t h o u g h  t h e r e f o r e ,  t he  commodi ty agreement  approach 
has p o t e n t i a l  i n  s t a b i l i z i n g  p r i c e s  o f  c o p p e r ,  i t s  use­
f u l n e s s  w i l l  be d e t e r m i n e d  by t he  a b i l i t y  o f  copper  p r o d u c i n g  
c o u n t r i e s  and consuming n a t i o n s  to  reach agreement  r e g a r d i n g  
main economic p r o v i s i o n s  such as the  range o f  p r i c e s  t o  be 
s u p p o r t e d .  For  an agreement  t o  be r ea c he d ,  t he s e  p r o v i s i o n s  
must r e f l e c t  a f a i r  b a l anc e between t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  both  
consumers and p r o d uc e r s  and must be f l e x i b l e  and e v o l u t i o n a r y  
p r o v i d i n g  f o r  a d j u s t m e n t  t o  c hang i ng  c i r c u m s t a n c e s .
Even i f  t h i s  b a s i c  agreement  i s  a c h i e v e d ,  one prob lem 
remains  t o  be t a c k l e d  and t h a t  i s ,  t he  f i n a n c i n g  o f  t he  
a c t i v i t i e s  o f  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  copper  o r g a n i z a t i o n  
Th i s  p rob l em has over  t he  y e a r s  c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  d i s a p p o i n t  
i n l j  p e r fo rm an ce  o f  t he  commodi ty  agreement  a ppr oach .  I t  
was i n  an a t t e m p t  t o  t a c k l e  t h i s  p rob lem t h a t  t he  Common 
Fund was c r e a t e d .  In Cha p t e r  V v a r i o u s  p rob l ems r e l a t i n g  
t o  t he  fund  are d i s c u s s e d  bu t  perhaps the  most i m p o r t a n t  
i s s u e  r e l a t e s  t o  i t s  a b i l i t y  t o  f und  a copper  agreement .
A number o f  p rob lems i n  t he  o r g a n i z a t i o n  o f  the  
Common Fund may r e s u l t  i n  i t s  i n a b i l i t y  t o  a d e q u a t e l y  
f i n a n c e  a copper  agreement .  Among t he se  problems are t hose  
r e l a t i n g  t o  t h e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  be made t o  t h e  f u n d ,  t he  
use o f  such r e s o u r c e s  by a s s o c i a t e d  commodi ty  o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  
and the  d e c i s i o n  making ma ch in er y  t o  be employed by the  f u n d .
As d i s c u s s e d  i n  c h a p t e r  f i v e  the  fund r e s o u r c e s  i n  
t he  f i r s t  a cco un t  wh ich  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  r e l e v a n t  t o  t he  i s s u e
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o f  p r i c e  s t a b i l i z a t i o n ,  are t o  be c o n s t i t u t e d  by c o n t r i ­
b u t i o n s  made by member c o u n t r i e s ,  d e p o s i t s  made by t he  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  commodi t y  agreements t o  be a f f i l i a t e d  t o  i t ,  
and b o r r o w i n g s  made by t he  Common Fund f r om t he  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
money ma r k e t s .  The adequacy o f  t he  f und  r e s o u r c e s  t h e r e ­
f o r e ,  w i l l  depend on a t  l e a s t  t h r e e  t h i n g s .  F i r s t ,  t he  
a b i l i t y  o f  member c o u n t r i e s  t o  meet  t h e i r  o b l i g a t i o n s  t o  t he  
Fund i n  t erms o f  c o n t r i b u t i o n s .  Second l y ,  t o  t h e  number o f  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  commodi t y  agreements t h a t  woul d be c o n s t i t u t e d  
and a f f i l i a t e d  t o  t he  f u n d ,  and f i n a l l y  t o  t h e  a b i l i t y  o f  
t he  Fund i t s e l f  t o  m o b i l i z e  r e s o u r c e s  f r om t h e  money ma r k e t s .  
The f i r s t  i s s u e  does not  seem t o  r a i s e  a l o t  o f  prob l ems 
s i n c e  t he  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  by member c o u n t r i e s  are d e t e r mi ne d  
t h r o u g h  a we i g h t e d  f o r m u l a  whi ch enab l es  c o u n t r i e s  t o  
c o n t r i b u t e  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e i r  a b i l i t y .  Such c o n t r i b u t i o n s  
however  are not  adequat e  t o  s u p p o r t  b u f f e r  s t o c k s  i n  a 
number o f  c ommod i t i es  as i s  proposed under  t h e  Fund a r r a n g e ­
ment s .  The two o t h e r  i s s u e s  however  r a i s e  a number o f  
p r ob l ems .  For  exampl e ,  t he  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  be made by 
commodi t y  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  w i l l  depend on t he  a b i l i t y  o f  
consumer  and p r o d u c e r  c o u n t r i e s  i n  v a r i o u s  commod i t i es  
c o n c l u d i n g  commodi t y  agr eement s .  The prob l ems i n  t h i s  aspec t  
have been d i s c u s s e d  i n  c h a p t e r  f o u r .  Wi t h o u t  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  
o f  such agr eemen t s ,  t h i s  source o f  t he  Fund ' s  r e s o u r c e s  
woul d not  be a v a i l a b l e .  The t h i r d  pr ob l em r e l a t e s  t o  t he 
b o r r o w i n g s  t o  be made by t h e  Fund f rom i n t e r n a t i o n a l  ma r k e t s .  
In t h i s  aspec t  t he  pr ob l em woul d seem t o  l i e  i n  t h e  f a c t
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t h a t  such b o r r o w i n g s  woul d have t o  be made f r om f i n a n c i a l  
i n s t i t u t i o n s  i n  t he  d e v e l o p ^  c o u n t r i e s  s i n c e  d e v e l o p i n g  
c o u n t r i e s  do not  command adequat e f i n a n c i a l  r e s o u r c e s .
Th i s  be i ng  t h e  case prob l ems may a r i s e  r e g a r d i n g  t he  w i l l i n g ­
ness o f  such f i n a n c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  t o  l end  monies t h a t  
woul d be used i n  s t a b i l i z i n g  commodi t y p r i c e s  s i n c e  t he  
c o u n t r i e s  i n  whi ch t h e y  are s i t u a t e d  may be i n t e r e s t e d  i n  
o b t a i n i n g  such commod i t i es  a t  t he  cheapes t  p o s s i b l e  p r i c e s .
Apa r t  f r om t he  pr obl ems o f  t he  c o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  
r e s o u r c e s  f o r  t h e  f und and t he  c o n c l u s i o n  o f  commodi t y  
agreements  t h e r e  i s  t he  pr ob l em o f  t he  d e c i s i o n  making 
ma ch i ne r y  i n  t he  f u n d .  The d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  vo t e s  i n  t he  
Fund i s  based on member c o n t r i b u t i o n s .  Th i s  approach has 
been employed i n  o t h e r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  and 
has been a s u b j e c t  o f  c r i t i c i s m  p a r t i c u l a r l y  by d e v e l o p i n g  
c o u n t r i e s  s i n c e  i t  t ends  t o  g i v e  more power t o  t he  
deve l oped  c o u n t r i e s  i n  d e c i s i o n  making at  t he  expense o f  
t he  f i n a n c i a l l y  weaker  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s .  The use 
o f  t h i s  approach i n  t he  Fund w i l l  i n n e v i t a b l y  mean a f i r m  
c o n t r o l  by deve l oped  c o u n t r i e s  o f  t he  d e c i s i o n  making 
ma c h i n e r y .  I t  i s  i r o n i c a l  t h a t  an i n s t i t u t i o n  l i k e  t he 
Common Fund whi ch seeks t o  deal  w i t h  prob l ems o f  commodi t y  
p r i c e  f l u c t u a t i o n s ,  wh i ch  i s  ma i n l y  a p r ob l em f a c i n g  t he 
d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s ,  shou l d  be c o n t r o l l e d  by t h e  deve l oped  
c o u n t r i e s  who do no t  f a c e  t h i s  p r ob l em.
Given t h e s e  c o n s t r a i n t s ,  i t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  t he  
commodi t y  agreement  approach even s u p po r t e d  by a Common Fund 
may not  be an adequat e  s o l u t i o n  t o  probl ems o f  copper  p r i c e  
f l u c t u a t i o n s .  As s t a t e d  i n c h a p t e r  3,  any s e r i o u s  s t r u c t u r a l
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r e f o r ms  o f  t he  norms g o v e r n i n g  t he  ma r k e t i n g  o f  a m i n e r a l  
l i k e  copper  are bound t o  undermi ne t he  economi c w e l l - b e i n g  
o f  t he  deve l oped  c o u n t r i e s  whi ch depend on u n i n t e r r u p t e d  
access t o  i n d u s t r i a l  raw m a t e r i a l s .  In t h i s  r e s p e c t  t he 
we i g h t ed  system o f  v o t i n g  i n  t he  Common Fund w i l l  o n l y  
a c c e n t u a t e  t he  power s t r u g g l e  between p r o d u c e r s  and 
consumers o f  c oppe r .  U t i l i z i n g  t he we i g h t e d  system o f  
v o t i n g  makes i t  u n l i k e l y  t h a t  t he  member s t a t e s  commanding 
t he  l a r g e s t  b l oc  o f  vo t es  woul d vo t e  i n  f a v o u r  o f  p o l i c i e s  
whi ch t h e y  c o n s i d e r  t o  be d e t r i m e n t a l  t o  t h e i r  n a t i o n a l  
economi c i n t e r e s t s .
The t h i r d  ma j o r  i s s u e  r e v e a l e d  by t h e  s t u d y  r e l a t e s
t o  p r o d u c e r  a s s o c i a t i o n  approach employed by CIPEC. CIPEC
i s  an i n . t e rgover  nment  al  a s s o c i a t i o n  o f  p r o d u c e r s  whi ch seeks
t o  e x e r t  a c o n s c i o u s  change i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  copper
ma r k e t i n g  a r r an ge me n t s .  One o f  i t s  main aims i s  t o
c o - o r d i n a t e  measures des i gned  t o  ensure t h e  gr owt h  o f
members'  r e a l  i ncome f r om copper  e x p o r t s ,  ha r mon i ze  member 
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c o u n t r y  p o l i c i e s  r e l a t i n g  t o  p r o d u c t i o n  and m a r k e t i n g  o f  
cop pe r ,  and t he  exchange o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  between members 
r e l a t i n g  t o  p r o d u c t i o n  and m a r k e t i n g .
However ,  CIPEC has been u n s u c c e s s f u l  i n  t h e  area o f  
p r i c e  s t a b i l i z a t i o n .  I t s  f a i l u r e  i n  t h i s  r e s p e c t ,  appears 
t o  be t i e d  t o  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t he  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  i n s t r u m e n t  
i t  empl oys .  I t s  agreement  l ac k s  economi c p r o v i s i o n s  
whi ch c o u l d  enab l e  i t  t o  c o n t r o l  members'  copper  p r o d u c t i o n  
l e v e l s ,  or  enab l e  members t o  un de r t ake  a j o i n t  s t o c k i n g  
ar rangement  t h a t  woul d enab l e  i t  c o n t r o l  t he  movement  o f  
p r i c e s  on w o r l d  ma r k e t s .  Th i s  l ack  o f  economi c p r o v i s i o n s
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has r e s u l t e d  i n t o  a s i t u a t i o n  i n  whi ch such measures are 
a t t e mp t e d  as need a r i s e s  t h r o u g h  c o n s u l t a t i o n  but  l e a v i n g  
t h e  u l t i m a t e  d e c i s i o n  as t o  employment  o f  such measures 
t o  i n d i v i d u a l  member c o u n t r i e s .  Th i s  somewhat  i n f o r m a l  
approach has r a i s e d  pr obl ems whi ch has made t he  approach 
w h o l l y  i n e f f e c t i v e  i n  s t a b i l i z i n g  copper  p r i c e s .  For  
exampl e ,  i n  t h e  two i n s t a n c e s  when CIPEC members agreed 
t o  c u t  p r o d u c t i o n  i n  1974 and 1975,  some members d i d  not  
e f f e c t  t h e  c u t b a c k s .  Even t hose  c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  made t he  
cu t b a cks  d i d  not  q u i t e  agree on t he l e v e l s  f o r  an e f f e c t i v e  
cu t ba c k s  because t h ey  c o u l d  nto agree on t he  base l e v e l s  
o f  p r o d u c t i o n  and sa l e s  upon whi ch an e f f e c t i v e  cu t back  
c o u l d  be c a l c u l a t e d .  As a r e s u l t  t he  two c u t b a c k s  had 
o n l y  the.  minimum o f  e f f e c t  on t he  p r i c e s  o f  c o p pe r .
A l t h o u g h  t h e  i n f o r m a l  approach t aken  by CIPEC has 
proved a f a i l u r e  i n  s t a b i l i z i n g  copper  p r i c e s ,  i t  has 
proved u s e f u l  i n  f o s t e r i n g  a sense o f  s o l i d a r i t y  between 
member c o u n t r i e s  whenever  one o f  i t s  members t o o k  i n d i v i d u a l  
measures t o  seek t o  i n f l u e n c e  p r i c e s .  I t  has a l s o  ac t ed 
as a u s e f u l  i n s t r u m e n t  f o r  t he  exchange o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  
between members aimed at  a b e t t e r  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  t he  
w o r l d  copper  ma r k e t s .
To remedy copper  p r i c e  f l u c t u a t i o n s ,  CIPEC member 
c o u n t r i e s  w i l l  need t o  r e - e x a mi n e  i t s  agreement  so as t o  
i n c l u d e  economi c and f i n a n c i a l  p r o v i s i o n s  t h a t  woul d enab l e  
i t  t o  adopt  a p r i c e  s u p p o r t  scheme i n  t he  n a t u r e  o f  a b u f f e r  
s t oc k  coup l ed  by p r o d u c t i o n  c o n t r o l .  The ma j o r  h u r d l e  i n  
t h i s  r e s p e c t  woul d be how t o  meet t he  c o s t  o f  f i n a n c i n g  
such a b u f f e r  s t o c k .  U n l i k e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  commodi t y  ag r ee -
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meri ts composed o f  bo t h  p r o duc e r s  and consumes,  CIPEC 
c o u n t r i e s  do not  have access t o  e i t h e r  t he  IMF b u f f e r  s t o c k  
f i n a n c i n g  f a c i l i t y  or  t he  Common Fund f a c i l i t y .  I t  i s  
u n l i k e l y  t h a t  CIPEC c o u n t r i e s  may be ab l e  t o  o b t a i n e d  
f i n a n c e s  f o r  t h i s  purpose f r om o t e h r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f i n a n c i a l  
i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  because many o f  t hese  i n s t i t u t i o n s  are l a r g e l y  
c o n t r o l l e d  ; by copper  consumi ng n a t i o n s  whi ch woul d p r e f e r  
t o  see an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  commodi t y  agreement  f o r  copper  
r a t h e r  t han an a s s o c i a t i o n  o f  p r odu ce r  c o u n t r i e s .  Indeed 
t h i s  appears  t o  be t he  a t t i t u d e  t aken  by t he  IBRD t o  a 
r e q u e s t  made by t he  Zambian M i n i s t e r  o f  F i n a n c e ,  John 
Mwanakatwe i n  November 1971.  The M i n i s t e r  appea l ed  t o  t he  
IBRD f o r  f i n a n c i a l  a s s i s t a n c e  t o  b u i l d  a s t o c k p i l e  f o r  copper  
out  o f  s u r p l u s  s u p p l i e s  i n  o r d e r  t o  remedy t h e  t hen  p r e v a i l ­
i ng  a b n o r ma l l y  l ow p r i c e s .  The bank has never  r esponded 
t o  t h a t  r e q u e s t .  Th i s  f i n a n c i n g  prob l em w i l l  have t o  be 
t a c k l e d  by CIPEC i t s e l f .  One o f  t he  o p t i o n s  open t o  CIPEC 
i n  t a c k l i n g  t h i s  pr ob l em may be t o  work ou t  a d e c e n t r a l i z e d  
f o r m o f  a b u f f e r  s t o c k  mechani sm i n  whi ch each member c o u n t r y  
woul d u n d e r t a k e  t h e  s t o c k i n g  o f  copper  p roduced  i n  excess 
o f  t he  agreed l i m i t s .  Th i s  d e c e n t r a l i z e d  approach t o  b u f f e r  
s t o c k i n g  may a l l e v i a t e  or  reduce t he  d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n v o l v e d  
i n  t he  s e t t i n g  up o f  a j o i n t  b u f f e r  s t o c k  w i t h  a l l  i t s  
a t t e n d a n t  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  and o t h e r  c o s t s .  Even t h i s  approach 
however ,  w i l l  r e q u i r e  t he  commi tment  o f  s u b s t a n t i a l  f i n a n c i a l  
r e s o u r c e s  by member c o u n t r i e s .
Gi ven t he  c o n s t r a i n t s  i n h e r e n t  i n  t he  CIPEC agreement  
i t s e l f ,  as w e l l  as t he  f i n a n c i a l  p robl ems i n v o l v e d  i n  i t s
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a b i l i t y  t o  u t i l i z e  t he  b u f f e r  s t o c k i n g  mechani sm,  i t  woul d 
seem t h a t  t h i s  o r g a n i z a t i o n  i s  u n l i k e l y  t o  succeed i n  
s t a b i l i z i n g  t he  w o r l d  p r i c e s  f o r  copper .  Th i s  woul d seem 
t o  be t he  case not  w i t h s t a n d i n g  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  i t  has 
encouraged a sense o f  s o l i d a r i t y  between copper  p r o d u c e r s .
Pr ospec t s  f o r  more success by CIPEC woul d c e r t a i n l y  
i mprove i f  i t  c o u l d  work i n  c o n j u n c t i o n  w i t h  o t h e r  p r o d u c e r s '  
a s s o c i a t i o n s  such as t hose  o f  B a u x i t e  or  a l u mi n i u m.  There 
i s  ev i d e n c e  t h a t  c o n t a c t s  t owar ds  t h i s  approach have a l r e a d y  
begun.  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  t he  B a u x i t e  P r o d u c e r s '  A s s o c i a t i o n  
have s i n c e  1974 been r e g u l a r  a t t e n d a n t s  a t  t h e  CIPEC M i n i s t e r s '  
c o n f e r e n c e s .
The l i m i t e d  success o f  t h e  commodi t y  agreement  approach 
and t he  p r o d u c e r s '  a s s o c i a t i o n  approach b r i n g s  i n t o  f ocus  
t he  f o u r t h  ma j o r  scheme examined i n  t he  t h e s i s .  Th i s  i s s u e  
i n v o l v e s  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f i n a n c i a l  s u p po r t  schemes.  Two 
such schemes have been d i s c u s s e d  i n  c h a p t e r s  seven and 
e i g h t .  These are t he  IMF compensa t o r y  f i n a n c i n g  scheme 
and t h e  scheme o f  f i n a n c i a l  t r a n s f e r s  c o n t a i n e d  i n  t he 
Lome c o n v e n t i o n  aimed at  t he  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  o f  t he  e x p o r t  
e a r n i n g s  o f  a s s o c i a t e d  member c o u n t r i e s  such as Zambia.
The Lome Conven t i on  is t h o u g h t  by many t o  be a model  
agreement  on c o o p e r a t i o n  between two se t s  o f  c o u n t r i e s .
Look i ng  at  i t  i n  a w i d e r  p e r s p e c t i v e  however ,  r e v e a l s  an 
agreement  aimed a t  m a i n t a i n i n g  economi c c o m p l e m e n t a r i t i e s  
between a group o f  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  and a group o f  
deve l oped  c o u n t r i e s .  The p r o v i s i o n s  o f  t he  c o n v e n t i o n  
d e a l i n g  w i t h  t he  i s s u e s  o f  p r i ma r y  commodi t y  m a r k e t i n g ,
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t h a t  i s ,  p r o v i s i o n s  d e a l i n g  w i t h  t he  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  o f  
e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s  appear  t o  be based on t h i s  w i d e r  i n t e r p r e ­
t a t i o n  o f  t he  c o n v e n t i o n .
These p r o v i s i o n s ,  whi ch i n  t he  case o f  a g r i c u l t u r a l  
commod i t i es  are code named STABEX and i n  t he  case o f  m i n e r a l  
p r o d u c t s  are code named SYSMIN, enab l e  ACP c o u n t r i e s  t o  
hedge a g a i n s t  f l u c t u a t i o n s  i n  w o r l d  market  p r i c e s  r e s u l t i n g  
i n t o  d e t e r i o r a t i o n  i n  t h e i r  e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s  or  p r o d u c t i o n  
c u t b a c k s  hav i ng  t he  same e f f e c t .  These p r o v i s i o n s  o b v i o u s l y  
do p r o v i d e  some advant ages  t o  a c o u n t r y  l i k e  Zambia whi ch 
depends a l mos t  e n t i r e l y  on one e x p o r t  commod i t y ,  copper .
But  i t  may be more i m p o r t a n t  t o  t h e  EEC c o u n t r i e s  who may 
t h r o u g h  t hese  p r o v i s i o n s  ensur e  a s t r o n g h o l d  on t he  sources  
o f  copper  f r om Zambia and assur e  t h a t  Zambia r emai ns  a v i a b l e  
EEC mar ke t  f o r  t h e i r  ma nu f ac t u r ed  goods.
The l i m i t i n g  n a t u r e  o f  t he  b e n e f i t s  o f  Lome" t o  Zambia 
i s  i n d i c a t e d  i n  t h e  o p e r a t i o n  o f  SYSMIN. The compensa t o r y  
payments under  SYSMIN have been ve r y  r e s t r i c t e d  i n  s i z e  
and have a l mos t  e n t i r e l y  gone t o  t he  r e h a b i l i t a t i o n  o f  
t he  copper  mi nes r a t h e r  t han r e h a b i l i t a t i n g  t h e  e n t i r e  
economy.  The SYSMIN scheme p r o v i d e s  f i n a n c i a l  a s s i s t a n c e  
t o  a copper  p r o d u c i n g  c o u n t r y  l i k e  Zambia i n  two f o r ms .
F i r s t  t he  scheme can p r o v i d e  guar an t ees  f o r  p r i v a t e  l oans  
t o  he l p  m a i n t a i n  a c e r t a i n  l e v e l  o f  p r o d u c t i o n .  Second l y ,  
t he  scheme may p r o v i d e  d i r e c t  a i d  t o  t he  Zambian government  
i f  t he  p r o d u c t i o n  probl ems were combined w i t h  l ower  wor l d  
copper  p r i  c e s .
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A l t h o u g h  t he  scheme may sound i n t e r e s t i n g ,  t he  
amounts a v a i l a b l e  under  t he  scheme are e x t r e m e l y  l ow and i n  
many cases woul d not  make any n o t i c e a b l e  i mpac t  on t he  
economy o f  a c o u n t r y  l i k e  Zambia t h a t  e x p e r i e n c e s  c o n t i n u e d  
p r i c e  f l u c t u a t i o n s  i n  t h e  p r i c e s  o f  c o p pe r .  The amount  
made a v a i l a b l e  f o r  t he  d u r a t i o n  o f  t he  e n t i r e  Lome I I  
under  t h i s  scheme was o n l y  280m. European U n i t s  o f  Account  
( abou t  378 m i l l i o n  USA d o l l a r s ) .  Th i s  amount  i s  c l e a r l y  
i na d e q u a t e  t o  s u p p o r t  p r o d u c t i o n  i n  Zambia a l one  f o r  one 
y e a r ,  and y e t  i t  i s  earmarked t o  s u p p o r t  p r o d u c t i o n  f o r  
seven m i n e r a l s  produced i n  t h i r t e e n  ACP c o u n t r i e s  f o r  a 
p e r i o d  o f  f i v e  y e a r s .
Th i s  i nadequacy  i n  t he  f unds  i s  made c l e a r  by t he 
case o f  Zambi a.  In May 1982 f o r  exampl e,  t h e  ACP-EEC 
Counc i l  o f  M i n i s t e r s  approved 55 m i l l i o n  European U n i t s  o f  
Account  f o r  Zambi a.  Th i s  amount  was made a v a i l a b l e  t o  t he  
Zambia C o n s o l i d a t e d  Copper  Mines f o r  c o p p e r - c o b a l t  i n d u s t r y  
r e h a b i l i t a t i o n .  The t o t a l  sum r e q u i r e d  f o r  t he  r e h a b i l i t a ­
t i o n  however  was over  85 m i l l i o n  European U n i t s  o f  Accoun t .
For  an ACP c o u n t r y  l i k e  Zambia,  t he  p r ob l em o f  
i n s u f f i c i e n t  f unds  under  t h e  SYMIN a r r angement  i s  made worse 
by two o t h e r  i s s u e s .  F i r s t ,  s i n c e  t he  scheme becomes 
o p e r a t i o n a l  when p r o d u c t i o n  o f  copper  d e c r e a s e s ,  i t  i s  not  
p o s s i b l e  t o  o b t a i n  compensa t i on  i n  a s i t u a t i o n  i n  whi ch 
a c t u a l  p r o d u c t i o n  i n c r e a s e s  but  e a r n i n g s  d e c r ea s e .  In t h i s  
r e s p e c t  i t  woul d appear  as though t he  scheme i s  no t  e n t i r e l y  
s a t i s f a c t o r y  i n  a l l e v i a t i n g  t h e  probl em o f  f l u c t u a t i o n s  i n  
e i t h e r  t h e  p r i c e s  o f  copper  or  e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s  f r om t h e  
m i n e r a l .  The second i s s u e  concer ns  t he  i n s t i t u t i o n a l
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mach i ne r y  p r o v i d e d  under  t he  second Lome c o n v e n t i o n .  The 
c o n v e n t i o n  se t s  up t h r e e  p r i n c i p a l  organs namel y t he  Counc i l  
o f  M i n i s t e r s ,  t h e  Commi t t ee o f  Ambassadors,  and t he  C o n s u l ­
t a t i v e  Assembl y .  A l l  t hese  organs p r o v i d e  a mach i ne r y  f o r  
c o n s u l t a t i o n  between ACP and EEC c o u n t r i e s  r e g a r d i n g  t he  
gene r a l  p o l i c i e s  and t he  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  such p o l i c i e s .
The a c t u a l  d e c i s i o n s  r e g a r d i n g  t r a n s f e r  o f  r e s o u r c e s  
under  t he  SYSMIN a r r angement  however ,  are l a r g e l y  i n  t he 
hands o f  t he  EEC Commi ss i on.  In t h i s  r e s p e c t ,  A r t i c l e  53 
s t a t e s  t h a t :
" . . .  The a p p l i c a t i o n  f o r  a i d  s h a l l  be made t o  t he 
Commi ssi on whi ch s h a l l  examine i t  i n  c o n j u n c t i o n  
w i t h  t he  ACP s t a t e  concer ned .  The f a c t  t h a t  t he  
c o n d i t i o n s  have been f u l f i l l e d  s h a l l  be e s t a b l i s h e d  
by common accor d  between t he  Communi ty and t he  ACP 
s t a t e .  N o t i f i c a t i o n  t h e r e o f  by t h e  Commi ssi on t o  
th.e ACP s t a t e  s h a l l  e n t i t l e  t he  l a t t e r  t o  Communi ty 
a i d  f r om t he  s p e c i a l  f i n a n c i n g  f a c i l i t y . "
Th i s  power  t o  make t he  f i n a l  d e c i s i o n  on whe t he r  a i d  woul d
be g r a n t e d  or  no t  seems t o  l i e  f i n a l l y  on t h e  EEC Commi ss i on.
F u r t h e r mo r e ,  t he  d e c i s i o n  on t he  amount  o f  a i d  t o  be g r a n t e d
t o  a c o u n t r y  t h a t  has a p p l i e d  l i e s  i n  t h e  Commi ssi on as
w e l l .  A r t i c l e  54 s t a t e s  t h a t :
" . . .  The amount  o f  t h i s  a i d  t o  f i n a n c e  p r o j e c t s  or  
programmes shou l d  be d e t e r mi ned  by t he  Commi ssi on 
i n  t he  l i g h t  o f  t h e  f unds  a v a i l a b l e  under  t he 
s p e c i a l  f i n a n c i n g  f a c i l i t y ,  t he  n a t u r e  o f  t he  p r o j e c t  
or  programme pr oposed by t he  ACP s t a t e s  concer ned 
and t he  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f  c o - f i n a n c i n g . . . . "
These two p r o v i s i o n s  make i t  c l e a r  t h a t  t he  j o i n t  i n s t i ­
t u t i o n s  o f  t he  ACP-EEC s t a t e s  p r o v i d e  o n l y  an a d v i s o r y  
mach i ne r y  and p l a y  o n l y  a mi nor  r o l e  i n  t h e  d e c i s i o n s  
r e g a r d i n g  t he  a c t u a l  d i s b u r s e men t  o f  a i d  i n  t he  SYSMIN 
scheme.
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The s u b o r d i n a t i o n  o f  t he  j o i n t  i n s t i t u t i o n s  means i n 
e f f e c t  t h a t  ACP c o u n t r i e s  canno t  e f f e c t i v e l y  d e t e r m i n e  t he  
p a t t e r n  o f  a i d  under  t he  scheme e i t h e r  as a group or  as 
i n d i v i d u a l s .  I n c r e a s i n g  t he  power o f  t h e  j o i n t  i n s t i t u t i o n s  
i n  f u t u r e  c o n v e n t i o n s  may g r e a t l y  i n c r e a s e  t he  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  
o f  t he  SYSMIN scheme as w e l l  as t he o v e r a l l  c r e d i b i l i t y  o f  
t he  ACP-EEC c o - o p e r a t i o n .  I t  shou l d  be obser ved  t h a t  
coup l ed  w i t h  t h e p r ob l e ms  f a c i n g  n e g o t i a t i o n s  t owar ds  t he 
c o n c l u s i o n  o f  a copper  agreement  i s  t he  pr ob l em o f  t he  ve r y  
e x i s t e n c e  o f  t he  Common Fund.  For  t he Fund t o  be a c t i v a t e d ,  
a t  l e a s t  90 o f  t h e  c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  s i gned  t h e  agreement  
c r e a t i n g  i t  must  r a t i f y  i t .  The 90 r a t i f i c a t i o n s  must  
r e p r e s e n t  a t  l e a s t  t w o - t h i r d s  o f  t o t a l  f i n a n c i a l  c o n t r i b u ­
t i o n s  t o . b e  made t o  t he  Fund by members.  However ,  by t he  
end o f  December 1983 o n l y  64 r a t i f i c a t i o n s  had been made 
r e p r e s e n t i n g  o n l y  41 per  cen t  o f  d i r e c t l y  c o n t r i b u t e d  c a p i t a l .  
A l t h o u g h  a l l  t h e  f u l l  members o f  CIPEC have r a t i f i e d  t he  
agr eement ,  many European c o u n t r i e s  and t he  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  
have not  done so making i t  d i f f i c u l t  f o r  t h e  Fund t o  come 
i n t o  e f f e c t .
The t h i r d  ACP-EEC c o n v e n t i o n  o f  Lome was s i gned  on 
December 8,  1984.  In as f a r  as t he  SYSMIN scheme i s  
conc e r n e d ,  no changes have been i n c o r p o r a t e d  i n  t h e  new 
agreement .  The a d m i s s i b i l i t y  r u l e s ,  t h a t  i s  t h e  dependence 
t h r e s h o l d s  f o r  b r i n g i n g  t he  system t o  o p e r a t i o n  remai n 
unchanged.  The l i s t  o f  p r o d u c t s  t o  be cove r ed  by t he  scheme 
remai ns  unchanged a l t h o u g h  i t  i s  now p o s s i b l e  f o r  o t h e r  
m i n e r a l s  not  i n c l u d e d  i n  t he  l i s t  t o  b e n e f i t  f r om t he 
scheme on a case by case d e r o g a t i o n .
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SYSMIN a i d  i s  s t i l l  i n  t he  f orm o f  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  
c l e a r l y  d e f i n e d  p r o j e c t s .  Whereas i n  t he  second Lome 
c o n v e n t i o n  t he  emphasi s i n  such p r o j e c t s  was r e q u i r e d  t o  
be on m a i n t a i n i n g  p r o d u c t i o n  c a p a c i t i e s ,  under  t he  t h i r d  
Lome c o n v e n t i o n ,  such p r o j e c t s  are r e q u i r e d  t o  be geared 
t owar ds  t he  r e s t o r a t i o n  o f  t he  mi n i n g  i n d u s t r y ' s  v i a b i l i t y .  
Such p r o j e c t s  must  t h e r e f o r e  aim at  t h e  r e h a b i l i t a t i o n ,  
ma i n t en a nc e ,  and r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  o f  t he  i n d u s t r y .  Desp i t e  
t he  d i f f e r e n t  wo r d i ng  used i n  t he  new c o n v e n t i o n ,  t he 
e f f e c t  o f  t h e  scheme on t hose  c o u n t r i e s  u t i l i z i n g  i t  i s  
bound t o  r emai n v e r y  much t he  same as i t  was i n  t he  second 
Lome c o n v e n t i o n .
The second compensa t o r y  f i n a n c i n g  scheme t h r o u g h  
whi ch Zambia may seek a s s i s t a n c e  i n  t h e  even t  o f  i t s  
e x p o r t  e a r n i n g  d e c l i n i n g  as a r e s u l t  o f  p r i c e  f l u c t u a t i o n s  
i s  t h e  IMF compensa t o r y  f i n a n c i n g  scheme.  Th i s  scheme i s  
c l e a r l y  a r e f l e c t i o n  o f  t he  main purpose o f  t h e  IMF whi ch 
i n  gene r a l  t e r ms  i s  t o  p r o v i d e  s h o r t - t e r m  ba l ance  o f  pay ­
ments s t a b i l i z a t i o n  t o  member c o u n t r i e s .  I t  i s  g e n e r a l l y  
accept ed  t h a t  f l u c t u a t i o n s  i n  e x p o r t  r e c e i p t s  do t end  t o  
a f f e c t  ba l a n c e  o f  payments and t h e r e f o r e  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  
t h e  aim o f  t he  o r g a n i z a t i o n .
The o p e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  scheme r e v e a l s  a number o f  
c o n s t r a i n t s  t h a t  make i t  no t  an adequate s o l u t i o n  t o  
Zamb i a ' s  copper  e a r n i n g s  f l u c t u a t i o n s .  The f i r s t  ma j or  
c o n s t r a i n t  i s  t h a t  t he  scheme i s  not  commodi t y  o r i e n t e d  
but  based on i s s ue s  o f  ba l ance  o f  payments .  Th i s  means 
t h a t  f o r  a c o u n t r y  l i k e  Zambia t o  b e n e f i t  f r om t he  scheme,
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copper  p r i c e  f l u c t u a t i o n s  must  t r a n s l a t e  t hems e l v es  t o  a 
ba l ance  o f  payments p r ob l em.  The c r u c i a l  i s s u e  o f  p r i c e  
f l u c t u a t i o n s  i s  t h e r e f o r e  not  a m a t t e r  o f  p r i me concern 
t o  t he  IMF scheme.
The second c o n s t r a i n t  r e l a t e s  t o  t he  f a c t  t h a t  t he  
scheme f u n c t i o n s  by way o f  l oans  t o  t he  a f f e c t e d  c o u n t r i e s .
Such l oans  are e v e n t u a l l y  ‘ t o  be r e p a i d  by t he  c o u n t r i e s  
i n v o l v e d .  Thus a l t h o u g h  t he  scheme does p r o v i d e  some r e l i e f  
i n  a l l e v i a t i n g  t he  consequences o f  copper  p r i c e  f l u c t u a t i o n s  
on Zamb i a ' s  ba l ance  o f  payments ,  t he  r e l i e f  i s  o f  a t empor a r y  
n a t u r e .  In f a c t  such t e mp o r a r y  r e l i e f  may i nduce  such a 
c o u n t r y  t o  depend on t he  scheme t o  t he  e x t e n t  t h a t  i t s  
debt  p robl ems are made wor se .  R e s t r u c t u r i n g  t he  scheme 
so as t o . t r a n s f e r  f i n a n c i a l  r e s o u r c e s  w i t h o u t  n e c e s s a r i l y  
r e q u i r i n g  t h e  repayment  o f  such f i n a n c e s  may go a l ong way 
i n  i mp r o v i n g  t he  b e n e f i t s  t h a t  can acc r ue  t o  a c o u n t r y  
l i k e  Zambia.
The c o n s t r a i n t s  i n  t he  use o f  t he  above i n t e r g o v e r n ­
mental  r e g u l a t o r y  t e c h n i q u e s  b r i n g s  i n t o  t he  f o r e  a n o t h e r  
t e c h n i q u e  whi ch  can be c o n s i d e r e d  and whi ch has p o t e n t i a l  
f o r  success .  Th i s  t e c h n i q u e  avo i ds  t he  mar ke t  s h a r i n g  
p r obl ems i n v o l v e d  i n  t he  commodi t y  agreement  appr oach ,  
and may be used i n  c o n j u n c t i o n  w i t h  t he  p r o d u c e r s '  a s s o c i ­
a t i o n  approach and compensa t o r y  f i n a n c i n g  schemes.  Th i s  
t e c h n i q u e  woul d be t he  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  an i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l  
j o i n t  m a r k e t i n g  agency on a r e g i o n a l  b a s i s  wh i ch  woul d ac t  
as s o l e  buyer  f o r  p a r t i c u l a r  commod i t i es  produced by 
c o u n t r i e s  i n  t h e  r e g i o n ,  and as so l e  s e l l e r  o f  such commod i t i es  
t o  deve l oped  i m p o r t i n g  c o u n t r i e s .  Such an agency cou l d
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m a i n t a i n  i t s  own s t o cks  whi ch c o u l d ,  i n  e f f e c t ,  be used 
i n  much t he  same way as t he  t r a d i t i o n a l  t y p e  o f  i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  b u f f e r  s t o c k  a r r angement s  t o  smooth ou t  p r i c e  
f l u c t u a t i o n s .  But  i n  a d d i t i o n  such a j o i n t  agency co u l d  
be i n  a p o s i t i o n  t o  e x e r t  a r e g i o n a l  b a r g a i n i n g  p o s i t i o n  
on i n t e r n a t i o n a l  m a r k e t i n g  i n s t i t u t i o n s .
In c h a p t e r  n i ne  such an approach i s  sugges t ed  i n  
r e l a t i o n  t o  m i n e r a l s  i n  Sout her n  A f r i c a .  SADCC does seem 
t o  be an a p p r o p r i a t e  u n i t  t h r o u g h  whi ch such a j o i n t  
m a r k e t i n g  ar r angement  may t a k e  p l a c e .  There are two main 
reasons f o r  t h i s .  F i r s t ,  t h a t  SADCC p r o v i d e s  t he  necessa r y  
p o l i t i c a l  a t mosphere t h a t  i s  necessar y  f o r  t he  success o f  
any r e g i o n a l  j o i n t  v e n t u r e .  Second l y ,  SADCC p r o v i d e s  a 
u n i t  encompass i ng n i ne  c o u n t r i e s  some o f  whom are h e a v i l y  
dependent  on t he  e x p o r t s  o f  m i n e r a l s .  Angol a  produces 
q u a n t i t i e s  o f  o i l ,  Zimbabwe produces a t  l e a s t  s i x  m i n e r a l s ,  
Zambia depends h e a v i l y  on t h e  e x p o r t  o f  co p pe r .  Tanzan i a ,  
Lesot ho  and Swaz i l and  produce smal l  q u a n t i t i e s  o f  v a r i o u s  
m i n e r a l s  w h i l e  Botswana i s  a s u b s t a n t i a l  p r o d u c e r  o f  d i amonds.  
A l t h o u g h  a l mos t  a l l  SADCC c o u n t r i e s  p roduce at  l e a s t  a 
smal l  q u a n t i t y  o f  one or  more m i n e r a l s ,  SADCC woul d do w e l l  
t o  admi t  Z a i r e  i n t o  t he  group s i n c e  Z a i r e  i s  a b i g  p r oduce r  
o f  v a r i o u s  m i n e r a l s  and may add a l o t  o f  musc l e t o  any 
j o i n t  m i n e r a l  m a r k e t i n g  a r r angement .  Z a i r e  i t s e l f  has 
been keen t o  j o i n  t he  o r g a n i z a t i o n  and has p r e s e n t e d  i t s  
a p p l i c a t i o n  at  a l l  summi t  co n f e r en c e s  s i n c e  1982.  I t  
woul d be t o  t he  advant age o f  a l l  t hose  c o u n t r i e s  dependent  
on m i n e r a l  e x p o r t s  i n  t h e  s u b - r e g i o n  t o  f a c i l i t a t e  t he
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i n c l u s i o n  o f  Z a i r e  i n  t he  o r g a n i z a t i o n .  Zambia i n  
p a r t i c u l a r ,  woul d do w e l l  t o  l obby  t he  o t h e r  SADCC members 
so as t o  f a c i l i t a t e  t he  admi ss i on  o f  Z a i r e .
The i n c l u s i o n  o f  Z a i r e  i n t o  SADCC does not  appear  t o  
be i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  i t s  g e o g r a p h i c a l  p o s i t i o n  or  i t s  
t r a d i t i o n a l  economi c t i e s .  In f a c t  g e o g r a p h i c a l l y ,  Z a i r e  
may c l a i m  t o  be i n  ve r y  much t he  same p o s i t i o n  as Tanzan i a  
and t h e r e f o r e  t h e r e  i s  no r eason why Tanzan i a  i s  i n c l u d e d  
i n  SADCC and Z a i r e  e x c l u d e d .  As f a r  as t r a d i t i o n a l  economi c 
t i e s  are c o ncer ned ,  Z a i r e  can c l a i m  t o  have been more c l o s e l y  
a f f i l i a t e d  t o  most  c o u n t r i e s  i n  Sou t her n  A f r i c a  t han Tanzan i a .
The o p e r a t i o n a l  p r i n c i p l e  suggest ed f o r  such an agency 
i s  one o f  a j o i n t  v e n t u r e  c o r p o r a t e  body i n v o l v i n g  a l l  
t he  members o f  SADCC. The mode f o r  t he  c r e a t i o n  and 
o p e r a t i o n  o f  such a j o i n t  v e n t u r e  woul d i n v o l v e  e l a b o r a t e  
and c a r e f u l l y  worked ou t  p r i n c i p l e s  whi ch w i l l  i n  t he 
u l t i m a t e  i n v o l v e  t he  h a r m o n i z a t i o n  o f  t hose  l aws i n  t he  
s u b - r e g i o n  d e a l i n g  w i t h  m i n e r a l  ma r k e t i n g  a r r angement s  as 
we l l  as t he  c o r p o r a t e  l aws .
Wi th t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  such a j o i n t  m a r k e t i n g  c o r p o r a t i o n  
f o r  m i n e r a l s ,  t h e r e  i s  bound t o  be an i n c r e a s e d  scope f o r  
t he  use o f  l ong  t e r m m a r k e t i n g  agreements between t he  
c o r p o r a t i o n  and consumers i n  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s .  Such 
l ong t e r m agreements  c o u l d  s p e c i f y  annual  q u a n t i t i e s  t o  be 
t r a d e d  and t o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  p r i c e s  can be s p e c i f i e d ,  t he  
agreements c o u l d  go a l ong way i n  r e d u c i n g  i n s t a b i l i t y  i n  
t h e  p r i c e s  o f  m i n e r a l s  such as c oppe r .  Long t e r m agreements 
o f  t h i s  n a t u r e  are common on a b i l a t e r a l  b a s i s  between
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f o r e i g n  t r a d e  e n t e r p r i s e s  o f  s o c i a l i s t  c o u n t r i e s  o f  Eas t e r n  
Europe and n a t i o n a l  t r a d i n g  c o r p o r a t i o n s  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  
d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s .
Such l ong t e r m agreements e n t e r e d  i n t o  by a r e g i o n a l  
m a r k e t i n g  c o r p o r a t i o n  such as i s  sugges t ed  f o r  Sout her n  
A f r i c a  woul d go a l ong  way i n  a s s u r i n g  m i n e r a l  e x p o r t i n g  
c o u n t r i e s  i n  t he  r e g i o n ,  such as Zambia,  a p r o f i t a b l e  r e t u r n  
f r om t h e i r  m i n e r a l  e x p o r t s  t han t hey  have had t o  d a t e .
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  mechani sms f o r  t he  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  o f  
p r i c e s  o f  m i n e r a l s  and o t h e r  commod i t i es  have not  been 
e n t i r e l y  s u c c e s s f u l  and need r a d i c a l  changes.  The i n s t r u m e n t s  
o f  t he  f u t u r e  w i l l  depend on t he  w i l l i n g n e s s  and i m a g i n a t i o n  
o f  commodi t y  p r o du c e r s  t o  f o r m u l a t e  p o l i i c e s  j o i n t l y  w i t h  




A b d u l q a w i , Yusu f ,  Legal  aspec t s  o f  t r a d e  p r e f e r e n c e s  f o r  
d e v e l o p i n g  s t a t e s . Ma r t i n u s  N i j h o f f  p u b l i s h e r s ,
The Hague,  1982.
Amacher ,  R . C . ,  H a b e r l e r ,  G, ,  and Wi 1 l e t ,  T.D.  ( e d . )
Cha l l en g es  t o  a l i b e r a l  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  eocnomi c o r d e r . 
Amer i can e n t e r p r i s e  i n s t i t u t e  f o r  p u b l i c  p o l i c y  
r e s e a r c h ,  Washi ngt on D . C. ,  1979.
Angel  opou 1 o s , Angel o T h . ,  For  a new p o l i c y  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
d e v e l o p m e n t . Praeger  p u b l i s h e r s ,  New Yo r k ,  1977.
At imomo,  Emi ko,  Law and d i p l omac y  i n  commodi t y  e c o n o mi c s . 
The Mac Mi l l an  p r ess  L t d . ,  1981.
Ba l d w i n ,  R . E . ,  R i c h a r d s o n ,  J . D.  ( e d i t i o n ) ,  I n t e r n a t i  onal  
t r a d e  and f i n a n c e  r e a d i n g s . L i t t l e ,  Brown and Co. ,  
B o s t o n , 1974.
Banks,  F . E . ,  The w o r l d  copper  m a r k e t . Cambr i dge,  Massachus-  
s e t s , 1974.
B a x t e r ,  T. W. ,  Occas i ona l  papers o f  t he  n a t i o n a l  a r c h i v e s  
o f  Rhodes i a and N y a s a l a n d , No. 1. S a l i s b u r y ,  1963.
Behrman,  J e r e ,  R. ,  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  commodi t y  agreement s :
An e v a l u a t i o n  o f  t he  UNCTAD i n t e g r a t e d  commodi t y  
programme. Overseas deve l opment  c o u n c i l ,  NIE0 
s e r i e s ,  monograph no.  9, Oc t ober  1977.
Bohm, P . ,  P r i c i n g  o f  copper  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e :  A case 
s t u d y  o f  t he  p r i c e  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  p r ob l em.  St ockho l m,
1 968.
Boor ,  G. ,  J u d i c i a l  c o n t r o l  o f  t he  European c o m m u n i t i e s . 
London , 1962.
Bos t ock ,  R.M. and Harvey ,  C. ,  Economic deve l opment  and
Zambian coppe r :  A case s t udy  i n f o r e i g n  i n v e s t m e n t . 
East  A f r i c a n  p u b l i s h i n g  house,  1972.
B r a n d t ,  W. ,  Common c r i s i s .  N o r t h - S o u t h :  C o - o p e r a t i o n  f o r
w o r l d  r e c o v e r y .  Pan books,  London,  1983.
U -
405
Brown,  M. ,  and B u t l e r ,  J . ,  The p r o d u c t i o n ,  m a r k e t i n g  and 
c onsumpt i on  o f  copper  and a l umi n i u m,  1968.
C a l l a g h y ,  T.M.  ( e d . ) ,  South A f r i c a  i n  Sou t he r n  A f r i c a :  
The i n t e n s i f y i n g  v o r t e x  o f  v i o l e n c e . Pr aeger  
p u b l i s h e r s ,  New Yor k ,  1983.
C l a r f i e l d ,  K.W. ,  Jackson,  S . ,  Keef ee ,  J . ,  Nob l e ,  M. A. ,  
and Ryan,  A. P.  ( e d . ) ,  E i g h t  m i n e r a l  c a r t e l s :  The 
new c h a l l e n g e  t o  i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  n a t i o n s .  1975.
C o r b e t ,  Hugh,  Raw m a t e r i a l s :  Beyond t he  r h e t o r i c  o f  
commodi t y  p o we r . Trade and r e s e a r c h  c e n t r e ,  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  i s s ue s  no.  1.
Cor dovez ,  Di ego,  UNCTAD and deve l opment  s t r a t e g y :  f r om
c o n f r o n t a t i o n  t o  s t r a t e g y . P u b l i s h e d  by t he  j o u r n a l  
o f  w o r l d  t r a d e  l aw.
Cuddy,  J . D . A . ,  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  p r i c e  i n d e x a t i o n . D.C.  Heath 
L t d . ,  1976.  London .
Dor ne r ,  P. and Mahmoud, A. E l - S h a f i e  ( e d . ) ,  Resources and
deve l o p men t :  N a t u r a l  r e s o u r c e  p o l i c i e s  and economi c
deve l opment  i n  an i n t e r d e p e n d e n t  w o r l d . U n i v e r s i t y  
o f  Wi sco ns i n  Pr ess ,  1980.
S t o v e r ,  W. A. ,  R e n e g o t i a t i o n s  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  bus i ness  
t r a n s a c t i  o n s , L e x i n g t o n  books,  1981.
Edwards,  A . ,  The p o t e n t i a l  f o r  new commodi t y  c a r t e l s .  
Economic i n t e l l i g e n c e  u n i t ,  London,  1975.
E l i a n  George,  The p r i n c i p l e  o f  s o v e r e i g n t y  ove r  n a t u r a l  
r e s o u r c e s . S i j t h o f f  and N o o r d h a f f ,  1 979.
E l l i o t  C. ( e d . ) ,  C o n s t r a i n t s  on t he  economi c deve l opment  
o f  Zamb i a . Ox f or d  U n i v e r s i t y  p r e s s ,  N a i r o b i ,  1971.
Faber ,  M . L . O . ,  and P o t t e r ,  J . G . ,  Towards economi c i n d e p e n ­
dence:  Papers on t h e  n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  o f  t he  copper  
i n d u s t r y  i n  Zamb i a . Cambr i dge u n i v e r s i t y  p r e s s ,  1971.
F a w c e t t ,  James,  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  economi c c o n f l i c t s ,  Europa 
p u b l i c a t i o n s  L t d . ,  London,  1977.
Fa w c e t t ,  J . E . ,  and P a r r y ,  A . ,  Law and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e s o u r c e  
c o n f 1i c t s .
Mi n i ng
Cl ar endon p r e s s ,  Ox f o r d ,  1981.  
Fox,  W.,  T i n :  The w o r k i n g  o f  a commodi t y  aqreei
Jou r na l  Books,  London,  1974.
406
Fr i edman ,  Wo l f gang ,  The chang i ng  s t r u c t u r e  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
1 aw. London,  1964.
Ghai  Pharma,  T a x a t i o n  f o r  d e v e l o p m e n t . East  A f r i c a n  p u b l i s h ­
i ng  house,  N a i r o b i ,  1970.
G i r  v a n , N. ,  Copper  i n  C h i l e :  A s t u d y  i n  c o n f l i c t  between 
t h e  c o r p o r a t e  and n a t i o n a l  economy. K i n g s t o n ,
Jamai ca ,  1972.
Go l d ,  G e r a l d ,  Modern commodi t y  f u t u r e s  t r a d i n g . 7 th e d i t i o n ,  
Commodi ty r e s e a r c h  i n c o r p o r a t i o n ,  New Yor k ,  1975.
G r e i g ,  D.W. ,  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  l a w , B u t t e r w o r t h s , 1976.
G r e w l i c h ,  K.W. ,  T r a n s n a t i o n a l  e n t e r p r i s e s  i n  a new i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  s y s t e m . S i j h o f f  and N o o r d h o f f ,  N e t h e r l a n d s ,  1980.
H a b e r l e r ,  G o t t f r i e d ,  The t h e o r y  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e .
New Yor k ,  1937.
Ha i l wo o d ,  P . ,  S t a b i l i z a t i o n  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  commodi t y  
m a r k e t s , Jai  p ress  i n c o r p o r a t i o n ,  Gr eenwi ch ,
C o n n e c t i c u t ,  1979.
Hamid,  G.M. ,  The Laqos p l an  o f  a c t i o n  and t he  deve l opment  
o f  m i n e r a l  r e s o u r c e s  i n  A f r i c a .  In CODESRIA ( e d . ) ,
A f r i c a  d e v e l o p m e n t , volume V I I ,  No. 1 / 2 ,  1982.
Hawk i ns ,  P . ,  ( e d . )  Research i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  bu s i n es s  and f i n a n c e , 
volume 1, Jai  Press I n c . ,  Gr eenwi ch ,  C o n n e c t i c u t ,  1979.
,v H e l l e i n e r ,  G . K . ,  ( e d . ) ,  A w o r l d  d i v i d e d :  The l e s s  deve l oped  
c o u n t r i e s  i n  t he  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  economy. Cambr i dge 
U n i v e r s i t y  p r e s s ,  1978.
H e l l e i n e r ,  G . K . ,  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  economi c d i s o r d e r :  essays
i n  n o r t h - s o u t h  r e l a t i o n s . The Ma c Mi l l an  p r ess  L t d . ,  
London,  1980.
Hossa i n ,  K. ( e d . ) ,  Legal  spec t s  o f  t he  new i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
economi c o r d e r . Frances P i n t e r ,  London,  1980.
J a n k o w i t s c h ,  Od e t t e ,  and Sauvan t ,  The w o r l d  w i t h o u t  s u p e r ­
powers :  t h e  c o l l e c t e d  documents o f  t he  n o n - a l i g n e d  
c o u n t r i e s . volume 1, Oceana p u b l i c a t i o n s  i n c o r p o r a t i o n ,
New Yor k ,  1978.
J o h ns t o n ,  C . R . ,  Law and p o l i c y  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  commodi t y  
a g r e e me n t s . Volume 1, 19 76.
Koopmans,  T. ( e d . ) ,  . C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  e q u a l i t y .
A.W. S i j t h o f f - L e d e n  , 1 975.
¥407
Koul  , A . K . ,  The l e g a l  f r amewor k  o f  UNCTAD i n  w o r l d  t r a d e .
A.W. S i j t h o f f ,  Bombay,  1979.
K o u r i , P . J . K . ,  Trade i n  p r i m a r y  c ommod i t i es  and t he  new
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  economi c o r d e r . UNITAS, H e l s i n k i ,  1977.
K r o n s t e i  n , H. ,  The law o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c a r t e l s . C o r n e l l  
U n i v e r s i t y  Pr ess ,  1973.
L a s z l o ,  E r v i n ,  Baker  Ro b e r t ,  E i s e n b e r g ,  E l l i o t ,  and Raman, 
Venkat a ,  The o b j e c t i v e s  o f  t he  new i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
economi c o r d e r . Pergamon p r e s s ,  New Yor k ,  p u b l i s h e d  
f o r  UNITAR, 1979.
Lau r s en ,  K a r s t e n ,  The i n t e g r a t e d  program f o r  c o m m o d i t i e s .
IBRD, Washi ngt on D . C. ,  1977.
Law, D . A . ,  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Commodi ty Agr eement s .  L e x i n g t o n  
books ,  L e x i n g t o n ,  Ma s s a c h u s s e t s , 1975.
L a z a r ,  Leonar d ,  T r a n s m i t t a l  and i n s t r u c t i o n a l  sheet  f o r
t r a n s n a t i o n a l  economi c and monet ar y  l aw t r a n s a c t i o n s  
and c o n t r a c t s . 1977.
Lombard,  C . S . ,  Tweedi e ,  A . H . C . ,  A g r i c u 1t u r e  i n  Zambia,
N a t i o n a l  E d u c a t i o n  Company o f  Zambi a,  1974.
Long,  F r a n k ,  The p o l i t i c a l  economy o f  EEC r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  
A f r i c a n ,  C a r r i b e a n  and P a c i f i c  s t a t e s :  c o n t r i b u t i o n
' ' ' ■  -      - gn ■ ""..n 11 ii
t o  t h e  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  t he  Lome c o n v e n t i o n  on 
N o r t h - S o u t h  r e l a t i o n s . Pergamon p r e s s ,  1980.
L o we n f e l d ,  A . F . ,  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  p r i v a t e  t r a d e . Mathew 
Bender ,  New Yor k ,  1977.
MacAvoy,  P.W. ,  Economic p e r s p e c t i v e  on t h e  p o l i t i c s  o f
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  commodi t y  a g r e e me n t s . The i n s t i t u t e  
o f  government  r e s e a r c h ,  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  A r i z o n a ,  1977.
Ma c Ni c h o l ,  D . L . ,  Commodi ty agreements  and p r i c e  s t a b i l i z a t i o n :
A p o l i c y  a n a l y s i s .  L e x i n g t o n  books ,  Ma s s a c h u s e t t s ,
1 978.
Mahnoush,  H . A . ,  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e g u l a t i o n  o f  i n t e r n a l  r e s o u r c e s :  
A s t u d y  o f  l aw and p o l i c y . U n i v e r s i t y  p r ess  o f  
V i r g i n i a ,  C h a r l o t t e s v i l l e ,  1981.
Meerhaeghe,  M. A . G. ,  Van,  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  economi c i n s t i t u t i o n s . 
2nd e d i t i o n ,  Longmans,  London,  1971.
Me t z g &r  , S . D . ,  Law o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e :  documents and 
r e a d i  n q s . Volume 2 . 1 966 .
408
Met zger  , Dor o t hea ,  Copper  i n  t he  wo r l d  economy. Heinemann,  
London,  1980.
M i k e s e t l ,  Raymond F . ,  Fo r e i g n  i n v e s t me n t  i n  t h e  p e t r o l e u m
and m i n e r a l  i n d u s t r i e s . The John Hopk i ns  Pr ess ,  
b a l t i  mo r e , 1971.
Mi kese l l  , Raymond F . ,  The w o r l d  copper  i n d u s t r y . Pu b l i s h e d  
f o r  r e s o u r c e s  f o r  t he  f u t u r e  by t he  Johns Hopk i ns  
U n i v e r s i t y  p r e s s ,  B a l t i m o r e ,  1979.
M i k d a s h i ,  Zuhay r ,  The i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c s  o f  n a t u r a l  
r e s o u r c e s . C o r n e l l  U n i v e r s i t y  Pr ess ,  I t h a c a ,  New 
Yor k ,  1976.
M o r t n e r ,  Gonzo l a ,  Survey o f  p r o d u c e r s '  a s s o c i a t i o n s  o f
d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s . A Un i t e d  Na t i o n s  a c t i o n  p r o ­
gramme f o r  economi c c o - o p e r a t i o n  r e p o r t .  Georget own,
1 976.
Mor t on ,  Ka t h r y n  and T u l l o c h ,  P e t e r ,  Trade and d e v e l o p i n g  
c o u n t r i e s . Croom Helm,  London,  i n  a s s o c i a t i o n  w i t h  
t h e  ove r seas  deve l opment  i n s t i t u t e ,  1977.
M u t h a r i k a ,  A , P . ,  The i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l aw o f  deve l opmen t :
b a s i c  do c ume n t s . Volumes 1 and 2,  Oceana p u b l i c a t i o n s  
i n c o r p o r a t i o n ,  Dobbs F e r r y ,  New Yor k ,  1978.
Nseke l a ,  A. ( e d . ) ,  Sou t her n  A f r i c a :  Toward economi c l i b e r a ­
t i o n .  Rex C o l l i n g s ,  London,  1981.
Oppenhe i mer , Pe t e r  ( e d . ) ,  I ssues  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  e c o n o mi c s . 
O r i e l  p r ess  L t d . ,  S t o c k s f i e l d ,  Eng l and ,  1980.
01 a i b a , AT. ,  OPEC and t he  p e t r o l e u m i n d u s t r y . Croom Helm, 
London , 1 975 .
Payer ,  C h e r y l ,  Commodi ty t r a d e  o f  t he  t h i r d  w o r l d . MacMi l l an  
p r e s s ,  London,  1975.
Pearce,  D.W. ,  The economi cs o f  n a t u r a l  r e s o u r c e  d e p l e t i o n .  
Ma c Mi l l a n  p r e s s ,  New York ,  1975.
Pos t ,  Mer l e  A l e x a n d e r ,  Deepsea mi n i ng  and t he  l aw o f  t he  sea 
M a r t i n u s  N i j h o f f ,  The Hague,  1983.
P r a i n ,  Ronal d ( S i r ) ,  Copper :  The anatomy o f  an i n d u s t r y . 
M i n i n g  J o u r n a l  books L t d . ,  London,  1975.
409
P r e b i s c h ,  Rau l ,  Towards a g l o b a l  s t r a t e g y  o f  d eve l opmen t .  
Un i t e d  Na t i o n s  p u b l i c a t i o n  No. E . 6 8 . 1 1 . D . 6 .
R a d e t z k i ,  Ma r i a n ,  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  commodi t y  mar ke t  a r r a n g e ­
ments . C. H u r s t ,  London,  1970.
R a d e t z k i ,  M. ,  and Zor n ,  S . ,  F i n a n c i n g  m i n i n g  p r o j e c t s  i n  
d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s . Mi n i ng  J o u r na l  Books L t d . ,  
London,  1979.
Rau g a r a j a n ,  L . N . ,  Commodi ty C o n f l i c t :  The p o l i t i c a l
economy o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  commodi t y  n e g o t i a t i o n s .
Croom Helm,  London,  1978.
Re i dy ,  B . ,  Edwards,  J . ,  and De Keyser ,  E . ,  Gui de t o  w o r l d  
commodi t y  m a r k e t s . Kogan page L t d . ,  London,  1974.
Reubens,  E.P.  ( e d . ) ,  Cha11enge o f  NIEO. West v i ew Press 
I n c .  , USA, 1981.
R i d k e r ,  Ronal d G. ,  Changi ng r e s o u r c e  p r ob l ems o f  t he  f o u r t h  
w o r 1d . Resources f o r  t h e  f u t u r e ,  Wash i ng t on  DC, 
Fe b r u a r y  1976.
R o b e r t s ,  Andrew,  A h i s t o r y  o f  Zamb i a . Hei nemann,  1976.
R o t h s t e i n ,  Rober t  L . ,  Gl oba l  b a r g a i n i n g :  UNCTAD and t he  
q ues t  f o r  a new i n t e r n a t i o n a l  economi c o r d e r . 
P r i n c e t o n ,  New J e r s e y ,  1979.
S c h a c h t e r ,  Oscar ,  Sha r i ng  t h e  w o r l d ' s  r e s o u r c e s . Col umbi a 
U n i v e r s i t y  Pr ess ,  New York ,  1977.
S c h m i t h o f f ,  C.M. ( e d . ) ,  The h a r m o n i s a t i o n  o f  European
company l a w . The UK n a t i o n a l  commi t t ee  o f  c o mp a r a t i v e  
1 aw, London , 1 973.
S c h w a r z e n b e r g e r , G. ,  The dynami cs o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l a w .
1 976.
S c h w a r z e n b e r g e r , G. ,  The f r o n t i e r  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l a w .
1 962 .
Seidman,  A . ,  N a t u r a l  r e s o u r c e s  and n a t i o n a l  w e l f a r e :  t he  
case o f  c o p p e r .  New Yor k ,  1975.
Shaw, C. ( e d . ) ,  Legal  p rob l ems i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e  and 
i n v e s t m e n t , 1 962 .
S i d e r i ,  S. and Johns S. ( e d . ) ,  Mi n i ng  f o r  deve l opmen t  i n  
t he  t h i r d  w o r l d :  m u l t i n a t i o n a l c o r p o r a t i o n s ,  s t a t e  
e n t e r p r i s e  and t he  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  economy.  New York ,  
Pergamon w i t h  i n s t i t u t e  o f  s o c i a l  s t u d i e s  at  t he  
Hague,  1980.
410
Ski  a r  9 R . L . ,  C o r p o r a t e  power i n  an A f r i c a n  s t a t e :  t he
p o l i t i c a l  i mpac t  o f  m u l t i n a t i o n a l  m i n i n g  compani es 
i n Zamb i a . U n i v e r s i t y  o f  C a l i f o r n i a  Pr ess ,  B e r k e l e y ,
1 975 .
Smi t h ,  Davi d N . s and W e l l s ,  Lou i s  T . ,  N e g o t i a t i n g  t h i r d  
w o r l d  m i n e r a l  a g r e e me n t s . B a l l i n g e r ,  Cambr i dge,  
Ma s s a c h u s e t t s ,  1975.
Sohn,  Lou i s  B . ,  Bas i c  documents o f  A f r i c a n  r e g i o n a l  
o r g a n i  z a t i  ons . volume I V,  1 972.
S t e i n e r ,  H. J .  and Vag t s ,  D . F . ,  T r a n s n a t i o n a l  l e g a l  p r o b l e m s . 
The Fou n d a t i o n  Press I n c . ,  M i n e o l a ,  New Yor k ,  1976.
Stoneman,  C o l i n  ( e d . ) ,  Z i mbabwe' s  h e r i t a g e . The Ma cMi l l an  
Press L t d . ,  London,  1981.
To s t e ns e n ,  A . ,  Dependence and c o l l e c t i v e  s e l f - r e l i a n c e  i n 
Sou t he r n  A f r i c a :  The case o f  t h e  Sou t he r n  A f r i c a n  
Devel opment  C o - o r d i n a t i n g  Con f er ence  (SADCC) . 
S c a n d i n a v i a n  i n s t i t u t e  o f  A f r i c a n  s t u d i e s  r e s e a r c h  
r e p o r t  no.  62,  Uppsa l a ,  1982.
V a l e n t i n e ,  D. G. ,  The c o u r t  o f  j u s t i c e  o f  t h e  European 
Communi t i  e s . volume 1, London,  1 965.
Van Themaat ,  V e r l o r e n ,  The chang i ng  s t r u c t u r e  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
economi  c 1 aw. M a r t i n u s  N i j h o f f  p u b l i s h e r s ,  The Hague,
1 982.
Varon,  Bens l on ( e d . ) ,  Ob s t a c l e s  t o  m i n e r a l  dev e l o p men t :  A 
p r a g ma t i c  v i e w . Pergamon Pr ess ,  New Yor k ,  1979.
Von Geusau,  Frans A.M.  A l t i n g  ( e d . ) ,  The Lome Conve n t i o n  and 
a new i n t e r n a t i o n a l  economi c o r d e r .  A.W. S i j t h o f f ,  
Leyden,  1977.
W e i s f e l d e r ,  R i c ha r d  F . ,  The Sou t her n  A f r i c a n  Devel opment
C o - o r d i n a t i o n  Con f e r ence :  A new f a c t o r  i n  t h e  l i b e r a t i o n  
p r o c e s s .  In C a l l a g h y  Thomas M. ,  South A f r i c a  i n  
Sou t he r n  A f r i c a :  The i n t e n s i f y i n g  v o r t e x  o f  v i o l e n c e . 
Praeger  p u b l i s h e r s ,  New York ,  1983.
Weston,  A . ,  Cab l e ,  V i n c e n t ,  and H e w i t t ,  A d r i a n ,  The EEC's
g e n e r a l i s e d  system o f  p r e f e r e n c e s .  Overseas deve l opment  
i n s t i t u t e ,  1980.
Wi d s t r a n d  Car l  ( e d . ) ,  M u l t i n a t i o n a l  f i r m s  i n  A f r i c a .  No r d i s k a  
A f r i k a i n s t i t u t e t , Uppsa l a ,  Sweden,  1 975.
V
411




Ak i n s a n y a ,  A . ,  " Hos t  g o v e r n me n t ' s  r esponses  t o  f o r e i g n
economi c c o n t r o l :  t h e  e x p e r i e n c e s  o f  s e l e c t e d  A f r i c a n  
c o u n t r i e s . "  The i n t e r n a t i o n a l  and c o mp a r a t i v e  l aw 
q u a r t e r l y ,  volume 30,  Oc t ober  1981,  769.
A n g l i n ,  D. G. ,  "Economi c l i b e r a t i o n  and r e g i o n a l  c o - o p e r a t i o n  
i n  Sou t he r n  A f r i c a :  SADCC and PTA. "  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
O r g a n i z a t i o n ,  volume 37,  number 4,  Autumn 1982,  681.
Benedek,  Wo l f gang ,  "The Lome Conven t i on  and t h e  i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  l aw o f  deve l opmen t :  a c o n c r e t i s a t i o n  o f  t he  
NIEO. "  J o u r na l  o f  A f r i c a n  l aw,  S p r i n g  1982,  74.
Cohen,  Benj ami n J . ,  " Ba l ance  o f  payments f i n a n c i n g :  e v o l u t i o n  
o f  a r e g i m e . "  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  O r g a n i z a t i o n ,  volume 36,  
n o . 2,  Sp r i n g  1982.
Cosgr ove,  Caro l  Ann,  "The EEC and i t s  Yaounde a s s o c i a t e s :  
a model  f o r  d e v e l o p me n t . "  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e l a t i o n s ,  
volume I V,  no.  2,  November 1972,  142.
Cosgrove,  Caro l  Ann,  "The Second Yaounde c o n v e n t i o n  i n
p e r s p e c t i v e . "  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  R e l a t i o n s ,  volume I I I ,  
no.  9,  May 1970,  679.
Da l e ,  W i l l i a m  ( S i r ) ,  " I s  t he  Commonweal th an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
o r g a n i z a t i o n ? "  31 I n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o m p a r a t i v e  l aw 
q u a r t e r l y ,  451 .
Dor sey ,  John F . ,  " P r e f e r e n t i a l  t r e a t m e n t :  a new s t a n d a r d  f o r  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  economi c r e l a t i o n s . "  18 Havard i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  l aw j o u r n a l ,  no.  1, Wi n t e r  1977,  109.
F r a n c i s ,  L . B . ,  " P r o d u c e r s '  A s s o c i a t i o n s  i n  r e l a t i o n s  t o  
t h e  new i n t e r n a t i o n a l  economi c o r d e r . "  The i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  and c o mp a r a t i v e  l aw q u a r t e r l y ,  volume 30,  
p a r t  4,  Oc t ober  1981,  745.
F r anck ,  T . M. ,  " S t a n da r d s  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  commodi t y  n e g o t i ­
a t i o n s . "  160 Academie De D r o i t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e c u e i l  
des cour s  I I ,  1978,  403.
F r i edman ,  " A n t i t r u s t  l aw and j o i n t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  bus i ness  
v e n t u r e s  i n  e c o n o m i c a l l y  u n de r deve l oped  c o u n t r i e s . "
60 Col umbi a  l aw r e v i e w ,  1960,  780.
413
Gann, L . H . ,  "The No r t h e r n  Rhodesi a copper  i n d u s t r y  and t he  
w o r l d  c o p pe r :  1 9 2 3 - 5 2 . "  The R h o d e s - L i v i n g s t o n e  
J o u r n a l ,  volume 18,  1975,  5.
Ger ha r d ,  F e l s ,  "The e x p o r t s  o f  t he  d e v e l o p i n g  w o r l d . "  The 
Commonweal th Jo u r na l  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a f f a i r s ,  J u l y  
1973,  305.
Green,  R . H. ,  "Towards Sou t her n  A f r i c a n  R e g i o n a l i s m :  t he
emergence o f  a d i a l o g u e . "  A f r i c a  co n t e mp o r a r y  r e c o r d ,  
1978- 79 ,  A44 .
Gwyer ,  G. D. ,  " Three i n t e r n a t i o n a l  commodi t y  agr eement s :  t he  
e x p e r i e n c e  o f  East  A f r i c a . "  Economic deve l opment  and 
c u l t u r a l  change,  21s t  Oc t ober  1972,  465.
Hexner ,  " I n t e r p r e t a t i o n  by p u b l i c  i n t e r n a t i o n a l
o r g a n i s a t i o n s  o f  t h e i r  b as i c  d ocumen t s . "  73 Amer i can 
J o u r n a l  o f  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Law, 1979,  341.
H u t t o n ,  N. ,  "Sources  o f  s t r a i n  i n  t he  E u r o a f r i c a n  a s s o c i a t i o n . "  
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e l a t i o n s ,  volume I V,  no.  3,  May 1973,
288.
Jaege r ,  W. H. E. ,  " J o i n t  v e n t u r e s :  o r i g i n ,  n a t u r e  and d e v e l o p ­
me n t . "  Amer i can U n i v e r s i t y  Law Rev i ew,  1.
Koch,  , " C a r t e l s  as i n s t r u m e n t s  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  economi c 
o r g a n i z a t i o n s . "  8 Modern Law Revi ew,  1945,  130.
Kopper ,  "The i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e g u l a t i o n  o f  c a r t e l s  -
c u r r e n t  p r o p o s a l s . "  V i r g i n i a  Law Rev i ew,  1954,  
volume 40,  1005.
Krumme, R . D . ,  " I n t e r n a t i o n a l  commodi t y  agr eement s :  pu r pose ,  
p o l i c y ,  and p r o c e d u r e . "  George Wash i ng t on  Law Revi ew,  
v o l .  31,  1962- 63 ,  784.
Mason,  E . ,  "The f u t u r e  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c a r t e l s . "  Fo r e i g n  
A f f a i r s ,  J u l y  1944,  604.
Mar as i n g he ,  M . L . ,  "A r e v i e w  o f  r e g i o n a l  economi c i n t e g r a t i o n  
i n  A f r i c a  w i t h  p a r t i c u l a r  r e f e r e n c e  t o  e q u a t o r i a l  
A f r i c a . "  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  and Compar a t i ve  Law Q u a r t e r l y ,  
v o l .  33,  p a r t  1, Januar y  1984,  39.
McKi nnon,  R . I . ,  " F u t u r e s  ma r k e t s ,  b u f f e r  s t o c k s ,  and i ncome
s t a b i l i t y  f o r  p r i m a r y  p r o d u c e r s . "  J o u r n a l  o f  p o l i t i c a l  
economy,  v o l .  65,  1967,  844.
4 1 4
Mc N i c o l ,  D. ,  “ The two p r i c e  systems i n  t h e  coppe r  i n d u s t r y . "  
B e l l  J ou r n a l  o f  Economi cs ,  v o l .  6,  S p r i n g  1975,  50.
M i n g s t ,  " C o o p e r a t i o n  or  I l l u s i o n :  an e x a m i n a t i o n  o f
t h e  i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l  Counc i l  o f  copper  p r o d u c i n g  
c o u n t r i e s . "  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  O r g a n i z a t i o n ,  v o l .  30,
1975,  275.
Moran,  T . H . ,  " T r a n s n a t i o n a l  s t r a t e g i e s  o f  p r o t e c t i o n  and
de f ense  by m u l t i n a t i o n a l  c o r p o r a t i o n s :  s p r e a d i n g  t he  
r i s k  and r a i s i n g  t h e  c o s t  o f  n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  i n n a t u r a l  
r e s o u r c e s . "  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  O r g a n i z a t i o n ,  v o l .  27,
Spr i  ng 1 973,  273.
Mo r g e n s t e r n ,  F . ,  " L e g a l i t y  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n s . "  
B r i t i s h  Yearbook o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l aw,  1976- 77 ,  256.
Ndu l o ,  M. ,  " Requ i r emen t  o f  domes t i c  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  new 
m i n i n g  v e n t u r e s  i n  Zamb i a . "  Compar a t i ve  and I n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  Law J o u r n a l  o f  South A f r i c a ,  v o l .  10,  1977,
257 .
O ' B r i e n ,  R.C.  and H e l l e i n e r ,  G . K . ,  "The p o l i t i c a l  economy 
o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  i n  a chang i ng  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  economi c 
o r d e r . "  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  O r g a n i z a t i o n ,  v o l .  34,  no.  4,  
Autumn 1980,  445.
O ' Kee f e ,  P . J . ,  "The U n i t e d  Na t i o ns  and permanent  s o v e r e i g n t y  
over  n a t u r a l  r e s o u r c e s . "  J ou r na l  o f  w o r l d  t r a d e  
l aw,  v o l .  8,  no.  3,  May-June 1974.
O l o f i n ,  S . ,  "ECOWAS and t h e  Lome c o n v e n t i o n :  an e x p e r i me n t
i n  comp l ement a r y  or  c o n f l i c t i n g  customs un i on  a r r a n g e ­
me n t . "  J o u r na l  o f  Common mar ket  s t u d i e s ,  v o l .  16,  
1977- 78 ,  53.
P a r k i n s o n ,  F . ,  "The Un i t e d  Na t i o ns  i n t e g r a t e d  programme f o r  
c o m m o d i t i e s . "  C u r r e n t  l e g a l  p r ob l ems ,  1981,  259.
P i n d e r ,  J . ,  "The Communi ty and t he  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s :
a s s o c i a t e s  and o u t s i d e r s . "  Jo u r na l  o f  common mar ke t  
s t u d i  e s , 1 973,  n o . 1, 53.
P o l l a r d ,  D . E . E . ,  " C o n f l i c t  r e s o l u t i o n  i n  P r o d u c e r s '  A s s o c i ­
a t i o n s . "  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  and Compar a t i ve  Law Q u a r t e r l y ,  
volume 31,  1982,  99.
Q u a t t a r a ,  A . D . ,  " Tr ade e f f e c t s  o f  t he  a s s o c i a t i o n  o f  A f r i c a n  
c o u n t r i e s  w i t h  t he  EEC." IMF s t a f f  p a pe r s ,  volume XX, 
1973,  499.
Y415
R o b e r t s ,  A . D . ,  "Not es  t owar ds  a f i n a n c i a l  h i s t o r y  o f  copper  
m i n i n g  i n  No r t h e r n  R h o d e s i a . "  Canadi an J ou r na l  o f  
A f r i c a n  S t u d i e s ,  v o l .  16,  no.  2,  1982,  347.
Rock,  C . A . ,  " R e g u l a t o r y  c o n t r o l  over  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  
Canad i an ,  and U n i t e d  Kingdom f u t u r e s  m a r k e t s . "
Bus i ness  Lawyer ,  Januar y  1982,  v o l .  37,  no.  2, 613.
Romni c i anu ,  M. ,  "Management  agr eement s :  are t h e y  r e a l l y  
n e c es s a r y ? "  E n t e r p r i s e ,  t he  INDECO J o u r n a l ,  1s t  
Q u a r t e r ,  1972,  8.
S a b r i ,  A . I . ,  "The i nadequacy  and l o s s  o f  l e g i t i m a c y  o f  t he  
I MF. "  Devel opment  d i a l o g u e ,  number 2,  1980,  25.
Sc h a c h t e r ,  0 . ,  " J u s t  p r i c e s  i n  w o r l d  ma r k e t s :  p r o p o s a l s  
de l ege  f e r e n d a . "  69 Amer i can J o u r n a l  o f  I n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  Law, 1975,  101.
S c h w a r z e n b e r g e r , G. ,  "The p r i n c i p l e s  and s t a n d a r d s  o f  i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  economi c l a w . "  Hague Academy o f  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
Law, R e c u e i l ,  v o l .  117,  1966.
Sei dman,  A . ,  " P r o s p e c t s  f o r  A f r i c a ' s  e x p o r t s . "  Jou r na l  o f  
modern A f r i c a n  s t u d i e s ,  1971,  9.
S l i n n ,  P . E . ,  "The Sou t he r n  A f r i c a n  Devel opment  C o - o r d i n a t i o n  
C o n f e r e n c e . "  The Yearbook o f  w o r l d  a f f a i r s ,  1984,
183.
St e v e n s ,  C . ,  "The EEC and A f r i c a :  t he  end o f  a phase . "
A f r i c a  c o n t e mpo r a r y  r e c o r d ,  v o l .  XIV,  1981- 82 ,  
p.  A120.
U s t o r ,  E . ,  "The most  f a v o u r e d  n a t i o n  customs un i on  e x c e p t i o n . "  
J o u r n a l  o f  w o r l d  t r a d e  l aw,  v o l .  15,  377.
Wa l ke r ,  H. ,  "The 1n t e r n a t i o n a l  l aw o f  commodi t y  a g r e e me n t s . "  
Law and c o n t e mpo r a r y  p r ob l ems ,  v o l .  28,  Sp r i n g  1963,
392.
Wassermann,  U. ,  " I n t e r n a t i o n a l  cocoa agreement  1980 . "
J o u r na l  o f  w o r l d  t r a d e  l aw,  v o l .  15,  1981,  149.
Wassermann,  U. ,  "UNCTAD: The Common Fund , "  J o u r n a l  o f  
w o r l d  t r a d e  l aw,  v o l .  13,  J u l y - A u g u s t  1979,  355.
Wassermann,  U. ,  "Commodi t i es  i n  UNCTAD: P r e l i m i n a r y  meet i ngs  
on c o p p e r . "  J o u r na l  o f  w o r l d  t r a d e  l aw,  v o l .  11,
1977,  92.
5416
X (Anonymous) ,  " Th r ee  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  commodi t y  a g r e e me n t s . "  
B r i t i s h  Yearbook o f  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Law, v o l .  XXXV,
1959,  244.
Yusu f ,  A . A . ,  " D i f f e r e n t i a l  and more f a v o u r a b l e  t r e a t m e n t :  
t h e  GATT e n a b l i n g  c l a u s e . "  Jo u r na l  o f  w o r l d  t r a d e  
l aw,  v o l .  14,  1980,  488.
O f f i c i a l  p u b l i c a t i o n s  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n s
CIPEC S e c r e t a r i a t ,  Repor t  o f  t he  E x e c u t i v e  D i r e c t o r s  on
t h e  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  CIPEC, 1970,  CIPEC Document  CO/ 97/ 71.
Jean d ' H a i n a u t ,  A b r i e f  g l i mp s e  o f  CIPEC. CIPEC Document  
I n f o . / 251 / 7  9,  March 1 979.
ACP-EEC Counc i l  o f  M i n i s t e r s ,  The Second ACP-EEC Co n v e n t i o n ,  
s i gn e d  at  Lome o f  31s t  Oc t ober  1979.  B r u s s e l s ,  1981 
e d i t i o n .
EC Commi ssi on i n f o r m a t i o n  d i r e c t o r a t e  g e n e r a l ,  The Lome 
c o n v e n t i o n  - t he  s t a b i l i s a t i o n  o f  e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s .
Doc.  9 5 / 7 5 - 2 0 2 / X / 7 5 - E .
EC Commi ss i on,  Lome Co n v e n t i o n :  D e c i s i o n  on STABEX t r a n s f e r s  
f o r  1976.  J u l y  1977.
Un i t e d  Na t i o n s  depa r t me n t  o f  p u b l i c  i n f o r m a t i o n ,  Towards a 
w o r l d  economy t h a t  wo r k s ,  1980.
UN General  Assembl y ,  D e c l a r a t i o n  on t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  a 
new i n t e r n a t i o n a l  economi c o r d e r  and programme o f  
a c t i o n .  UN Doc.  A/ 9556 .
UNCTAD Trade and Devel opment  Board,  Repor t  o f  t he  i n t e r g o v e r n ­
ment a l  g roup o f  e x p e r t s  on c oppe r .  Doc.  TD/B/1 PC/COPPER/ 
AC/1 .
UNCTAD Trade and Devel opment  Board,  An i n t e g r a t e d  programme 
f o r  c o mmo d i t i e s .  Repor t  by t he  UNCTAD S e c r e t a r i a t .
Doc.  T D / B / C . 1 / 194 .
UNCTAD Trade and Devel opment  Board,  I n t e g r a t e d  programme 
f o r  c o mmo d i t i e s :  r e p o r t  by t he  S e c r e t a r y  General  o f  
UNCTAD. Doc.  TD / B / C . 1 / I  66,  December 9,  1 974.
UNCTAD Trade and Devel opment  Board,  I n t e g r a t e d  programme f o r  
c o mmo d i t i e s :  r e p o r t  o f  t h e  second i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l  
g roup o f  e x p e r t s  on c oppe r .  Docs.  TD/B/ IPC/COPPER/17 
and TD/ B/ I PC/ COPPER/ AC. 2 / 2 ,  25 June - 6 t h  J u l y  1979.
417
UNCTAD Trade and Devel opment  Board,  The b a s i c  e l emen t s  o f  
an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  copper  agreement .  Doc.  TD/ B / I PC/  
COPPER/13.
UNCTAD Trade and Devel opment  Board,  Framework agreement  f o r
t h e  Common Fund.  Doc.  TD/ IPC/CONF. / 1 9 ,  21s t  March 1979.
UNCTAD Trade and Devel opment  Board,  Repor t  o f  t h e  f i r s t
p r e p a r a t o r y  mee t i ng  on c o p pe r .  Doc.  TD/ B/ I PC/ COPPER/ 1.
UNCTAD Trade and Devel opment  Board,  Repor t  o f  t h e  c o n s u l ­
t a t i o n s  on c op pe r .  Doc.  T D/ B / C .1 / 2 0 3 .
U n i t e d  Na t i o n s  Cen t r e  on T r a n s n a t i o n a l  C o r p o r a t i o n s ,  T r a n s ­
n a t i o n a l  C o r p o r a t i o n s  i n  t he  copper  i n d u s t r y .  New 
York 1981,  Doc.  ST/ CTC/ 21 .
Metal  M a r k e t i n g  c o r p o r a t i o n  o f  Zambia L t d . ,  Annual  Repor t  
1 980.
CIPEC S e c r e t a r i a t ,  CIPEC Q u a r t e r l y  Revi ew,  t e n t h  a n n i v e r s a r y  
i s s u e , 1s t  June 1 977.
UNCTAD Trade and Devel opment  Board,  Common Fund:  F i n a n c i a l  
r e q u i r e m e n t s ;  not e  by t h e  UNCTAD S e c r e t a r i a t ,  Doc.  
T D / B / I P C / C F / L . 2 ,  29t h  December 1976.
Un i t e d  Na t i o n s  S e c r e t a r i a t ,  UN i n f o r m a t i o n  no t e  on j o i n t  
v e n t u r e s .  UN Document  A / C o n f . 6 2 / C . 1 / L . 19 ,  18th May 
1 977 .
